

"CLASS STRUGGLES IN CHINA"

A MARXIST-LENINIST ANALYSIS OF MAO-TSE TUNG, BY W.B.BLAND.

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FOREWORD

Nearly thirty years ago, in January 1968, the '**Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain**', the predecessor of the '**Communist League**', published a report on 'The Situation in the People's Republic of China'.

The main features of the report were its characterisation of the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' as counter-revolutionary, and 'The Thought of Mao Tse-tung' as reactionary and revisionist.

While the 'Communist League' fully endorses these main features of the MLOB report, further research makes it clear that the class situation in post-1949 China was more complex than was envisaged by the MLOB.

In fact, the following social classes were operating in the People's Republic of China in the period concerned, each striving to mould China along lines which would serve its interests, and each represented by a grouping within the Communist Party.

1) The working class, represented by a Marxist-Leninist grouping within the Communist Party headed by **Kao Kang**;

2) The national bourgeoisie, a section of the bourgeoisie engaged primarily in manufacturing and oppressed by imperialism, represented by a revisionist grouping within the Communist Party headed by **Liu Shao-chi**;

3) The comprador bourgeoisie, a section of the bourgeoisie engaged primarily in foreign trade and dependent upon imperialism, represented by a revisionist grouping within the Communist Party headed by **Mao Tse-tung** and **Lin Piao**.

Some time after the 'Cultural Revolution', the interests of that section of the comprador bourgeoisie dependent upon United States imperialism diverged from the interests of that section dependent upon Soviet imperialism (i.e. the Soviet Union after the restoration of capitalism there following the death of Stalin).

As a result, Class 3 above split into:

3a) The pro-US comprador bourgeoisie, headed by Mao Tse-tung;

and

3b) the pro-Soviet comprador bourgeoisie, headed by Lin Piao.

'CLASS STRUGGLES IN CHINA' shows how this class analysis makes sense of such otherwise inexplicable phenomena as the 'Kao Kang Affair', the 'Hundred Flowers Affair', the 'Great Leap Forward', the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution', the death of Lin Piao in an air crash while defecting to the Soviet Union, and the post-Mao economic reforms

TRANSLITERATION NOTE

In June 1979 the Chinese authorities introduced a new system (known as **Pinjin**) of transliterating Chinese characters into English, replacing the system -- known as the **Wade-Giles** system, after its English Creator Thomas F. Wade (1818-95) and its English modifier Herbert A. Giles (1845-1935).

In this book, the Wade-Giles system -- which is more familiar to English speakers -- is used throughout, with the exception that in the bibliographies the name and title used in the original work is given, followed, where either of these are in Pinjin, by the Wade-Giles version in brackets.

CLASS STRUGGLES

IN CHINA

INTRODUCTION

THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN COLONIAL-TYPE COUNTRIES

THE AIM OF MARXIST-LENINISTS IS TO LEAD THE WORKING CLASS IN EACH COUNTRY TO ACCOMPLISH SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS WHICH WILL ESTABLISH SOCIALIST, AND ULTIMATELY COMMUNIST, SOCIETIES.

The revolutionary process will differ somewhat in different countries according to the specific conditions existing:

"The nationally peculiar and nationally specific features in each separate country must unfailingly be taken into account . . . when drawing up guiding directives for the working class movement of the country concerned".

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Notes on Contemporary Themes' (July 1927), in: 'Works', Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 337).

Thus, the revolutionary process in developed capitalist countries will differ from that in colonial-type countries, that is, relatively undeveloped countries which are dominated by one or another Great Power, which is today usually an imperialist (i.e., monopoly capitalist) country.

A revolution in a colonial-type country which brings about the national liberation of that country is termed a national-democratic revolution. A revolution in any country which brings about the political power of the working class is termed a socialist revolution.

The Role of the National Bourgeoisie

A key feature of the class structure of a colonial-type country is that the native capitalist class -- where this exists -- consists of two parts:

Firstly, the comprador capitalist class or comprador bourgeoisie, which has close ties with the landlord class and whose exploitation is based primarily upon foreign trade, making them, like the landlord class, dependent upon the dominating Great Power, and

Secondly, the national capitalist class or national bourgeoisie, whose exploitation is based primarily upon the ownership of industrial or commercial enterprises and whose economic advancement is held back by the dominating Great Power.

Stalin pointed out in May 1925 to the students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East that the native bourgeoisie in some colonial-type countries

"Is splitting up into two parts, a revolutionary part (the national bourgeoisie -- Ed.) . . . and a compromising part (the comprador bourgeoisie -- Ed.) . . . of which the first is continuing the revolutionary struggle, whereas the second is entering into a

bloc with imperialism".

(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East' (May 1925), in: 'Works, Volume 7; Moscow; 1954; p. 147).

In other words, the national bourgeoisie of a colonial-type country is a class objectively **in favour** of the national-democratic revolution, but objectively **opposed** to the socialist revolution.

It follows that the class forces which are objectively in favour of the national-democratic revolution are **wider and stronger** than the class forces which are objectively in favour of the socialist revolution.

The Marxist-Leninist strategy for the revolutionary process in a colonial-type country must be based on striving to mobilise the maximum objectively possible forces for both the national-democratic and the socialist revolutions:

"The Communist Party of each country must unfailingly avail itself of even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally for the proletariat, even if a temporary, vacillating unstable and unreliable ally".

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Notes on Contemporary Themes' (July 1927), in: 'Works', Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 337).

Thus, the Marxist-Leninist strategy of the revolutionary process in colonial-type countries is to strive to carry through the process in **two stages**: firstly, the stage of national-democratic revolution and, secondly, the stage of socialist revolution. In the first stage, Marxist-Leninists should strive **to ally themselves with the national bourgeoisie**, to the extent that this class remains genuinely revolutionary:

"Temporary cooperation is permissible, and in certain circumstances even a temporary alliance, between the Communist Party and the national-revolutionary movement, provided that the latter is a genuine revolutionary movement, that it genuinely struggles against the ruling power, and that its representatives do not hamper the Communists in their work".

(6th Congress, Communist International: Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-colonial Countries (September 1928), in:

Jane Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents Volume 2; London; 1971; p. 542).

Such co-operation, such an alliance, is **temporary** because the aim of the Marxist-Leninists is to win for the working class the leading role in the revolutionary process in order to carry this through, with the minimum possible interruption, to the **socialist revolution**. This leadership can only be won in struggle with the national bourgeoisie:

"The proletariat pushes aside the national bourgeoisie, consolidates its hegemony and assumes the lead of the vast masses of the working people in town and country, in order to overcome the resistance of the national bourgeoisie, secure the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and then

gradually convert it into a socialist revolution."

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Questions of the Chinese Revolution' (April 1927), in: 'Works', Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 225).

When it becomes clear that the working class is winning the leadership of the national-democratic revolution, and so is attaining a position to transform the revolution into a socialist revolution, then **the national bourgeoisie will inevitably desert the revolution and go over to the counterrevolution**, preferring the retention of limited exploitation under colonial-type domination to the ending of exploitation under socialism. This is what occurred in China in the coup of CHIANG Kai-shek* in April 1927:

"In the first period of the Chinese revolution, . . . the national bourgeoisie (not the compradors) sided with the revolution. . .

Chiang Kai-shek's coup marks the desertion of the national bourgeoisie from the revolution".

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Questions of the Chinese Revolution' (April 1927), in: 'Works' Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 226, 229).

CHAPTER ONE **THE NATIONAL ANTI-JAPANESE FRONT IN CHINA** **(1935-45)**

The Advent of Chinese Revisionism (January-December 1935)

In January 1935, at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China held during the famous 'Long March' at Tsunyi in Kweichow Province,

"A new Central Committee headed by Comrade MAO Tse-tung*"

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 155).

was established.

The change of leadership was quickly followed by **a change of policy**.

In a report to a conference of Party activists held at Wayaopao in Northern Shensi in December 1935, Mao Tse-tung declared that the political situation in China had now **fundamentally changed**:

"A great change has now taken place in the political situation".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism';

(December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 153).

This new situation, asserted Mao, was that instead of a number of imperialist powers

sharing in the domination of semi-colonial China, the armed forces of **one** imperialist power -- Japan -- was now **aiming to occupy all China and to transform it into a Japanese colony:**

"Today . . . the Japanese imperialists . . . want to convert the whole of China from a semi-colony shared by several imperialist powers into a colony monopolised by Japan".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 154).

and in this new situation **it was possible to win back the national bourgeoisie to the anti-imperialist struggle:**

"It is now possible . . . for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese struggle".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 168).

"The task of the proletariat is to form a united front with the national bourgeoisie against imperialism and the bureaucrat and warlord governments, without overlooking its revolutionary quality".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On New Democracy' (January 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 348-49).

Mao Tse-tung held that this united front against Japanese imperialism should include not merely the urban national bourgeoisie, but also the **rural** national bourgeoisie, the **rich peasants:**

"The rich peasants . . . might make some contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle of the peasant masses."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' (December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 323).

Furthermore, in this new situation - according to Mao Tse-tung -- it was possible to win to the anti-Japanese united front **the anti-Japanese** (i.e., pro-American and pro-British) **sections of the landlord class and comprador bourgeoisie.** The anti-Japanese sections of the landlord class were called by the Communist Party of China at this period the **'enlightened gentry'**.

"China is a semi-colonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending. When the struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, then the running dogs of the United States or Britain, obeying the varying tones of their masters' commands, may engage in veiled or even open strife with the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs. . . . We must turn to good account all such fights, rifts and contradictions in the enemy camp and turn them against our present main enemy."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 158-59).

"Different groups within this big bourgeoisie are backed by different imperialist powers, so that when contradictions among these powers becomes sharper and when the edge of the revolution is mainly directed against a particular power, the big bourgeois groups dependent upon the other powers may join the struggle against that particular imperialist power to a certain extent and for a certain time. . . The Chinese proletariat may form a united front with these groups and should maintain it as far as possible".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Introducing "The Communist"' (October 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 289).

"A good many of the enlightened gentry who are middle and small landlords and who have some capitalist colouration display some enthusiasm for the war, and we should unite with them in the common fight against Japan. .

Different sections of the comprador big bourgeoisie owe allegiance to different imperialist powers, so that when the contradictions among the latter become very acute and the revolution is directed mainly against one particular imperialist power, it becomes possible for the sections of the comprador class which serve other imperialist groupings to join the current anti-imperialist front to a certain extent and for a certain period".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' (December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 319-20).

"The enlightened gentry . . . are the left-wing of the landlord class. It is possible for . . . the enlightened gentry to join us in the common fight against Japan".

(Mao Tse-tung: "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front" (March 1940), in: 'Selected Works"', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 423, 424).

In other words, Mao Tse-tung called for the formation of [a national united front against Japanese imperialism:](#)

"The task of the Party is to form a revolutionary national united front."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 161).

"The Wayaopao meeting . . . decided on the tactics of a national united front".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 153).

[The Revisionist Character of Mao's 'National United Front' Policy](#)

But the question of whether China was dominated by a number of imperialist powers or by one had nothing whatever to do with such questions as the attitude of the national bourgeoisie to the struggle against imperialism. The national bourgeoisie had deserted the revolution [because they felt that their own position as an exploiting class was threatened by a continuation of the revolutionary process.](#)

In other words, the new line being put forward by Mao Tse-tung was a [deviation from](#)

Marxist-Leninist principles.

When someone claiming to be a Marxist-Leninist puts forward a policy which deviates from Marxist-Leninist principles, Marxist-Leninists call such a policy 'revisionist'.

MAO TSE-TUNG WAS, FROM 1935 TO HIS DEATH IN 1976, THE MOST PROMINENT FIGURE IN CHINESE REVISIONISM.

To secure a national united front against Japanese imperialism, THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS HAD TO CONVINCe THE EXPLOITING CLASSES WHICH THEY WISHED

TO RECRUIT TO THE FRONT THAT THEIR POSITION, AS EXPLOITERS WOULD BE SECURE IF THEY SO PARTICIPATED.

They attempted to do this in several ways.

For example:

Firstly, in February 1937 the Communist Party offered, if the Kuomintang would agree to participate in a National United Front, to place the Red Army and the Liberated Areas under the control of the Kuomintang government. In these circumstances:

"The workers' and peasants' democratic government . . . and the Red Army . . . will come under the direction of the Central Government in Nanking and its Military Council respectively".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 281).

Secondly, it replaced the policy of confiscation of the landlords' land by one of ('not too great') reductions in rent and interest:

"After 1936, in order to facilitate the formation of a broad anti-Japanese national united front, the Chinese Communist Party changed its policy for the country as a whole (from one of confiscating the landlords' land -- Ed.) to one of reduction of rent and interest

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 77).

"This is not the time for a thoroughgoing agrarian revolution. . . Our present policy should stipulate that landlords shall reduce rent and interest . . . but the reductions should not be too great".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 446).

"The government's policy should be one of enforcing the decree on rent reduction and adjusting the relative interests of the landlords and the tenants."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Spread the Campaign to Reduce Rent . . .' (October 1943), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; 1965; p. 131).

"The Communist Party has made a major concession in the anti-Japanese war period by changing the policy of land to the tiller to one of reducing rent and interest".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 298).

Thirdly, in putting forward a programme of '**new democracy**' for the liberated areas, the Party assured anti-Japanese national capitalists that in these areas they would be encouraged **to make profits and develop their enterprises**:

"The people's republic will not expropriate private property other than imperialist and feudal private property, and so far from confiscating the national bourgeoisie's industrial and commercial enterprises, it will encourage their development. We shall protect every national capitalist who does not support the imperialists or the Chinese traitors. . . . The labour laws of the people's republic . . . will not prevent the national bourgeoisie from making profits or developing their industrial and commercial enterprises."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 169).

"The new-democratic revolution . . . differs from a socialist revolution in that it . . . does not destroy any section of capitalism which is capable of contributing to the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' (December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 327).

"Capitalists should be encouraged to come into our anti-Japanese base areas and start enterprises here. . . Private enterprise should be encouraged".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 447).

"The sector of non-monopoly capitalism in our economy should be given the opportunity to develop".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Postscript to "Rural Surveys"' (April 1941), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 15).

"Some people suspect that the Chinese Communists are opposed to . . the growth of private capital and the protection of private property, but they are mistaken. . . . It is the very task of the New Democracy we advocate to guarantee that the people can develop freely such private capitalist economy as will benefit and not 'dominate the livelihood of the people', and to protect all appropriate forms of private property.

It is not domestic capitalism but foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism which are superfluous in China today; indeed, we have too little of capitalism. . . Under the state system of New Democracy in China it will be necessary in the interests of social progress to facilitate the development of the private capitalist sector of the economy (provided it does not dominate the livelihood of the people)".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 281, 283).

Fourthly, it assured capitalists that the new democratic state would protect them against labour indiscipline, as well as against demands for excessive wage increases or excessive' reductions in working hours:

"There must not be excessive increases in wages or excessive reductions in working hours. . . . The workers must observe labour discipline".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 445).

Fifthly, it promised anti-Japanese landlords, comprador capitalists and national capitalists, through 'New Democracy', **a share in the administration of liberated areas:**

"Our government . . . must be so transformed as to include also the members of all other classes who are willing to take part in the national revolution.

Our government represents . . . the whole nation".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 165, 168).

"The new-democratic republic . . . will consist of . . . all those in the country who agree with the national and democratic revolution; it will be the alliance of these classes in the national and democratic revolution".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan' (May 1938), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 271).

"New-democratic constitutional government . . . is the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'New-democratic Constitutional Government' (February 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 409).

"Concerning the organs of political power, the allocation of places should be one-third for Communists, one-third for non-Party left progressives, and one-third for the intermediate sections who are neither left nor right. . . .

Our aim in allocating one-third of the places to the intermediate sections is to win over the middle bourgeoisie (the national bourgeoisie -- Ed.) and the enlightened gentry".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas' (March 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 418).

"The 'three-thirds system', under which the Communists have only one-third of the places in the organs of political power . . ., must be carried out resolutely".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 445).

"We propose the establishment, after the thorough defeat of the Japanese aggressors, of a state system which we call New Democracy. It is this kind of state system that truly meets the demands . . . of the . . . national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and other patriots".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 279).

Sixthly, it presented the transition from the national-democratic to the socialist revolution as **a long-term process, taking several decades:**

"In the future the democratic revolution will undoubtedly be transformed into a socialist revolution. . . . It may take quite a long time. . . It is wrong to . . . expect the transition to take place soon."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 144).

"The Chinese revolution cannot avoid taking the two steps, first of New Democracy, and then of socialism. Moreover, the first step will need quite a long time".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On New Democracy' (January 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 358).

"A new democratic state based on an alliance of the democratic classes is different in principle from a socialist state under the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . For a long time to come there will exist a special form of state and political power, a form that is distinguished from the Russian system, . . . namely, the new democratic form of state and political power based on the alliance of the democratic classes. Our general programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged . for several decades".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 284, 285).

In other words, it was implied that the transition to a socialist revolution was not something which should follow the democratic stage of the revolution with the minimum possible interruption, but **a distant prospect:**

"Needless to say, private enterprise . . . will inevitably continue to occupy a dominant position for a considerable time".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Our Economic Policy' (January 1934), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 144).

"In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution. . . . It may take quite a long time. . . . It is wrong to . . . expect the transition to take place soon".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 170).

"For a long time to come there will exist a special form of state and political power, a form that is distinguished from the Russian system but is perfectly necessary and reasonable for us, namely, the new-democratic form of state. . . . Our general programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged . . . for several decades".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; op. cit.; p. 285).

But according to Marxist-Leninist principles, if the Communist Party has won the leadership of the revolutionary process, the democratic revolution should be transformed into the socialist revolution **without interruption**:

"From the democratic revolution we shall at once, according to the degree of our strength , . . , begin to pass over to the socialist revolution. We stand for continuous revolution. We shall not stop half way".

(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Attitude of Social-Democracy toward the Peasant Movement' (September 1905), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; London; 1946; p. 145).

"To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese wall between the first and second revolutions, to separate them by anything else than the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of unity with the poor peasants, is monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarise it, to put liberalism in its place".

(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky' (November 1918), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 7; London; 1946; p. 191).

"Lenin himself maintained the point of view of uninterrupted revolution".

(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Foundations of Leninism' (April/May 1924), in: 'Works', Volume 6; Moscow; 1953; p. 107).

The Changed Character of the Kuomintang

By the late 1930s, the class character of the Chinese nationalist party, **the Kuomintang**, had changed. It had ceased to represent primarily the interests of the national bourgeoisie, as it had earlier, and had come to represent primarily the interests of the most reactionary section of the landlord class:

"At the extreme right (of the Kuomintang -- Ed.) was the CC clique headed by CHEN Li-Fu* and his brother CHEN Kuo-fu*, traditionalists and zealous anti-Communists who represented the landlord interest. They stood closest to the Generalissimo (Chiang Kai-shek -- Ed.), controlled appointments and promotions, and held the largest block of votes in the Central Executive Committee. . . . Chen Li-fu was considered the Party boss. .

By the 1930s the once revolutionary Kuomintang had lost most of its idealism and had shifted to the right. . . . The loss of the large eastern cities reduced the wealth and power of its businessmen and Westernised components, leaving it more

dependent on landlords, which tended to transform it into a landlord party".
(Wesley H. Bagby: 'The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: America's Relations with
China in World War II'; Newark (USA); 1992; p. 46, 47).

[The Kuomintang Attitude to Japanese Aggression](#)

The initial attitude of the Kuomintang to Japanese aggression against China:

"Was to trade space for time for survival until Japan, in its imperial advance,
might collide with another Great Power ('Collier's Encyclopedia', Volume 6; New
York; 1994; p. 328).

[The Sian Incident \(December 1936\)](#)

In December 1936, troops of CHANG Hsueh-liang*, the warlord known as 'the Young
Marshal', having been ousted from their Manchurian base by Japanese forces, arrested
Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang President of the Republic of China, at Sian and
presented him with demands for the formation of a united front against Japan.
(Hugh B. O'Neill: 'Companion to Chinese History'; New York; 1987; p. 287).

Although:

"Chiang accepted the demands",
(Hugh B. O'Neill: *ibid.*; p. 287).

He failed to keep the agreement.

[The Lukouchiao Incident \(July 1937\)](#)

In July 1937:

"The Japanese invading forces attacked the Chinese garrison at Lukouchiao, some
10 kilometres south-west of Peking".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 21).

The incident fostered an:

"Ardent nation-wide anti-Japanese movement".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 21).

and this situation forced a change in the public policy of the Kuomintang. It

"Compelled the Chinese authorities to begin changing their policy of non-
resistance, as pursued ever since . . . 1931".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'For the Mobilisation of all the Nation's Forces for Victory in the
War of Resistance' (August 1937), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965;
p. 23).

[The Chinese War of Resistance against Japan \(1937-38\)](#)

The Lukouchiao Incident:

"Marked the beginning of the Chinese people's heroic War of Resistance against Japan which lasted for eight years".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 21).

In July 1937, Chiang Kai-shek issued a:

"Statement recognising the legal status of the Communist Party of China".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Urgent Tasks following the Establishment of Kuomintang Communist Cooperation' (September 1937), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 37).

and agreeing to the formation of a:

"United front of the two parties".

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 39).

But the change in the Kuomintang's policy towards Japanese imperialism and to the Communist Party was only a nominal one. In fact:

"The Chiang Kai-shek government continued to parley with the Japanese aggressors and even accepted the so-called peaceful settlement they concluded with local authorities. .

Chiang never ceased his clandestine attempts to make peace with Japan."

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 13, 14).

and continued to pursue:

"The reactionary policy of passively resisting Japan but actively opposing the Communist Party".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 14).

It was not until August 1937:

"When the Japanese aggressors launched a major attack on Shanghai and thus made it impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to maintain his rule in south-eastern China, that he was compelled to embark on armed resistance."

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 13-14).

After taking Peking and Tientsin in July 1937, in November 1937, the Japanese invaders captured Shanghai, and the Chinese capital was moved from Nanking to Chungking. In December Japanese forces took Nanking and Hangchow, and in October 1938 Canton and Hankow. (William L. Langer (Ed.): 'An Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval and Modern: Chronologically Arranged'; London; 1972; p. 1,110).

By the end of 1938:

"Japanese armies controlled North and Central China, the main coastal cities, and modern lines of communication."

('Encyclopedia Americana', Volume 6; Danbury (USA); 1992; p. 543).

[The Outbreak of the Second World War \(September 1939\)](#)

On 1 September 1939:

"Germany attacked Poland. Britain and France replied to this by declaring war on Germany in September 3".

('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 22).

In March 1940, the Japanese occupation forces established:

"A puppet government under WANG Ching-wei* at Nanking".

(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.;p. 1,152).

The military policy of the Chinese Communist forces was based on establishing [base areas of resistance](#), and:

"By the end of 1940, such 'resistance bases' were found across the whole of occupied China's."

(Henry McAleavy: 'The Modern History of China'; London; 1967; p. 305).

[The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact \(April 1941\)](#)

In April 1941, the Soviet Union and Japan concluded a Neutrality Pact, which:

"Ensured peace on the eastern border of the Soviet Union, thus crushing the plot for a joint German, Italian and Japanese attack on the Soviet Union".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 468).

[The Entry of the Soviet Union into the World War \(June 1941\)](#)

On 22 June 1941:

"German forces invaded the Soviet Union without declaring war".

('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 49).

However, because of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the Soviet Union did not immediately become the ally of China.

[The Breach of the CPC-Kuomintang United Front \(1939-41\)](#)

In fact, the united front between the Kuomintang and the CPC:

"Did not last much beyond 1938".

('Encyclopedia Americana', Volume 6; Danbury (USA); 1992; p. 544).

For, in spite of it, in 1939-41 Kuomintang forces launched two surprise attacks upon Communist armies:

"In the first campaign, from the winter of 1939 to the spring of 1940, the Kuomintang troops in their surprise attacks captured five county towns garrisoned

by the 8th Route Army in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. . . . The second campaign was launched in January 1941. . .

The Kuomintang troops in southern Anhwei actually did catch these New Fourth Army units in a dragnet."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'A Comment on the Sessions of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and of the People's Political Council' (October 1943), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1956; p. 146).

It was not until May 1941 that Mao Tse-tung was able to report that:

"The second anti-Communist onslaught has come to an end".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught' (May 1941), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 463).

[The Entry of the USA into the Second World War \(December 1941\)](#)

In December 1941:

"Japanese sea and air forces launched a surprise attack on the United States base at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii".

(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,153).

[bringing the USA into the Second World War.](#)

[The Division within US Imperialism](#)

Although the USA and China were allies in 1941-45, the US imperialists were not united in regard to the strategy which should be adopted towards China.

[One section](#) of the US imperialists, consisting primarily of those elements **without** special economic connections with China, regarded the [speediest possible defeat of Japan as their first priority](#). This strategy required:

- 1) the modernisation and democratisation of the Kuomintang armed forces to transform it into an efficient fighting force;
- 2) the broadest possible national front of all social forces in China opposed to Japanese imperialism, including the Communist Party of China and its armed forces;
- 3) the maximum possible US aid to these forces.

The rival section of US imperialists, consisting primarily of those elements with special economic connections **with** China, regarded the Pacific theatre-of-war as of secondary importance and held that [no strategy should be adopted in relation to that theatre which might jeopardise America's post-war imperialist interests in the region](#), even if this should prolong the war. This strategy required:

- 1) recognition that, although the modernisation and democratisation of the Kuomintang armed forces might benefit the war effort against Japan, it should not be pressed upon the Kuomintang since it would undermine the power of this

political party, which provided the best available basis for future US domination of the area;

2) recognition that the broadest possible national front, which would include the forces of the Communist Party, would also undermine Kuomintang power and so should not be pressed on the Kuomintang;

3) the confinement of US aid to the Kuomintang forces.

The first strategy was espoused by such elements as General Joseph STILWELL*, appointed to serve as Chiang's Chief of Staff.

The second strategy was supported by such elements as General Claire CHENNAULT*, who led the 'American Volunteer Group' (the 'Flying Tigers'), a group of planes and pilots which had been sent to China in 1940, and Patrick HURLEY*, who was appointed President Franklin ROOSEVELT*'s personal representative in China in August 1944.

Thus, in an undated note in 1942, Stilwell summed up bluntly the weaknesses of the Kuomintang's military forces:

"The Chinese army lies immobile and rotting, sprawled all over China. Officers getting rich, men dying of malnutrition, malaria, dysentery, cholera; the sick simply turned loose. Ammunition and weapons being sold. Open traffic with the enemy on all 'fronts'. Stupidity, ignorance, apathy in the general staff. . . . Personal loyalty to CKS (Chiang Kai-shek -- Ed.) weighs more than ability and efficiency; crookedness, cowardice go unpunished".

(Joseph W. Stilwell: Note (undated), in: Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 58).

Accordingly, he sought to reform and modernise them:

"China's huge, poorly equipped, fed and led armies were structured more for domestic political control than international war. With little respect for the complex politics of the Chinese military, Stilwell urgently sought to modernise them for offensive action."

(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 67).

even though:

"Full acceptance of his proposals would have threatened the survival of Chiang's regime".

(Wesley M. Bagby: ibid.; p. 67).

Naturally:

"Holding such opposite concepts, he and Chiang clashed in a bitter and acrimonious feud. .

Stilwell's diary reflected his growing anger and frustration in increasingly bitter denunciation: 'stupid little ass' (15/6/42), ignorant, illiterate, superstitious, peasant son of a bitch' (summer 1942), 'nasty little bastard' (6/1/43), 'grasping, bigoted,

ungrateful little rattlesnake' (18/6/43) . . .

Stilwell's denunciations extended to the entire Chinese government --'a gang of thugs'".

(Wesley M. Bagby: *ibid.*; p. 69-70).

Supporters of the Stilwell strategy were accused by its opponents of being 'crypto-communists'. For example, although Stilwell was a right-wing Republican, Hurley wrote later:

"The record of General Stilwell in China is irrevocably coupled in history with the conspiracy to overthrow the Nationalist Government of China and to set up in its place a Communist regime".

(Patrick J. Hurley, in: Don Lohbeck: 'Patrick J. Hurley'; Chicago; 1956; p. 305).

In October 1944, after strong representations from Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt wrote to Chiang

"That he would remove Stilwell".

(Wesley M. Bagby: *op. cit.*; p. 149).

The victory of the Hurley/Chennault fraction of the US imperialists was confirmed when Chiang Kai-shek said publicly, in a speech on 1 January 1945, that he:

"Opposed the proposal for abolishing the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship and for setting up a coalition government and a joint supreme command".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 334).

And when Hurley -- appointed US Ambassador to China in November 1944 --declared in Washington on 2 April 1945:

"That the United States would cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek only and not with the Chinese Communist Party".

(Patrick J. Hurley: Statement of 2 April 1945, in: Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Danger of the Hurley Policy' (July 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 336).

[The Third Anti-Communist Campaign \(March 1943\)](#)

The entry of the USA into the World War II did not check the Kuomintang's unwillingness to participate -- other than nominally -- in the national united front against Japan proposed by the Communist Party of China.

The third anti-Communist campaign:

" . began in March of this year (1943-- Ed.) and is still going on".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'A Comment on the Sessions of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and of the People's Political Council' (October 1943), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 146).

and in October 1944 Mao Tse-tung wrote:

"Chiang Kai-shek has already dispatched 775,000 troops who are now engaged exclusively in encircling or attacking the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the people's guerillas in southern China."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Chiang Kai-shek's Speech on the Double Tenth Festival' (October 1944), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 232).

And in April 1945 Mao warned the 7th National Congress of the CPC that

"The chief ruling clique of the Kuomintang . . . is now stepping up preparations to unleash civil war as soon as the forces of a certain allied country have cleared a considerable part of the Chinese mainland of the Japanese aggressors."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government,' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 275).

The Yalta Conference (February 1945)

In February 1945, the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain met at Yalta and signed a secret agreement (published only in January 1946) that, on certain conditions,

"In two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 6; p. 7,732).

Soviet Denunciation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (April 1945)

In April 1945,

"The Soviet Union denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. The situation, the Soviet Government declared, had changed: as an ally of Germany, Japan was helping her in the war against the USSR; in addition, she was at war with the USA and Britain, who were allies of the USSR. In this situation, the neutrality pact had lost its meaning and could no longer remain valid".

('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 411).

The Surrender of Germany (May 1945)

In May 1945:

"The Nazis capitulated".

('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 392).

US Atom Bomb Attacks on Japan (August 1945)

On 6 August 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and another on Nagasaki on 9 August. ('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 415).

The Soviet Union enters the Pacific War (August 1945)

On 8 August 1945:

"The Soviet government declared war on Japan"
(*'Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'*;
Moscow; 1974; p. 417).

and:

"By nightfall of August 14 troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front had advanced
50-200 kilometres into Manchuria. .
In six days the Soviet troops thus inflicted a disastrous defeat on the Kwangtung
Army'.
(*'Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'*;
Moscow; 1974; p. 422).

[The End of the Pacific War \(August 1945\)](#)

On 14 August 1945, Japan surrendered, and the Second World War came to an end.
(William L. Langer (Ed.): *op. cit.*; p. 1,156).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 1

CHANG Hsueh-liang, Chinese military officer (1898-), 'the Young
Marshal'; warlord of Manchuria.

CHEN Guofu = Pinyin form of CHIEN Kuo-fu.

CHEN Kuo-fu, Chinese politician (1892-1951); Director, Kuomintang
Organisation
Department (1926-32, 1944); Acting President, Control Yuan (1928-36);
Governor, Kiangsu Province (1933-37); Director, Kuomintang Personnel
Department (1939-45); Chairman, Kuomintang Central Finance Committee
(1945); to USA (1950).

CHEN Lifu = Pinyin form of Chen Li-fu.

CHEN Li-fu, Chinese politician (1900-93); Secretary-General, Kuomintang
(1929-31); Director, Kuomintang Investigation Department (1928-38);
Director, Kuomintang Organisation Department (1938-39, 1944-48);
Minister of Education (1938-44); Vice-President, Legislative Yuan
(1948-49); to USA (1950).

CHENNAULT, Claire L., American military officer (1893-1958); military
adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (1937-45); general (1942); Commander, US

Army Air Force in China (1942-45); Director, Chinese Air Transport Inc. (1948-50); Director, Chinese Air Transport Ltd. (1955-59).

CHIANG Kai-shek, Chinese military officer and politician (1887-1975); gangster in Shanghai (1916-17); joined Kuomintang (1918); commandant, Whampoa Military Academy (1924); led Northern Expedition (1926); State President (1928-49); President, 'Republic of China' (Taiwan) (1950-75).

HURLEY, Patrick, American lawyer, diplomat and military officer (1883-1963); Secretary of War (1929-32); brigadier-general (1941); President's personal representative to Kuomintang government (1941-42); Minister to New Zealand (1942); Ambassador to China (1945).

MAO Tse-tung, Chinese revisionist politician (1893-1976); Chairman, Chinese Soviet Republic (1934); married Chiang Ching (1939); Chairman, People's Republic of China (1949-59); chairman, CPC (1949-76).

MAO Zedong = Pinyin form of Mao Tse-tung.

MARSHALL, George C., American military officer and politician (1880-1959); Army Chief of Staff (1939-45); general of the army (1944); US administration's 'mediator' in China (1945-47); Secretary of State (1947-49); Secretary of Defence (1950-51).

ROOSEVELT, Franklyn D., American lawyer and politician (1892-1945); state senator (1910-13); assistant secretary of the navy (1913-20); Governor of New York (1929-33); President (1933-45).

STILLWELL, Joseph, American military officer (1893-1946); military attache, Peking (1935-39); general (1942); commanding general, US forces in China-Burma-India (1942-44); commanding general, US Ground Forces (1945).

WANG Ching-wei, Chinese politician (1883-1944); Premier (1925-27, 1932-35); chairman, Kuomintang (1932-38); Prime Minister of Japanese puppet government in occupied China (1940-44); died in Japan (1944).

WANG Jingwei = Pinyin form of WANG Ching-wei. ZHANG Xueliang = Pinyin form of CHANG Hsueh-liang.

CHAPTER TWO: THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR **(1945-49)**

INTRODUCTION

Marxist-Leninist revolutionary strategy required that, once Japan had been defeated, the revolutionary process should proceed, with the minimum possible interruption, to the national-democratic revolutionary struggle against the remaining -- pro-American and pro-British -- landlords and comprador bourgeoisie.

However, with the ending of the Pacific War, the policy of the revisionist-led Communist Party of China continued to be one of working for a national united front with the Kuomintang and of willingness to make (weakening) concessions to the Kuomintang in an effort to secure this.

Thus, when Japan surrendered in August 1945, the Communist Party of China did not attempt to initiate the next stage of the revolutionary process. On the contrary, it put forward a policy of avoiding civil war except in self-defence:

"We don't want civil war. However, if Chiang Kai-shek insists on forcing civil war on the Chinese people, the only thing we can do is to take up arms and fight him in self-defence. . . . This will be a civil war he forces on us."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Situation and Our Policy after the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan' (August 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 15).

The Division within US Imperialism

The division within the ranks of US imperialism described in Chapter Two continued after the ending of the Pacific War.

One section of the US imperialists, consisting primarily of those elements without special economic connections with China, aimed to bring about internal peace by means of a compromise settlement between the forces of the Kuomintang government and those of the Communist Party.

The rival section of US imperialists, consisting primarily of those elements with special economic connections with China, held that no strategy should be adopted in relation to China which might jeopardise America's future imperialist interests in the region.

The first strategy was espoused by the US Democratic administration around Roosevelt,
the second strategy by the ultra-right Republican opposition, and especially by military officers linked with it.

Clearly, the strategy of the CPC dovetailed neatly with that of the US civilian administration.

THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR (1945-49) US Military Intervention in China (1945-47)

By July 1945-- that is, before the Japanese surrender -- the US military were actively intervening militarily in China in an effort to strengthen the military position of the Kuomintang forces and to weaken the military position of the forces of the Communist Party:

"A (US -- Ed.) War Department directive of August 10 (1945-- Ed.) provided for the occupation by American forces of key ports and communications centres in China, the rapid transportation of Nationalist forces to key areas, and the turning over of localities occupied by American forces only to agencies and forces accredited by the Nationalist government. . . . Immediately after V-J day, American forces lifted three Nationalist armies by air to key points of East and North China, including the three most important cities -- Shanghai, Nanking and Peking"

(Tsou Tang: 'America's Failure in China: 1941-50'; Chicago; 1964; p.305-06, 308).

Thus, after Japan's surrender in August 1945,

"The armed forces of the United States . . . landed in China and stationed themselves at Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, . and other places. In addition, they repeatedly invaded the Liberated Areas."

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 439).

Kuomintang-CPC Peace Negotiations (1945)

In 1944, Roosevelt had sent Vice-President Henry WALLACE* on a fact-finding mission to China, and by July 1945 both:

"Roosevelt and Wallace were bearing down hard on Chiang to come to terms with the Communists".

(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 111).

As a result, in August 1945, Chiang Kai-shek invited Mao Tse-tung:

"To Chungking for peace negotiations."

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 48).

and a delegation headed by Mao Tse-tung:

"Arrived in Chungking on August 28 and held negotiations with the Kuomintang for 43 days".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 49).

The Communist Party offered very considerable concessions to the Kuomintang in an effort to secure their acceptance of a national united front. Mao Tse-tung

insisting:

"We are ready to make concessions."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Chungking Negotiations' (October 1945),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 57).

For example:

Firstly, the Party offered

"To reduce the anti-Japanese troops under its command to . . . twenty divisions and to take prompt action to demobilise its anti-Japanese troops now distributed in the eight areas of Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh and Honan",
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 61).

so **surrendering eight of its liberated areas** -- in order to make the Kuomintang 'feel easy':

"Some comrades have asked why we should concede eight Liberated Areas. It is a great pity to concede these eight areas, but it is better to do so. . . . Why should we concede those areas? Because otherwise the Kuomintang will not feel easy. . . . Our concession on this point will help frustrate the Kuomintang's plot for civil war'.
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Chungking Negotiations' (October 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 56).

Secondly, the Party **agreed to the reoccupation of Manchuria by Kuomintang troops without opposition**. In December 1945, the US government sent General George MARSHALL*, recently retired as Army Chief of Staff, to China, ostensibly **to 'mediate' between the opposing forces**.

Marshall proposed that the Kuomintang forces should be allowed:

"To reoccupy Manchuria without any interference from the Communists. In an extraordinary development, CHOU En-lai* agreed".
(Lionel M. Chassin: 'The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil War: 1945-49'; London; 1966; p. 72).

Thirdly, the Party continued its policy of **rent and interest reduction** in place of that of confiscation of the landlords' land:

"The present policy of our Party is still to reduce rents, not to confiscate land".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Rent Reduction and Production are Two Important Matters for the Defence of the Liberated Areas' (November 1945), in: 'Selected

Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 72.)

"Reduce rent. . . . All areas must launch movements in 1946 for the reduction of rent and interest in their newly liberated areas."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Policy for Work in the Liberated Areas for 1946'

(December 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 70).

However, these concessions did not satisfy the Kuomintang which made the demand:

"To eliminate altogether the people's army and the Liberated Areas."

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 60).

and

"Consequently no agreement could be reached".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 60).

In fact, even during the peace negotiations, the forces of the Kuomintang continued to attack the forces of the Communist Party:

"The Kuomintang is negotiating with us on the one hand and is vigorously attacking the Liberated Areas on the other hand".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Chungking Negotiations' (October 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 53).

[The Spurious 'Cease-fire' \(January-June 1946\)](#)

However, in January 1946:

"Both sides agreed . . . to an unconditional cease-fire based upon the status quo."

(E. R. Hooton: 'The Greatest Tumult: The Chinese Civil War: 1936-49'; London; 1991; p. 29).

At the same time, the Kuomintang government agreed to convene a:

"Political Consultative Conference, agreed upon in principle by the Kuomintang and Yen-an (the capital of the Liberated Areas -- Ed.) in October 1945".

(Lionel M. Chassin: *ibid.*; p. 71).

The conference:

"Adopted a series of resolutions favourable to peace and democracy."

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 90).

but the:

"Political Consultative Conference agreements were soon torn up by him (Chiang Kai-shek - Ed.) one after another".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 95).

In fact, Chiang Kai-shek used the truce:

"As a smoke-screen behind which he made arrangements for a major war; at the very time the cease-fire order was being transmitted, he ordered the Kuomintang troops 'to seize strategic points' and from then he moved up troops continuously to attack the Liberated Areas". (Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 92).

and by June 1946:

"Chiang Kai-shek had massed 80% of his regular forces (which were about two million men) at the front for attacks on the Liberated Areas; more than 540,000 of these troops were transported directly by the warships and planes of the US armed forces".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 110).

[The Renewal of the Civil War \(July 1946\)](#)

In July 1946:

". . . when the disposition of his troops had been completed, Chiang Kai-shek launched a country-wide counter-revolutionary war . . .

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 110-11).

against the armed forces of the Communist Party of China. In Marshall's view:

"The Chinese Communist Party had been sincerely desirous. . . of reaching an understanding with the Nationalists; it was the Kuomintang government that had wrecked negotiations with its incessant violations of the truce and continuation of its military action".

(Lionel M. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 94).

An important factor in the Kuomintang attitude was US military aid:

"Americans trained and equipped 20 Chinese divisions with modern weapons, began the training and equipment of others, built up China's financial reserves."

(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 222).

This resulted in:

". . . the strengthening of elements in the Kuomintang that opposed reform".

(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 222).

And so opposed to any sharing of power with the Communist Party. In January 1947:

"The United States officially abandoned its mediation efforts"
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,338).

which:

"Had ended in complete failure",
(Lionel M. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 95).

and open warfare:

"... now spread across the whole of northern China".
(E. R. Hooton: op. cit.; p. 39).

Although the civil war was initiated by the Kuomintang, it acquired many characteristics of [a national-democratic revolutionary war](#), and was described by the Party as a struggle for:

"... the liberation of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army'
(October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 147).

[Spontaneous Land ReForm \(1947-48\)](#)

Despite the efforts of the Chinese revisionists to deter the peasants from undertaking land reform, a 'Directive on the Land Question' issued by the CC of the CPC in May 1946 noted that in many areas [the peasants had spontaneously seized land from the landlords](#):

"In combatting Chinese collaborators, settling accounts with landlords, and reducing rent and interest, the people have seized land directly from the landlords, thus realising the principle of 'land to the tiller'."
(Liu Shao-chi: 'Directive on the Land Question' (May 1946), in: Liu Shao-chi: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Oxford; 1984; p. 372).

Even though this campaign had been initiated in contravention of the policy of the Communist Party, the Party felt it tactically necessary to [endorse such action retrospectively](#):

"Our Party . . . cannot but support the masses in their direct implementation of agrarian reform".
(Liu Shao-chi: *ibid.*; p. 373).

By February 1947, land reform had been put into effect in about two-thirds of the

territory of each Liberated Area:

"In about two-thirds of the territory in each Liberated Area, . the land problem has been solved and the policy of land to the tillers has been carried out".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 123).

[The New National United Front Policy in China \(1945-49\)](#)

The Communist Party of China maintained that the position of China in 1945-49 was [essentially the same as in 1941-45, except that US imperialism had taken the place of Japanese imperialism:](#)

"US imperialism and its running dog Chiang Kai-shek have replaced Japanese imperialism and its running dog Wang Ching-wei and adopted the policies of turning China into a US colony".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 120).

"After the victorious conclusion of the anti-fascist Second World War, US imperialism . . . stepped into the shoes of . . . Japanese imperialism".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 158).

In this new situation, the Communist Party called again for [the formation of a new national united front, this time against US imperialism:](#)

"Form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang- Kai-shek government".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).

[The Breadth of the Anti-American National United Front](#)

It would seem even at first glance that this new proposed anti-American national united front must be [narrower](#) than the earlier anti-Japanese national united front.

In view of the Party's reluctant endorsement of land reform, the term '[enlightened gentry](#)' was now redefined to mean landlords:

- 1) who favoured struggle against United States imperialism and the Kuomintang government;
- 2) who were prepared to collaborate with the Communist Party; and
- 3) who supported land reform.

"The enlightened gentry are individual landlords . . . with democratic leanings.

At the present stage, what we require of them is that they favour the struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, favour democracy (not be anti-Communist), and favour land reform. If they can meet these requirements, we should unite with them without exception."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry' (March 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 209, 210).

In words, the Party presented the 'enlightened gentry' as possible recruits to the new anti-American national united front:

"These reactionary policies of US imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek have forced all strata of the Chinese people to unite for their own salvation. These strata include . . . the enlightened gentry".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 121).

"The strata of the Chinese people . . . united for their own salvation include the . . . enlightened gentry".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chiang Kai-shek Government is besieged by the Whole People' (May 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 136).

"The enlightened gentry . . . constitute an element in the revolutionary united front. . . . We should unite with them without exception".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry' (March 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 210).

On these grounds, Mao maintained in words that

"On the surface, our revolutionary national united front appears to have narrowed in the present period as compared with the period of the War of Resistance. As a matter of fact, . . . our national united front has really broadened".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 169-70).

But clearly few landlords who would be willing to support the confiscation of their own land, so that the Party's endorsement of land reform reduced in practice the number of 'enlightened gentry' -- i.e., of landlords willing to take part in the anti-American national united front -- to a negligible figure.

Furthermore, it would hardly be possible to bring pro-American comprador capitalists into an anti-American united front, while, in view of the long struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese occupiers, it would be politically very difficult for the Party to invite the remnants of pro-**Japanese** comprador capitalists to join it.

Nevertheless, it was envisaged not only that the national bourgeoisie could be won to the new national united front, but that a policy of concessions to the pro-American comprador capitalists could induce them to transfer their allegiance to the anti-American national united front.

CPC Concessions to the National Bourgeoisie

The Communist Party of China continued to maintain that the **national bourgeoisie** could be a participant in this anti-American national united front:

"The reactionary policies of US imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek have forced all strata of the Chinese people to unite for their own salvation.

These strata include the . . . national bourgeoisie."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 121).

"The strata of the Chinese people . . . united for their own salvation include the . . . national bourgeoisie."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chiang Kai-shek Government is besieged by the Whole People' (May 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p.136).

"'Businessmen' means all the national bourgeois who are persecuted and fettered. . . . The Chinese revolution at the present stage is a revolution in which all these people form a united front. . At the present stage, . . . circumstances make it necessary and possible for us to win over the majority of the national bourgeoisie."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry' (March 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 207, 209).

"The united front is so broad that it includes . . . the national bourgeoisie".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Address to the Preparatory Committee of the New Political Consultative Conference' (June 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 407).

"We must unite with the national bourgeoisie in the common struggle".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship' (June 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 421).

However, since the national bourgeoisie had previously deserted the national liberation movement because of fear for their future, in order to bring them into the anti-American national united front it was necessary for the Party to make concessions to the national bourgeoisie which might assure them that their future as exploiters would be secure if they supported the anti-American national united front:

Firstly, the Party renewed its former pledge that their enterprises would be **protected and encouraged to develop** by the new-democratic state:

"Develop the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).

"The policy . . . of protecting and encouraging the development of private industry and commerce was correct and should be continued in the future".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy' (January 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 183).

"There should be no encroachment . . . upon the national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area' (April 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 236).

"Protect the industrial, commercial, agricultural and livestock enterprises of the national bourgeoisie. All privately owned factories, shops, banks, warehouses, vessels, wharves, farms, livestock farms and other enterprises will, without exception, be protected against any encroachment".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Proclamation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (April 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 397).

"China must utilise all the factors of urban and rural capitalism that are beneficial . . . to the national economy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship' (June 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 421).

Secondly, it renewed its former pledge that political representatives of the national bourgeoisie would be accorded **a share in the power of the new-democratic state**:

"It is the . . . new rich (i.e., bourgeois -- Ed.) peasants . . . all united together . . . who conquer the country and should rule the country. . . The new-democratic state power is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal state power of the masses of the people. . . . The masses of the people include . . . the national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy'

(January 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 182-83, 186-87).

Thirdly, it renewed its former suggestion that there would be a long interval between the victory of the national-democratic revolution and its transformation into a socialist revolution:

"It will still be necessary to permit the existence for a long time of a capitalist sector of the economy. . . . This capitalist sector will still be an indispensable part of the whole national economy."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 168).

"There will be need, for a fairly long time after the victory of the revolution, to make use of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism as far as possible, in the interests of developing the national economy."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Report to the 2nd Plenary Session of the 7th CC of the CPC' (March 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 367).

CPC Concessions to the Comprador Bourgeoisie

In its strategy of offering concessions to the pro-US comprador bourgeoisie in an effort to draw it into a national united front against US imperialism, the Communist Party invented the new term of '**bureaucrat-capital**', defined as that section of comprador capital which was:

"The property of the four big families of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. SOONG*, H. H. KUNG* and the Chen . . . brothers".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).

It now became the policy of the Communist Party that **the new-democratic state should confiscate, not comprador capital as a whole, but only that section of it defined as 'bureaucrat-capital'**, together with the capital of a few individual comprador capitalists who actively resisted the anti-American national united front and who were classified as **war-criminals**:

"Confiscate the property of the four big families of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and the Chen . . . brothers, and the property of the other chief war criminals".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).

"Confiscate monopoly capital, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H.

H. Kung and Chen Li-fu, and turn it over to the new-democratic state. During their twenty-year rule, the four big families, Chiang, Soong, Kung and Chen, have piled up enormous fortunes, valued at ten to twenty thousand million US dollars and monopolised the economic lifelines of the whole country. . . . This capital is popularly known in China as bureaucrat capital. This capitalist class, known as the bureaucrat-capitalist-class, is the big bourgeoisie of China. .

The new-democratic revolution aims at wiping out only . . . the bureaucrat-capitalist class".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 167, 168).

Thus, in the above report of December 1947, Mao:

"Delineated more clearly those segments of private capital earmarked for expropriation. These potential victims were described as owners of 'bureaucratic capital'.

(Wu Yuan-li: 'The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction'; London; 1965; p. 10).

The 'war criminals' concerned were:

"Forty-three war criminals . . . who were listed by the Communist Party of China on December 25, 1948".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Ordering the Reactionary Kuomintang Government . . to Arrest the Kuomintang War Criminals: Statement by the Spokesman for the Communist Party of China' (January 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 329).

[The Military Course of the Civil War \(1946-49\)](#)

In the second half of 1946, Kuomintang forces:

"Made impressive gains in North China and Manchuria, capturing 165 towns."

('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 141).

which in March 1947:

"Culminated in the capture of the Communist capital of Yen-an".

(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,338).

Not till November 1947 was a new capital of the Liberated Areas established at "Shihkiachwang".

(Lionel N. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 147).

During 1947, however:

"The strategic initiative passed to the PLA. .

By the end of 1947, . . . the Nationalists were widely spread and on the defensive".

('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p, 141, 142).

and in December 1947 Mao Tse-tung could tell the Central Committee of the CPC:

"The Chinese people's revolutionary war has now reached a turning point. . . . Beginning with . . . July/September 1947, the People's Liberation Army went over to the offensive on a national scale."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 157).

During the second half of 1948:

"The Communist armies had gained . . . a numerical superiority and had captured such huge stocks of rifles, artillery and armour that they were better equipped than the Nationalists."

('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 142).

and in September 1948 the Communist Party:

"Announced the formation of a People's Government for North China."

(Lionel N. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 202).

1949 saw:

"The rapid decomposition of the Nationalist armies".

(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,339).

Tientsin and Peking falling in January 1949, Nanking in April, Shanghai in May and Canton in October.

In April 1949, Mao Tse-tung, as Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Commission, and CHU Teh*, as Commander-in-Chief of the PLA,

"Ordered the People's Liberation Army to advance courageously, wipe out all reactionary Kuomintang troops who dare to resist, arrest all incorrigible war criminals, liberate the people of the whole country (Mao Tse-tung: Proclamation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army".

(April 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 397).

In July 1949, the Nationalists:

"Began to prepare for withdrawal to the island of Formosa (Taiwan), which

was completed by December".
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,339).

while:

"The US government, attempting to extricate itself from its entanglement with the collapsing forces of the National Government, pursued a policy of non-involvement".

('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 142-43).

The Establishment of the People's Republic of China (October 1949)

In September 1949, a 'Political Consultative Conference of the Chinese People' met in Peking:

"The 662 members of this body represented not only the CPC, but such other anti-Kuomintang bodies as the Democratic League, . . . regional democratic groups. . . . There were also representatives of regional governments, of labour and peasant unions, of commerce and industry, of religious and cultural interests, of ethnic minorities, and of the overseas Chinese."

(Lionel N. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 238).

The conference accomplished:

"Election of the members of the central government; adoption of a Common Programme'; designation of Peking as the official capital of China; . . . adoption of a national anthem . . . ; and adoption of a national flag. . . The 'Common Programme was in fact the constitution of the new state."
(Lionel M. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 238-39).

In October 1949,

"the People's Republic of China was officially proclaimed at Peking with Mao Tse-tung as Chairman . . . (i. e., State President -- Ed.) and Chou En-lai as premier and foreign minister".

(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,339).

The Communist Party insisted that the People's Republic was:

"Led by the Communist Party of China."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Long live the Great Unity of the Chinese People!'

(September 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 19).

The Establishment of the 'Republic of China' (December 1949)

In December 1949, the remnants of the Kuomintang forces headed by Chiang Kai-shek, having withdrawn from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, there:

"Established a Kuomintang regime. . . . This regime continued to assert that it was the rightful Chinese Government, in opposition to the People's Republic of China."
('Europa World Year Book: 1995', Volume 1; London; 1995; p. 833).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

CHOU En-lai, Chinese revisionist politician (1898-1976); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1927-76); deputy chairman, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1949-54); member, Central People's Government Council (1949-54); Minister of Foreign Affairs (1949-58); Prime Minister (1949-76); deputy chairman, CPC (1956-76); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1956-76).

CHU Teh, Chinese military officer and revisionist politician (1886-1976); commander, People's Liberation Army (1931-54); marshal (1955); chairman, Standing Committee of National People's Council (1949-76).

GONG, Xianxi = Pinyin form of KUNG Hsiang-hsi.

KUNG, Hsiang-hsi (H. H.), Chinese financier and politician (1881-1967); Minister of Finance (1933-44); Minister of Industries (1931); president, Executive Yuan (1938-39, 1944-48); to USA (1948).

SOONG, Tzu-wen ('T. V. '), Chinese financier and politician (1894-1971); educated in USA; Minister of Finance (1925-31); vice-president, Executive Yuan (1932-33); chairman, Bank of China (1934-43); Minister of Foreign Affairs (1942-45); chairman, Executive Yuan (1945-47); governor of Kwangtung (1947); to USA (1949).

WALLACE, Henry A., American agronomist, editor and politician (1888-1965); associate editor, (1910-24), editor (1924-29), 'Wallace's Farmer'; editor, 'Wallace's Farmer and Iowa Homestead' (1929-33); Secretary of Agriculture (1933-40); Vice-President (1941-45); Secretary of Commerce (1945-46); editor, 'New Republic' (1946-47).

HOU Enlai = Pinyin form of CHOU En-lai. ZHU De Pinyin form of CHU Teh.

CHAPTER THREE : THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION (1949-53)

INTRODUCTION

In the years immediately prior to 1949, as we have seen, the Communist Party of China had come to represent the interests of a national united front.

But with the ending of the civil war in China and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, THERE CEASED TO BE ANY COMMON INTERESTS BETWEEN THE LANDLORD CLASS, THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE AND THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE -- LET ALONE THE WORKING CLASS.

THERE CEASED, THEREFORE, TO BE ANY BASIS FOR A NATIONAL UNITED FRONT BETWEEN THESE CLASSES. AND THERE CEASED TO BE ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE CONTINUED UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AS IT EXISTED IN 1949.

With the acceptance by the Communist Party in the 1945-49 period of land reform -- i.e., the confiscation and redistribution of the landlords' land (see pages 23-24)-- THERE HAD CEASED TO BE ANY GROUPING WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE LANDLORD CLASS.

THUS, AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA CAME TO CONSIST OF THREE GROUPINGS REPRESENTING DIFFERENT CLASS INTERESTS:

FIRSTLY, A MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS, HEADED BY KAO KANG*;

SECONDLY, A REVISIONIST GROUPING REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI*; AND

THIRDLY, A REVISIONIST GROUPING REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG.

ALL THREE GROUPINGS WITHIN THE PARTY WERE AGREED ON CARRYING FORWARD THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS AGAINST THE LANDLORD CLASS, BUT THE THIRD GROUPING DIFFERED FROM THE FIRST TWO IN SEEKING TO PROTECT, AS FAR AS WAS PRACTICABLE, THE INTERESTS OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE.

THE THEORETICAL GROUND FOR THIS PROTECTION HAD ALREADY BEEN LAID BY MAO'S REVISIONIST DICTUM THAT THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION SHOULD BE DIRECTED NOT AGAINST THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE AS A WHOLE, BY ONLY AGAINST A SMALL SECTION OF IT LABELLED 'BUREAUCRAT-CAPITAL' AND 'WAR CRIMINALS' (see page 28).

THE NATIONALISATION OF BUREAUCRAT-CAPITAL (1949-50)

In 1949-50, shortly after the establishment of the People's Republic of China,

"The People's Government confiscated all the enterprises operated by bureaucrat-capital. . . . These enterprises, including the Japanese, German and Italian concerns in China taken over by the Kuomintang government following the victory of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, were turned into . . . state-owned enterprises".

(Liu Shao-chi: 'Political Report of the CC of the CPC to the 8th National Congress of the Party' (September 1956) (hereafter listed as 'Liu Shao-chi (1956)'; Peking; 1956; p 12).

Comprador bourgeois other than bureaucrat-capitalists and a few designated war criminals were treated as **national bourgeois**:

"Those capitalists who were independent of the Kuomintang monopolists retained their enterprises."(John & Elsie Collier: 'China's Socialist Revolution'; London; 1973; p. 30).

THE LAND REFORM (1950-1952)

In the summer of June 1950, THE PARTY PROCEEDED TO INITIATE A COUNTRYWIDE LAND REFORM WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE LANDLORDS AS A CLASS.

"The Party turned once again to land reform, abandoning the more moderate Anti-Japanese War policy of rent and interest reduction."

(Suzanne Pepper: 'Civil War in China: The Political Struggle: 1945-1949'; Berkeley. (USA); 1978; p. 229).

In the discussions leading up to the land reform, the national and comprador bourgeois groupings of the Party successfully pressed for the reform to be **applied only to land held by the landlord class, with land held by rich peasants** (i.e., rural capitalists) **exempted**. This was the main theme of several speeches by Mao Tse-tung in the spring and early summer of 1950:

"If we touch only the landlords and not the rich peasants, we can more effectively isolate the landlords".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Request for Opinions on the Tactics for dealing with Rich Peasants' (March 1950), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 24).

Thus, declared Mao, the Party's policy:

"Should be one of maintaining the rich peasant economy in order to facilitate the early rehabilitation of rural production and the better to isolate the landlords."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Fight for a Fundamental Turn for the Better in the Nation's Financial and Economic Situation' (June 1950), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 29).

In June 1950, the Central Committee of the Party presented the draft of an 'Agrarian Reform Law':

"To the 2nd Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. . . . After it had been discussed and endorsed by the session, the Central People's Government Council approved the draft. On June 30 of the same year, Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central People's Government, promulgated the 'Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China'." (Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 40).

The Effect of the Land Reform

The land reform legislation brought about:

"Far-reaching modifications in the shape of society in the countryside". (Jacques Guillermaz: 'The Chinese Communist Party in Power: 1949-1976'; Folkestone; 1976; p. 28-29).

It:

"Succeeded in redistributing about 43% of China's cultivated land to about 60% of the rural population".

(Frederick C. Teiwes: 'Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime', in: Roderick MacFarquahar & John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China', Volume 14: 'The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China: 1949-1965' (hereafter listed as 'Fredrick C. Teiwes (1987)'); Cambridge; 1987; p. 87).

It had the effect of:

"Freeing millions of peasants of the burden of paying rent to landlords. . . 300 million poor peasants had their plots of land enlarged and instead of being tenant farmers . . . became . . . owners of small independent holdings." (Jacques Guillermaz: op. cit.; p. 26).

In fact:

"The local landlord gentry was destroyed". (Franz Schurmann: 'Peasants', in: Franz Schurmann & Orville Schell (Eds.): 'Communist China: Revolutionary Reconstruction and International Confrontation: 1949-1966'; Harmondsworth; 1977; p. 170).

in:

"One of the greatest social revolutions of modern times." (Franz Schurmann: ibid.; p. 169).

and, in the rural areas:

"China became a country of small owner-cultivators". (Edward L. Wheelwright & Bruce McFarlane: 'The Chinese Road to Socialism: Economics of the Cultural Revolution'; Harmondsworth; 1973; p., 34).

However:

"Land belonging to rich peasants was 'protected' (Article 6)".
(Jacques Guillermez: op. cit.; p. 26).

The land reform had been:

"completed by 1952".
(Edward L. Wheelwright & Bruce McFarlane: op. cit.; p. 33).

CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR (1951-53)

In October 1950, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu river in order to intervene in the Korean War on the side of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, driving the invading United States and South Korean troops back to the line of the 38th Parallel.

In May 1951, on US initiative, negotiations began for an armistice. This was finally signed in July 1953.

THE 'CAMPAIGN FOR THE ELIMINATION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES' (February 1951-Spring 1953)

With the aim of consolidating the effects of the partial national-democratic revolution, a 'Campaign for the Elimination of Counter-Revolutionaries' was initiated in February 1951.

The directives for the campaign emphasised the need to mobilise:

"Mass participation in the process of uncovering counter-revolutionaries".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1987): : op. cit.; p. 91).

and 'Committees for the Elimination of Counter-revolutionaries' were set up in schools, factories, government bodies, etc.

The campaign:

"Ended in 1953".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1987): op. cit.; p. 88).

It:

"Effectively destroyed the old Kuomintang (KMT) power structure and enabled the CPC to extend its power to villages throughout the land".
(Roderick MacFarquhar: 'The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: 1: Contradictions among the People: 1956-1957' (hereafter listed as 'Roderick MacFarquhar (1974)'; London; 1974; p. 16).

CONCLUSION

The land reform of 1950-52 liquidated the Chinese landlord class, forming part of **a national-democratic revolution**. But since this left untouched most of the comprador bourgeoisie -- liquidating only a small part of this class, namely the 'bureaucrat-

capitalists' and a few individuals designated as 'war criminals' -- it was an incomplete national-democratic revolution.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 3

GAO Gang = Pinyin form of KAO Kang

KAO Kang, Chinese Marxist-Leninist politician (1902-55); Deputy Premier (1949-53); Vice-Chairman, Central Revolutionary Military Council (1951-53); Chairman, State Planning Commission (1952-53); arrested by revisionists (1954); and reportedly died in prison (1955).

LIU Shaoqi = Pinyin form of LIU Shao-chi.

LIU Shao-chi, Chinese revisionist politician (1898-1969); general secretary, CPC (1949-59); Deputy Premier (1949-67); President (1959-68); expelled from Party and imprisoned (1968); died in prison (1969); 'rehabilitated' by revisionists (1980).

CHAPTER FOUR: THE 'ANTIS' AFFAIRS (December 1951- June 1952)

THE 'THREE-ANTI CAMPAIGN' (December 1951 - January 1952)

In December 1951:

"The National Committee of the PPCC (People's Political Consultative Conference -- Ed.) issued a directive calling upon the PPCC in all local areas to mobilise the 'democratic political parties' and 'people's organisations' in support of the 'three-anti' movement. . . .

The directive called for a nation-wide 'anti-corruption, anti-waste and anti-bureaucratism struggle'".

(Theodore H. & Wen-hui Chen: 'The 'Three-Anti' and the 'Five-Anti' Movements in Communist China', in: 'Pacific Affairs', Volume 26, No. 1 (March 1953); p 5).

The 'Three-Anti' campaign was planned by the Marxist-Leninist grouping of the Party, headed by Kao Kang:

"Kao Kang . . . planned the Three-Anti campaign".

('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 144).

"After careful preparation and a trial run organised by Kao Kang in Manchuria". (Jacques Guillermaz: op. cit.; p. 22).

It:

"Had the seemingly worthwhile stated objectives of eliminating bureaucracy,

waste and corruption in [government](#)."

(Robert Loh: 'Escape from Red China'; London; 1963; p. 60).

and:

"Applied to civil servants and cadres of all kinds.. .

The aims were to give the new administration a new style of work and new ethics, to correct the cadres inherited from the former regime, to save the new ones from the temptations of power."

(Jacques Guillermaz: op. cit.; p. 22).

In other words, it was directed:

"Against malpractices in government offices."

(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 35).

It had the active support of the national bourgeois grouping of the Party, headed by Liu Shao~hi.

[THE 'FIVE-ANTI CAMPAIGN' \(January-June 1952\)](#)

IN THE COURSE OF THE 'THREE-ANTI CAMPAIGN', THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS

GROUPING WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG, TOOK ADVANTAGE OF MAO'S PRESTIGE TO TRANSFORM THE CAMPAIGN INTO A 'FIVE-ANTI CAMPAIGN' DIRECTED AGAINST THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE AND ITS POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES.

In the period between November 1951 and January 1952, Mao wrote a number of notes to the Central Committee demanding such a transformation:

"Particular attention must be paid to the fact that the corrosion of cadres by the bourgeoisie results in serious cases of corruption".

(Mao Tse-tung: Directive for CC, CPC (November 1951), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 64).

"In all cities . . . we should . . . wage a large-scale, resolute and thoroughgoing struggle against those capitalists who are violating the law. . . . All our big cities . . . should start the struggle against the 'five evils in the first ten days of February. Please make prompt arrangements."

(Mao Tse-tung: Directive for CC, CPC (January 1952), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 65-66).

Thus, from January 1952, the 'Three-Anti Campaign':

"Gave place to the Five-Antis. This campaign was directed against bribes, fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement of state property, and the illegal obtaining of state economic secrets."

(Jacques Guillermaz: op. cit.; p. 23).

The campaign was officially said to be directed:

" . . . at lawbreaking capitalists".
(Frederick C. Teiwes: (1987): op. cit.; p. 90).

but in fact its:

"Target was the national bourgeoisie as a class".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1987): op. cit.; p. 90).

In other words, the 'Five-Anti Campaign':

"Was not therefore aimed at civil servants or cadres, but at those who might corrupt them: the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. The latter were to be discredited politically . . . , while their economic influence on various state or provincial bodies was to be destroyed. This campaign, known as the 'tiger hunt', with its secret denunciations and public accusation meetings, was accompanied by thousands of condemnations and caused hundreds of people to commit suicide in the large towns. . . .

The 'national bourgeoisie' was terror-stricken".
(Jacques Guillermaz: *ibid.*; p. 23).

"While the target of the 'three-anti' was the corrupt elements in the government and Party, the 'five-anti' was directed against the 'bourgeoisie' -- merchants, industrialists and business people in general. .

The launching of an attack upon the bourgeoisie within three years of the establishment of the new regime no doubt came as a shock to many. . . .

Accusations, public trials, confessions, huge mass meetings and the like marked the campaign."

(Theodore H. & Wen-hui Chen: op. cit.; p. 10, 12, 13).

Those accused in the campaign:

"Were forced to pay large sums to the state in the form of fines, delinquent tax assessments or returned stolen assets."

(Theodore H. & Wen-hui Chen: op. cit.; p. 18).

Mao confirmed to representatives of press and publishing circles in March 1957 that:

"The 'Five-Antis' was for rectifying the capitalists".

(Mao Tse-tung: Talk with Representatives of Press and Publishing Circles (March 1957), in: Roderick MacFarquahar, Timothy Cheek & Eugene Wu (Eds.): 'The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward'(hereaf ter listed as 'Roderick MacFarquahar et al (Eds.) (1989)'); Cambridge (USA); 1989; p. 261).

And the campaign did inflict severe damage on the national bourgeoisie:

"In the cities the prestige of the bourgeoisie was gravely damaged by the Five Anti

Campaign".

(Frederick C. Teiwes: 'Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms: 1950-1965'; Folkestone; 1979; p. 160).

However, as a result:

Firstly, of opposition from the Marxist-Leninist grouping within the Party, which considered an offensive against the national bourgeoisie premature at this stage of the revolutionary process, and

Secondly, of particularly intense opposition from the Party grouping representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie, which was the target of the campaign, the 'Five-Anti Campaign':

" . . . came to an end on June 13, 1952".

(Jacques Guillermaz: op. cit.; p. 23).

CHAPTER FIVE: PREPARATION OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN (November 1952- February 1954)

By the autumn of 1952, the dominant grouping within the Communist Party was again a coalition of the Marxist-Leninist grouping, headed by Kao Kang, and the national bourgeois grouping, headed by Liu Shao-chi.

Both these groupings had **a common interest in planning economic development so as to maximise industrial development** -- a programme which was resisted by the comprador bourgeois grouping, headed by Mao Tse-tung, whose interests required the continuation of a colonial-type of economy in China.

In November 1952,

"The State Planning Commission was established. Kao was brought to Peking to become its first chairman".

(Donald Klein & Anne B. Clark: 'Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism: 1921-1965'; Cambridge (USA); 1971; p. 433).

Because of the dissension within the Party over the principles of economic planning, there was considerable difficulty in reaching agreement on the First Five-Year Plan, covering the period 1953 to 1957, which was, in only:

"Finalised at the National People's Congress in July 1955",

(Mark Selden (Ed.): 'The People's Republic of China: A Documentary History of Revolutionary Change'; New York; 1979; p. 294).

"Retroactively incorporating the 1953 and 1954 plans".

(Marc Blecher: 'China: Politics, Economics and Society: Iconoclasm and Innovation in a Revolutionary Socialist Country'; London; 1986; p. 54).

Because of the dominance within the Party of a coalition of the Marxist-Leninist and national bourgeois groupings during the period when the Plan was being drawn up, THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN AS ADOPTED BROADLY FOLLOWED THE MARXIST-LENINIST PRINCIPLES PRACTISED IN THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE PERIOD WHEN STALIN WAS GENERAL-SECRETARY OF THE CPSU.

There was to be [a high decree of centralisation](#) in economic planning:

"Planning was to be highly centralised".

(Marc Blecher: *ibid.*; p. 54).

Investment priority was accorded to heavy industry:

"Investment priority was given to heavy industry. .The new heavy industry was to take the form of very large complexes concentrated in a few big cities."

(Marc Blecher: *ibid.*; p. 54, 55).

"The 58% of total investment China allocated to heavy industry actually exceeded the Soviet figure".

(Marc Selden (Ed.): *op. cit.*; p. 56).

"The Soviet Union provided credit and technical assistance for 156 major projects, in what was perhaps the largest transfer of technology ever carried out by any country".

(Marc Blecher: *ibid.*; p. 54).

While the management of state industrial enterprises was based on:

"one-man management" along Soviet lines".

(Marc Blecher: *ibid.*; p. 56).

Under the First Five-Year Plan:

"Industrial output grew faster than the very high target of 14.7% per year. . . . Heavy industrial output nearly tripled, while light industry grew 70%. Railway freight volume more than doubled". (Marc Blecher: *ibid.*; p. 56-57).

CHAPTER SIX: The 'KAO KANG AFFAIR'

(December 1953 - March 1955)

INTRODUCTION

The Communist Party of China had long recognised in words the Marxist-Leninist

principle that the revolutionary process in a colonial-type country like China would take place in two successive stages -- the stage of national-democratic revolution and that of socialist revolution:

"The Chinese revolutionary movement led by the Communist Party embraces two stages, i.e., , the democratic and the socialist revolutions, which are two essentially different revolutionary processes.

The second process can be carried through only after the first has been completed".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' (December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 330-31).

With the defeat of the Kuomintang forces on the mainland, and the liquidation of the bureaucrat-capitalist and landlord classes, it was impossible to disguise the fact that the first (national-democratic) stage of the revolutionary process had been sufficiently completed to enable it to go forward to its second stage -- to the stage of socialist revolution:

"The task confronting the Party now is to build China into a great socialist country as quickly as possible".

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 6).

THE MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY HEADED BY KAO KANG, WHICH REPRESENTED THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS, WAS INDEED EAGER TO GO FORWARD TO THE SOCIALIST STAGE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.

HOWEVER, THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI, WHICH REPRESENTED THE INTERESTS OF EXPLOITERS WHO WERE ENGAGED IN INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE (see page 1), WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, SINCE THIS WOULD DESTROY THEIR POSITION AS EXPLOITERS.

THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG, WHICH REPRESENTED EXPLOITERS WHO WERE ENGAGED IN FOREIGN TRADE (see page 1), WAS SIMILARLY STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF COMMERCE, SINCE THIS WOULD DESTROY THEIR POSITION AS EXPLOITERS.

HOWEVER, IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS PERIOD -- BEFORE THE 20th CONGRESS OF THE CPSU HAD MADE REVISIONISM 'RESPECTABLE' WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT -- FOR THE TWO BOURGEOIS

GROUPINGS WITHIN THE CHINESE PARTY PUBLICLY TO REPUDIATE THE AIM OF SOCIALISM WITHOUT STRIPPING THEMSELVES OF THEIR FALSE 'SOCIALIST' MASKS.

THEREFORE, THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE TWO CLASSES COLLABORATED TO EVOLVE A NEW REVISIONIST THEORY WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CARRY FORWARD THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN WORDS, WHILE HOLDING IT BACK IN FACT.

CHINESE PSEUDO-SOCIALISM

IN ESSENCE, THIS PSEUDO-SOCIALIST THEORY ELABORATED BY THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS SIMPLY EQUATED CAPITALISM WITH SOCIALISM. Marxism-Leninism holds that the transition from capitalism to socialism requires a violent revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat:

"Can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Obviously not".

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Concerning Questions of Leninism' (January 1926), in: 'Works', Volume 8; Moscow; 1954; p. 25).

THUS, ACCORDING TO MARXIST-LENINIST PRINCIPLES, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 'NEW-DEMOCRATIC' STATE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE TRANSITION, FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM REQUIRED THE VIOLENT EXPULSION OF THE NATIONALAL BOURGEOISIE AND THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE FROM THE STATE APPARATUS AND THE ENDING OF CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND OTHER PARTIES.

INSTEAD OF PURSUING SUCH A POLICY, THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS SIMPLY DECLARED THAT, BECAUSE OF THE EXTENT OF STATE INFLUENCE IN THE ECONOMY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, THIS ECONOMY WAS ONE OF STATE CAPITALISM:

"The present-day capitalist economy in China is . . . a state-capitalist economy." (Mao Tse-tung: 'On State Capitalism' (July 1953), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 101).

AND THAT BECAUSE OF THE EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE STATE, IT WAS A STATE-CAPITALIST ECONOMY OF A NEW TYPE:

"The present-day capitalist economy in China a capitalist economy which for the most part is under the control of the People's Government. . . .

It is . . . a state-capitalist economy of a new type."

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 101).

WHICH HAD, 'TO A VERY GREAT EXTENT', A SOCIALIST CHARACTER:

"This state-capitalist economy of a new type takes on a socialist character to a very great extent."

(Mao Tse-tung: *ibid.*; p. 101).

THUS, THIS STATE CAPITALISM AND THIS NEW-DEMOCRATIC STATE ARE PRESENTED BY THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS AS 'VEHICLES FOR THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM':

"The transformation of capitalism into socialism is to be accomplished through state capitalism".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Only Road for the Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce' (September 1953), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 112).

"We can proceed with our step-by-step socialist transformation by means of the existing machinery of state".

(Liu Shao-chi: 'Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China' (September 1954); Peking; 1962; p. 26).

THIS TRANSITION CAN, IN THE CASE OF CHINA, BE GRADUAL:

"State capitalism in various forms is to be put into practice gradually so as to attain socialist ownership by the whole people".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China (June 1954), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 143).

CARRIED OUT OVER A RELATIVELY LONG PERIOD OF TIME:

"The socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce by the state will be gradually realised over a relatively long period of time, through various forms of state capitalism".

(Liu Shao-chi: 'Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China'; Peking; 1962; p. 26).

"The period of transition from capitalism to socialism . . . will cover roughly eighteen years".

(Mao Tse-tung: Preface 1 to 'Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside' (September 1955), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 235).

AND 'PEACEFUL':

"To achieve socialism through state capitalism . . . is a peaceful means of transition".

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): *op. cit.*; p. 24).

"Under conditions obtaining in this country, the exploiting class will be completely eliminated by peaceful means."

(Kuan Ta-tung: 'The Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce in China'; Peking; 1960; p. 111).

Furthermore, Marxism-Leninism defines the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a state in which the proletariat does not share political power with any other class and in which the Communist Party does not share leadership with any other party:

"The class of proletarians . . . does not and cannot share power with other classes. .

The party of the proletariat, the Party of the Communists. . . does not and cannot share leadership with other parties".

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Concerning Questions of Leninism' (January 1926), in: 'Works', Volume 8; Moscow; 1954; p. 27, 28).

BUT THE 'NEW-DEMOCRATIC' STATE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS DEFINED AS 'A STATE OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE', i.e., ONE IN WHICH THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE AND THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE SHARE IN POLITICAL POWER:

"After the founding of the People's Republic, . . . representatives of the national bourgeoisie and its parties have been taking part in the organs of our state".

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.;p. 61).

"Our state is a people's democratic dictatorship. . . . The aim of this dictatorship is to protect all our people. . . . Who is to exercise this dictatorship? . . . The entire people".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' (February 1957), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 387).

FURTHERMORE, THE 'NEW-DEMOCRATIC' STATE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS DEFINED AS A STATE IN WHICH THE COMMUNIST PARTY SHARES LEADERSHIP WITH OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES:

"Which is better, to have just one party or several? As we see it now, it's perhaps better to have several parties It means long-term coexistence and mutual supervision

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Ten Great Relationships' (April 1956), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 296),

"Why should the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democratic parties be allowed to exist side by side with the party of the working class over a long period of time? Because we have no reason for not adopting the policy of long-term coexistence with all those political parties."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' (February 1957), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 413).

ACCORDING TO THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS, 'SOCIALISM' IN CHINA

COULD BE ACHIEVED, NOT BY NATIONALISATION OF THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF PRODUCTION, BUT BY THE FORMATION OF JOINT STATE-PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE INVESTS AND TO WHICH IT ASSIGNS PERSONNEL TO SHARE IN MANAGEMENT WITH THE CAPITALISTS:

"A joint state-private enterprise is one in which the state invests and to which it assigns personnel to share in management with the capitalists".

(Kuan Ta-tung: op. cit.; p. 75).

ACCORDING TO THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS, IN THE COURSE OF THIS 'SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION' CAPITALISTS WILL GRADUALLY BE 'REMOULDED' INTO WORKING PEOPLE:

"In the course of bringing about the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, . . . educational measures are adopted to remould the capitalists gradually, . . . into working people".

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 25).

THE PROBLEM OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT WAS EASILY SOLVED BY THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS. THEY SIMPLY DECLARED THAT THE NEW-DEMOCRATIC STATE, THE JOINT DICTATORSHIP OF SEVERAL CLASSES, WAS THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT. Even though:

"Representatives of the national bourgeoisie and its parties have been taking part in the organs of our state",

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): ibid.; p. 61).

": . our state . . . is a dictatorship of the proletariat in essence".

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 61).

"Our state organs are organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at the 2nd Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC (November 1956), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 338).

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM (1952-54)

WITHIN THE PARTY, THE WHOLE REVISIONIST CONCEPT OF :

'PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM IN COOPERATION WITH THE BOURGEOISIE' WAS DENOUNCED BY THE MARXIST-LENINIST MINORITY WITHIN THE PARTY, HEADED BY KAO KANG.

Kao Kang, the leader of the Marxist-Leninist grouping within the Communist Party of China, came from

"The industrialised north-east . . . the only region where the functions of First Secretary (Party) and military commander-in-chief were united in one person --

Kao Kang".

(Jaap van Ginneken: 'The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao'; Harmondsworth; 1976; p. 35).

He:

"Had established both warm personal relations with Stalin. . . and smooth working relations with Soviet officials in the North-east".

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): 'Politics at Mao's Court: Kao Kang and Party Factionalism in the Early 1950s' (hereafter listed as 'Frederick C. Teiwes (1990)'); New York; 1990; p. 47).

and Mao himself noted:

"Stalin was very fond of Kao Kang. . . . Kao Kang sent Stalin a congratulatory telegram every 15 August."

(Mao Tse-tung: Talk at Chengtu Conference (March 1958), in: Stuart Schram (Ed.): 'Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters: 1956-71'; Harmondsworth; 1975; p. 100).

Shortly after Kao Kang's arrival in Peking, in early 1953, the Marxist-Leninist grouping there was strengthened when another leading Marxist-Leninist JAO Shuh-chih*::

"Came to Peking to head the Central Committee's organisation department".

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990); op. cit.; p. 6).

The fact that:

"Mao gave a ringing endorsement of peaceful transition";

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): *ibid.*; p. 61).

greatly strengthened the hand of the revisionists, while that of the Marxist-Leninist minority was weakened by the fact that they continued to observe the discipline of democratic centralism, opposing the revisionist majority only within higher Party organs.

Thus, contrary to later charges by the revisionists, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih:

"Never openly put forward any programme against the Central Committee of the Party".

(Frederick C. Teiwes: 'Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms: 1950-1965' (hereafter listed as 'Frederick C. Teiwes (1979)'); Folkestone; 1979; p. 183, citing 'New China News Agency' .

"There are many reasons to believe that little more than parallel action by the two men existed. . . . Chinese scholars today report having. . . seen no material demonstrating that Kao and Jao ever held talks concerning their 'anti-Party' activities. . . . Kao Kang's former secretaries claim there was little connection between Kao and Jao".

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990: op. cit.; p. 46).

and:

"The 1955 conclusion, that Kao and Jao formed an anti-Party 'clique or 'alliance is no longer used in Party history accounts."

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990: op. cit.; p. 12).

So, in the discussions within the Party leadership:

"Kao Kang was the odd man out. . . . While he said nothing, his silence was correctly perceived as disagreement."

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): *ibid.*; 61).

Privately, however, Kao was quite blunt. He is recorded as saying:

"Have you ever read 'On the Opposition' by Stalin? . . . Didn't Bukharin also advocate a peaceful entry into socialism?"

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): *ibid.*; p. 61).

while:

"Oral sources . . . picture Kao as favouring a comparatively rapid elimination of the national bourgeoisie as a class and a quick transition to socialism, and a close adherence to the Soviet model'. (Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): *ibid.*; p. 36).

THE COUP AGAINST THE MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING **(December 1853 - March 1955)**

THE REVISIONISTS CHOSE NOT TO FIGHT THE MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING

OPENLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM, ON WHICH THEIR FLAGRANT DEVIATIONS FROM MARXISM-LENINISM MIGHT HAVE EXPOSED THEM. INSTEAD, THEY EMBARKED ON A PLOT TO LIQUIDATE THE GROUPING BY BRINGING AGAINST ITS LEADERS FALSE CHARGES OF 'FACTIONALISM' AND 'CONSPIRACY TO SEIZE POWER':

Mao's 'Warning' to Kao Kang (December 1953)

The biographer of Mao's wife, CHIANG Ching* reports that Mao saw in the opposition of Kao and Jao to his revisionist line an unacceptable challenge to his personal supremacy in the state:

"In the deep winter of 1953, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih . . . challenged Mao's personal supremacy over the state structure."

(Roxane Witke: 'Comrade Chiang Ching'; London; 1977; p. 279).

So, at an Enlarged Politburo meeting in December 1953,

"Mao, for the first time, directly confronted Kao Kang".

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): op. cit.; p. 115).

He:

". . issued a 'serious warning' to Kao and Jao and proposed a draft resolution on strengthening Party unity."

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): *ibid.*; p. 120).

The 4th Plenum of the 7th CC (February 1954)

At the 4th Plenum of the 7th Central Committee in February 1954,

" . . the dominant figure . . . was Liu Shao-chi".

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1979): *op. cit.*; p. 173).

who criticised 'some cadres' (unnamed) who, he alleged:

"exaggerate the role of the individual and emphasise individual prestige. . . . They even regard the region or department under their leadership as their individual inheritance or independent kingdom".

(Liu Shao-chi: Report to 4th Plenum of 7th CC of CPC (February 1954), in: (John Gittings: 'The Role of the Chinese Army' (hereafter listed as 'John Gittings (1969)'); Delhi; 1969; p. 274, citing: 'New China News Agency' (19 February 1954).

During and after the 4th Plenum:

" . . Kao and Jao were offered many opportunities for a fresh start."

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): *op. cit.*; p. 124).

but they declined to support the revisionist theses:

" . . refusing to admit any serious fault".

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): *ibid.*; p. 126).

Suspicious that Liu's remarks were directed at the grouping headed by Kao Kang were supported by the fact that Kao:

" . . made his last major report in September 1953".

(Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark: *op. cit.*; p. 433),

However, no official announcement of his fate was published at the time. Kao merely:

" . . dropped from sight".

(Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark: *ibid.*; p. 410).

In fact, in February 1954 he was:

" . . thrown into prison",

('Who's Who in Communist China', Volume 1; Hong Kong; 1969; p. 330).

where he died in 1955.

It was later announced that Jao had suffered:

" . . . expulsion from the Party".
(Franz Schurmann: 'Ideology and Organisation in Communist China';
Berkeley (USA); 1968; p. 267).

[The National Conference of the CPC \(March 1955\)](#)

The 'Kao Kang Affair' was first made public at a National Conference of the CPC in March 1955:

"A resolution of the Party's National Conference in March 1955 for the first time in public discussed the 'Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance'".
(John Gittings (1969): op cit.; p. 275).

The resolution adopted by the conference claimed that Kao had:

"Made the North-east area the independent kingdom of Kao Kang".
(National Conference of CPC: Resolution on the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih (March 1955), in: 'People's China' (15 April 1955); p. 4).

and that after he was transferred to Peking in 1953:

"He even tried to instigate Party members in the army to support his conspiracy against the Central Committee of the Party".
(National Conference of CPC: Resolution on the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih (March 1955), in: 'People's China' (15 April 1955); p. 4).

The resolution alleged that, after a warning had been given to him at the 4th Plenum of the CC in February 1954:

"Kao Kang not only did not admit his guilt to the Party, but committed suicide as an ultimate expression of his betrayal of the Party".
(National Conference of CPC: Resolution on the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih (March 1955), in: 'People's China' (15 April 1955); p. 4).

The resolution similarly alleged that after Jao Shu-shih's transfer to Peking in the summer of 1952, he:

"Attempted to start a struggle on Kao's behalf".
(John Gittings (1969): op. cit.; p. 275).

In his opening address to the conference, Mao said:

"The criminal aim of this anti-Party alliance was to split our Party and seize power in the Party and the state by conspiratorial means".
(Mao Tse-tung: Opening Speech at the National Conference of the CPC (March 1955), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 155).

In his concluding speech to the conference, Mao Tse-tung replied to those who pointed out that there was no documentary evidence of factional activity involving Kao and Jao:

"About the doubts expressed by some comrades to the effect that since we have no

written agreement, perhaps there wasn't any alliance after all. . . . It is wrong to say that no alliance can exist without written agreement."

(Mao Tse-tung: Concluding Speech at the National Conference of the CPC (March 1955), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 162).

Along with Kao and Jao:

"Seven other men were also swept out of the Party for their part in the 'anti-Party bloc'. . . . Even if Kao and Jao had not been involved, the seven were so significant themselves that their purge alone would have constituted a major debacle within the CPC ranks".

(Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark: op. cit.; p. 410).

"Kao's fall was accompanied by the purge of virtually all the key Party leaders in the North-East Region."

('New Enclopaedia Britannica', Volume 5; Chicago; 1994; p. 113).

With regard to the allegation of the revisionists that Kao 'committed suicide', one may note that, according to a 'Red Guard' pamphlet entitled 'Down with Liu Shao-chi' published in 1967 during the 'Cultural Revolution':

". Kao was 'put to death'" not long after the (1955 -- Ed.) conference".

(Frederick C. Teiwes (1979): op. cit.; p. 654).

The 5th Plenum of the 8th CC (April 1955)

At the 5th Plenum of the CC in April 1955, a resolution on the 'Kao-Jao anti-Party bloc':

"Was based on a report made by the Party Secretary-General TENG Hsiao-ping*".

(Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark: op. cit.; p. 410).

The 8th National Congress of the CPC (September 1956)

In his Political Report to the 8th National Congress of the CPC, Liu Shao-chi referred to:

"The anti-Party bloc of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, who tried to seize the leadership of the state and Party by conspiratorial means."

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 96).

The 2nd Plenum of the 8th CC (November 1956)

By November 1956, Mao Tse-tung was suggesting that Kao Kang had been a Soviet agent:

"Are there such people in our country who provide foreigners with information behind the back of the Central Committee? I think there are. Kao Kang is a case in point".

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at 2nd Plenum of the 8th CC of the CPC' (November 1956), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 340).

CONCLUSION

The above interpretation of the 'Kao Kang Affair' -- that it was a frame-up engineered by Mao Tse-tung to eliminate progressive opponents of Mao --was fundamentally accepted by Soviet revisionist historians. However, not unnaturally, the political point at issue is presented as Kao's pro-Soviet sympathies rather than his loyalty to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principles:

"Beginning in 1953, Mao Tse-tung began the gradual elimination of all those who did not share his nationalist, anti-Soviet line. .

The struggle between the internationalist Marxist-Leninists and the Maoists . . . intensified at the beginning of the 1950s. The alarm was the arrest and death in prison in 1955 of Kao Kang. . . . The various criminal charges brought against him were completely unfounded".

(Oleg B. Borisov & Boris T. Koloskov: 'Soviet-Chinese Relations: 1945-1970'; Bloomington (USA); 1975; p. 126).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 4

CHIANG Ching, Chinese actress and revisionist politician (1914-91); married Mao Tse-tung (1939); in charge of 'proletarianisation' of Peking Opera and Ballet (1963-65); deputy director, Cultural Revolution Group (1966-68); arrested (1976); expelled from CPC (1977); tried for counterrevolutionary activity (1980-81); given suspended death sentence (1981); death sentence commuted to life imprisonment (1983); released from prison to house arrest (1984); died under house arrest, allegedly by suicide (1991).

JAO Shu-shih, Chinese Marxist-Leninist politician (1903-75); 1st secretary, East China Bureau, CPC, and 1st secretary, Shanghai Municipal Committee, CPC (1949-52); member, Central People's Government Council (1949-53); member, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1949-54); Political Commissar, East China Military Region (1950-54); Chairman, East China Military and Administrative Committee/East China Administrative Committee (1950-65); Director, Organisation Department, CC, CPC (1952-53); member, State Planning Commission (1952-54); arrested by revisionists (1955); expelled from CPC by revisionists (1955).

JIANG Qing = Pinyin form of CHIANG Ching.

RAO Shushi = Pinyin form of JAO Shu-shih.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE COOPERATIVISATION OF AGRICULTURE

(January 1951-June 1956)

The Marxist-Leninist Theory of Agricultural Cooperativisation

In the Political Report of the Central Committee to the 15th Congress of the CPSU in December 1927, Stalin pointed out **the unsatisfactory rate of development of Soviet agriculture:**

"The rate of development of our agriculture cannot be regarded as quite satisfactory",

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Political Report of the Central Committee to the 15th Congress of the CPSU' (December 1927), in: 'Works', Volume 10; Moscow; 1954; p. 312).

and declared that **the only solution to this problem was the gradual, voluntary unification of the small peasant farms into large-scale, mechanised cooperative farms:**

"The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms gradually but surely, not by pressure but by example and persuasion, into large farms based on common, cooperative, collective cultivation of the land and the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture.

There is no other way out".

(Josef V. Stalin: *ibid.*; p. 313).

With the income of the cooperative farmers **proportional to the quantity and quality of the work they performed:**

"The share in the surplus has to depend on the share in the work done. . . . For this the system of 'work-day units was evolved, based . . . on the work done."

(Jack Dunman: 'Agriculture: Capitalist and Socialist: Studies in the Development of Agriculture and its Contribution to Economic Development as a Whole'; London; 1975; p. 104).

In the form of cooperative farm recommended by the CPSU, the **artel**,

"The basic means of production, . . . - labour, use of the land, machines and other implements, draught animals and farm buildings -- are socialised. In the artel, the household plots (small vegetable gardens, small orchards), the dwelling houses, a part of the dairy cattle, small livestock, poultry, etc., are **not socialised**".

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Dizzy with Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective-Farm Movement' (March 1930). in: 'Works', Volume 12; Moscow; 1955; p. 202).

Marxism-Leninism calls for the cooperativisation of agriculture to **be linked with an offensive against the rich, capitalist peasants -- the kulaks:**

"The (15th-- Ed.) congress (of the CPSU -- Ed.) gave directions:

"To develop further the offensive against the kulaks".

('History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course'; Moscow; 1939; p. 289).

However, Marxism-Leninism holds that **before** the cooperativisation of agriculture can be successfully embarked upon, **a certain degree of industrial development must first have been achieved:**

"In order to start . . . mass transition to collective farms, certain preliminary conditions had to be available. . . .

It was necessary to industrialise the country, to set up a new tractor industry, to build new factories for the manufacture of agricultural machinery in order to supply tractors and machines in abundance to the collective-farm peasantry".

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Speech delivered at the 1st All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Brigaders' (February 1933), in: 'Works', Volume 13; Moscow; 1955; p. 244).

The Chinese Road to Agricultural Cooperativisation

As we have seen, as a result of the land reform carried out in 1950-52:

"What exists in the countryside today is capitalist ownership by the rich peasants and a vast sea of ownership by individual peasants".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture' (July 1955) (hereafter listed as 'Mao Tse-tung (July 1955)'), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 201).

China was therefore faced with similar serious problems to those of the Soviet Union:

"In China's economy, the role and importance of agriculture cannot be overstated; the agricultural sector has provided not only food for the entire population but also 90% of the raw materials for the consumer goods industries and 75% of the exports. .

Thus the lag in agricultural output has been a serious problem. . Farm production through the years has grown only slowly'.

(Parris H. Chang: 'Power and Policy in China'; University Park (USA): 1978; p. 9),

and there was general agreement within the Communist Party of China that, at least in the long run, the only solution to this situation was:

"To achieve cooperation step by step throughout our rural areas";

(Mao Tse-tung (July 1955): op. cit.; p. 189).

In fact, certain measures of short-term cooperation had been developed in the Chinese countryside long before the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949:

"Traditionally the Chinese peasants had from time to time formed mutual aid

groups to assist each other at harvest time, at spring planting, or in the face of flood or drought".

(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 29).

and after 1949 such mutual-aid groups came to be formed on a wider scale:

"It was after the founding of the People's Republic of China that our Party led the peasants in setting up agricultural producers' mutual-aid teams more extensively".

(Mao Tse-tung (July 1955): op. cit.; p. 186).

A further step followed: the establishment of **permanent mutual-aid teams**:

"It was soon taken a stage further. . . . Groups were set up which worked together and loaned each other tools and animals on a permanent all-the-year-round basis".

(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 29).

The Intra-Party Struggle over Cooperativisation Policy

On the question of the further development of agricultural cooperativisation:

"There was a cleavage of opinion in the Communist Party".

(John & Elsie Collier: *ibid.*; p. 29).

The Marxist-Leninist Party grouping, headed by Kao Kang, representing the interests of the working class, favoured the policies of:

- 1) postponing the cooperativisation of agriculture until industrialisation of the country had been achieved;
- 2) supporting the principle of distributing cooperative farmers' income on the basis of work performed; and
- 3) combining agricultural cooperativisation with an offensive against the rich capitalist peasants - the kulaks.

The national bourgeois grouping of the Party, headed by Liu Shao-shi, firstly,

"Argued for the postponement of collectivisation until China's industry was ready to support the creation of large-scale mechanised collective farms".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 10).

Secondly, supported the principle of distributing cooperative farmers' income partly on the basis of property brought into the farm; and,

Thirdly, rejected an offensive against the rich capitalist peasants - the kulaks, with whom the national bourgeoisie had close relations.

"In 1953 Liu Shao-chi argued that allowing a rich peasant economy to develop for some years would result in increased agricultural production and allow time to develop industry to the point where farming could be mechanised, and that only mechanisation could create a suitable basis for collective farming. This line of argument resulted in a call for the 'Four Freedoms' -- to rent land, to sell land, to hire labour and to lend money."

(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 28).

Later, during the 'Cultural Revolution', the line that industrial development should precede cooperativisation of agriculture was denounced as:

"Nothing but a pretext used by China's Khrushchev (Liu Shao-chi -- Ed.) to oppose the socialist transformation of agriculture".

(Editorial Depts. of 'People's Daily' and 'Red Flag': 'Struggle between Two Roads in China's Countryside (December 1967), in: 'Peking Review'; Volume 10, No. 49 (1 December 1967); p. 14).

The comprador bourgeois Party grouping, headed by Mao Tse-tung, [wishing to use the cooperativisation of agriculture only as a weapon to drive a wedge between the national bourgeois grouping of the Party and the peasantry](#), strongly opposed postponing cooperativisation of agriculture until the industrialisation of the country had been achieved, while supporting an offensive against the rich, capitalist peasants. The policy of this grouping:

"Adopted on the basis of the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, was to commence to develop forms of cooperative production immediately after the land reform".

(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 29).

[Lower-Level Cooperative Farms \(January 1951-July 1955\)](#)

From January 1951, an ideological controversy went on between the groupings of the Party on the question of the cooperativisation of agriculture.

In July 1951:

"Liu Shao-chi wrote and distributed a comment in his own name. In this comment, he opposed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line on the socialist transformation of agriculture . . . as an 'erroneous, dangerous and utopian notion.' (Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 71).

In September 1951, Mao Tse-tung:

"Personally took charge of drafting the 'Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC on Mutual Aid and Cooperation in Agricultural Production (Draft)'".

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 71).

The draft resolution was intended:

"To rebuff Liu Shao-chi's opposition."

(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 71).

and was distributed as an inner-Party document in December 1951.

From January 1951, the comprador bourgeois grouping of the Party headed by Mao Tse-tung, succeeded in establishing a number of cooperative farms, although the national bourgeois grouping of the Party was able to ensure that these adopted a distribution system which favoured the rich peasants:

"These first (so-called 'lower-level') coops paid out part of their product in the form of rent paid in proportion to the land each family had put into the coop, and rent for the use of the members' tools and animals, and the rest according to a system of work-points.

The lower-level coops favoured the old rich peasants in that it was they who in general . . . owned more land and capital for which they received rent".

(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 29).

In spite of this enforced concession, for the most part at this time, a coalition of the Marxist-Leninist and national bourgeois groupings dominated the Party machinery, so that the Party policy towards the cooperativisation of agriculture was one of restraint:

"Up to the summer of 1955, the principle of 'gradualism' prevailed".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 10-11).

"Until the summer of 1955, the Government had on the whole been wary in its advance towards the formation of agricultural producers' cooperatives. . . . The majority of the Central Committee was genuinely adhering to the often-proclaimed principles of 'gradualness' and 'voluntariness'."

('Communist China: 1955-59: Policy Documents with Analysis' (hereafter listed as 'Communist China'); Cambridge (USA); 1962; p. 3).

For example, in March 1955, the State Council:

"Ordered the cadres to slow down agricultural collectivisation and reorganise and consolidate the existing Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (APCs)".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 10).

and in May 1955 Deputy Premier Teng Tsu-hui:

"Retrenched and dissolved 200,000 cooperatives at a Central Committee Rural Work Conference. .

In the provinces there was a widespread feeling against rapid collectivisation. . . .

The decision of the May 1955 Central Work Conference to cut back APCs probably reflected this consensus".

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 13, 14).

THE 'FIRST LEAP FORWARD' (July 1955 - June 1956) **Mao's Speech on Agricultural Cooperativisation (July 1955)**

The liquidation of the Marxist-Leninist grouping of the Party in 1954 ended the coalition between this grouping and the national bourgeois grouping on the question of the cooperativisation of agriculture.

In July 1955, therefore, confronted with the strong opposition of the national bourgeois grouping of the Party, Mao Tse-tung:

"Intervened and attempted to reverse the moderate policy that was being

implemented".

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 11).

Mao:

"Chose to bypass the regular decision-making bodies and appeal directly to provincial-level leaders. . . . At the end of July 1955, . Mao convened a conference in Peking of the secretaries of the provincial-level Party committees (a forum stipulated in neither the 1945 nor the 1956 Party constitutions)".

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 14).

and:

"Against the wishes of most of his colleagues in the CP leadership, called for an acceleration of the transition to lower-level, and then to higher-level, agricultural producers' cooperatives in the countryside".

('Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 145).

Mao's intervention precipitated a new stage in intra-Party dissension:

"It was in connection with Mao Tse-tung 's new policy on cooperatives that . . . opposition first became acute and obvious".

('Communist China?': *op. cit.*; p. 3).

In a report he delivered to this conference entitled 'On the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture', Mao strongly criticised the slow pace of agricultural cooperativisation which had been adopted under the aegis of the national bourgeois grouping of the Party:

"Some of our comrades, tottering along like a woman with bound feet, are complaining all the time: 'You're going too fast, much too fast'. Too much carping, unwarranted complaints, boundless anxiety and countless taboos. . . .

This is not the right policy."

(Mao Tse-tung (July 1955): *op. cit.*; p. 184).

He condemned the practice of dissolving cooperative farms, even where a majority of the members favoured this course:

"No decision should be made to dissolve cooperatives unless all, or nearly all, the members are determined not to carry on. . . If the majority is firmly against carrying on, but the minority is willing to do so, let the majority withdraw while the minority stays in and continues."

(Mao Tse-tung (July 1955): *ibid.*; p. 189).

In particular, Mao called for the transition from lower-level cooperative farms to **higher-level cooperative farms, in which collective farmers' incomes were dependent only upon work performed:**

"The advanced coop farms were formed by the amalgamation of several small coops. . . . In these coops rent on land was abolished, the capital of the members

was bought out by the coop, thus abolishing rent on tools and animals, and ownership of the land was vested in the coop".
(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 29).

Mao called on the peasants to:

"Organise large fully socialist agricultural producers' cooperatives".
(Mao Tse-tung (July 1955): op. cit.; p. 199).

Following Mao's intervention:

"The movement to form advanced coops swept the country".
(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 29).

But Mao's speech remained unpublished:

"Until the policy 'suggested' by Mao had been ratified and formalised in the decisions of the Party's Central Committee in October 1955".
(*'Communist China'*: op. cit.; p. 92).

By this time:

"The leap in agricultural collectivisation was already a **fait accompli** in many provinces."
(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 15).

and came later to be called:

"The 'First Leap Forward'".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 26).

The 6th Plenum of the 7th CC (October 1955)

In October 1955, Mao convened the 6th Plenum of the 7th Central Committee:

"To formally endorse and legitimise the campaign that had already been launched".
(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 15).

At the 6th Plenum of the 7th Central Committee, in October 1955, Mao demanded a large-scale expansion of cooperative farming:

"The view in favour of a small expansion (of cooperative farming -- Ed.) is wrong".
(Mao Tse-tung: Concluding Speech at 6th Plenum of the 7th CC of the CPC (October 1955) (hereafter listed as 'Mao Tse-tung (October 1955)', in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 216).

and an expansion on a country-wide scale:

"Expansion is possible in areas which were liberated late, in mountain areas, in backward townships and in areas affected by disasters. . It is possible in all such

places."

(Mao Tse-tung (October 1955): *ibid.*; p. 216).

He argued against the liquidation of even poorly-run cooperative farms:

"Generally, the so-called poorly-run cooperatives should not be dissolved, for they can take a turn for the better after a check-up".

(Mao Tse-tung (October 1955): *ibid.*; p. 217).

and reaffirmed the comprador bourgeois line that cooperative farms could be successfully established without funds or machines:

"Cooperatives can be set up without funds, carts and oxen. . . Cooperatives can be set up without farm machinery".

(Mao Tse-tung (October 1955): *ibid.*; p. 217).

and argued again for the setting up of at least a batch of advanced-type cooperative farms in the near future:

"Should we set up a number of cooperatives of the advanced type in the near future? . . . A batch of such cooperatives should be set up".

(Mao Tse-tung (October 1955): *ibid.*; p. 218).

The Seventeen Articles (November 1955)

It was in this situation of continuing domination of the comprador bourgeois grouping of the Party that, in November 1955, Mao wrote:

"The so-called Seventeen Articles".

(Parris H. Chang: *op. cit.*; p. 19).

These formed the basis of a new pseudo-left agricultural programme for the comprador bourgeois grouping of the Party areas; they were circulated unofficially in the rural areas, where they produced a 'colossal mobilisation force':

"These Seventeen Articles, apparently without approval by legitimate decision-making bodies, were transmitted to the rural areas, where they produced a 'colossal mobilisation force'.

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 19).

Chou En-lai's Speech on Intellectuals (January 1956)

The dominance within the Party of the comprador bourgeois grouping of the Party was illustrated when Chou En-lai told a conference on intellectuals in January 1956 that the Central Committee had:

"Decided to make opposition to rightist conservative ideology the central question for the 8th National Congress of the Party",

(Chou En-lai: *Speech on the Question of Intellectuals (January 1956)*, in:

'Communist China': op. cit.; p. 129).

[The 1956-67 Draft Programme for Agricultural Development \(January 1956\)](#)

In January 1956, after more discussions with provincial Party officials in Peking:

"Mao expanded the Seventeen Articles into Forty Articles and produced the first version".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 19).

of the 1956-67 Draft National Programme for Agricultural Development, which was launched in January 1956:

"At a Supreme State Conference".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 17).

Thus, it was:

"In the context of the inner-Party disputes over the tempo of collectivisation and Mao's victory leading to the speed-up of collectivisation that the draft 'Forty Article 1956-1967 National Programme for Agricultural Development was launched".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 17).

The draft programme:

". . . called for a continuation of the fairly radical line pushed by Mao since the previous summer."

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 17-18).

It set:

"The goal of getting about 85% of all peasant households into APCs in 1956".

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 17).

and that of completing the transition to higher-level cooperative farms ('collective farms'):

"By 1958". (Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 18).

Whereas in fact this programme was exceeded, since:

"63% of all farm households were in collectives by June 1956, and 88% by December of that year."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 18).

Following the announcement of the draft programme:

"An intensive publicity campaign was launched to publicise it and to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses as well as that of the cadres.

With great fanfare, various provinces began to map out plans in accordance with the spirit of the draft programme. .

Unprecedentedly large numbers of peasants were mobilised".
(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 20, 21).

The voluntary principle was discarded:

"The cadres, spurred on by their superiors . . . , often ignored the principles of 'voluntarism and mutual benefit as prescribed by the central authorities'.
(Parris H. Chang: ibid.; p. 21-22).

and all but the most extreme counter-revolutionary elements were admitted into membership, since Article 5 of the new draft programme:

"Provided for the admission to collectives of all but the worst counter-revolutionaries."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 78).

[The Crisis in Agriculture \(June 1956-September 1956\)](#)

The pseudo-left character of the draft Agricultural Programme, and especially its coercive aspects, quickly aroused [mass discontent among the peasantry](#):

"The peasants . . . were dissatisfied and resentful. . . . The peasants slaughtered livestock and draught animals instead of surrendering them to the APCs. . . . Cadres' lack of experience in managing the APCs and the resulting mismanagement further exacerbated the difficulties of the APCs. . . . Food crops and cotton were overemphasised (because they were targets in the draft programme) at the expense of other economic crops; agriculture was overstressed, and subsidiary occupations were neglected. . . .
. . . Sideline production generally represented 30-40% of the peasants' total income, and the falling output in economic crops and sideline occupations greatly affected the peasants' cash income and increased the difficulties in their daily life".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 22-23).

As a consequence of all this, by April 1956:

"The national economy was encountering some serious problems. . . .
Both the problems afflicting national economy and the difficulties in the countryside resulted largely from the rapid collectivisation drive and poor management of the APCs, as well as from the attempts to achieve the goals of the draft programme ahead of time".
(Parris H. Chang: ibid.; p. 23-24).

Thus, the economic crisis of spring 1956:

"Served to vindicate the position of those Party officials who advocated gradualism".
(Parris H. Chang: ibid.; p. 24).

"Clearly those Party members who in the winter of 1955-56 had been accused of conservatism for opposing Mao's new line on cooperatives must have felt themselves amply justified by events."
(Communist China'; op. cit.; p. 9).

As a result of the unscientific nature of the draft Agricultural Programme, by June 1956:

"The economic situation . . . was now so serious that a top-level conference at Peitaiho . . . decided that the production drive should be slowed down".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 86).

[The Campaign 'against Reckless Advance' \(April 1956-September 1956\)](#)

Thus, by April 1956 the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie, headed by Liu Shao-chi, had succeeded in winning a majority of the leading cadres of the Party to the view that [the 'First Leap Forward' initiated by the comprador bourgeoisie headed by Mao Tse-tung had been economically harmful.](#)

In consequence, the [policy of the CPC was changed.](#)

In April/May 1956, a joint meeting of the Politburo of the CC of the CPC and of the State Council:

"Issued an important joint directive to stop the tendencies of 'reckless advance'.
(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 23).

At the NPC in June 1956, Minister of Finance Li Hsien-nien amended Mao's slogan of 'opposing right conservatism' to that of '[simultaneously opposing impetuosity and adventurism](#)', saying in his budget report:

"While opposing conservatism, one must at the same time oppose the tendency towards impetuosity and adventurism."
(Li Hsien-nien: Budget Speech (June 1956), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 86, citing 'People's Daily' (16 June 1956).

A few days later, an editorial in the 'People's Daily':

"Made it clear that while conservatism would still be criticised, opposition to impetuosity would be the more important task. Its real aim was to oppose blind advance".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 87, 88).

The text of this editorial was approved by Liu Shao-chi and sent for comment to Mao, who wrote on the draft:

"I won't read this".
(Mao Tse-tung: Comment on Draft of 'People's Daily' Editorial of 20 June 1956, in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 87).

Eighteen months later, in 1969, Mao explained:

"Why should I read something that abuses me?"

(Mao Yse-tung: Comment on Draft of 'People's Daily' Editorial of 20 June 1956, in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 87).

In September 1956, on the eve of the 8th National Congress of the CPC, a joint CC/State Council directive on agricultural production made a:

"Curt reference to the 12-Year Agricultural Programme in its preamble, but the whole intention of the directive was clearly to rectify the distortions of the rural economy that the programme had caused. . . . Effectively, the 12-Year Programme had been shelved. . . . Since the programme had been the centre-piece of the 1956 leap, its abandonment, along with the attack on adventurism, symbolised the abandonment of the leap itself".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 91).

Thus:

"Eight months after its emergence in January 1956, the draft programme had fallen into oblivion". (Parris H. Chang: *op. cit.*; p. 31).

CHAPTER EIGHT : CHINESE SOCIALISM AND PSEUDO-SOCIALISM IN PRACTICE

(Summer 1955-September 1956)

Socialism in Agriculture

In September 1956, Liu Shao-chi told the 8th National Congress of the CPC that, in spite of opposition, agriculture in China had been fundamentally reorganised on the basis of higher-level cooperatives:

"The elementary type of cooperatives were subsequently reorganised into the advanced type, which are socialist in character. In these advanced cooperatives, the land and other principal means of production are changed from private into collective ownership".

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): *op. cit.*; p. 16).

Since Marxist-Leninists agree that cooperative farm property is **socialist property**:

"Collective farm property is socialist property".

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR?' (September 1952), in: 'Works', Volume 16; London; 1986; p. 394).

One must agree with Liu Shao-chi's assessment that:

"We have been able to accomplish in the main the socialist transformation of agriculture".

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): *op. cit.*; p. 18).

Socialism in Handicrafts

At the same time, in September 1956, Liu Shao-chi told the 8th National Congress of the CPC that handicrafts had been fundamentally reorganised on the basis of cooperatives, the property of which, as in agriculture, could correctly be regarded as [socialist property](#):

"Individual handicraftsmen throughout the country have joined producers cooperatives of various forms. Those who are in . . . cooperatives now constitute 90% of the total number all who follow the calling of individual handicrafts".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 11).

Thus:

"We have now achieved a decisive victory in the socialist transformation of . . . handicrafts . . . in our country".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 11).

[Pseudo-Socialism in Industry and Commerce](#)

In the summer of 1955, a programme began:

"For the 'socialist transformation' of industry and commerce".
(*'New Encyclopaedia Britannica'*, Volume 16; 1994; p. 145).

In the case of industry and commerce, however, this 'socialist transformation' followed the [pseudo-socialist](#) lines already described (pages 43-46).

"Capitalist industry and commerce in the country has, by and large, come under joint state-private operation."
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 12)

The new-democratic state maintained the ['unreasonably high' salaries](#) which were being received by the capitalists involved:

"Even the unreasonably high salaries enjoyed by many of the capitalists and agents in these enterprises were continued after the changeover."
(Kuan Ta-tung: op. cit.; p. 87).

and paid the capitalists [a guaranteed rate of interest on their investments, thus maintaining exploitation of the workers](#):

"A fixed rate of interest was paid by the state for the total investment of the capitalists in the joint state-private enterprises. Irrespective of locality and trade, the interest was fixed at a rate of 5% per annum . thus maintaining exploitation."
(Kuan Ta-tung: *ibid.*; p. 86-87, 91).

Indeed, [the amount of profit being made increased significantly](#):

"Statistics of 64 factories in various parts of China which had gone over to joint operation earlier than others revealed that their profits were increasing. Taking their profit in 1950 as 100, it was 113 in 1951, 228 in 1952, and 306 in 1953". .

(Kuan Ta-tung: *ibid.*; p. 78, 91).

Not unnaturally, the capitalists **welcomed this spurious socialism:**

'Our bourgeoisie has heralded its acceptance of socialist transformation with a fanfare of gongs and drums.'

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): *op. cit.*; p. 59).

and were happy to be 'remoulded' by 'educational measures' into 'working people':

"While the enterprises are being transformed, educational measures are adopted to remould the capitalists gradually . . . into working people". (Liu Shao~hi (1956): *op. cit.*; p. 25).

Thus, Liu Shao-chi was able to tell the 8th National Congress of the SPC in September 1956 truthfully that

"Capitalist industry and commerce in the country has, by and large, come under joint state-private operation."

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): *op. cit.*; p. 12).

and untruthfully that:

"We have now achieved a decisive victory in the socialist transformation of . . . capitalist industry and commerce."

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): *op. cit.*; p. 11).

CHAPTER NINE: THE CONTROVERSY OVER ECONOMIC PLANNING

(February 1956 - December 1958)

INTRODUCTION

As we have seen (page 41),

THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI, FAVOURED THE PLANNING OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SO AS TO MAXIMISE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

On the other hand,

THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG, FAVOURED THE RESTRICTION OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INFRA-STRUCTURE -- communications, ports, etc. -- REQUIRED BY A COLONIAL-TYPE ECONOMY.

The intra-Party struggle over this question was fought out on the issue of **centralised economic planning.**

Since a planned economy is one of the foundations of a socialist society, the political representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie did not campaign openly for the **abolition** of economic planning, **only for its decentralisation**-- omitting to point out that centralisation, the binding nature of planning on every peripheral organisation, **is one of the essential features of economic planning.**

In the absence of centralised economic planning in a new-democratic society, production can be regulated only by **profitability**. Under these conditions:

"The law of value regulates the 'proportions' of labour distributed among the various branches of production."

(Josef V. Stalin: 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR' (February 1952) (hereafter listed as 'Josef V. Stalin (1952)', in: 'Works', Volume 16; London; 1986; p. 315).

In these conditions:

"Light industries, which are the most profitable".

(Josef V. Stalin (1952): *ibid.*; p. 315),

would developed to the full, in contrast to:

"Heavy industries, which are often less profitable, and sometimes altogether unprofitable".

(Josef V. Stalin (1952): *ibid.*; p. 315).

The 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956)

In February 1956, Nikita KHRUSHCHEV, the revisionist First Secretary of the CPSU, launched in his secret speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, his attack upon Stalin.

The speech was, in reality, an attack upon Marxism-Leninism and it had the important effect of making revisionism 'respectable' within the international communist movement.

Khrushchev also utilised the Congress to call for the decentralisation of economic planning, that is, **for the abolition of centralised economic planning:**

"In the past, practically all enterprises in certain Republics had been managed through Union Ministries, but this system requires revision."

(Nikita S. Khrushchev: 'Report of the Central Committee to the 20th Congress of the CPSU' (February 1956), in: 'Keesing '5 Contemporary Archives', Volume 10; p. 14,747).

CPC Reaction to the 20th Congress (April 1956)

That there were from the outset differences within the CPC on the question of the 20th Congress of the CPSU:

"Is suggested by the fact that, from February to April 1956, Chinese Communist media virtually ignored the question of destalinisation". (Donald S. Zagoria: 'The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961'; Princeton (USA); 1962; p. 43).

However, at the beginning of April 1956, the 'People's Daily' published a long article entitled 'On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat', stated to be:

"Based on discussions at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPC."

(Donald S. Zagoria: *ibid.*; p. 43).

The Chinese article endorsed the main points made in Khrushchev's secret speech. It declared:

"Stalin failed to draw lessons from isolated, local and temporary mistakes on certain issues and so failed to prevent them from becoming serious mistakes of a nationwide or prolonged nature. . . . Stalin took more and more pleasure in this cult of the individual, and violated the Party's system of democratic centralism. . . . As a result he made some serious mistakes, such as the following: . . . he lacked the necessary vigilance on the eve of the anti-fascist war; he failed to pay proper attention to the further development of agriculture and the material welfare of the peasantry; he gave certain wrong advice on the international communist movement and, in particular, made a wrong decision on the question of Yugoslavia. On these issues, Stalin fell victim to subjectivism and one-sidedness, and divorced himself from objective reality and from the masses. .

The Chinese Communist Party congratulates the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on its great achievements in this historic struggle against the cult of the individual".

('People's Daily': 'On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat' (April 1956), in: John Gittings: 'Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics: 1963-1967'; London; 1968; p. 291-92, 293).

Mao's 'On the Ten Major Relationships' (April 1956)

According to Marxist-Leninist principles, **priority in economic planning has to be given to heavy industry**, to the production of means of production:

"The national economy . . . cannot be continuously expanded without giving primacy to the production of means of production."

(Josef V. Stalin (1952): *op. cit.*; 'Works', Volume 16; London; 1986; p. 316).

In a speech entitled 'On the Ten Major Relationships', delivered to an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC in April 1956, Mao Tse-tung paid lip-service to the Marxist-Leninist principle that priority in economic planning

should be given to the production of means of production:

"The production of means of production must be given priority. That's settled".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Ten ~Iajor Relationships' (April 1956) (hereafter listed as 'Mao Tse-tung (April 1956), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 285).

However, he criticised Soviet planning policy for its alleged:

"Lop-sided stress on heavy industry to the neglect of agriculture and light industry".
(Mao Tse-tung (April 1956): *ibid.*; p. 285).

and **demanding that the proportion of investment devoted to light industry and agriculture be increased:**

"The proportion (of investment -- Ed.) for agriculture and light industry must be somewhat increased".
(Mao Tse-tung (April 1956): *ibid.*; p. 286).

Mao also demanded a reduction in centralised economic planning, that is, greater autonomy in the control of production for individual enterprises:

"It's not right, I'm afraid, to place everything in the hands of the central or the provincial and municipal authorities, without leaving the factories any power of their own, any room for independent action.

Every unit of production must enjoy independence as the correlative of centralisation if it is to develop more vigorously".

(Mao Tse-tung (April 1956): *ibid.*; p. 290).

The Foundation of the State Economic Commission (May 1956)

In May 1956, on Mao's initiative, a State Economic Commission was established, charged with charting over-ambitious annual targets in a bid to outflank the more cautious State Planning Commission and secure the adoption of pseudo-left economic plans:

"Mao hoped to outflank the State Planning Commission on both sides. Very long-term plans, like the Twelve-Year Agricultural Programme, would set high goals; the State Economic Commission would set high annual targets in an attempt to reach these goals. . . . The intermediate targets of the FYP (Five-Year Plan -- Ed.) could thus be by-passed. . .

The first head of the State Economic Commission was . . . P0 I-po*". (Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *op. cit.*; p 58).

The 8th National Congress of the CPC (September 1956)

Following the failure of the 'First Leap Forward', at the 8th National Congress of the

CPC in September 1956, the national bourgeois faction of the Party, headed by Liu Shao-chi, was dominant:

"Mao played a minor public role at the 8th Congress. He gave only a short opening address. . . .

The real blow to Mao's prestige at the 8th Congress was the omission from the new Party constitution of both references to 'the Thought of Mao Tse-tung' that had been included in the 1945 constitution. .

Maoists felt that the Chairman's prestige received a blow at the 8th Congress." (Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 100, 107).

while Liu Shao-chi's Political Report to the Congress on behalf of the CC:

"Made no mention of Mao Tse-tung's Thought".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): ibid.; p. 101).

Indeed:

"Liu Shao-chi played an active and important role in securing agreement to drop Mao's Thought."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): ibid.; p. 102).

and, during the 'Cultural Revolution', PENG Teh-huai* declared:

"In 1956, at the 8th Party Congress, when the 8th Congress was held, it was I who proposed to cross out (from the Party constitution) Mao Tse-Tung's Thought. As soon as I made this proposal, Liu Shao-chi gave me his approval".

(Peng Teh-huai: 'Record of Interrogation in Custody' (December 1966-January 1967), in: 'The Case of Peng Teh-huai'; Hong Kong; 1968; p. 119-20).

Later, in October 1966, Mao revealed that at the time of the 8th Congress:

"We set up a first and second line. I have been in the second line".

(Mao Tse-tung: Talk at Central Work Conference (October 1966), in: Stuart Schram (Ed.) (1975): op. cit.; p. 270).

The dominance of the national bourgeois grouping within the Party was further reflected in the resolutions adopted by the Congress. In contrast to Mao's formulation that [the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie was now the principal contradiction in China](#), i. e.:

"The contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie has become the principal contradiction in China".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Contradiction between the Working Class and the Bourgeoisie is the Principal Contradiction in China' (June 1952), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 77).

the 8th Congress 'Resolution on the Political Report' declared:

"The contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in our country has

been basically resolved. .

The major contradiction in our country . . . is already that between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces of society".

(Resolution on the Political Report of the CC (September 1956), in: 'Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China', Volume 1; Peking; 1956; p. 115, 116).

that is:

"The political resolution effectively stated that the main task of the CPC was now economic development. . . . This in turn implied that the CPC was not in need of rectification. Mao disagreed sharply. .

The political resolution seemed designed to head off any demand by Mao for rectification of the CPC".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 120, 121).

In the field of economic planning, the 8th Congress of the CPC reaffirmed the national bourgeois view that priority in economic planning should be accorded to heavy industry, and explicitly **repudiated** Mao's view that the rate of development of heavy industry should be lowered:

"We must continue to carry through the policy of giving priority to the development of heavy industry. Some comrades want to lower the rate of development of heavy industry. This line of thinking is wrong."

(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 39-40).

Decentralisation of Economic Planning in the USSR (March 1957)

In March 1957, Khrushchev put forward 20,000-word theses amplifying his 20th Congress proposals for 'decentralisation' of economic planning:

"Mr. Khrushchev proposed that the Central Ministries for particular branches of industry, and the similar Ministries in the Union Republics, should be abolished and replaced by 'Economic Councils', each of which would be responsible for a particular region."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 11; p. 15,575).

The adoption of revisionist deviations from Marxism-Leninism by the CPSU greatly assisted the political representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie, headed by Mao Tse-tung, in ditching the correct planning principles applied during the period of the 1st Five-Year Plan:

The 3rd Plenum of the 8th CC of the CPC (September/October 1957)

Before the 3rd Plenum of the 8th CC, which was held in September/October 1957, Mao Tse-tung:

". . travelled extensively in the provinces."

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 39).

attempting, in the new situation following the 20th Congress of the CPSU. which had made revisionism , respectable' in the international communist movement, to recruit

". . support from the provincial secretaries, many of whom had been brought into the CC since the 1956 Party Congress."

(Parris H. Chang: ibid.; p. 39).

Thus, at the Plenum, Mao:

". . suddenly turned the tables, as he had in 1955 on the issue of collectivisation, when he was assured of new support, and challenged the opponents among his colleagues by presenting his own policy".

(Parris H. Chang: ibid.; p. 39).

As a result:

"The balance of power among the Party leaders changed".

(Parris H. Chang: ibid.; p. 37).

putting the political representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie:

"Including Mao himself, in a very strong position."

(Parris H. Chang: ibid.; p. 37).

Thus, at the Plenum:

"Decentralisation was one of the major topics discussed".

(Franz Schurmann: op. cit.; p. 195).

and gave rise to heated argument:

"The unusual length of the meeting indicated that the CC engaged in hot and serious arguments".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 39).

What came out of the 3rd Plenum:

"Was a clear-cut decision for decentralisation II",

(Franz Schurmann: op. cit.; p. 197).

that is, powers were:

"Put into the hands of . . . lower-echelon administrative units".

(Franz Schurmann: ibid.; p. 197).

Furthermore, reflecting the dominant position of the comprador bourgeoisie Party grouping at the Plenum:

"The draft twelve-year National Programme for Agricultural Development . . . was unexpectedly resurrected. . . . It became one of the major items on the agenda of the Plenum".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 38-39).

Despite some modifications made at the Plenum, the document:

"Was still a very ambitious and unrealistic programme. Its revival represented a radical departure from the more moderate economic line which the regime had pursued since the second half of 1956".

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 40).

Nevertheless:

"Mao's victory in the 3rd Plenum was not total, inasmuch as the revised draft programme was only 'basically' passed, implying reservations by some of the Party leaders".

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 39).

The 1957 Decentralisation (November 1957)

In November 1957:

"The State Council, acting on the decision of the last CC Plenum, promulgated reforms in the system of industrial, commercial and financial administration. In the field of industry, . . . the power of provincial authorities was increased by transferring to their control many enterprises previously managed by the ministries of the central government. .

By the decree of November 1957, enterprises in consumer goods industries (most of which were then controlled by the Ministry of Light Industry), non-strategic heavy industry, and 'all other factories suitable for decentralisation' were to be 'transferred downward' to the local (primarily provincial) authorities. .

The provincial authorities now would . . . assume operational responsibilities for a broad range of industries coming under their control".

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 55-56).

In the field of commerce:

"As in industry, considerable authority devolved from Peking to the provinces and to the local authorities."

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 57).

These measures included the abolition of centralised price control:

"Provincial authorities were given the right to set some prices in their areas of jurisdiction."

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 57).

In fact, 'decentralisation' of economic planning was equivalent to the abolition of economic planning:

"Decentralisation could easily be carried, as it was, to the point where even

pretence of unity in national planning and national economic development was destroyed".

(Li Choh-ming: 'China's Industrial Development: 1958-63', in: Roderick MacFarquahar (Ed.) (1972): op. cit.; p. 197).

It was followed by a call for a rapid build-up of **local industry**, which was **almost entirely of the light type**:

"The decentralisation decisions called for a rapid build-up of regional industry, which was almost entirely of the light type. The industries transferred from central to provincial control were almost entirely in the light category".

(Franz Schurmann: op. cit.; p. 203).

Mao's 'Sixty Articles on Work Methods' (January 1958)

In a collection of articles by Mao Tse-tung entitled 'Sixty Articles on Work Methods', dated January 1958, Article 9:

"Contained the seeds of the undermining of the basis of careful planning, the statistical system", (Roderick MacFarquahar: 'The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: 2: The Great Leap Forward: 1958-1960'; Oxford; 1983; p. 31).

on the grounds that:

"Imbalance is constant and absolute, while equilibrium is temporary and relative". (Mao Tse-tung: 'Sixty Articles on Work Methods' (January 1958), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 30).

Not surprisingly:

"Mao's enthusiasm for disequilibrium was not shared by the planners." (Stuart R. Schram: 'Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution: 1958-69' (hereafter listed as 'Stuart R. Schram (1971)', in: 'China Quarterly', No. 46 (April/June 1971); p. 233).

and an editorial in the journal 'Planned Economy', the organ of the State Planning Commission, in March 1958 declared that:

"Should disequilibrium emerge, strenuous efforts should be made to overcome it ."

(Editorial: 'Planned Economy', No. 3, 1958, in: Stuart R. Schram (1971): *ibid.*; p. 235).

At the end of 1958:

"'Planned Economy' ceased publication." (Stuart R. Schram (1971): *ibid.*; p. 235).

The 1958 Decentralisation (early-June 1958)

In early 1958:

"The State Council carried out a sweeping reorganisation",
(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 62).

which was, in fact, a more drastic decentralisation measure than that of the previous year. As the comprador bourgeoisie's:

"Grip on the policy-making machinery became tighter in the winter of 1957-58, . . . gradualism and caution were discarded. . . Thus, some 80% of the enterprises and institutions controlled in 1957 by the . . . central government had been handed over to the provincial-level authorities by the end of June 1958, and the share of the locally controlled enterprises rose from 54% of the industrial value produced in 1957 to 73% in 1958".

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 61).

"By the middle of 1958, . . . the central government controlled virtually none of the output of manufactured consumer goods".

(Edward J. Wheelwright & Bruce McFarlane: op. cit.; p. 69).

"In the short span of 10 months, the central government had announced that it was, in effect, giving up . . . most of the major instruments at its disposal for planning and managing the economy."

(Nicholas R. Lardy: 'Centralisation and Decentralisation in China's Fiscal Management' in: 'China Quarterly', No. 61 (March 1975); p. 29).

[The 2nd Session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC \(May 1958\)](#)

In May 1958, the 2nd Session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC decided:

"To approve the draft Programme in principle".

(Resolution of 2nd Session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC on the National Programme for Agricultural Development (1956-1967), in:

'Second Session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC'; Peking; 1958; p. 95).

[The 2nd Five-Year Plan \(1958-62\)](#)

Although a resolution adopted by the 8th National Congress of the CPC in September 1956, characterised the basic tasks of the 2nd Five-Year Plan (1958-62) as:

"Continued development of various industries, with heavy industry as the core",

(Resolution of 8th Congress of CPC: (September 1956), in: Roderick MacFarquhar (Ed.) (1972): op. cit.; p. 177).

in fact, China:

"Had no 2nd Five-Year Plan (1958-72), only five **ad hoc** annual plans during that period".

(Li Choh-ming: 'China's Industrial Development: 1958-63', in: Roderick MacFarquhar (Ed.) (1972): *ibid.* p. 175).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 5

BO Yibo = Pinyin form of P0 1-po.

KHRUSHCHEV, Nikita S., Soviet revisionist politician (1894-1971); 1st Secretary, Moscow City and Regional Committees, CPSU (1935-38); 1st Secretary, CP Ukraine (1938-47, 1948-49); member, Political Bureau / Presidium, CC CPSU (1939-64); Order of the Red Banner of Labour (1941); lieutenant-general (1943); Order of Lenin (1944); Premier, Ukraine SSR (1944-47); Order of Suvorov, 1st Class (1945); 1st Secretary, Moscow, CPSU (1950-53); 1st Secretary, CPSU (1953-64); Premier (1958-64); retired from all posts (1964).

P0 1-po, Chinese revisionist economist and politician (1908-); member, Central People's Government Council (1949-53); member, Government Administrative Council (1949-53); Minister of Finance (1949-53); member, State Planning Commission (1952-54); Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission (1953-54, 1962-66); Chairman, State Economic Commission (1950-66); member, Political Bureau, CC, CPC (1951-56); Deputy Premier (1956-66, 1979-82); member, State Financial and Economic Commission (1979-81); member, State Machine Building Industry Commission (1980-82); member, State Council (1982-83); Deputy Minister, State Commission for Restructuring the Financial System (1982-88).

CHAPTER TEN : THE 'HUNDRED FLOWERS' AFFAIR

(May 1956 - September 1957)

INTRODUCTION

THE TERM 'HUNDRED FLOWERS AFFAIR' IS USED TO DESCRIBE THE CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED BY THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG, TO MOBILISE THE INTELLECTUALS OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE INTO CONFLICT WITH THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

Mao's 'Hundred Flowers' Speech (May 1956)

In May 1956 Mao Tse-tung gave his:

"Famous 'hundred flowers' speech, made to a closed session of the Supreme State Conference."

(Roderick MacFarquhar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 51).

The speech has:

"Never become available, but its main themes were elaborated three weeks later by the director of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, LU Ting-yi*",

(Roderick MacFarquahar et al (1989): op. cit.; p. 6).

who said:

"If we want art, literature and science to flourish, we must apply a policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom, letting a hundred schools of thought contend".

(Lu Ting-yi: 'Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend' (May 1956), in: 'Communist China': op. cit.; p. 152).

Clearly, the speech called for 'liberalism' in the fields of art, literature and science. However, spokesmen for the national bourgeois faction of the Party professed to interpret Mao's 'Hundred Flowers' speech as merely 'an attack on dogmatism'. For example, in a speech to students at Peking University on 13 May, 1956, Liu Shao-chi asserted that the main objective of the policy was:

"To oppose doctrinairism".

(Liu Shao-chi: Speech to History Students at Peking University' (May 1957), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): ibid.; p. 53).

[Mao's 'Contradictions' Speech \(February 1957\)](#)

In February 1957, in his capacity as head of state, Mao Tse-tung:

"Summoned a Supreme State Conference of 1,800 leading communists and non-communists",

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op cit.; p. 184).

and addressed it in:

" . . closed session".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (Ed.): 'The Hundred Flowers' (hereafter listed as 'Roderick MacFarquahar (Ed.) (1960)'; Paris; 1960; p. 17).

His speech:

"Was entitled 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People'".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (Ed.) (1960): ibid.; p. 17).

This:

"Major policy initiative had apparently not been preceded by extensive discussions within the CC. In this respect it . . . resembled . . . Mao's personal initiative on collectivisation policy in the summer of 1955".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op cit.; p. 192).

Mao 's speech remained unpublished, but in 1985 a version described as:

"speaking notes' of Mao's famous speech",
(Note to: Roderick MacFarquahar et al (Eds.) (1989): op. cit.; p. 131-32).

was circulated.

According to this 1985 version of the 'Contradictions' speech, Mao defined contradictions as of two types -- [antagonistic contradictions](#) with a class enemy, and [non-antagonistic contradictions](#) 'among the people':

"One type is antagonistic contradictions: contradictions between the enemy and ourselves. . . ; . Contradictions among the people are non-antagonistic contradictions."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' (February 1957), (Speaking Notes) (hereafter listed as 'Mao Tse-tung (February 1957)', in: Roderick MacFarquahar et al (Eds.) (1989): op. cit.; p. 132).

According to Mao, although the contradictions between the working class and the national bourgeoisie are antagonistic:

"The working class and the . . . national bourgeoisie are two antagonistic classes",
(Mao Tse-tung (February 1957): *ibid.*; p. 136).

the contradictions with:

"The national bourgeoisie cannot be put . . . in the category of contradictions between the enemy and ourselves",
(Mao Tse-tung (February 1957): *ibid.*; p. 135).

but must be regarded as:

"Contradictions among the people",
(Mao Tse-tung (February 1957): *ibid.*; p. 131).

since such:

"Antagonistic contradictions, if properly handled, . . . can be transformed into non-antagonistic contradictions."
(Mao Tse-tung (February 1957): *ibid.*; p. 136).

For a long time, asserted Mao, Stalin failed to differentiate between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions:

"During the period when Stalin was in charge, for a long time he confused these two types of contradictions."
(Mao Tse-tung (February 1957): *ibid.*; p. 136).

The bourgeoisie, admitted Mao, will have its own ideology, reflecting its class interests:

"The bourgeoisie . . . must certainly reflect their ideological consciousness."
(Mao Tse-tung (February 1957): *ibid.*; p. 170).

and it must be free to express this ideology:

"All attempts to use administrative fiat or compulsion to solve ideological problems are not only ineffective, but harmful. .

The bourgeoisie . . . must express themselves, using various methods, staunchly. . . . We cannot use coercive methods to stop them from expressing themselves; we can only debate with them".

(Mao Tse-tung (February 1957): *ibid.*; p. 135, 170-71).

In order to resolve contradictions among the people, Mao proceeded. criticism of the Party by the people is necessary:

"There are two types of criticism: There is the enemy criticising us, and there are the people criticising us . . . ; and the two must be distinguished. Stalin for so many years did not make such distinctions. . . .

You therefore need to go through the process of first uniting, then criticising and struggling, finally reaching the result of unity. From going through this process we have obtained this formula: unity-criticism-unity. . . . With capitalists, that is, exploiters, we can use this method". (Mao Tse-tung (February 1957): *ibid.*; p. 136-37, 139),

This encouragement of freedom to criticise the Party was expressed under the slogan **'Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend':**

"Letting a hundred flowers bloom, letting a hundred schools contend, how did these slogans come to be put forward? It was in recognition of various contradictions in society. . . . If you want only grain . . . and absolutely don't want any weeds, that's unachievable. . . .

To ban all weeds, not allowing their growth, is that possible? In reality it is not. . . . After all, what is to be called a fragrant flower? What is to be called a poisonous weed? Stalin in the past was 100% a fragrant flower; Khrushchev in one blow turned him into a poisonous weed. . . .

All these fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds that have grown up --what is there to fear from their growth? There is nothing to fear. . . .

Getting sick regularly is a good thing; it can produce immunity".

(Mao Tse-tung (February 1957): *ibid.*; p. 164-67, 173, 174).

The national bourgeois grouping of the Party, headed by Liu Shao-chi, did not bother to conceal their objection to Mao's speech:

'Liu Shao-chi . . . ostentatiously boycotted . . . the session of the Supreme State Conference at which Mao delivered his contradictions speech. When a picture of that session appeared in the 'People's Daily' on 3 March (1957-- Ed.), Liu Shao-chi was conspicuous by his absence from Mao's right-hand side.

Liu's attitude was thus made clear to the whole country. . . .

Five other Politburo members . . . were not in their rightful places on the rostrum".

(Roderick MacFarquhar (1974): *op. cit.*; p. 191, 192).

[The CPC National Propaganda Conference \(March 1957\)](#)

In March 1957, Mao renewed his call for 'criticism' at a National Propaganda Conference of the CPC:

"We are for a policy of 'opening wide'; so far there has been too little of it rather than too much. We must, not be afraid . . . of criticism and poisonous weeds. . . . Recently a number of ghosts and monsters have been presented on the stage. Seeing this, some comrades have become very worried. In my opinion, a little of this does not matter much; within a few decades such ghosts and monsters will disappear from the stage altogether".

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at the CPC's Conference on Propaganda Work (March 1957), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 193).

However, despite Mao's intervention, no mention of the 'hundred flowers' campaign appeared in the Party press until April 1957 - more than six weeks after it had been launched:

"One sign of the persisting hostility to Mao's ideas was the failure of Party propagandists decisively to slap down opponents of the 'hundred flowers policy. . . . No editorials on the subject were publicised in the 'People's Daily' until 13 April (1957 - Ed.), an extraordinary propaganda lapse";
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 192, 193).

and Mao -- in a speech first published in September 1968 during the 'Cultural Revolution' - denounced the Party press for its silence:

"It is a mistake that the conference on propaganda work has not been reported in the press. . . . Why is it that no editorial has been issued on the Supreme State Conference? Why are the Party's policies being kept secret? There is a ghost here; where is ~his ghost? . . . The papers are being run by the dead. . . . You resist, you oppose the Central Committee's policies".
(Mao Tse-tung: Speech of April 1957, in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 193-94).

Finally, a majority of the Party leadership was temporarily swayed, and 'People's Daily' published an editorial:

"Criticising . . . opponents of the 'hundred flowers' policy and also criticising itself for not having tackled them earlier."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 201).

[The 'Rectification Campaign' \(April 1957\)](#)

In January 1957, it had been announced that:

"The Central Committee of the Party recently decided that as from 1958 there will commence a rectification of work style throughout the Party".

(Article: 'China Youth' (16 January 1957), in: R. L. MacFarquahar.: 'Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists' "Rectification" Movement', in: 'World Today', Volume 13, No. 8 (August 1957); p. 340),

'Rectification of work style':

"Was a well-trying method pioneered by Mao in the early 1940s as he sought to impose his leadership".

(Roderick MacFarquahar et al (Eds.) (1989): op. cit.; p. 9).

In March 1957, Mao told a meeting of Party cadres in Shanghai that:

"The Centre has not yet made a formal decision on rectification. We plan to do it in this way: making preparations this year, getting the movement under way in the following years."

(Mao Tse-tung: Talk at Meeting of Party Cadres in Shanghai (March 1957), in: Roderick MacFarquahar et al. (Eds.): (1989): op. cit.; p. 359).

However, in April 1957 the 'rectification campaign' was brought forward so as to begin **immediately**:

"In April it was announced that a nation-wide campaign to rectify Party members . . . was to be launched immediately",

(Merle Goldman: 'Literary Dissent in Communist China'; Cambridge (USA); 1967; p. 189).

and it was launched at the end of April 1957:

"In the teeth of strenuous opposition from Liu Shao-chi, PENG Chen* and other Party officials",

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 10).

taking:

"The principles outlined by Mao as its guide",

(Roderick MacFarquahar (Ed.) (1960): op. cit.; p.10.

that is, along the lines of Mao's proposal at the National Propaganda Conference in March that:

"Non-Party people may take part in it."

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at National Propaganda Conference (March 1957), in: in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 10).

'Blooming and Contending'

In May 1957 a series of forums:

"Organised by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee, to which the leaders of the democratic parties and non-party personages were invited, encouraged the movement of criticism against the Party among the intellectuals, and particularly in colleges, all over the country" (Rene Goldman:

'The Rectification Campaign at Peking University: May-June 1957', in: Roderick MacFarquahar (Ed.): 'China under Mao: Politics takes Command: A Selection of Articles from "The China Quarterly"'; Cambridge (USA); 1972; p 257).

"For a brief six weeks in the early summer of 1957, Mao Tse-tung invited his country's academic, artistic and managerial intelligentsia to criticise his regime. . . The intelligentsia responded enthusiastically".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (Ed.) (1960): op. cit.; p. 3).

During the 'rectification campaign', Mao:

"Urged the intellectuals to criticise officials and show them how they had misused their power."

(Merle Goldman: op. cit.; p. 188).

In May 1957, a mass movement to criticise the Party:

"Started at Peking University (Pei-ta), the nation's premier university, . . . spread to other universities, and was snowballing rapidly. . . . Hundreds of posters were stuck up every day expanding the targets of the movement and attacking the policy of the Party towards the intellectuals".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 220).

"The students of Pei-ta were looked upon by others as leaders, not only because of their school's revolutionary traditions . . . , but also because of their location in the capital . . .

Another form of voicing criticism was the open-air meeting. One small plaza on the campus . . . became the centre of political life: it was called the 'Democratic Plaza'."

(Rene Goldman: op. cit.; p. 258).

On 25 May 1957, Liu Shao-chi warned the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress that the position was critical:

"If the worker masses, the teachers from the middle and primary schools and other mass organisations also start mobilising, then we won't be able to stand our ground. . . . If we don't control things, then in a jiffy millions of people will be on the move and then we won't be able to do anything".

(Liu Shao-chi: Speech to Standing Committee, NPC (May 1957), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 221).

and it was in this situation that on 25 May the opening of the NPC, which had been scheduled for 3 June, was:

"Postponed until 20 June",

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): op. cit.; p. 274).

and on 19 June postponed again,

"This time till 26 June".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 274).

[The End of the 'Hundred Flowers' Affair \(June 1957\)](#)

It was in these circumstances that, on 8 June 1957, the national bourgeois faction of the CPC was able to convince a majority of the leadership to stop the 'Rectification Campaign':

"The shocking events of the late spring and early summer during the 'hundred flowers period finally led to a political realignment. . . The balance of power among the Party leaders changed".

(Parris H. Chang: *op. cit.*; p. 37).

and so [bring the 'Hundred Flowers' affair to an end.](#) Thus,

"In mid-June (1957-- Ed.) . . . the 'blooming and contending' period . . . came to an abrupt halt. The period of a 'hundred flowers --Mao's phrase -- had lasted but a scant six weeks".

(Donald S. Zagoria: *op. cit.*; p. 66).

"Mao had to abandon the rectification campaign when the situation began to get out of hand on the campuses in late May and early June".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 249).

"The blossoming of the Hundred Flowers, launched by Mao, . . . was violently interrupted. . . . The Party discreetly sealed Mao's lips".

(Philippe Devillers: 'Mao'; London; 1967; p. 193).

[The Publication of Mao's 'Contradictions' Speech \(June 1957\)](#)

Mao's 'Contradictions' speech of February 1957 remained unpublished in China until 18 June.

However, on 13 June 1957:

"A summary of his speech with extended quotations",

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 267).

was published in the 'New York Times', to which it had been leaked via Warsaw.

In these circumstances, the adherents of the national bourgeois faction of the Party used the history of Khrushchev's 'secret speech' to press the view

"That without the publication of an official text, no amount of official denials would discredit the leaked version".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 267).

Accordingly, an officially approved version of the speech was:

issued by the 'New China News Agency' on 18 June and published in the 'People's Daily' the following day".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 267-68).

The principal differences between the leaked version and the officially approved version were a number of insertions -- principal among which were six [criteria for criticism](#) which, had they been included in the original 'Contradictions' speech, would effectively have discouraged any real 'blooming and contending':

"What should be criteria today for distinguishing fragrant flowers from poisonous weeds? . . . Broadly speaking, the criteria should be as follows:

- 1) Words and deeds should help to unite, and not divide, the people of all our nationalities;
- 2) They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction;
- 3) They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, the people's democratic dictatorship;
- 4) They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism;
- 5) They should help to strengthen, and not shake off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party.
- 6) They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to international socialist unity and the unity of the peace-loving people of the world".

(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' (Official Version) (June 1957), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 412).

[The Anti-Rightist Campaign \(1957\)](#)

However, although ended in substance, the 'Rectification Campaign' was not ended in name. In fact it was transformed into an [anti-Rightist campaign which was directed, in fact, at the comprador bourgeois grouping within the Party headed by Mao Tse-tung.](#)

The Anti-Rightist campaign was a:

"Ferocious counter-attack".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *op cit.*; p. 270).

upon the political representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie, headed by Mao Tse-tung,

"Led by a five-man group under Peking 1st Secretary PENG Chen* -- which cowed the intellectuals".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *op. cit.*; p. 1).

"Rightists continued to be condemned for advocating propositions which clearly stemmed from Mao".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *op. cit.*; ; p. 275).

In this situation, Mao was:

"Forced by circumstances to disavow his original intention and concur in the anti-rightist campaign."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 280).

claiming in an editorial in 'People's Daily' on 12 July 1957 that the 'Hundred Flowers' affair had been 'a mere manoeuvre to get rightists to reveal themselves', that is:

"A deliberate lure to flush out the enemy".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *op. cit.*; p. 279).

In Mao's own words:

"The objective was to let hobgoblins and demons 'contend and bloom greatly', to allow the weeds to grow particularly long and let the people see them".

(Mao Tse-tung: Editorial, 'People's Daily' (1 July 1957), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 279).

All that Mao could do was to plead that the rightists were so small in number that they need not be punished:

"The bourgeois rightists . . . are . . . a handful of people. .

They are extremely small in number. . . . Should they be punished or not? As it looks at present, this does not seem necessary."

(Mao Tse-tung: Editorial, 'People's Daily' (1 July 1957), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid.*; p. 280).

Under the 'Anti-Rightist' campaign, many:

"Rightists were removed from influential positions."

(Douwe W. Fokkema: 'Literary Doctrine in China and the Soviet Influence: 1956-1960'; The Hague; 1965; p, 151).

and:

"By the end of the year, over 300,000 intellectuals had been branded 'rightists'. . . . Many were sent to labour camps or to jail, others to the countryside".

(Jonathan D. Spence: 'The Search for Modern China'; New York; 1991; p. 572).

In July 1957:

"The 'People's Daily' began to print direct attacks on Mao."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *op. cit.*; p. 283).

Clearly:

"The Anti-Rightist campaign was a major defeat for Mao".

(Roderick MacFarquahar et al (Eds.) (1989): *op. cit.*; p. 13),

At the 2nd Session of the 8th Congress of the Party in May 1958, Liu Shao-chi said:

"The anti-rightist struggle has . . . been of profound significance within our Party. We expelled a number of rightists from the Party, They were alien class elements who had sneaked into the Party. . . . In league with the rightists outside the Party, they attacked the Party".

(Liu Shao-chi: 'Report on the Work of the Central Committee' (May 1958), in: 'Second Session of the 8th National Congress'; Peking; 1958; p. 22).

[The Compromise \(September 1957\)](#)

The 'Hundred Flowers' campaign was ended on the basis of [a compromise agreement](#) between the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie and those of the comprador bourgeoisie.

The main features of this compromise agreement were embodied in an editorial in 'People's Daily' on 5 September 1957:

1) the latter (ie the comprador bourgeoisie) agreed to the modification of the 'Hundred Flowers' policy along the lines of the revised version of Mao's 'Contradictions' speech -- in particular, to accept the leadership of the Communist Party and Party discipline:

"Relying on the strength of the masses and solving problems by means of mass debate does not mean that we can abdicate leadership. . . . On the contrary , the object of debate is precisely to strengthen leadership and the necessary centralism and discipline and not to weaken them'. (Editorial: 'Resolutely trust the Majority of the Masses', in: 'People's Daily' (5 September 1957), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid*; p. 303).

2) the former (ie the national bourgeoisie) agreed to end the anti-rightist campaign by merging it into the rectification movement:

"The Party's rectification movement and the mass struggle against bourgeois rightists, . is now just expanding into an all-people rectification movement." (Editorial: 'Resolutely trust the Majority of the Masses', in: 'People's Daily' (5 September 1957), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1974): *ibid*;; p. 303).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 6

LU Dingyi = Pinyin form of LU Ting-yi.

LU Ting-yi, Chinese revisionist politician (1906-); Director, Propaganda Department, CPC (1945-66); member, NPC Standing Committee (1954-59); Deputy Premier (1959-66); Secretary, CC, CPC (1962-66); Minister of Culture (1965-66).

PENG Chen, Chinese revisionist politician (1902-); member, Political

Bureau, CC, CPC (1945-66, 1979-87); member, Central Government Administrative Council (1949-66); 1st Secretary, Peking Municipality CPC (1949-66); Mayor, Peking (1951-66); Deputy Chairman and Secretary-General, Standing Committee, NPC (1954-66); Secretary, CC, CPC (1956-66); Acting Secretary-General, NPC (1979-81); Chairman, Legal Commission, NPC Standing Committee (1979-80).

PENG Zhen = Pinyin form of PENG Chen.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE 'GREAT LEAP FORWARD'

(May 1958 - January 1961)

INTRODUCTION

THE TERM "GREAT LEAP FORWARD" IS USED TO DESCRIBE THE CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED BY THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG, TO MOBILISE THE PEASANTRY INTO CONFLICT WITH THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI.

The Chengtu Conference (March 1958)

Since the comprador bourgeois grouping within the Party made preliminary preparations for the 'Great Leap Forward' at a CPC conference held in May 1958 at Chengtu, in Szechwan Province, this must be regarded as:

"The most important of the pre-Leap Party conferences."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 36).

At the conference, Mao called for a campaign,

Firstly,

"Against slavish adherence to the Soviet model",
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): ibid.; p. 36).

saying:

"We should . . . learn from the good points of the Soviet Union. . . This is a principle. But there are two methods of learning: one is merely to imitate, and the other is to apply the creative spirit. . . To import Soviet codes and conventions inflexibly is to lack the creative spirit. . The Chinese revolution won victory by acting contrary to Stalin's will. . . .
When our revolution succeeded, Stalin said it was a fake".
(Mao Tse-tung: Talk at Chengtu Conference (March 1958), in: Stuart Schram

(Ed.) (1975): op. cit.; p. 96, 102-03).

Secondly, Mao disagreed with Stalin's view that

"The training of new cadres for socialist industry, . . . cadres capable of providing social and political, as well as production and technical leadership, for our enterprises, is a cardinal task. .

Unless this task is fulfilled, it will be impossible to convert the USSR from a backward into an advanced country",

(Josef V. Stalin: 'To the Graduates of the Industrial Academy' (April 1930), in: 'Works', Volume 12; Moscow; 1955; p, 235).

And Mao began calling for a campaign:

"Against excessive respect for experts."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 36).

His message was that:

"Truth was more important than knowledge, redness superior to expertise."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): ibid.: p. 41).

an attack upon expertise which was:

"Crucial to the evolution of the great leap strategy, for by diminishing respect for expertise he laid the foundations for exclusive reliance on the mass mobilisation of labour".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): ibid.; p. 40).

Thirdly, Mao called for a new:

"General Line for Socialist Construction."

(Edwin P-w. Leung: 'Historical Dictionary of Revolutionary China: 1839-1976'; New York; 1992; p. 414)

that was expressed in the slogan:

"'achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results' in building socialism".

(Edwin P-w. Leung: ibid.; p. 414).

This 'general line' was the product of the compromise agreement between the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie and those of the comprador bourgeoisie. In it,

"The Chinese leadership still seemed committed to relatively modest goals".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 33).

The 2nd Session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC (May 1958)

In his report to the 2nd Session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC, Liu Shao-chi claimed that there was taking place:

"The beginning of a leap forward on every front. . The current mighty leap forward in socialist construction is the product . . . of a correct implementation of the Party's general line --to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has often said that there are two methods of carrying on socialist transformation and construction: One will result in doing the work faster and better, the other more slowly and not so well.

On this question some comrades still clung to such outmoded ideas as . . . it's better to take small steps than to go striding forward'. The struggle between the two methods in dealing with this question was not fully decided until the launching of the rectification campaign and the anti-rightist struggle".

(Liu Shao-chi: Report on the Work of the CC of the CPC to the 2nd Session of the 8th National Congress (May 1958), in: 'Second Session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC'; Peking; 1958; p. 29, 33-34).

It is clear that Liu's report to the congress:

"Was specifically designed to launch a new campaign."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 51).

So that it may be said that the 'Great Leap Forward' was launched:

"In May 1958 at the 2nd Session of the 8th CPC Congress with the full panoply of a Party congress".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): ibid.; p. 51).

and by agreement (initially) between the political representatives of both the comprador and the national bourgeoisie.

Thus, the 2nd Session of the Congress:

"Gave its wholehearted and unanimous support to the general line for the construction of socialism first proposed by Chairman Mao in words which today are on the lips of everybody in China -- **'to exert the utmost efforts, press ahead consistently and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results'**".

(Report of 2nd Session of 8th Congress of CPC (May 1958), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 1, No. 14 (3 June 1958); p. 5),

It is true that the 2nd Session of the Congress:

"represented the high point of the Mao-Liu alliance on development policy. Both men committed themselves to . . . an all-out economic drive."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 51).

However, even at the Congress there were indications of different attitudes towards economic development on the part of the two allied groupings:

"For Liu it was essential that the energy of the masses be harnessed and organised. Party leadership was crucial. .

In none of his (Mao's -- Ed) five known speeches to the congress does he mention it (Party leadership -- Ed.)".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 53-54).

On the contrary, Mao told the Congress:

"Our method is to lift the lid . . . and let the initiative and creativity of the labouring people explode".

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at 2nd Session of 8th Congress of CPC (May 1958), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 54).

and asserted that it was not the Party which should lead the people, but the people who should lead the Party:

"First of all, one should learn from the people and follow them. We follow the people first, and afterwards the people follow us".

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at 2nd Session of 8th Congress of CPC (May 1958), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 54).

And immediately after the Congress the comprador bourgeois faction of the Party leadership began to diverge to the pseudo-left from the policies which had been agreed at 2nd Session of the congress, which was:

"The last major public occasion on which the Chinese leadership still seemed committed to relatively modest economic goals".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *op. cit.*; p. 33).

[The Revival of the People's Militia \(July 1958\)](#)

After the end of the civil war, the 'People's Militia' lay largely dormant, and from 1953 to the summer of 1958:

"Little was said about the militia".

(Franz Schurmann: *op. cit.*; p. 561).

But within a few weeks of the 2nd Session of the 8th Congress of the CPC, the political representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie, headed by Mao Tse-tung, moved to revive the militia:

"Responsibility and credit for the campaign to make 'Everyone a Soldier' lies with Mao Tse-tung".

(Ralph L. Powell: 'Everyone a Soldier: The Chinese Communist Militia', in: 'Foreign Affairs', Volume 39, No. 1 (October 1960); p. 102).

"The chief advocates of the People's Militia were Mao Tse-tung and LIN Piao*. . . Mao Tse-tung must be seen as the prime mover in the campaign to implement the militia system."

(Franz Schurmann: op. cit.; p. 562, 571).

against the strong opposition of the political representatives of the national bourgeois grouping, headed by Liu Shao-chi:

"Mao Tse-tung appears to have had more confidence in the basically reliable qualities of the peasants who made up the militia than Liu Shao-chi".

(Franz Schurmann: ibid.; p. 568).

and here by Minister of National Defence PENG Teh-huai*:

"One of the key issues of contention between Mao Tse-tung and Peng Teh-huai was over the question of the People's Militia. . . . During the summer of 1958, Mao Tse-tung had won out: the peasants were militarised and the militia was resurrected. But the opposition to Mao must have been strong, for the decision was only made after the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee had met for over a month (May-July 1958)".

(Franz Schurmann: ibid.; p. 567).

In other words, the revival of the militia was:

"A policy opposed by the red professionals".

(Franz Schurmann: ibid.; p. 567).

In this way, **a powerful para-military force, composed mainly of peasants**, was formed:

"The sudden distribution of arms to the militia in the summer of 1958 created new sources of village power. . . . The militia came to constitute a competitor for local power."

(Franz Schurmann: ibid.; p. 567-68).

By January 1959, there were:

"220 million men and women recruited into the militia."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 102).

But in order that this peasant power structure might be used as a counter-revolutionary weapon against the national bourgeoisie, it was first necessary to alienate the mass of the peasantry from the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie.

THIS FUNCTION WAS PERFORMED BY THE SUCCESSFUL BID OF THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE TO DIVERT THE PRODUCTION DRIVE AGREED UPON AT THE PARTY CONGRESS TO THE PSEUDO-LEFT INTO THE 'GREAT LEAP FORWARD' WHICH BEGAN IN JULY 1958.

The Initiation of the 'People's Communes' (July 1958)

In May 1958, Mao returned from:

"A nation-wide trip . . . , participating in over ten provincial Party meetings."
(Byung-joon Ahn: 'Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution: Dynamics of Policy Processes'; Seattle; 1976; p. 23).

during which he sought and obtained:

"Support from provincial leaders against the . . . attitudes of central leaders."
(Byung-joon Ahn: *ibid.*; p. 22-23).

The 2nd Session of the 8th Party Congress had:

"Added twenty-five alternate members to the Central Committee, most of whom were provincial leaders who had actively responded to Mao's agricultural policy. Subsequently the 5th Plenum (in May 1958 -- Ed.) added Mao's other supporters to the Politburo."
(Byung-joon Ahn: *ibid.*; p. 24).

including:

"Lin Piao as its new vice-chairman and member of its Standing Committee."
(Byung-joon Ahn: *ibid.*; p. 24).

In this situation, [the political representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie, headed by Mao, were able to divert the policy of the Party along pseudo-left lines from that agreed with the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie, headed by Liu.](#) The clearest manifestation of this pseudo-left deviation, which became known as the '[Great Leap Forward](#)', was the initiation of '[People's Communes](#)'.

In July 1958:

"Chen Po-ta used for the first time the term commune as the name of these collectives."
(Jurgen Domes: 'Peng Teh-huai: The Man and the Image'; London; 1985; p. 78).

The inauguration of 'People's Communes' was clearly carried out on the initiative of the comprador bourgeois grouping within the Party leadership, headed by Mao Tse-tung:

"Mao Tse-tung jumped the gun, pressing for the formation of communes without prior formal endorsement even by the Politburo."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *op. cit.*; p. 77).

"It seems probable that Mao did not want to have the policy discussed in the Central Committee until the communes were already in being".
(Geoffrey Hudson: Introduction: 'The Chinese Communes: A Documentary Review and Analysis of the "Great Leap Forward"'; London; 1960; p. 13).

It was Mao Tse-tung who:

"Began to suggest the amalgamation of a number of Agricultural Production Cooperatives (APCs) into larger production units. While the central decision-making organs of the Party were still reluctant to

follow this concept, he (Mao -- Ed.) succeeded in inspiring provincial and local cadres to start experiments based on his ideas".

(Jurgen Domes: op. cit.; p. 78).

and it was Mao Tse-tung himself who in August 1958:

"Established the first People's Commune in Hopei province. "

(Edwin P-w. Leung: op. cit.; p . 414).

'People's Communes' differed from APCs in four major respects:

"1) . . . The commune was much bigger both in size and scope. It was concerned with the coordination of every type of activity: agriculture, industry, education and defence. Its predecessor, the collective, was merely an agriculture unit;

2) The district government was merged with the commune administration;

3) Food consumption no longer depended entirely on the amount of work done. A percentage was freely given to each person in the commune, regardless of whether he or she worked. Commune mess halls were set up to facilitate the distribution and consumption of food. The free supply proportion, therefore, represented the application of one of the first principles of communism, distribution according to need. The rest of a person's food consumption was still related to the work he did;

4) The private plot, land beneath houses, and all trees were communised."

(Kenneth R. Walker: 'Planning in Chinese Agriculture: Socialisation and the Private Sector: 1956-1962'; London; 1965; p. 13).

In particular, communes differed from APCs in insisting on:

"A collectivisation of the peasant's whole life".

(Jurgen Domes: op. cit.; p. 78).

Under the commune system, the peasant was:

"Deprived of the private plot, livestock and implements which had been left to him by the previous collectivisation".

(Geoffrey Hudson: op. cit.; p. 11).

while **his work-load was greatly increased:**

"Under the commune system. peasants may either be required to perform non-agricultural tasks during the slack periods of the agricultural year, or they may be drafted for mining, construction and industrial work in their localities more or less permanently. . . . Since the establishment of the communes the total of work required of the peasants has been enormously increased without any corresponding increase in their real incomes; indeed, in many cases their living standards have declined".

(Geoffrey Hudson: *ibid.*; p. 10).

and he was placed under a military discipline:

"The working people have put forward these slogans which are full of revolutionary spirit: get organised along military lines, do things the way battle duties are carried out".

('Greet the Upsurge in forming People's Communes', in: 'Peking Review', Volume 1, No. 27 (2 September 1958); p. 6).

"The militia movement facilitated the 'militarisation of labour' within the communes."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 101).

"Every commune is simultaneously a unit of a national militia, and its members are regarded as being permanently under military discipline."

(Geoffrey Hudson: op. cit.; p. 12).

Commune members were pressed to adopt **a collectivist life-style:**

"The most spectacular feature of the Chinese communes . . . has . . . been . . . the drive for 'collectivisation of living'. . . . The attack on the family in the communes went far beyond what might have been claimed as necessary on economic grounds. . . . The peasant . . . had . . . to surrender his home, and it was part of the idea of the commune that he should be rehoused in some kind of communal building to be constructed from materials obtained from the demolition of private family houses. In some cases the rehousing was . . . in large dormitories with families broken up. Everywhere communal mess-halls or canteens were set up and the strongest pressure was put on commune members to eat at them exclusively and give up family meals; indeed, where private kitchens were eliminated and even cooking utensils were taken by the commune, there ceased to be any alternative."

(Geoffrey Hudson: ibid.; p. 11).

"Within the communes, a collectivist life-style was to be promoted through community mess-halls, kindergartens, nurseries, tailoring teams, barber shops, public baths, 'happiness homes' for the aged".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 87).

Furthermore, some 'people's communes' began to operate a system of free provision of:

"Meals, clothes, housing, schooling, medical attention, burial, haircuts, theatrical entertainment, money for heating in winter and money for weddings"

(A. V. Sherman: 'The People's Commune'; London; 1960; p. 36, citing 'People's Daily' (1 October 1958).

and this:

"Rapidly became the basis of an attempted leap towards communism."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 103).

The 'Great Leap Forward'::

"Began slowly everywhere. However, it quickly gained an incredible momentum."

(Stephen Andors: 'China's Industrial Revolution: Politics, Planning and Management: 1949 to the Present'; New York; 1977; p. 70).

so that by the autumn of 1959, 'People's Communes' had:

"Been established in all rural areas throughout the country (with the exception of a few national minority areas)".

('Long live the People's Communes!', in: 'Peking Review', Volume 2, No. 36 (8 September 1959); p. 6).

The later months of 1958:

"Were the high tide of the great leap forward',
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p.91).

and by the end of the year, the proportion of peasant households in 'People's Communes' had reached 99.1%.(Kenneth R. Walker: op. cit.; p. 14, citing: 'Ten Great Years'; Peking; 1959; p. 36).

[The Peitaiho Politburo Conference \(August 1958\)](#)

An enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CC of the CPC, held in August 1958 at the seaside resort of Peitaiho, gave retrospective approval to the formation of 'People's Communes', which

"Had already been set up over a large part of China before there was any public directive on the subject."

(Geoffrey Hudson: op. cit.; p. 13).

At Peitaiho:

"The establishment of 'people's communes' was proclaimed as official Party policy and therefore mandatory for the whole country (Jurgen Domes: op. cit.; p. 78).

although in many respects the 'Resolution on the Establishment of Communes' adopted by the conference still:

"Fell short of what was actually being done in the villages."

(Geoffrey Hudson: op. cit.; p. 13).

The resolution endorsed the practice of transferring private plots from the peasants to the commune:

"Generally speaking, reserved private plots of land may perhaps be turned over to collective management in the course of the merger of cooperatives."

(CC, CPC: 'Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes in the Rural Areas' (August 1958), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 1, No. 29 (16 September 1958); p. 22).

but the regulations replaced the 'may perhaps' of the resolution by the more rigid 'shall':

"The regulations stipulate the members shall turn over to the common ownership of the commune 'all the small plots of private holdings, privately-owned house sites and other means of production such as livestock, tree holdings. etc. ('What is a People's Commune?', in " 'Peking Review', Volume 1, No. 30 (23 September 1958); p. 13).

and also endorsed the principles of military-style organisation and collective living within the commune:

"The people have taken to organising themselves along military lines and to lead a collective life".
(CC, CPC: 'Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes in the Rural Areas' (August 1958), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 1, No. 29 (16 September 1958); p. 21).

Apart from the decisions on communes, the key decisions taken at Peitaiho were:

"To raise the 1958 steel target to 10.7 million tons, double the 1957 output. . . . The major Peitaiho prediction was that grain output would reach between 300 and 350 million tons".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 85).

Theoretically, the resolution broke new ground in maintaining that **the formation of communes symbolised the imminent transition to a communist society, in which distribution would be based on the principle 'to each according to his needs':**

"The communes . . . will develop into the basic social units in communist society. .
The attainment of Communism in China is no longer a remote future event. We should actively use the form of the people's commune to explore the practical road of transition to communism."
(CC, CPC: 'Resolution on the Establishment of Communes' (August 1958), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 1, No. 29 (16 September 1958); p. 23).

Up to that point:

"The leap . . . was still basically a . . . production drive."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 82).

After Peitaiho, it became:

"A launching pad for an ideological leap towards communism".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): ibid.; p. 82).

The Backyard Steel Drive (August-October 1958)

Thus, after the Peitaiho Conference:

"All China was plunged into an all-out steel drive in the effort to reach the new national target of 10.7 million tons. .

By mid-September, over 20 million people were engaged in producing iron and steel; at the height of the steel drive the figure rose to 90 million. .

The 1.07 million ton target was achieved by mid-December (1958--Ed.)".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 113, 114, 116).

"Nowadays native-style steel-smelting furnaces -- mostly small reverberatory furnaces made of bricks -- can be seen in the backyards of government offices, along the alleys and on open grounds".

(Chu Chi-lin: 'New High in Steel Output', in: 'Peking Review', Volume 1, No. 37 (11 November 1958); p. 15).

"The policy of 'steel as the leading link' in the high tide of the Great Leap Forward produced a nation-wide fanatical mass movement having for its slogan 'The entire nation making steel'. Backyard furnaces mushroomed and millions of people all over the country took part in their construction and the production of iron and steel".

(Ronald Hsia: 'The Concept of Economic Growth', in: Werner Klatt (Ed.):

'The Chinese Model: A Political, Economic and Social Survey'; Hong Kong; 1965; p. 87-88).

By this time, the three movements of the 'General Line for Socialist Construction', the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'People's Communes' had become known collectively as the

"Three Red Banners."

(Edwin P-w. Leung: *op. cit.*; p. 414).

[The Agricultural Crisis \(1958-1961\)](#)

Particularly as a result of the diversion of rural labour to backyard steel-making,

"In the fields, bumper harvests of grain, cotton and other crops awaited collection. A massive tragedy was in the making. . . .

Even with shock work, many areas failed to gather in all the harvest."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *op. cit.*; p. 116, 120).

In consequence:

"Acreage sown to grain declined by 6 million hectares in 1958, and a further 11.6 million hectares in 1959, a total reduction of 13% over the two years."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 126).

In 1959:

"When nature turned nasty . . . , an agricultural labour force reduced by over 0% was in no position to cope."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 328).

As a result, grain rations had to be reduced as follows during the Great Leap:

1957 1958 1959 1960

Kilograms per head: 203.0 198.0 186.5 163.5"

(Yang Jianbai & Li Xuezheng: 'The Relations between Agriculture, Light Industry and Heavy Industry in China', in: Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 329).

and there were:

"'Famine' conditions prevailing in the winter of 1959".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 328).

Countrywide:

"The mortality rate doubled from 1.08% in 1957 to 2.54% in 1960. In that year the population actually **declined** by 4.5%. Anywhere from 16.4 to 29.5 million extra people died during the leap, because of the leap".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 330).

By the autumn of 1960:

"The country was in the throes of the worst agricultural disaster in a century. . . . By the end of the year . . . well over half the cultivated acreage had been devastated, sometimes repeatedly", (Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 322).

and in 1961:

"China began to import food on a huge scale. From December 1960, when the first shipments arrived, up to the end of 1963, about 16 million metric tons of grain have been purchased, largely from Canada and Australia".
(Li Shoh-ming: 'China's Industrial Development: 1958-63', in: Ronald MacFarquahar (Ed.) (1972): *op. cit.*; p. 182).

The Steel Crisis (1958-1962)

The 'Great Leap' in steel fared no better than the 'Great Leap' in agriculture:

"Of the 10.7 million tons (of steel - Ed.) produced, only 9 million were of good quality; the following autumn the figure would be reduced further to 8 million tons."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *op. cit.*; p. 128).

"The three million tons of steel produced in rural furnaces were largely unusable and represented a waste of resources and labour".

(A. V. Sherman: *op. cit.*; p. 55).

"High material cost and low quality of product gave rise to a negative contribution

from the native iron-smelting sector to the GNP (Gross National Product -- Ed.) during the period of the 'Great Leap Forward'".

(Wu Yuan-li: 'The Steel Industry in Communist China'; New York; 1975; p. 236).

Thus, during 1959 and 1960:

"Many of the 'native' iron and steel furnaces were either abandoned or replaced by furnaces of improved design".

(Wu Yuan-li: *ibid.*; p. 236).

[The 6th Plenum of the 8th CC \(November/December 1958\)](#)

The developing crisis in agriculture, together with the loss of their private plots, the increased work-load and militarised life-style enforced in the communes had by October of 1958 aroused [intense opposition among the peasants to the 'Three Red Banners':](#)

"Opposition of the peasantry to the new collectives . . . had not been particularly strong at the start of the campaign, but it increased rapidly and soon began to turn into open resistance.

From mid-October 1958 this open resistance took on, in many regions, the character of a general though entirely uncoordinated movement. The peasants refused to march to their work in the fields in military formation and they secretly continued cooking food at home despite orders from the cadres to the contrary. Parents took their children out of the nurseries and kindergartens in large numbers, and elderly people left their 'houses of happiness' and returned to their families, often over great distances. Grain was not delivered to the state granaries because the labour units in the villages divided it among their members. . . .

During November and December 1958 . . . these activities escalated into local rebellions which began to pose a serious threat to the structures of political and economic control".

(Jurgen Domes: *op. cit.*; p. 81).

These developments:

"Caused most of the leaders of the civilian Party machine, led by Liu Shao-chi and TENG Hsiao-ping*, to intensify their opposition to Mao's prescriptions".

(Jurgen Domes: *op. cit.*; p. 107).

and at the 6th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the CPC, held in Wuhan in November/December 1958:

"Difficulties around the Great Leap and the forming of the people's communes constituted the main problem".

(Jaap van Ginneken: *op. cit.*; p. 33).

As a result of the:

"Disaffection within the Party itself",

(Bill Brugger: Introduction: 'The Historical Perspective', in: Bill Brugger (Ed.): 'China: The Impact of the Cultural Revolution'; London; 1978; p. 19-20).

the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie were able in late November/early December 1958 to win a majority of the Party leadership to support:

"A strategic retreat from Mao's developmental concept of the Three Red Banners."

(Jurgen Domes: op. cit.; p. 81).

Firstly, the Plenum called for a return to economic planning and to 'proportionate development' of the economy:

"It is necessary to endeavour to put economic planning on a completely reliable basis, and to maintain suitable proportions between the various targets in accordance with the objective law of the proportionate development of the various branches of the national economy."

(6th Plenum of 8th CC of CPC: Communique (December 1958), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 1, No. 43 (23 December 1958); p. 7).

laying down, for the immediate circumstances, a:

"Policy of simultaneous development of industry and agriculture",

(6th Plenum of 8th CC: Communique (December 1958), in: 'Peking Review' Volume 2, No. 3 (20 January 1959); p. 3).

symbolised as a policy of:

"Walking on two legs."

(6th Plenum of 8th CC: Communique (December 1958), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 2, No. 3 (20 January 1959); p. 3).

Secondly, it asserted that the industrialisation of China would take 'twenty or more years:

"It will still take a fairly long time to realise on a large scale the industrialisation of our country. . . . This whole process will take fifteen, twenty or more years to complete, counting from now".

(6th Plenum of 8th CC: 'Resolution on Some Questions concerning the People's Communes' (December 1958), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 1, No. 43 (23 December 1958); p. 11).

Thirdly, it took a stand against the free supply system, saying:

"Any premature attempt to negate the principle of 'to each according to his work' . . . is undoubtedly a Utopian concept that cannot possibly succeed".

(Resolution on Some Questions concerning the People's Communes (December 1958), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 1, No. 43 (23 December 1958); p. 13).

In other words, it:

"Sharply denounced the belief in the imminence of communism".
(A. V. Sherman: op. cit.; p. 49).

Fourthly, since life in the communes had aroused:

"So much opposition from the peasants",
(Geoffrey Hudson: op. cit.; p. 11).

The Plenum:

"Called a halt and ordered that families should be permitted to remain together,
and even eat together if they wanted to".
(Geoffrey Hudson: *ibid.*; p. 11).

and decided upon:

"A relaxation of the military-style discipline that had been promoted in the early
days of the communes."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 136).

However,

"Since the essence of the commune was military-industrial organisation, the
abandonment of that type of organisation must be regarded as equivalent to the
abandonment of the commune system." (Franz Schurmann: op. cit.; p. 498).

In short, the Plenum:

"Marked the beginning of the retreat for the communes. . . Accommodating
peasants by sexes, each sex in a separate barracks, was now forbidden, and the
resolution guaranteed that peasants would retain the private ownership of their
houses, vegetable gardens and small animals 'for all time', as well as having eight
hours' sleep and four hours' leisure every day. Working time was to be restricted to
eight hours. Wages should once more mostly be paid in cash. The use of nurseries,
kindergartens and mess-halls would now be entirely voluntary for commune
members, and it was strictly forbidden to seize and destroy household utensils".
(Jurgen Domes: op. cit.; p. 83-84).

At the Plenum, Mao made a self-criticism, admitting:

"I made a mistake at the Peitaiho Conference. . . . The Peitaiho Conference
resolution must now be revised. I was enthusiastic at the time, and failed to
combine revolutionary fervour and the practical
spirit."

(Mao Tse-tung: Statement at Wuhan Plenum (December 1958), in: Roderick
MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 129).

Finally, the Plenum approved [the removal of Mao from the position of State
Chairman \(i.e., President\)](#), but under the face-saving formula that this was at Mao's

request . It:

"Decided to approve this proposal of Comrade Mao Tse-tung 's, and not nominate him again as candidate for Chairman of the People's Republic of China".
(Decision approving Comrade Mao Tse-tung '5 Proposal that he will not stand as Candidate for Chairman of the People's Republic of China for the Next Term of Office' (December 1958), in: 'Communist China'; op. cit.; p. 487).

Peng's 'Letter of Opinion' (July 1959)

In July 1959, just before the 8th Plenum of the 8th CC, Peng Teh-huai wrote a critical 'Letter of Opinion' to Mao. In it he :

"Detailed all the disasters stemming from the great leap and the commune movement, and then implicitly but unmistakably laid the blame where it ultimately belonged, at the door of the Chairman. . . . His letter amounted to an indictment of the Chairman."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 216).

The letter said:

"Some small and indigenous blast furnaces which were not necessary were built, with the consequence that some resources (material and financial) and manpower were wasted. This is, of course, a relatively big loss. .

The habit of exaggeration spread to various areas and departments, and some unbelievable miracles were also reported in the press. This has surely done tremendous harm to the prestige of the Party.

At that time, from reports sent in from various quarters, it would seem that communism was around the corner. This caused not a few comrades to become dizzy. . . . Extravagance and waste developed".

(Peng Teh-huai: 'Letter of Opinion' (July 1959), in: 'The Case of Peng Teh-huai'; op. cit.; p. 9, 11).

and:

"Attributed the 'leftist' mistakes of the previous twelve months to 'petty-bourgeois fanaticism."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 216).

saying:

"Petty-bourgeois fanaticism makes us liable to commit 'Left' mistakes".

(Peng Teh-huai: 'Letter of Opinion' (July 1959), in: 'The Case of Peng Teh-huai'; op. cit.; p. 11).

Peng's letter:

"Was immediately printed and distributed to participants at the conference before Mao got down to reading it."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 217).

[The 8th Plenum of the 8th CC \(August 1959\)](#)

The 8th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee, held in Lushan in August 1959:

"Was marked by a severe intra-Party battle".

(Donald S. Zagoria: op. cit.; p. 135).

at which Peng Teh-huai:

"Openly attacked the whole range of Great Leap policies."

(Stuart Schram: 'Mao Zedong: A Preliminary Reassessment'; Hong Kong; 1983; p. 51).

The Plenum:

"Witnessed the most bitter political and personal attack on Mao Tse-tung in the history of the Chinese Communist Party".

(David & Nancy D. Hilton: 'The Wind will not subside: Years in Revolutionary China: 1964-1969'; New York; 1976; p. 37).

At the Plenum, Mao charged:

"Peng Teh-huai's letter of opinion constitutes an anti-Party outline of right opportunism".

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at 8th Plenum of 8th CC (August 1959), in: 'Chinese Law and Government', Volume 1, No. 4 (Winter 1968-69); p. 25).

However, there was such agreement among the leaders about the erroneous character of the 'Great Leap Forward' that Mao was compelled to make a [self-criticism](#):

"I have committed two crimes, one of which involved calling for 10.7 million tons of steel. . . As for the people's communes, . . . there is also the general line for which . . . you also shared some responsibility. .

The smelting of 10.7 million tons of steel and the participation of 90 million people in it . . . was a great disaster for which I must be responsible myself".

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at 8th Plenum of 8th CC (August 1959), in: 'Chinese Law and Government', Volume 1, No. 4 (Winter 1968-69); p. 41, 42-43).

Mao excused himself by saying that Marx also been guilty of bourgeois fanaticism:

"Marx also committed many errors. He hoped every day for the advent of the European revolution, but it did not come. . . Wasn't this bourgeois fanaticism? . . . We have . . . blown some communist wind', and enabled the people of the entire nation to learn a lesson."

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at 8th Plenum of 8th CC (August 1959), in: 'Chinese Law and Government', Volume 1, No. 4 (Winter 1968-69); p. 42).

Peng made several interventions at the Plenum. He:

"Questioned the value of the backyard steel campaign. . . . He criticised the launching of the communes and the free food supply system without prior experimentation."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 202-03).

Mao's reply:

"Was a brilliant debating performance, designed to rally his supporters and frighten Peng Teh-huai' s sympathisers".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 218).

It included:

"A threat by Mao to return to the hills and organise a new revolutionary army of peasants to fight the leadership",

(David & Nancy D. Milton: op. cit.; p. 36).

Mao saying that in the event of the CC not backing his position:

"I would go to the countryside to lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If the Liberation Army won't follow me, I will find a Red Army".

(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at 8th Plenum of 8th CC (August 1959), in: 'Chinese Law and Government' Volume 1, No. 4 (Winter 1968-69); p. 35).

and:

"Mao, as conference chairman, was able to ensure that Peng had no effective right of reply".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 222).

The group around Peng:

"Wanted to disband the communes and to undertake a general retreat from the leap forward".

(Donald S. Zagoria: op. cit.; p. 135)."

while the comprador bourgeois grouping around Mao:

"Wanted to press on with the communes and the Leap Forward more or less as originally conceived".

(Donald S. Zagoria: *ibid.*; p. 135).

But the main grouping representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie - the group headed by Liu Shao-chi -- were **reluctant to force the issue to a showdown**, especially in the face of Mao's explicit threat to lead the peasants into civil war against the government.

Thus, the main national bourgeois grouping persuaded Peng, in the name of 'Party unity', to accept a compromise agreement under which the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'People's Communes' policy would be tacitly ended but -- in deference to Mao -- without being publicly repudiated.

Thus:

"Liu Shao-chi, Premier Chou (En-lai -- Ed.) and CHU Teh* exhorted him (Peng Teh-huai -- Ed.) to consider protecting the authority of Chairman Mao and protecting the unity of the Party. "

(Jurgen Domes: op. cit.; p. 98).

It was in these circumstances that, at the Plenum:

"Peng was persuaded . . . to make a full, indeed exaggerated self-criticism."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 233).

Consequently, **THE STRUGGLE AT THE 8th PLENUM ENDED IN A COMPROMISE TRUCE.**

Under this compromise, it was agreed:

- 1) that Peng would confirm his self-criticism and accept dismissal from his state positions, but he would not be expelled from the Party and a resolution criticising 'his clique' for 'anti-Party activity' would remain. secret;
- 2) that Mao would confirm his self-criticism concerning the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'People's Communes', BOTH OF WHICH POLICIES WOULD BE HALTED IN PRACTICE but -- in deference to the reputation of their author -- not publicly repudiated.

Thus, at the Lushan Plenum:

"The period of unrealistic targets and claims ended".

(Kenneth R. Walker: op. cit.; p. 81).

and, as agreed, the Central Committee at Lushan:

not only made drastic reductions in the target figures, but also admitted that there had been gross exaggerations in the claims of production for 1958".

(Geoffrey Hudson: op. cit.; p. 14).

The principal production figures were adjusted downwards as follows:

"The grain output figure for 1958 was reduced from 375 million tons to 250 million tons, the cotton figure from 3.35 million tons to 2.1 million tons, the steel figure from 11.08 million tons to 8 million tons (with an estimated 3.08 million tons produced in backyard furnaces now disregarded as being below quality".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): op. cit.; p. 247).

while:

"These reductions, published in the 8th Plenum communique, forced corresponding reductions in the 1959 targets: grain down from 525 to 275 million tons, cotton down from 5 to 2.31 million tons, steel down from 18 to 12 million tons".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *ibid.*; p. 247).

The Plenum resolved:

"That the production of steel by indigenous methods for local use be decided upon by the local authorities in accordance with local conditions; it will no longer be included in the state plan".

(8th Plenum of 8th CC: Communiqué (August 1959), in: 'Peking Review Volume 2, No. 35 (1 September 1959); p. 6).

The Plenum adopted a 'Resolution concerning the Anti-Party Clique headed by Peng Teh-huai' (published only during the Cultural Revolution) which declared that in the period prior to the Plenum

"A fierce onslaught on the Party's General Line, the great leap forward and the people's communes was made inside our Party by the Right opportunist anti-Party clique headed by Peng Teh-huai".

(8th Plenum of 8th CC of CPC: 'Resolution concerning the Anti-Party Clique headed by Peng Teh-huai' (August 1959), in: 'Peking Review Volume 10, No. 34 (16 August 1967); p. 10).

The compromise agreed upon at the 8th Plenum, in fact, favoured the comprador bourgeois grouping within the Party, since, with Peng's dismissal:

"The balance of forces turned once again in the Chairman's favour."
(David & Nancy D. Milton: *op. cit.*; p. 110).

It:

"Prepared the way for LIN Piao's* rise to power in the army, and renewed attempts to implement the militia system on a nation-wide scale".

(Franz Schurnann: *op. cit.*; p. 567).

In September 1959:

"Peng was removed from his post as Minister of National Defence and replaced by . . . Mao's trusted lieutenant Marshal Lin Piao. Along with Peng, HUANG Ke-cheng* was dismissed as Chief of the General Staff".

(Jurgen Domes: *op. cit.*; p. 99).

In fact, the victorious comprador bourgeois intra-Party grouping:

"Felt it necessary not merely to replace Chief of Staff General Huang Ke-cheng (allegedly Peng's principal co-conspirator) with someone from outside the existing military hierarchy, but also to sack a number of other generals whose ties to the departing Defence Minister might make suspect their loyalty to the incoming one."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1983): *op. cit.*; p. 247).

Immediately after the new Minister of Defence, Lin Piao, took office,

"A campaign for the glorification of Mao and for widespread circulation of his writings . . . began within the armed forces."
(Jurgen Domes: op. cit.; p. 100).

Later, after the 'Cultural Revolution', Mao accused Peng of having 'attempted to carry out a military coup' as a 'foreign agent':

"At the 1959 Lushan Conference, Peng Teh-huai colluded with a foreign country to seize power."

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Summary of Talks with Responsible Comrades at Various Places during his Provincial Tour' (August/September 1971), in: Stuart Schram (Ed.) (1975): op. cit.; p. 292).

The 9th Plenum of the 8th CC (January 1961)

After the Lushan Plenum of July 1959, the 'Great Leap Forward':

"Began to taper off",
(Stephen Andors: op. cit.; p. 70).

and at the 9th Plenum of the 8th CC in January 1961 a decision was formally taken:

"To slow down the hectic pace of the 'Great Leap Forward'".
(Stephen Andors: op. cit.; p. 98).

In fact, at the Plenum the 'People's Communes' were so 'reorganised' .

Liu Shao-chi was attacked as a Right opportunist, in documents made public later in the Cultural Revolution:

"Shao-chi -- Ed.) . . . whipped up the evil wind of reversing the correct verdict passed on the Right opportunists. . . . He vainly tried to help Peng Teh-huai to rise again and resume command of the armed forces".

('Peng Teh-huai and his Behind-the-Scenes Boss cannot shirk Responsibility for their Crimes', in: 'Peking Review', Volume 10, No. 35 (25 August 1967); p. 7).

EPILOGUE

With the failure of the 'Great Leap Forward' and his removal from the post of State President

"Mao retreated to the second front to lick his wounds".
(Roderick MacFarquhar (1983): op. cit.; p. 336).

Thereupon, he:

"Began to move steadily and relentlessly toward what was ultimately to become the greatest wave of all: . . . the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution".
(Stuart R. Schram: (1983): op. cit.; p. 51).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES - 7

DENG Xiaoping = Pinyin form of TENG Hsiao-ping.

HUANG Kecheng = Pinyin form of HUANG Ke-cheng.

HUANG Ke-cheng, Chinese revisionist military officer (1902-86); political commissar, Hunan Military District (1949-50); commander, Hunan Military District (1950-52); member, State Planning Commission (1952-54); Deputy Chief of Staff, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1952-54); member, National Defence Council (1954-64); Deputy Minister of National Defence (1954-59); general (1955); Secretary, CC, CPC (1956-59); Chief of Staff, PLA (1958-59).

LIN Biao = Pinyin form of LIN Piao.

LIN Piao, Chinese revisionist military officer and politician (1907-71); member, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1949); 1st Secretary, Central-South Bureau, CPC (1949-54); Deputy Chairman, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1951-54); Deputy Chairman, National Defence Council (1954-67); Deputy Premier (1954-71); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1955-71); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1957-71); Minister of National Defence (1959-71); killed in plane crash during flight to Soviet Union (1971).

PENG Dehuai = Pinyin form of PENG Te-huai.

PENG Te-huai, Chinese revisionist military officer and politician (1898-1974); commander, Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea (1950-53); Minister of National Defence (1954-59); marshal (1955); arrested by 'Red Guards' (1966); died in prison (1974).

TENG Hsiao-ping, Chinese revisionist military officer and politician (1904-97); member, Central People's Government Council (1949-54); member, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1949-54); Deputy Premier (1952-66); member, State Planning Commission (1952-54); Minister of Finance (1953-54); Deputy Chairman, National Defence Council (1954-67); General Secretary, CPC (1954-69); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1955-66, 1974-87); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC

(1956-66, 1975-87); Deputy

Premier (1973-80); member, Standing Committee, CC, CPC (1975-87); Deputy Chairman, CPC (1975-82); Chief of Staff, PLA (1977-80).

CHAPTER TWELVE : THE 'AGRICULTURE FIRST' POLICY

(Summer 1960 - September 1962)

Introduction

COMPELLED TO BRING THE 'GREAT LEAP FORWARD' TO AN END, THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS GROUPING OF THE PARTY NEVERTHELESS SUCCESSFULLY UTILISED THE AGRICULTURAL CHAOS CAUSED BY THE 'LEAP' TO IMPOSE ON THE PARTY FOR A TIME

**-
A POLICY OF ACCORDING THE PRIORITY TO AGRICULTURE.**

The Peitaiho Central Work Conference (summer 1960)

In the summer of 1960, a Central Work Conference was convened at Peitaiho, attended by all provincial Party First Secretaries. The proceedings of the conference were not made public, but subsequent events indicated that it:

"Decided to change drastically the priorities of economic policy -- above all by mobilising available resources to support agriculture. . . . After the work conference, the shift towards an 'agriculture-first' policy became clearly discernible".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 126).

The 9th Plenum of the 8th CC (January 1961)

This policy was confirmed at the 9th Plenum of the 8th CC, in January 1961, which:

"Decided to reinforce the agricultural front by making agriculture the foundation of the national economy and giving industry second priority".

(Edward L. Wheelwright & Bruce McFarlane: op. cit.; p. 68).

The Plenum declared that:

"Since there had been tremendous development in heavy industry in the last three years . . . the scale of the basic construction industries should therefore be appropriately reduced".

(Li Choh-ming: 'China's Industrial Development: 1958-63' (hereafter listed as 'Li Shoh-ming (1972)'), in: Roderick MacFarquahar (Ed.) 'China under Mao: Politics takes Command: A Selection of Articles from "The China Quarterly"'; Cambridge (USA); 1972.; p. 182).

and reaffirmed the call for a movement of:

"All the Party and all people to agriculture and food grains."

(Resolution of 9th Plenum of 8th CC, in: Li Choh-ming (1972): ibid.; p. 182).

70 Articles of Industrial Policy (December 1961)

In December 1961:

"The Party issued secretly to the cadres in the field a document known as '70 Articles of Industrial Policy'. In essence, it directed that, unless special authority was given, all basic construction should be suspended, all those enterprises that had been operating regularly at a loss be shut down, and the practice of recruiting labour from rural areas be abandoned for at least three years."

(Li Shoh-ming (1972): *ibid.*; p. 182-83).

The 10th Plenum of the 8th CC (September 1962) The 10th Plenum of the 8th CC in September 1962 resolved that:

"As the immediate urgent task of the people, the development of agriculture, itself the foundation of the national economy . . . must be given the topmost position".

(Resolution of 10th Plenum of 8th CC (September 1962), in: Li Shoh-ming (1972): *ibid.*; p. 183-84).

CHAPTER THIRTEEN : THE 'SOCIALIST EDUCATION MOVEMENT' (September 1962 - April 1966)

Introduction

THE 'SOCIALIST EDUCATION MOVEMENT' WAS A MOVEMENT INITIATED BY THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP WHICH AIMED AT MOBILISING THE POOR AND LOWER-MIDDLE PEASANTS IN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE AGAINST THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE.

The 10th Plenum of the 8th CC (September 1962)

By the time of the 10th Plenum of the 8th CC, in September 1962:

"China's internal political and economic situation was just beginning to improve following three years of severe crop failures and a series of emergency administrative retrenchments made necessary by the collapse of the Great Leap Forward".

(Richard Baum: 'Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party and the Peasant Question: 1962-66' (hereafter listed as 'Richard Baum (1975); New York; 1975; p. 11).

At the Plenum:

"Mao Tse-tung put forward the slogan 'Never forget the class struggle'".
(John Gittings (1968): *op. cit.*; p. 271).

which was, of course, a call for class struggle against the national bourgeoisie.

The most important decision taken by the Plenum was to set up:

"A mass movement called the Socialist Education Movement. The aim of this movement was . . . to counter all moves towards an individualistic economy . . . and generally to raise the socialist consciousness of the whole people by bringing about mass participation in the struggle and relating Mao Tse-tung's works to it."

(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 58).

"The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-66 . . . was not just directed at 'capitalist' attitudes in the countryside. . . . It was also concerned with institutional arrangements which might contribute to capitalist' relations".

(Dennis Woodward: "'Two Line Struggle' in Agriculture", in: Bill Brugger (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 153).

The official aim of the Socialist Education Movement' was:

"To rectify the four 'uncleans' in rural administration (lack of political discipline, ideological deviations, organisational deviations and the mismanagement of economic affairs) and thus became popularly known as the . . . 'Four Clean-ups Movement'".

(David & Nancy D. Milton: op. cit.; p. 71).

but it:

"In addition to stressing 'class struggle' was increasingly identified with the Thought of Mao Tse-tung".

(William F. Dorrill: 'Power, Policy and Ideology in the Making of the Chinese Cultural Revolution', in: Thomas W. Robinson (Ed.): 'The Cultural Revolution in China'; Berkeley (USA): 1971; p. 56).

The Socialist Education Movement (SEM) (or Campaign) (SEC) must be regarded as a:

"Rehearsal of the 'Cultural Revolution.'"

(Alam Chamsul: 'A Critique of China's Cultural Revolution (1966-76)'; Calcutta; 1980; p. 5).

and by February 1963, it:

"Was well under way in many provinces".

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 148).

The Two Lines within the SEM

From the outset, however,

"Within the Socialist Education Movement there developed two opposed

policies".

(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 59).

and a:

"Great struggle between the representatives of the 'two roads'".

(David & Nancy D. Milton: op. cit.; p. 75).

The national bourgeois grouping within the Party:

"Continued to stress not politics but production, . . . not class struggle but technical reform",

(Richard Baum (1975): op. cit.; p. 20).

while the comprador bourgeois grouping within the Party sought to utilise it to mobilise masses of the peasantry into class struggle, that is, into counter-revolutionary action against the national bourgeoisie and its political representatives.

As a result of the opposition of the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie to Mao's 'class struggle' aims for the SEM, up to February 1963:

"Party functionaries at the intermediate and lower levels dragged their feet in implementing the new campaign",

(Richard Baum (1975): *ibid.*; p. 19).

and as a result:

"The SEC was relatively lifeless".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 148).

The Central Work Conference (February 1963)

In a speech to a Central Work Conference in February 1963, in an effort to put the SEC on what he regarded as:

". . . the correct course, Mao intervened",

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 149).

and:

"Revealed the extraordinary political significance he attached to the new movement:

'How can we achieve socialist construction when there is peaceful coexistence in politics? . . . Once we grasp class struggle, miracles are possible'".

(Richard Baum (1975): op. cit.; p. 17).

Mao's 'Note on Seven Well-written Documents' (May 1963)

In May 1963, Mao issued 'Note on Seven Well-written Documents of the Chekiang Provincial Committee concerning Cadre Participation in Physical

Labour', in which he warned that, without class struggle:

"The day would not be far off . . . before a counter revolutionary restoration on a nation-wide scale would inevitably occur. The whole of China would then change colour. . . Isn't that a most dangerous prospect?"

(Mao Tse-tung: 'Note on Seven Well-written Documents of the Chekiang Provincial Committee concerning Cadre Participation in Physical Labour'; (May 1963), in: Richard Baum (1975): *ibid.*; p. 22).

Mao's 'First Ten Points' (May 1963)

In May 1963:

"The Chairman's growing displeasure . . . was clearly manifested . . . when the Central Committee, acting under Mao's personal supervision, promulgated a 'Draft Directive on Some Problems in Current Rural Work'. Known in Maoist parlance as the 'First Ten Points', this directive served notice to Party officials throughout the country that their superficial, perfunctory and lackadaisical attitudes towards class struggle would no longer be tolerated".

(Richard Baum (1975): *ibid.*; p. 21).

This document was:

"The first major policy directive concerning the SEC and was clearly intended by Mao to guide the campaign along the course he desired".
(Parris H. Chang: *op. cit.*; p. 149).

Its most important feature was that:

"Those cadres who had failed to emphasise the class struggle or had paid insufficient attention to the class struggle phenomena were criticised".

(Parris H. Chang: *ibid.*; p. 149).

For example, Article 4 declared:

"Not all of our comrades have paid attention to the various phenomena of class struggle. . . Many have failed to observe these phenomena and have not given them the serious thought required. Instead they adopt an attitude of indifference, thereby letting the phenomena continue to develop".

('Draft Directive on Some Problems in Current Rural Work' (May 1963), in: Richard Baum (1975): *op. cit.*; p. 21).

The 'First Ten Points':

"Held that cadre corruption . . . was the most prevalent cause of peasant dissatisfaction with the existing rural leadership".

(Richard Baum (1975): *ibid.*; p. 24).

and that this must be corrected by mobilising the masses of the poor and middle peasants against the 'forces of corruption':

In other words, the 'First Ten Points':

"Called for the revitalisation of long-dormant poor and lower middle peasants' organisations in the countryside, The poor and lower-middle peasants, who reportedly constituted some 65% to 70% of China's total rural population, . . . were now instructed to form a 'class army' to do battle against the forces of corruption and reaction in the countryside".

(Richard Baum (1975): *ibid.*; p. 24).

The 'First Ten Points' declared:

"During the course of the movement, the masses must be given every opportunity to fully air their views, make criticism of errors and shortcomings, and expose evil people and evil deeds".

('Draft Directive on Some Problems in Current Rural Work' (May 1963), in: Richard Baum (1975): *ibid.*; p. 24).

Because of opposition from the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie, Mao's 'First Ten Points' were only:

"Officially adopted by the Central Committee at its 11th Plenum in August 1966, when the Cultural Revolution was in full blood. It took 38 months for these ideas to be accepted by the majority of the Party's highest body".

(Jean Esmein: 'The Chinese Cultural Revolution'; London; 1975; p. 44).

The 'Second Ten Points' (September 1963)

In September 1963, four months after the issuing of the 'First Ten Points', the leaders of the national bourgeois grouping within the Party succeeded in getting the Central Committee to issue:

"Another directive on the SEC, 'Some Concrete Policy Formulations of the CC of the CPC in the Rural Socialist Education Movement' (also known as the 'Second Ten Points')". (Parris H. Chang: *op. cit.*; p. 150).

They:

"Were drafted on the basis of a report . . . by Peking Party boss, Peng Chen".

(Richard Baum (1975): *op. cit.*; p. 43).

Later, during the 'Cultural Revolution', the 'Second Ten Points' were attributed:

"If not to Liu Shao-chi personally, at least to Liu's thought".

(David & Mancy D. Milton: *op. cit.*; p. 71).

The 'Second Ten Points' essentially reversed the political line of Mao's 'First Ten

Points;

"The 'Second Ten Points' substantially modified the spirit and softened the impact of the SEC as set forth in its predecessor."

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 150).

"Reliance in the movement should be placed, the revised 'Ten Points' stated, not on the poor and lower-middle peasants, but on the Party leadership".

(David & Nancy D. Milton: ibid.; p. 71).

Thus:

"The net effect of both the 'Second Ten Points' and the ensuing propaganda campaign in the mass media was to ensure that the Socialist Education Movement would be a relatively low-key affair."

(Richard Baum (1975): op. cit.; p. 63).

Mao's 'Twenty-three Articles' (December 1964)

In December 1964, the comprador bourgeois grouping within the Party struck back with the issue of:

"A new directive 'Some Problems currently arising in the Course of the Rural Socialist Education Movement' (also known as the 'TwentyThree Points', which was said to have been drafted under Mao's personal guidance)".

(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 156).

The document re-defined:

"The Socialist Education Movement as a movement meant to confront the 'contradiction between socialism and capitalism in China's countryside'. In order to accomplish this, it called once again on the peasant masses to supervise the Party cadres by their criticism and, for the first time, there appeared the formulation that was to be the central political focus of the Cultural Revolution -- to direct the 'spearhead of criticism against 'those people in authority within the Party who take the capitalist road'".

(David & Nancy D. Milton: op. cit.; p. 71-72).

It attempted to make the new line final and definitive by declaring:

"If the present document should contradict previous Central Committee documents concerning the Socialist Education Movement, then this document shall uniformly be regarded as the standard".

(CC, CPC: 'Some Problems currently arising in the Course of the Rural Socialist Education Movement' (January 1965), in: Richard Baum (1975): op. cit.; p. 127).

During the Socialist Education Movement:

"Lin Piao rose to ideological prominence";
(Roxane Witke: op. cit.; p. 375).

and:

"Chiang Ching, . . . after two decades of isolation, . began her return."
(Roxane Witke: ibid.; p. 306).

Conclusion

In April 1966:

"Mao study was incorporated into the Socialist Education Movement on a regular and nation-wide basis".
(Richard Baum: 'The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Anatomy of a Limited Rebellion'(hereafter listed as 'Richard Baum (1971)', in: Thomas W. Robinson (Ed.): 'The Cultural Revolution in China'; Berkeley (USA); 1971; p. 376).

and was associated with:

"The initiation of the Cultural Revolution".
(Richard Baum (1971): ibid.; p. 376).

So that the Socialist Education Movement:

"Overlapped the Cultural Revolution and virtually merged with it in the autumn of 1966". (John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 62).

The ritual study of 'The Thought of Mao Tse-tung' was common to both the 'Socialist Education Movement' and the 'Cultural Revolution':

"Mao-study was the common element of both the (urban) Cultural Revolution and the (rural) Socialist Education Movement."
(Richard Baum (1971): op. cit.; p. 376).

Indeed, the Socialist Education Movement may justly be regarded as:

"Mao's test run"
(David & Nancy D. Milton: op. cit.; p. 127).

for the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' of 1966-69.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN : PRELUDE TO THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION' (September 1962 - April 1966)

The 10th Plenum of the 8th CC (September/October 1962)

The 10th Plenum of the 8th CC was held in September/October 1962.
Although:

**"Mao presided over this meeting";
(Kenneth Lieberthal: 'The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yanan Leadership' (hereafter listed as 'Kenneth Lieberthal (1987)'), in: Roderick MacFarquahar & John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China', Volume 14: 'The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China'; Cambridge; 1987; p. 334).**

and, as has been said:

**"put forward the slogan 'Never forget the class struggle!'.
(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at 10th Plenum of 8th CC (September/October 1962), in: John Gittings (1968): op. cit.; p. 271).**

this policy was not endorsed by the Plenum, and:

**"In the months that followed, precious time slipped by while the Secretariat of the Central Committee appeared to do nothing".
(Jean Esmein: op. cit.; p. 44).**

The Initiation of the 'Learn from the PLA' Campaign (December 1963)

In December 1963,

**"Mao issued a general call for people to 'learn from the PLA', a startling slogan".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 338).**

In this period,

**"The PLA generated several models of political rectitude including a selfless soldier (LEI Feng*)".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 338).**

Lei Feng:

**"Was a peasant soldier from Hunan province who was held up by Mao Tse-tung to be youthful paragon of Maoist virtues. . . . These virtues included courage, humility, sacrifice . . . and above all unquestioned loyalty".
(Edwin P-w. Leung: op. cit.; p. 205).**

He:

**"Died in an accident",
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 338).

"crushed by a fallen telegraph pole".
(Edwin P-w. Leung: op. cit.; p. 205).**

Chiang Ching and 'Cultural Reform' (January 1964)

By 1962, Chiang Ching had convinced Mao:

**"That the cultural sphere needed attention".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 343).**

and in January 1964, with Mao's support, she was able to put into practice:

**"Her plans to revolutionise Peking Opera and other aspects of Chinese culture."
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 343).**

However, being under the control of the national bourgeois grouping of the Party leadership,

**"the Ministries of Culture and Education and the Propaganda Department of the CPC . . . paid her no heed and scoffed at her efforts."
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 345-46).**

In this situation Chiang Ching linked up with other pseudo-left opposition elements -- such as KANG Sheng*, who

**"Heavily and personally involved himself in Chiang Ching 's efforts to revolutionise Peking Opera",
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 345).**

CHANG Chun-chiao*,

**"Who was in the cultural apparatus in Shanghai",
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 345).**

YAO Wen-yuan*,

**"a Shanghai critic".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 345). ;**

and, above all, Minister of Defence Lin Piao.

In June/July 1964,

" . . clashes occurred at . . . the . . . Festival of Peking Opera on Contemporary Themes"; (Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 346).

In February 1966,

". . Lin Piao and Chiang Ching were clearly linked up when Lin invited Chiang to stage a 'Forum on Literature and Art for Troops' and made her the official cultural adviser to the military. This for the first time gave Chiang an official position that she could use as a base for pursuing her political goals".

(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 342).

The forum:

"Directly challenged the policies of Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi and others".

(Frederick C. Teiwes & Warren Sun: 'The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution: 1966-1971'; London; 1996; p. 57).

The Establishment of the Five-Man Group for Cultural Reform (June 1964)

In June 1964,

"the Party Secretariat formed a Five-Man Group to coordinate efforts toward Cultural Reform. Peng Chen . . . took charge of the group". (Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): *ibid.*; p. 346).

The Publication of the 'Little Red Book' (May 1965)

In May 1965:

"The army . . . compiled the little red book of Mao quotations"; (David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): 'People's China: Social Experimentation, Politics, Entry onto the World Scene: 1966 through 1972'; New York; 1974; p. 225).

The Removal of Lo Jui-ching (September 1965)

LO Jui-ching* had been appointed Chief-of-Staff of the PLA in April 1959, at the time of the ousting of Peng Teh-huai, and:

"Over the course of time, Lo came to adopt views similar to those of Peng". (Lois D. Tretiak: 'Revolt of the Generals', in: 'The Case of Peng Tehhuai'; *op. cit.*; p. 339-40).

"General Lo . . . was a recent convert to the modernisers". (Gerard H. Corr: 'The Chinese Red Army: Campaigns and Politics since 1949'; Reading; 1974; p. 149).

In the sphere of military science, Lo held that the strategy of guerilla warfare originally adopted by the CPC was no longer suitable for China now that the People's Republic had become a sovereign power, and that the strategy of guerilla warfare needed to be replaced by more orthodox military strategy. Indeed, among many PLA officers, Mao's military ideas were dismissed as:

"A romantic day-dream inspired by nostalgia for the caves of Yenan, holding China back from building the modern armed forces that she needs" (Joan Robinson: 'The Cultural Revolution in China'; Harmondsworth; 1969; p. 32).

Chu Teh, the commander-in-chief of the PLA, said in a radio broadcast in August 1951:

"Our troops . . . must absorb the highly advanced military science of the Soviet Union". (Chu Teh: Broadcast of August 1951, in: Gerard H. Corr:

op. cit.; p. 143).

However, the comprador bourgeois grouping within the Party, headed by Mao Tse-tung, aimed to use the PLA primarily as a weapon against the national bourgeoisie rather than an instrument of national defence, and therefore demanded that the PLA retain its reliance on guerilla warfare and a military organisation appropriate for such warfare.

Lin Piao, the new Minister of National Defence:

"Was given the job of remoulding a new PLA, one more to Mao's liking and one which in the future could be used as a military-political instrument".
(Gerard H. Carr: op. cit.; p. 147).

On becoming Defence Minister, Lin:

" . . . had overtly dropped the interest he had once shown in what Mao called 'positional warfare' and, unhesitatingly, accepted . . . the Chairman's concept of a people's war with all the supporting ideology".
(Clare Hollingworth: 'Mao and the Men against him'; London; 1985; p. 104).

Thus, Lin Piao played up:

"The role of the militia and of unconventional forces rather than of the regular army".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 340).

and he:

"Began his reform of the PLA by bringing back into prominence the Military Affairs Commission (MAC) of the Party".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 336).

and

"Giving greater power to the Army's Political Department,"
(Gerard H. Carr: op. cit.; p. 148).

The MAC was:

"The command vehicle through which the Party exercises control over the professional military. . . . Day-to-day leadership of this body generally resided in the Minister of Defence."
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 336).

Also, Lin began:

"To stress the use of Mao Tse-tung Thought in the military".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 337).

In his capacity of Chief-of-Staff, Lo Jui-ching resisted the introduction of 'Mao

Tse-tung Thought' into the PLA, and after November 1965 he ceased to appear in public in his official capacity. However, no official announcement of his removal was made, and it was not until August 1966 that this was implied in the official reference to General YANG Cheng-wu* as Acting Chief of Staff.

Later, during the Cultural Revolution, Lo was accused of:

"Opposing the thorough establishment by our army of the absolute authority of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung".

(Yang Cheng-wu: 'Thoroughly establish the Absolute Authority of the Great Supreme Commander Chairman Mao and of his Great Thought', in: 'Peking

Review', Volume 10, No. 46 (10 November 1967); p. 19).

[Lin Piao's 'Long Live the Victory of People's War!' \(September 1965\)](#)

In September 1965:

"Lin Piao's famous programmatic document, 'Long live the Victory of People's War!', was published".

(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 226).

Apart from approving Mao's theses on 'people's war', it supported the theory of [the revolutionary movement spreading from the countryside to the cities:](#)

"The countryside alone can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory. . . . Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of establishing revolutionary base areas in the rural districts and encircling the cities from the countryside is attracting more and more attention among the people in these regions (Asia, Africa and Latin America -- Ed.)".

(Lin Piao: 'Long live the Victory of People's War!'; Peking; 1965; p. 48).

[The Central Work Conference \(September/October 1965\)](#)

At a Central Work Conference in September/October 1965, Mao severely criticised a play written in 1961 by WU Han*, historian and Deputy Mayor of Peking, entitled 'Hai Jui dismissed from Office'. Hai Jui was an official of the Ming period, renowned for his honesty, who had been dismissed by the Emperor, and Mao regarded the play as:

"A veiled political attack on Mao's 1959 dismissal of Peng Teh-huai."

(Hong Y. Lee: 'The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study'; Berkeley (USA); 1978; p. 11).

and demanded that the play be criticised by:

"The Group of Five in charge of revolutionising literature and art".

(Hong Y. Lee: *ibid.*; p. 11).

It was:

**"a very stormy meeting".
(Jean Esmein: op. cit.; p. 56).**

at which Mao gave 'instructions':

**"regarding the criticism of Wu Han".
('Circular of the CC of the CPC' (May 1966), 'CCP Documents of the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: 1966-1967' (hereafter listed as 'CCP
Documents (1968)'; Hong Kong; 1968; p. 20).**

But:

**"Mao was in a minority".
(Shamsul Alam: op. cit.; p. 15).**

and no critique of Wu Han emerged from the meeting.

Shortly afterwards:

**"Mao withdrew to Shanghai".
(Jean Esmein: op. cit.; p. 56).**

As Mao himself expressed it in January 1967:

**"In September and October 1965, the central committee surrendered to
revisionism, and I thought that I could not put my ideas into practice in
Peking".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Statement of January 1967', in: 'Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,985).**

He:

**"Therefore left the capital, where the Party machine was controlled by his
opponents, and settled in Shanghai".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,985).**

Of course:

**"In singling out Wu Han, Mao was actually focussing his fire against Peng
Chen and the Peking Party apparatus, for Wu Han was one of Peng's
proteges".
(Stanley Karnow: 'Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution';
London;
1973; p. 159).**

[Yao Wen-Yuan's Critique \(November 1965\)](#)

Mao:

**"Had to go to Shanghai to find his man who might expose the so-called
bourgeois outlook in culture and ideology. It was Yao Wen-yuan who drafted**

**the critique of 'Hai Jui' and Wu Han".
(Alam Shamsul: op. cit.; p. 8).**

The critique, although:

". . commissioned by Mao, was turned down by every official publication in Peking."

(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann: op. cit.; p. 225).

but was published in November 1965 in the Shanghai newspaper 'Wen-hui Daily'.

Yao's critique was, in fact:

"The first bullet of the Cultural Revolution".

(Alam Shamsul: op. cit.;p. 8).

The 'February Thesis' (February 1966)

In February 1966 the Group of Five finally published its report on the 'Wu Han Affair' -- a document which became known as the 'February Thesis' -- in the name of the CC of the CPC. It criticised Wu Han, but implied that the matter involved academic questions, such as:

"The appraisal of historical figures, and the viewpoint and method of historical research".

('Outline Report concerning the Current Academic Discussion of the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution' (February 1966), in: 'CCP Documents (1968)'; op. cit.; p. 7).

rather than questions of political principle, as Mao demanded. In essence,

"the report discarded any connection between the play of Wu Han and Peng Teh-huai's dismissal".

(Shamsun Alam: op. cit.; p. 9).

It said:

"As regards people like Wu Han, who treats history with the bourgeois world outlook and committed political mistakes, the discussion in the press should not be confined to political questions, but should go fully into the various academic and theoretical questions involved".. ('Outline Report concerning the Current Academic Discussion of the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution' (February 1966), in: 'CCP Documents (1968)': op. cit.; p. 10).

It even defended the right to put forward anti-Marxist ideas by quoting some of Mao's own pronouncements during the 'Hundred Flowers' campaign:

"The policy of 'opening wide' propounded by Comrade Mao Tse-tung . . calls for a full expression of all kinds of opinion (including anti-Marxist things)".

('Outline Report concerning the Current Academic Discussion of the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution' (February 1966), in: 'CCP Documents (1968)'; *ibid.*; p. 9).

The CC Circular (May 1966)

In May 1966, the comprador bourgeois grouping within the Party leadership persuaded an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPC to denounce, in the name of the Central Committee, the 'February Thesis' as:

**"An outline report by Peng Chen alone",
(Circular of CC of CPC' (May 1966), in: 'CCP Documents (1968)':
ibid.; p. 21).**

and one which:

**"Violates the basic Marxist thesis that all class struggles are political struggles".
(Circular of CC of CPC' (May 1966), in: 'CCP Documents (1968)'; *ibid.*;
p. 22).**

It therefore revoked the 'February Thesis' and dissolved the Group of Five':

**"The Central Committee has decided to revoke the 'Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion made by the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution . . . , to dissolve the 'Group of Five in charge of the Cultural Revolution' and its offices."
(Circular of CC of CPC' (May 1966), in: 'CCP Documents (1968); *ibid.*; p.
20).**

It charged that the 'February Thesis',

**"While feigning compliance, . . . actually opposes and stubbornly resists the great cultural revolution initiated and led personally by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, as well as the instruction regarding the criticism of Wu Han which he gave . . . in September and October 1965. .
It obscures the sharp class struggle that is taking place on the cultural and ideological front."
(Circular of CC of CPC' (May 1966), in: CCP Documents (1968); of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: 1966-1967'; *ibid.*; p. 20).**

It replaced the existing 'Group of Five' by a new 'Cultural Revolution Group' controlled by the comprador bourgeois grouping within the leadership of the Party. That is, it resolved

**"To set up a new Cultural Revolution Group directly under the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau".
(Circular of CC of CPC' (May 1966), in: 'CCP Documents (1968)'; *ibid.*; p.
20).**

The new 'Cultural Revolution Group' was known as the:
"'Cultural Revolution Small Group'".
(Hong Y. Lee: op. cit.; p. 16).

and was placed:

"under the leadership of Chiang Ching, who took control of the Party
propaganda machine".
(Hong Y. Lee: ibid.; p. 16).

THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION', PROPERLY SO-CALLED, HAD BEGUN.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES -- 8

CHANG Chun-chiao, revisionist journalist and politician (1917-90);
Director, East China Branch, New China News Agency (1950); managing
director, 'Liberation Army Daily' (1954); Deputy President, Shanghai
Branch, All-China Journalists' Association (1955); member, Shanghai
Municipal Committee, CPC (1958); secretary, Shanghai Municipality CPC
(1958-71); director, propaganda department, Shanghai Municipal
Committee, CPC (1963); secretary, East China Bureau, CC, CPC (1966-67);
1st Secretary and Director, Shanghai Municipal People's Commune (1967);
deputy head, Cultural Revolution Small Group, CC, CPC (1967-69);
director, Shanghai Garrison, PLA (1967-76); member, Politburo, CC, CPC
(1969-76); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1971-76);
director, General Political Department (1975-76); Deputy Premier (1975-76);
dismissed from all posts and arrested (1976); tried and found guilty of
counter-revolutionary crimes and sentenced to death (1980-81); sentence
commuted to life imprisonment (1983); died in prison (1990).

KANG Sheng, Chinese revisionist politician (1903-75); member, Politburo,
CC,
CPC (1934-56, 1966-75); secretary, CC, CPC (1937-56, 1962-67); member,
Central People's Government Council (1949-54); 1st Secretary, Shantung
Province CPC (1949-55); Governor, Shantung Province (1949-55); member,

East China Military and Administrative Council (1950-62); member, East
China Administrative Committee (1952-55); political commissar, PLA,
Shantung Military District (1953); adviser, Cultural Revolutionary Small
Group, CC, CPC (1967-69); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC,
CPC
(1969-75); Deputy Chairman, CC, CPC (1973-75); expelled posthumously
from
CPC (1980).

LEI Feng, Chinese revisionist soldier (1940-62); held up as paragon of virtues by Chinese revisionists; killed in accident (1962).

LO Jui-ching, Chinese revisionist military officer (1906-); member, Supreme People's Procuratorate (1949-54); member, Government Administrative Council (1949-54); Minister of Public Security (1949-59); Director, Public Security Bureau, Peking (1949); Commander, PLA Public Security Forces (1950-59); political commissar, Public Security Forces (1953-59); member, National Defence Council (1954-65); Chief of General Staff (1959-65); Deputy Premier (1959-66); Deputy Minister of National Defence (1959-66); secretary-general, Military Affairs Committee, CPC (1961-65); general (1955); secretary, CC, CPC (1962-66); Deputy Chairman, National Defence Council (1965-66).

LUO Ruiching = Pinyin form of LO Jui-ching.

WANG Hongwen = Pinyin form of WANG Hung-wen.

WANG Hung-wen, Chinese revisionist politician (1935-92); member, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee (1967); Deputy Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee (1967-73); secretary, Shanghai Municipality, CPC (1971-72); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1973-76); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1973-76); Deputy Chairman, CC, CPC (1973-76); expelled from CPC and arrested (1976); tried and sentenced for counter-revolutionary crimes (1980-81); died in prison (1992).

WU Han, Chinese revisionist historian, journalist and politician (1909-); Dean, College of Arts, and head, Department of History, Tsinghua University (1949-50); member, Standing Committee, University Administration Committee, Tsinghua University (1949-52); member, Standing Committee, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth (1949-66); Deputy Mayor, Peking (1949-66); Deputy Chairman, University Administrative Centre, Tsinghua University (1951-52); member, editorial board, 'New Observer' (1959-66); President, Peking TV University (1964-66).

YANG Cheng-wu, Chinese revisionist military officer (1914-); deputy commander, Peking-Tientsin Garrison, PLA (1950); member, North China Administrative Council (1951-54); deputy commander, North China Military Region (1952-54); member, North China Defence Council (1954-68); commander, Peking-Tientsin Garrison, PLA (1954-56); colonel-general (1955); commander, Air Defence Command, PLA (1956-58); commander, Peking Military Region (1957-59); Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA (1959-66); Acting Chief of Staff, PLA (1966-68); deputy head, PLA Cultural Revolution

Group (1967-68); deputy chairman, Military Commission, CC, CPC (1967-68); removed from all posts, tried and sentenced to imprisonment for counterrevolutionary crimes (1968); rehabilitated by revisionists (1974).

YANG Chengwu = Pinyin form of YANG Cheng-wu.

YAO Wen-yuan, revisionist journalist and politician (1931-); member, Cultural Revolution Small Group (1966-69); member, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee (1967-69); deputy chairman, Municipal Revolutionary Committee, Shanghai (1967-76); chief editor, 'People's Daily' (1967); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1969-76); dismissed from all posts and arrested (1976); tried, found guilty of counter-revolutionary crimes and sentenced to imprisonment; released from prison (1996).

YAO Wenyan = Pinyin form of YAO Wen-yuan.

ZHANG Chunqiao = Pinyin form of CHANG Chun-chiao.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN : THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION'

(April 1966 - April 1969)

INTRODUCTION

THE 'GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION' WAS AN ATTEMPT BY THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG:

TO DESTROY THE POLITICAL POWER OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI,

BY MOBILISING AGAINST THEM:

FIRSTLY, THE YOUTH; WHEN THAT FAILED, SECONDLY, THE WORKERS; AND WHEN THAT IN TURN FAILED, THIRDLY, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.

In other words, THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION' WAS NEITHER CULTURAL NOR REVOLUTIONARY, BUT POLITICAL AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY.

The Initiation of the 'Cultural Revolution' (April 1966)

The 'Cultural Revolution' began in April 1966, when Premier Chou En-lai:

"Called for a fierce and protracted struggle to wipe out 'bourgeois ideology' in the academic, educational and journalistic fields, in art,

literature and all other fields of culture".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,577).

In the same month, April 1966, the newspaper 'Liberation Army Daily', the most important press organ under the control of the comprador bourgeois grouping of the Party, published an editorial which declared:

"There exists in our literary and art circles an anti-Party, antisocialist black line running counter to Mao Tse-tung's thinking. .

We must . . . take an active part in the great socialist revolution on the cultural front, thoroughly eradicate this black line. . We must not mind being blamed for 'brandishing the stick'".

('Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thinking: Actively participate in the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution', in: 'Peking Review', Volume 9, No. 18 (29 April 1966); p. 6, 9).

In May 1966, Yao Wen-yuan in:

"'Liberation Army Daily' published a violent attack . . . on three journals published by the Peking Party -- the 'Peking Daily'. the 'Peking Evening News' and the fortnightly 'Front Line

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,577).

denouncing them as:

". . instruments for opposing the Party and socialism".

(Yao Wen-yuan: 'On Three-Family Village' (May 1966), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 9. No. 22 (27 May 1966); p. 5).

In June 1966, the 'People's Daily', now controlled by the comprador bourgeois grouping of the Party, published a violent attack on the Party leadership at Peking University:

"Peking University . . is a key point of the 'Three-Family Village' sinister gang, a stubborn bastion used by them to oppose the Party and socialism. The people of the whole country will rise up, oppose and knock down all those who oppose Chairman Mao. . . . The whole nation will smash their sinister gang, sinister organisation and sinister discipline to pieces."

('Hail the Big Character Poster at Peking University' (June 1966), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 9, No. 37 (9 September 1966); p. 21, 22).

On the following day, it was announced:

"That the Central Committee of the CPC had decided to reorganise the Peking Party Committee."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,577).

as well as:

"The Party Committee of Peking University".
(Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,577).

and had appointed a new Peking First Secretary in place of Peng Chen, (Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,577).

The announcement was:

"Immediately followed by demonstrations outside the Peking Party headquarters and at the university which continued for several days. Thousands of people marched through the streets carrying portraits of Mao Tse-tung, beating drums and cymbals, exploding fire-crackers and acclaiming the purge as a victory for Chairman Mao's thought."
(Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,578).

The 'Red Guards' (May 1966 - January 1967)

The first stage of the Cultural Revolution:

"Was led by the students".

(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): 'People's China: Social Experimentation, Politics, Entry onto the World Scene: 1966 through 1972'; New York; 1974; op. cit.; p. 230).

From May 1966, young people were recruited into a para-military fascist-type organisation called 'Red Guards':

"The PLA and People's Militia trained groups of teenagers in schools and universities to form Red Guard units which were designed . . . to promote the teachings of the Chairman".

(Clare Hollingworth: op. cit.; p. 136).

The 'Red Guards' were designed to function as a shock force against the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie:

"The Red Guards are the shock force of the great proletarian cultural revolution

('In Praise of the Red Guards' (September 1966), in: 'Peking Review Volume 9, No. 39 (23 September 1966); p. 15).

Significantly, their allegiance was declared to be, not to the Communist Party but to Mao Tse-tung personally:

"The Red Guards say, and say it well:

'Chairman Mao is our red commander and we are the young, red soldiers of Chairman Mao . . .'

They carry with them copies of 'Quotations from Chairman Mao'".

('In Praise of the Red Guards' (September 1966), in: 'Peking Review Volume 9, No. 39 (23 September 1966); p. 15).

accepting the dictum that 'a genuine revolutionary' is one who accepts 'Mao Tse-tung Thought' without question:

"The attitude towards Mao Tse-tung's Thought, whether to accept it or reject it, to support it or oppose it, to love it warmly or be hostile to it, this is the touchstone to test and the watershed between true revolution and sham revolution, between revolution and counterrevolution."

('Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the Telescope and Microscope of our Revolutionary Cause' (June 1966), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 9, No. 24 (10 June 1966); p. 7).

In June 1966:

"Universities and schools were closed indefinitely to enable them (the students - Ed.) to participate in the Cultural Revolution".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,986).

In July 1966:

"Great prominence was given in the Chinese Press . . . to a report that Mr. Mao had swum nine miles in the Yangtze River in 65 minutes, apparently in order to dispel rumours that he was in poor health".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,579).

In August 1966, at a mass rally of Red Guards in Peking, Mao:

"Signified his approval of the movement by donning the red armband which they wore."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,986).

Between August and December 1966:

"eight such giant rallies of a million or more Red Guards were held in the great Tien An Men Square in Peking".

(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.;p. 268).

In August 1966, it was announced:

"that the entire printing industry would be mobilised to print 35 million copies of the 'Selected Works' of Mao Tse-tung by the end of 1967".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,579).

In November 1966, Teng Hsiao-ping was dismissed as general secretary of the CPC.

In December 1966:

"Peng Chen was dragged from his bed and arrested by Red Guards and was displayed before a rally of 100,000 Red Guards in a Peking stadium."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,987).

Also 'arrested' by Red Guards were:

"Lo Jui-ching" .

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,987).

who had been secretly removed as Chief of Staff in November 1965, accused of:

"Opposing the thorough establishment by our army of the absolute authority of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung".

(Yang Cheng-wu: 'Thoroughly establish the Absolute Authority of the Great Supreme Commander Chairman Mao and of his Great Thought'

(November

1967), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 19. No. 46 (10 November 1967); p. 19).

and:

"Lu Ting-yi"

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,987).

former:

". . head of the propaganda department and Minister of Culture".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,578).

who had been:

". . removed from both posts."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,578).

in July 1966.

The 11th Plenum of the 8th CC (August 1966)

The 11th Plenum of the 8th CC of the CPC was held in August 1966:

". . guarded by the troops of Lin Piao",

(Alam Shamsul: op. cit.; p. 17).

and:

"Mao resorted to the extraordinary measures of packing the galleries with .

. . youthful supporters and convoking only about half the total CC membership".

(Lowell Dittmer: 'Liu Shao-chi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism'; Berkeley (USA); 1974; p. 95).

At the Plenum:

". . presided over by Comrade Mao Tse-tung",

('Communique of 11th Plenum of CC of CPC' (August 1966), in: 'CCP Documents': op. cit.; p. 62). p. 1).

those present:

"Were confronted with a big-character poster written by Mao himself",

(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 267-68).

reading:

"Bombard the Headquarters!"

(Mao Tse-tung: Big-Character Poster (August 1966), in: David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): ibid.; p. 268).

The poster:

"Was immediately understood by all the delegates as an attack on Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and other prominent leaders of the powerful Party apparatus."

(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 268).

The Plenum:

"Demoted Liu Shao-chi . . . and elevated Lin Piao, the Minister of Defence, to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin was officially proclaimed as 'Chairman Mao's closest comrade-in-arms and successor'."

(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 268).

It gave formal approval both to the 'Cultural Revolution' and to 'Mao Tse-tung Thought'. It stressed:

"That the series of directives by Comrade Mao Tse-tung concerning the great proletarian cultural revolution are the guide to action in the present cultural revolution of our country ('Communique of 11th Plenum of CC of CPC' (August 1966), in: 'CCP Documents': op. cit.; p. 65).

It reiterated that:

"Our objective is to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road".

('Decision of the CC of the CPC concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' (August 1966), in: 1CCP Documentst: op. cit.; p. 42).

and instructed:

"Trust the masses, rely on them, and respect their initiative. Cast out fear. Don't be afraid of disorder".

(tDecision of the CC of the CPC concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' CPC' (August 1966), in: 'CCP Documents': op. cit.; p. 45).

In particular, the Plenum emphasised:

"That the intensive study of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's works by the whole

Party and the whole nation is an important event of historic significance. Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has . . . developed Marxism-Leninism with genius . . . and has raised Marxism-Leninism to a new stage. Mao Tse-tung's thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory. It is the guiding principle for all the work of our Party and country".
('Communique of 11th Plenum of 8th CC of CPC , in: 'CCP Documents : op. cit.; p. 69).

The 'Revolutionary Rebels' (November-December 1966)

To counter the offensive of the 'Red Guards', Liu Shao-chi:

"Organised a large number of work teams -- perhaps four hundred teams with more than ten thousand members in all -- and dispatched them to universities and high schools and to bureaucratic agencies . . . to re-establish Party leadership over the student movement . . .

The work teams were able to restore a modicum of normality to many universities"

(Harry Harding (1991): op. cit.; p. 136).

On the other hand:

"In the long run, the student movement became unmanageable because of factional quarrels".

(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 229).

Thus, the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie were:

"Able to repulse the first attack by Red Guards in August and September (1966 - Ed.) by mobilising workers . . . in their defence".

(Philip Bridgham: 'Maoist Cultural Revolution in 1967', (hereafter listed as 'Philip Bridgham (1971)'); in: Richard Baum (Ed.): 'China in Ferment: Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution'; Englewood Cliffs (USA); 1971; p. 122).

As a result of the failure of the Red Guards to fulfil the role allotted to them, it was announced in November 1966:

"That free transport, food and accommodation would no longer be provided for Red Guards coming to Peking".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,986).

and:

"that Red Guards from the provinces must leave the city within three days".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,986).

The political representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie responded to the failure of the campaign of the 'Red Guards' in November 1966 by seeking to supplement them with adult workers -- called 'Revolutionary Rebels':

"The campaign began . . . with the formation of new 'revolutionary rebel' organisations in industrial and mining establishments."
(Philip Bridgham (1971): op. cit.; p. 122).

The 'Revolutionary Rebels':

". . . consisting of adult workers, replaced the Red Guards from this time on as the main agents of the Cultural Revolution."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives?', Volume 15; p. 21,988).

However:

"The Revolutionary Rebels . . . did not form a single movement organised on a national scale. . . . Scores of militant Maoist organisations bearing a wide variety of names sprang up throughout the country, often operating independently and even in rivalry. In Shanghai, for example, there were at least 31 Revolutionary Rebel and Red Guard organisations. . . . In many cities and provinces the Revolutionary Rebels were opposed by equally militant anti-Maoist organisations."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,988-89).

In other words, under the direction of the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie:

"Armed organisations were formed to resist them (the 'Revolutionary Rebels' - Ed.)".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,985).

Furthermore, under the influence of the demagogic pseudo-left propaganda of the 'Cultural Revolution', the 'Revolutionary Rebels' demanded:

"higher wages, lower working hours, better housing, improved medical care and other benefits."
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.;p. 265).

In many areas, the 'Revolutionary Rebels' pursued their demands with strikes, which reached particular intensity in Shanghai:

"Widespread strikes in support of demands for wage increases began in Shanghai at the end of December (1966 -- Ed.). . . . The port was brought to a standstill".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,989).

The port officials:

"Revolutionaries', fearful of being branded as 'revisionist

counterpromised to satisfy every demand".
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 265).

and as a result:

"They were then told that they had been hoodwinked into following the 'evil road of economism'".
(Philip Bridgham (1971): op. cit.; p. 123).

The struggle:

"Raged even more fiercely through December (1966 - Ed.)".
(Joan Robinson: op. cit.; p. 57).

[The 'Revolutionary Committees' \(January 1967 - September 1968\)](#)

During the early months of the 'Cultural Revolution', the Army had:

". . remained neutral in the struggle".
(Keessing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,989).

But by January 1967 the 'Cultural Revolution' had brought the country to a state of:

"Anarchy".
(Philip Bridgham (1971): op. cit.; p. 125).

and:

". . only one institution had the capacity to fill the power vacuum the Army".
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 275).

Resistance:

"to involving the Army in the Cultural Revolution . . . was apparently led by officers like Marshal HO Lung*".
(Stanley Karnow: ibid.; p. 279).

and in May 1967 Red Guards arraigned Ho Lung:

"Before a kangaroo court and . . he disappeared from public view".
(Stanley Karnow: ibid.; 282).

In January 1967, the policy of army non-involvement was changed:

"In the light of the general stalemate that had occurred throughout the fall, and the collapse of authority that had begun to appear around the turn of the year."

(Harry Harding: 'The Chinese State in Crisis' (hereafter listed as 'Harry Harding (1991)', in: Roderick MacFarlane & John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China1 Volume 15: The People's Republic, Part 2: 'Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution; 1966-1992'; Cambridge; 1991;

op. cit.; p. 161).

and the PLA was ordered to intervene in the 'Cultural Revolution' on the side of the 'revolutionary Leftists':

"All past directives concerning the army's non-involvement in the great cultural revolution . . . are null and void. Active support must be rendered to the broad masses of revolutionary Leftists in their struggle to seize power. . . Counter-revolutionaries and counter-revolutionary organisations who oppose the proletarian revolutionary Leftists must be resolutely suppressed".

('Decision . . . concerning the Resolute Support of the PLA for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left' (January 1967), in 'CCP Documents': op. cit.; p. 196).

It was decided:

"That the former provincial and municipal administrations must be replaced by Revolutionary Committees, based on a 'triple alliance' of Revolutionary Rebels, Army representatives."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,992).

And:

"Old Party cadres who had passed the test of the Cultural Revolution".
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 354).

'Revolutionary Committees':

"Were set up between November 1967 and May 1968 in 16 provinces
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,945).

while in August and September 1968:

"Revolutionary Committees were established . . . in the five remaining provinces"

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,945).

The PLA played by far the dominant role in the 'Revolutionary Committees':

"The triple alliance policy in practice gave the Army control of the 'revolutionary committees'".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,993).

with Maoist politicians:

"playing only a subsidiary role".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,945).

In most provinces,

"the chairman of the committee was the local political commissar or military

commander".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 22,949).

In January 1968:

"The public sale of Red Guard literature was forbidden . . . on the ground that certain of them fomented 'sectarianism'".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,949).

and July 1968 saw:

"The last campaign of the historic Peking Red Guards. Massive worker and army teams were sent in to direct and lead the universities. The mass movement was over."

(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 354).

and Mao himself:

"repudiated the Red Guards".

(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 441).

In October 1968, the CC of the CPC ordered that:

"all schools and universities . . . should reopen immediately".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,949).

The Rebuilding of the Party (September 1968 - August 1971)

During this time, the Communist Party had "disintegrated":

"Except in the Army, (the CPC-Editor) had virtually disintegrated during the Cultural Revolution". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 24,698).

"Reorganisation of the Communist Party . . began in September 1968, local branches being established first."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 24,698).

and the:

". . pattern of military predominance was dutifully applied to the Party Committees germinating in the provinces."

(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 462).

"At the provincial level, . . . Party authority gradually slipped into the hands of the local PLA leaders".

(Liao Kuang-sheng: 'Factional Politics after the Cultural Revolution: The Gang of Four and "Old Revolutionaries"' (hereafter listed as 'Liao Kuangsheng (1977)'), in: Steve S.K.Chin (Ed.): 'The Gang of Four: First Essays after the Fall'; Hong Kong; 1977; p. 124).

while:

**"The Red Guards ended up with derisory treatment."
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 458).**

In almost all provinces:

**"The post of First Party Secretary was assumed by the Chairman of the provincial Revolutionary Committee, who in most cases was an army officer or political commissar, whilst the majority of the assistant secretaries were also officers or political commissars".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 24,698).**

The last of the new Party Committees:

**"were finally established in late August 1971".
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 463).**

The 12th Plenum of the 8th CC (October 1968)

The 12th Plenum of the 8th CC of the CPC was held in October 1968. Like the 11th Plenum in August 1966, it:

**"Was a rump session. . . . Only 54 full members of the Central Committee attended the meeting, representing a bare quorum of the surviving members of the body. Furthermore, like its predecessor the 12th Plenum was packed with people who were not Central Committee members. . . . The extra participants were members of the Cultural Revolution Group, representatives of the provincial revolutionary committees, and 'principal responsible comrades of the Chinese People's Liberation Army'".
(Harry Harding (1991): op. cit.; p. 193-94).**

The Plenum:

**"announced that Liu Shao-chi was being dismissed from all his government and Party positions, and was being expelled from the Party 'once and for all'".
(Harry Harding (1991): ibid.; p. 194).**

as a:

**"'renegade, traitor and scab hiding in the Party', as 'a lackey of imperialism and modern revisionism, and Kuomintang reactionaries.'
('Resolution of 12th Plenum of 8th CC, CPC' (October 1968), in: Harry Harding (1991): ibid.; p. 194-95).**

However, THAT THE VICTORY OF THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE IN THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION' WAS NOT COMPLETE OR DECISIVE WAS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT, AT THE PLENUM:

"The Cultural Revolution Group's proposal that Teng Hsiao-ping . . . be

expelled from the Party altogether, along with Liu Shaochi, was rejected".
(Harry Harding (1991): *ibid.*; p. 195).

The 9th National Congress of the CPC (April 1969)

The 9th National Congress of the CPC was held in April 1969:

"The first such conference to be held in more than a decade".
(Stanley Karnow: *op. cit.*; p. 454).

It was:

"held in conditions of strict secrecy, no journalists or foreign observers being admitted".
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 17; p. 23,377).

and:

"No foreign parties were invited to send delegations."
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 17; p. 23,379).

Delegates to the Congress were:

" appointed by the central authorities after 'negotiation' with the provinces."
(Harry Harding (1991): *op. cit.*; p. 193).

Reporting on the Cultural Revolution, Lin Piao declared that it had achieved a

". . . great victory",

Lin Piao: Report on the Cultural Revolution, 9th National Congress CPC
(April 1969), in: Stanley Karnow: *op. cit.*; p. 405).

Although admitting that:

"We cannot speak of final victory."
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 17; p. 23,377).

As has been said, the PLA:

"Emerged as the single most powerful institution in China at the 9th Congress."
(Frederick C. Teiwes & Warren Sun: *op. cit.*; p. 127).

The congress adopted a new Party Constitution, replacing that of 1956. It declared:

"The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought as the theoretical basis guiding its thinking. Mao Tse-tung's thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and Socialism is advancing to world-wide victory".
(*'Constitution of CPC adopted at 9th National Congress'* (April 1969), in: *'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 17; p. 23,378).

and laid down that:

"Comrade Lin Piao is Comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-inarms and successor." ('Constitution of CPC adopted at 9th National Congress' (April 1969), in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 17; p. 23,378).

A new Central Committee was elected, to which:

"Only 54 out of the 167 members of the previous Central Committee were re-elected". (Harry Harding (1991): op. cit.; p. 197).

It:

"Was overwhelmingly weighted in favour of Army officers and Party cadres who had survived the Cultural Revolution."
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 458).

At its 1st Plenum the new Central Committee elected a Politburo -- and its Standing Committee with Mao as Chairman, Lin Piao as Deputy Chairman, Chen Po-ta, Chou En-lai and Kang Sheng.
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 17; p. 23,378).

while new members of the Politburo:

"Included YEH Chun* (Lin Piao's wife -- Ed.), Chiang Ching, Chu Teh, Chiang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-Yuan".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 17; p. 23,378).

CONCLUSION

WITH THE 9th CONGRESS OF THE CPC IN APRIL 1969, THE "GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION" EFFECTIVELY -- ALTHOUGH NOT OFFICIALLY -- CAME TO AN END.

The 'Cultural Revolution':

"Whilst virtually destroying the Communist Party organisation, greatly strengthened the political role of the Army, which largely controlled the provincial Revolutionary Committees and many Ministries and economic enterprises."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

IT LEFT THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG, IN THE DOMINANT POSITION AND THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS GROUPING, HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI, IN A GREATLY -- ALTHOUGH NOT FATALLY - WEAKENED POSITION.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --9

HE Long = Pinyin form of HO Lung.

HO Lung, Chinese revisionist military officer (1896-); member, Central People's Government Council (1949-54); commander, South-Western Military Region (1950-54); secretary, South-Western Bureau, CC, CPC (1952-54); secretary, CPC, South-western Military Region (1953); Deputy Chairman, South-Western Administrative Council (1953-56); Deputy Chairman, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1954); Deputy Chairman, National Defence Council (1954-67); Deputy Premier (1954-67); marshal (1955); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1956-66); Deputy Chairman, Military Commission, CC, CPC (1961-67).

YE Qun = Pinyin form of YEH Chun.

YEH Chun, Chinese revisionist journalist and politician, wife of Lin Piao (? 1971); member, PLA Cultural Revolution Group (1967); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1969-71); killed in air crash fleeing to Soviet Union (1971).

CHAPTER SIXTEEN : THE 'LIN PIAO AFFAIR'; (September 1971 - August 1973)

Introduction

As we have seen, the 'Cultural Revolution' was basically a struggle for power between the political representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie and those of the national bourgeoisie of China.

But as the Cultural Revolution drew to a close,
A LATENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST WAS BECOMING MANIFEST
WITHIN THE CHINESE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE --
BETWEEN THAT SECTION LINKED TO UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM
AND THAT SECTION LINKED TO SOVIET IMPERIALISM.

This contradiction was reflected in:
CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
BETWEEN THE GROUPING REPRESENTING THE POLITICAL
INTERESTS OF
THE PRO-US COMPRADORS, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG,
AND THE GROUPING REPRESENTING THE POLITICAL INTERESTS OF
THE PRO-SOVIET COMPRADORS, HEADED BY LIN PIAO.

According to the biographer of Mao's wife, Chiang Ching,

"Even before the lines of Cultural Revolution began to be drawn in 1965, the Chairman was a foe of Lin Piao. Contradictions between them were already evident".

(Roxane Witke: op. cit.; p. 311).

and Chiang Ching herself told Witke that:

"During the Cultural Revolution, the 'Lin Piao clique' . commissioned two groups of people to search for materials that could be used against her (in the power struggle)".

(Roxane Witke: *ibid.*; p. 59).

Furthermore, having been called upon to intervene in the 'Cultural Revolution', the People's Liberation Army emerged from it with greatly increased power:

"During the Cultural Revolution, the power of the Army grew to unprecedented proportions as the PLA was called on . . . to intervene to impose military control. . . . Later, in the reorganised Party committees, the military continued to play the dominant organisational role".

(Kau Ying-mao & Pierre M. Perrolle: 'The Politics of Lin Piao's Abortive Military Coup', in: 'Asian Survey', Volume 14, No. 6 (June 1974); p. 560).

The Rift within the Party (1970-71)

The contradiction between the two comprador bourgeois groupings within the Party showed itself particularly in:

"Disagreements inside the Party leadership over foreign policy".
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 18; p. 25,437).

Firstly, in September 1970 the pro-US faction pressed for a Fourth Five-Year Plan which involved:

"A massive programme for the mechanisation of agriculture",
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 18; p. 25,437).

to be financed:

"By reducing expenditure on the armed forces".
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 18; p. 25,437).

this reduction to be made possible by bringing about:

"A detente with the United States".
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 18; p. 25,437).

The pro-Soviet faction of the Party, headed by Lin Piao, naturally

"opposed the policy of detente with the United States."
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 18; p. 25,437).

Secondly, in December 1970 a movement began for:

"The revival of the provincial Party committees",
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 18; p. 25,437).

a movement strongly:

**"Opposed by Marshal Lin and a section of the Army leadership".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).**

since it:

**". . threatened the Army's political ascendancy."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).**

**Mao himself is on record as telling French Foreign Minister Maurice
SCHUMANN* and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimavo BANDARANAIKE* that
Lin:**

**". . broke ranks with the leadership on a number of domestic and foreign
issues, including the decision to seek a normalisation of relations with the
United States."
('New York Times', 28 July 1972; p. 2),**

and that:

**"Another policy opposed by Mr. Lin was the move to rebuild the Communist
Party apparatus, which had been shattered by the Cultural Revolution".
('New York Times', 28 July 1972; p. 2).**

Thus, by the beginning of 1971:

**"A certain ambiguity became apparent . . . in the Chinese attitude towards
the United States. While violent opposition to American intervention in Asia
continued to be voiced, Edgar SNOW* and several other Western mediators
were sounding out Washington's readiness to establish a dialogue".
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 244).**

In initiating these approaches to the US imperialists, the grouping headed by Mao:

". . was supported by Chou En-lai, though Lin Piao remained opposed to it."

(Jaap van Ginneken: ibid.; p. 244).

**"The more radical faction in China, led by Lin Piao, vigorously opposed the
prospect of detente".**

**(Michael Schaller: 'The United States and China in the Twentieth Century';
Oxford; 1990; p. 185).**

This opposition to rapprochement with US imperialism was denounced by its
supporters as

""ultra-leftism"".

**(Dennis Woodward: 'Political Power and Gun Barrels: The Role of the PLA',
in: Bill Brugger (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 88).**

The 2nd Plenum of the 9th CC (August/September 1970)

At the 2nd Plenum of the 9th Central Committee, held at Lushan in August/September 1970, the struggle between the two main current groupings within the Party -- between that representing the interests of the pro-American compradors and that representing the interests of the pro-Soviet compradors -- emerged into the open.

The Plenum:

**". . . was a particularly lengthy one".
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 206).**

Lin Piao and his supporters:

**"Were reported to have been responsible for having the original agenda of the session amended in such a way that Chen Po-ta could place the question of the Presidency on the new agenda".
(Jaap van Ginneken: ibid.; p. 217).**

the State Presidency having:

**"Remained vacant . . . since Liu Shao-chi was removed from it during the Cultural Revolution."
(Dennis Woodward: op. cit.; p. 80).**

At the Plenum:

**"A movement developed . . . to solve the problem of the Presidency immediately, by pressing Mao to accept. . . . Chen Po-ta delivered a seemingly unprepared speech on the subject of the Presidency. . . . He then proposed spontaneously to nominate Mao as President".
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 215).**

The proposal was accompanied by criticism of those -- particularly Chou En-lai -- who were alleged to have deleted from the draft State Constitution the position of State Chairman and a provision extolling Mao as a 'genius':

**"The 'surprise attack' contained in speeches by Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and other top military leaders was directed at those (Chou En-lai in particular) who, in drawing up the new State Constitution, had deleted the post of Chairman and a provision extolling the 'genius' of Mao Tse-tung".
(Philip Bridgham: 'The Fall of Lin Piao' (hereafter listed as 'Philip Bridgham (1973)'), in: 'China Quarterly', No. 55 (July/September 1973); p. 434-35).**

But the manoeuvre:

"Backfired when Mao rejected both the proposal for a State Chairman . . . and the view of 'genius' which Lin and Chen had propounded in their speeches".

(Philip Bridgham (1973): *ibid.*; p. 435).

As Mao insisted later:

"I don't want to be state chairman. I have said this six times already".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades at Various Places during his Provincial Tour' (August/September 1971), in: Stuart Schram (Ed.) (1975): *op. cit.*; p. 294-95).

The real aim of the manoeuvre, however, was to nominate Lin Piao to the vacant post after Mao had once again declined nomination:

"Lin, through his supporters, attempted to reappoint Mao to the position of Chairman (President -- Ed.) of the People's Republic. . . Lin 's supporters, led by Chen Po-ta, knowing that Mao would decline the position, hoped that by this tactic, Lin would be appointed to the revived post".
(Dennis Woodward: *op. cit.*; p. 80).

If this manoeuvre had been successful, Lin would have come to hold the influential post of State President, while he:

"Would also have become Party Chairman in the event of Mao's death, while still remaining commander-in-chief of the army."
(Jaap van Ginneken: *op. cit.*: p. 215-16).

But Mao saw through the manoeuvre as a hypocritical attempt to organise a coup d'etat:

"At the 1970 Lushan Conference they made a surprise attack and carried out underground activity. . . . They caused trouble . . . for . . . two days and a half. . . . This kind of behaviour shows that they had some aim in mind. . . . Their programme was to appoint a state chairman, and to extol 'genius'. . . . A certain person was anxious to become state chairman, to split the Party and to seize power. . . . I am no genius. . . . I wrote 'Some Opinions' which specially criticises the genius theory. . . . We should not appoint a state chairman. . . . Chen Po-ta . . . gave the appearance of meaning to establish my prestige. But when you get to the bottom of it, he really meant himself".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades at Various Places during his Provincial Tour' (August/September 1971), in: Stuart Schram (Ed.) (1975): *Op. cit.*; p. 292, 293, 294-95).

Later, at the 10th National Congress of the CPC in August 1973, Chou En lai characterised the events at the 2nd Plenum bluntly as an 'aborted coup':

"Lin Piao . . . went further to start a . . . coup d'etat, which was aborted, at the 2nd. Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee in August 1970".
(Chou En-lai: 'Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC' (August 1973), in: 'The 10th National Congress of the CPC (Documents)'; Peking;

1973; p. 5-6).

As a result, at the Plenum:

"Chen Po-ta had to face a full-scale attack. His whole political career was closely examined, bringing reproaches of ultra-Left deviationism. . . . He was finally deposed . . . from his position as a member of the Standing Committee and, obviously, from the position of propaganda chief".
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 216).

Significantly, it was Lin Piao:

"who resisted Chen's dismissal longest".
(Jaap van Ginneken: ibid.; p. 217).

[The Moves to Weaken Lin Piao's Base of Support \(September 1970 - January 1971\)](#)

With the conclusion of the 2nd Plenum, the pro-US comprador grouping of the Party:

"Was determined to undermine Lin's power base so as to stall off an attempt to seize power".
(Wu Tien-wei: 'Lin Piao and the Gang of Four: Contra-Confucianism in Historical and Intellectual Perspective'; Carbondale (USA); 1983; p. 17).

Immediately following the 2nd Plenum, Chen Po-ta:

"was taken into custody in September 1970".
(Wu Tien-wei: ibid.; p. 17).

and:

". a campaign to criticise Chen Po-ta and to oppose 'idealism and metaphysics' followed immediately after the end of the plenum."
(Dennis Woodward: op. cit.; p. 80).

However, because of Lin Piao's wider and stronger power base,

"Mao was compelled . . . to resort to indirect tactics to undermine Lin's base of power in the Army".
(Philip Bridgham (1973): op. cit.; p. 435).

justifying these tactics by the 'need for unity':

"We have shielded Vice-Chairman Lin and have not drawn conclusions concerning an individual. . . . We still want to protect Lin. No matter who it is who has made mistakes, it is not a good thing to forget unity".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades at Various Places during his Provincial Tour' (August/September 1972), in: Stuart Schram (Ed.) (1975): p. 294).

Instead, the political representatives of the pro-US compradors took indirect steps to weaken the power base of Lin and his fellow-conspirators:

"In the months following the plenum moves were taken to undermine Lin Piao's base of support as a prelude to his eventual demotion or dismissal. These moves . . . embraced the launching of a campaign to criticise Chen Po-ta and to oppose arrogance and conceit within the PLA. . . In January 1971, the Peking Military Region was thoroughly reorganised". (Dennis Woodward: op. cit.; p. 80).

And at an Enlarged Politburo Conference at Peitaiho in December 1970:

**"Lin's closest supporters . . . who had championed his cause at the 2nd Plenum, were criticised".
(Dennis Woodward: op. cit.; p. 80).**

The Plan for a Coup (March 1971)

Following their setback at the 2nd Plenum in August/September 1970, in March 1971, according to Chou En-lai's report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC in August 1973, Lin Piao -- together with his wife Yeh Chun and his son Lin Ki-kuo, who was Deputy Director of Operations of the Air Force:

"drew up the plan for an armed . . . coup d'etat entitled 'Outline of Project 571'".

(Chou En-lai: 'Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC' (August 1973), in: 'The 10th National Congress of the CPC (Documents)'; op. cit.; p. 6).

'Project 571':

**"Envisaged a military coup based on Air Force and Army support; Soviet pressure on the frontier; the arrest of Chairman Mao; . . . and the murder of the conspirators' other opponents in the Party leadership".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,635).**

A leading Chinese official told Scandinavian journalists in November 1972:

**"That Marshal Lin had offered to cede large areas of Chinese territory to the Soviet Union in return for its support".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,635).**

In July 1972, Mao confirmed to French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike:

**"that Mr. Lin had plotted to assassinate him as part of a conspiracy aimed at replacing the civilian leadership of China with a military dictatorship".
(Mao Tse-tung: Statement of July 1972, in: 'New York Times', 28 July 1972; p. 1)**

by bombing his train while he was on an inspection tour:

"Lin had arranged to blow up the train somewhere north of Nanking".
(Wilfred Burchett: 'Lin Piao's Plot: The Full Story', in: 'Far Eastern Economic Review', Volume 81, No. 33 (20 August 1973); p. 23).

Lin Piao's Flight (September 1971)

However, Lin Tou-tou:

"Daughter of Lin Piao, . . . reported the situation to the premier (Chou En-lai -- Ed.) in time, which led to the foiling of her father's monstrous conspiracy".

('Top Secret Communiqué of CC of CPC concerning Lin Piao's 1'September 12" Anti-Party Incident' (September 1971), in: Michael Y. M. Kau (Ed.): 'The Lin Piao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup'; White Plains (USA); 1975; p. 70).

During the three days 13-15 September 1971:

"All internal air flights were halted, . . . and . . . the Air Force remained almost completely grounded for some time".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,438),

while:

"The preparations for the annual mass procession . . . on 1 October were cancelled".

(Jaap van Ginneken: *ibid.*; p. 20).

In addition, a number of high-ranking Army and Air Force officers were arrested, while:

"During the following months . . . the number of arrests began to run into hundreds".

(Jaap van Ginneken: *op. cit.*; p. 283).

At the end of September 1971, the government of the People's Republic of Mongolia issued a statement declaring that:

"During the night of Sept. 13 a jet aircraft belonging to the Chinese People's Republic violated the air space of the Mongolian People's Republic . . . and . . . crashed. . . . The semi-carbonised bodies of nine persons, a firearm, documents and equipment proving that the aircraft belonged to the Chinese Air Force were found on the scene of the catastrophe". ('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,438).

In December 1971, public attacks on Lin Piao began to appear in the Chinese press:

**"in the innuendo of . . . 'Liu Shao-chi and his kind of swindler'".
(Wu Tien-wei: op. cit.; p. 20).**

But not until the summer of 1972 was any official Chinese statement made on these events. In July 1972, as has been said, Mao Tse-tung told French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike:

**"That Mr. Lin had plotted to assassinate him as part of a conspiracy aimed at replacing the civilian leadership of China with a military dictatorship. . . . When the plot failed, he (Lin -- Ed.) and certain of his followers commandeered a plane and 'tried to escape' to the Soviet Union; the plane crashed and they were killed".
(*'New York Times'*, 28 July 1972; p.1; 2).**

In July 1972, the Chinese Embassy in Algiers:

**"Officially confirmed that Mr. Lin had died in a plane crash in Mongolia . . . while fleeing to the Soviet Union".
(*'New York Times'*, 29 July 1972; p. 7).**

An Ad Hoc Investigation Committee was set up by the Central Committee of the CPC:

**"To conduct the investigation into the Lin Piao-Chen Po-ta anti-Party clique".
(*'Resolution of CC of the CDC concerning the Lin-Chen Anti-Party Clique'*, (1971), in: Michael Y. M. Kau (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 74).**

The Moves for Rapprochement with US Imperialism (1970-76)

After the setback received by the political representatives of the pro-Soviet compradors, headed by Lin Piao, at the Lushan Plenum in August/September 1979, and particularly after the frustration of Lin Piao's attempted coup in September 1971, moves towards a Sino-US rapprochement developed quickly. In November 1970, American proposals for improving relations between the USA and China were:

**"conveyed to Mr. Chou En-lai . . . by the Romanian government."
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 18; p. 25,437).**

and in December 1970:

**"Chairman Mao told the American journalist Mr. Edgar Snow that he would like to meet President NIXON*, and that it would be made clear in the coming months that it was not the Army which wielded power in China."
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 18; p. 25,437).**

In April 1971:

"after a six-year absence from international competitions, the People's

Republic of China competed in the world table tennis championships."
(**'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 24,645).**

and:

"When the American table-tennis players arrived in Peking, the group received VIP treatment. . . . They were received personally by Chou En-lai".
(**Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 244).**

Who told them:

"Your visit to China on invitation has opened the door to friendly contacts between the people of the two countries."
(**Chou En-lai: Statement to Visiting US Table-Tennis Team (April 1971), in: Jaap van Ginneken: ibid.; p. 244).**

In July 1971, following a secret visit to China by US diplomat Henry KISSINGER*, the 'People's Daily' announced:

"Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai . . . has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China". (**Jaap van Ginneken: ibid.; p. 250, citing 'People's Daily' (15 July 1971).**

In August 1971, US Secretary of State William ROGERS* announced that:

"The United States would support the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations."
(**'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 24,765).**

In February 1972, US President Richard Nixon and a large entourage landed in Peking, Premier Chou En-lai headed the welcoming party, and Nixon was received by Mao Tse-tung the same day. At dinner, Nixon said:

"Let us start a Long March together".
(**Richard Nixon: Speech at Peking Dinner (February 1972), in: Jaap van Ginneken : op. cit.; p. 295).**

In November 1972, on Nixon's orders,

"The 22-year-old restrictions on travel to China by US ships and aircraft were lifted".
(**'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 19; p. 25,684).**

In February 1973, Dr. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, arrived in Peking for a 5-day visit, during which:

"the two countries . . . agreed . . . to establish a liaison office in each other's capitals". (**'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 19; p. 25,837).**

In November 1973, Dr. Henry Kissinger, now US Secretary of State, made:

"a five-day visit to Peking."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 20; p. 26,316).

In August 1975, American columnist Jack ANDERSON* reported that:

"Chairman Mao Tse-tung had invited him (Nixon -- Ed.) to visit China."

('New York Times', 14 August 1975; p. 19).

In December 1975, US President Gerald FORD* and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Peking.

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,557).

Sino-US Rapprochement in World Affairs (1971-76)

The rapprochement between the US and the PRC was reflected in the latter throwing off its false 'anti-imperialist' mask in international affairs.

This was seen in Chinese support for the strengthening of NATO:

"The Communist Chinese leadership . . . promoted the strengthening of the NATO alliance";

(A. James Gregor: 'The China Connection: US Policy and the People's Republic of China'; Stanford (USA); 1986; p. 90).

in Chinese support for German reunification and West European integration:

"China is the world's most consistent advocate of German reunification and West European integration";

('Economist', Volume 257, No. 6,898 (8 November 1975); p. 59).

in Chinese support for the US-Japanese 'Security Treaty'. After 1972:

"Peking ceased its criticism of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The Communist Chinese leadership . . . actively encouraged the security relationship between Tokyo and Washington";

(A. James Gregor: op. cit.; p. 90).

in declining Chinese support for genuine national liberation movements:

"With the termination of the war in Vietnam, Communist Chinese support for insurrectionary movements in South-East Asia rapidly declined";

(A. James Gregor: ibid.; p. 90).

by 1975, the PRC had:

"Become a champion of stability in the Persian Gulf region. It had . . . gradually disassociated itself from the national liberation movements in the region".

(A. James Gregor: ibid.; p. 91).

in Chinese support for semi-colonies of imperialist powers, such as imperial Iran, Pakistan, Zaire, fascist Chile and the Philippines:

In January 1971, the Chinese government declared:

"The Government of People's Republic of China firmly supports the Imperial Government of Iran in its just struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty". ('Peking Review', Volume 14, No. 34 (20 August 1971); p. 4).

**"After the proclamation of Bangla Desh as an independent nation, China refused to recognise it as it had affected the integrity of Pakistan. China opposed the consideration of Bangla Desh's application for UN membership. China offered so much aid to Pakistan that the latter occupied the first place on the list of recipients of Chinese economic aid. From 1965 to 1973 Pakistan received from China \$445.7 million of economic aid".
(R. S. Chavan: 'Chinese Foreign Policy: The Chou En-lai Era'; New Delhi; 1979; p. 85-86).**

During a visit to China in January 1973 by President Sese MOBUTU* of Zaire (now the 'Democratic Republic of Congo) at the invitation of the Chinese government, Premier Chou En-lai declared:

"The Chinese government supports the just positions of the Government of Zaire", ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 19; p. 25,751).

and:

**"offered Zaire a big loan of \$115 millions".
(R. S. Chavan: op. cit.; p. 198).**

In October 1973, the Chinese government informed the Ambassador of the Chilean military junta:

**"that she no longer recognised him as Santiago's representative, in a move viewed in diplomatic circles as de facto recognition of the new Chilean military junta".
('New York Times', 12 October 1973; p. 3),**

In June 1975, at a banquet in honour of visiting Philippines President Ferdinand MARCOS*, Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsaio-ping praised the Philippine government's:

**"Unremitting efforts to safeguard national independence and defend state sovereignty".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 27,334).**

In his reply, Marcos described the People's Republic of China as:

**"The natural leader of the Third World".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 27,334).**

The growing Sino-US rapprochement was also seen in Chinese support for spurious

national liberation movements backed by imperialist powers:

In the 1970s, the 'New York Times' reported that the US-backed 'National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola' (UNITA), led by Jonas SAVIMBI*,:

"is supported by China and Zaire."
(*'New York Times'*, 12 July 1975; p. 3).

and that UNITA:

"had acquired Mirage jets -- a French-made aircraft -- and Chinese pilots to fly the planes".
(*'New York Times'*, 24 August 1975; p. 2).

The 10th National Congress of the CPC (August 1973)

In his report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC, held in August 1973, Chou En-lai declared that:

"The shattering of the Lin Piao anti-Party clique is our Party's greatest victory since the 9th Congress. . . . A movement to criticise Lin Piao and rectify style of work has been launched throughout the country."
(Chou En-lai: 'Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC', (August 1973), in: 'The 10th National Congress of the CPC (Documents)'; op. cit.; p. 6-7).

And the press communique issued by the congress reported:

"The congress indignantly denounced the Lin Piao anti-Party clique for its crimes. All the delegates firmly supported this resolution: . . . Expel Lin Piao, the bourgeois careerist, conspirator, counterrevolutionary double-dealer, renegade and traitor, from the Party once and for all; expel Chen Po-ta, principal member of the Lin Piao anti-Party clique, anti-Communist Kuomintang element, Trotskyite, renegade, enemy agent and revisionist, from the Party once and for all, and dismiss him from all posts".
(Press Communique of the 10th National Congress of the CPC (August 1973), in: 'The 10th National Congress of the CPC (Documents)'; *ibid.*; p. 92).

The new Party constitution adopted at the congress:

"did not vary greatly from the statutes adopted at the previous congress";
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 304).

except that:

"The paragraph concerning Lin Piao . . . was completely deleted".
(Wang Hung-wen: 'Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution' (August 1973), in: 'The 10th National Congress of the CPC (Documents)'; op. cit.; p. 43).

The new Central Committee elected at the congress:

"Mirrored the decline in 'military' representation in the Chinese leadership towards pre-Cultural Revolution levels".

(Dennis Woodward: 'Political Power and Gun Barrels: The Role of the PLA', in: Bill Brugger (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 92).

The 4th National People's Congress (January 1975)

The 4th National People's Congress met in January 1975, for the first time in ten years:

"The failure to reconvene it being generally attributed to the political upheaval caused by the Cultural Revolution".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,965).

The congress:

"Took place in complete secrecy".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,965).

It adopted a new Constitution from which:

"the post of Chairman (President) of the Republic was abolished",

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,966).

and appointed a new State Council (Cabinet), headed by Chou En-lai as Prime Minister.

The Army was not strongly represented in the new government, there being only one military officer among the twelve Deputy Premiers.

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,969).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --10

ANDERSON, Jack N., American journalist and missionary (1922-); reporter, 'Salt Lake City Tribune' (1941-44); Mormon missionary (1941-44); reporter, 'Washington Merry-go-Round' (1947-); editor, 'Parade' (1954-68).

BANDARANAIKE, Sirimavo R. D., Sri Lankan politician (1916-); married Sri Lankan politician Solomon Bandaranaike (1940); president of Sri Lankan Freedom Party after assassination of husband (1959); Prime Minister (1960-65, 1970-71); stripped of political rights by parliament (1980); pardoned (1986).

FORD, Gerald R., American lawyer and politician (1913-); Vice-President (1973-74); President (1974-77).

KISSINGER, Henry A., German-born American academic and diplomat (1923-); to USA (1938); Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University (1959-62);

Professor of Government, Harvard University (1962-69); Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs (1969-73); head, National Security Council (1969-75); Nobel Peace Prize (1973); Secretary of State (1973-77); Professor of Diplomacy, Georgetown University (1977-).

MARCOS, Ferdinand, Hawaiian-born Filipino lawyer and politician (1917-89); Senator (1959-66); President of Senate (1963-65); President (1966-86); fled to USA (1986).

MOBUTU, Sese Seko. Zairean journalist, military officer and politician (1930); Army Chief of Staff (1960-65); led military coup (1965); President (1965-97); field marshal (1982); fled abroad (1997).

NIXON, Richard M, American lawyer and politician (1913-94); Vice-President (1953-61); President (1969-74); resigned (1974).

ROGERS, William P., American lawyer and diplomat (1913-); Deputy Attorney General (1953-57); Attorney-General (1957-61); US representative to UN General Assembly (1965); Secretary of State (1969-73).

SAVIMBI, Jonas M., Angolan politician (1934-); formed US/South African-backed National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) (1966);

SCHUMANN, Maurice, French journalist and politician (1911-); Minister for Foreign Affairs (1951-54, 1959, 1969-73); Minister for Scientific Research (1967-68); Senator (1974-); Vice-President of Senate (1977-83).

SNOW, Edgar P., American journalist and author (1905-72); to China (1928); assistant editor, 'China Weekly Review' (1929-30); correspondent, 'Chicago Tribune' (1929-30); correspondent, 'Daily Herald' (1932-39); returned to USA (1941); war correspondent (1942-43), assistant editor, 'Saturday Evening Post' (1943-51); special consultant, Harvard University (1956-57); correspondent, 'Look' (1960-61); correspondent, 'Le Nouveau Candide' (1964-65); died in Switzerland (1972).

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN : THE RESURGENCE OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE (April 1973 - March 1976)

Introduction

ENGAGED IN A LIFE-AND-DEATH STRUGGLE AGAINST THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRO-SOVIET COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY LIN PIAO,

ONE SECTION OF THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRO-AMERICAN COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE - THAT HEADED BY CHOU EN-LAI -- SOUGHT A WORKING ALLIANCE WITH THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, NOW HEADED BY TENG HSIAO-PING.

Chou:

**". . asserted himself strongly in 1972."
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 192).**

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE WERE ABLE TO RECOVER SOME OF THE POSITIONS THEY HAD LOST DURING THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION'.

Since Chou brought:

**"back into office many people who had been disgraced between 1966 and 1969".
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 192).**

**The Resurgence of the Political Representatives of the National Bourgeoisie
(November 1971 - Autumn 1975)**

After the 'Lin Piao Affair', Teng Hsiao-ping:

**"wrote twice to Mao, in November 1971 and August 1972, asking to be allowed to work once more for the Party and nation."
(Roderick MacFarquahar: 'The Successor to Mao and the End of Maoism', (hereafter listed as 'Roderick MacFarquahar (1991)'), in: Roderick Macfarquahar & John K. Fairbank (Eds.) (1991): op. cit.; p. 338).**

In April 1973, Teng Hsiao-ping:

**"returned to public life . . . with his former title as a Deputy Premier, and was elected to the Communist Party Central Committee" .
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives, Volume 20; p. 26,786).**

at the 10th Congress of the CPC in August 1973.

As has been said, the National People's Congress in January 1973

**"approved . . . a new State Council, headed by Mr. Chou En-lai".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,968).**

as Prime Minister, and with only one military officer:

**"among the 12 Deputy Premiers."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,969).**

The new government:

**"included representatives of different . . . political tendencies".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,969).**

Only one Deputy Premier -- Chang Chun-chiao -- was:

**"Associated with the . . . 'Shanghai group' . . . None of the other members of
this group -- Mr. Wang Hung-wen, Mme. Chiang Ching and Mr. Yao Wen-
yuan -- received a ministerial post".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,969).**

From January 1974 onwards,

**"Teng Hsiao-ping . . . played an increasingly prominent role in public life".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 20; p. 26,786).**

In April 1974, for example:

**"he led the Chinese delegation to the special session of the UN General
Assembly on raw materials and development".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 20; p. 26,786).**

In January 1975, Teng was:

**"appointed Chief of Staff. . . . The post of Chief of Staff had been vacant
since 1971, when General Huang Yung-sheng disappeared from the political
scene at the same time as Marshal Lin Piao". ('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,969).**

The 2nd Plenum of the 10th CC, in January 1975:

**"elected Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping as one of its vice-chairmen and as a member of
the Standing Committee of its Political Bureau".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,965).**

and in February 1975, Teng Hsiao-ping was:

**"appointed a vice-chairman of the Communist Party's military affairs
commission
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,668).**

By these appointments, Teng assumed:

"day-to-day control of both Party and government".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 351),

Furthermore, during the summer and autumn of 1975,

"a large number of political leaders who had been denounced as 'revisionists' during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,669).

For example, in July 1975:

"General Lo Jui-ching, a former Army Chief of Staff, made his first public appearance for 10 years."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,669).

The 'Anti-Confucius' Campaign (January 1974)

Chou En-lai's policy of promoting a working alliance with the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie met with strong:

"opposition from former activists of the Cultural Revolution period".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,669).

and they:

"prepared to denounce their most formidable opponent, Premier Chou En-lai himself".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.;p. 343).

In January 1974 a campaign was initiated under the slogan:

"Criticise Lin, criticise CONFUCIUS*".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 20; p. 26,785).

The group around Mao strove to transform this campaign into:

"a political campaign to destroy the authority and reputation of Chou En-lai".

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 193).

"Under cover of the campaign to resist the teachings of Confucius, the Gang of Four became more and more audacious in saying things that could only have been meant to apply to Chou En-lai".

(Dick Wilson: 'Chou: The Story of Zhou Enlai: 1898-1976'; London; 1984; p. 286).

Organised by Chiang Ching and Wang Hung-wen:

"Teams of writers from Peking's two best-known universities, Peking University and Tsinghua, wrote articles to criticise Confucius and the Duke of Chou, a ruler of the 12th century BC whom Confucius had held up as a model".

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 195).

In August 1974, the 'People's Daily' published an article which quoted Confucius as saying:

'Revive states that have been extinguished, restore families whose line of succession has been broken, and call to office those who have retired to obscurity'. This was an oblique but unmistakable critique of Chou's rehabilitation of senior cadres, particularly clear to those who knew that the passage referred to the actions of Chou's namesake, the great statesman of the 12th century BC, the Duke of Chou".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 345).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --11

CONFUCIUS -- Anglicised form of KUNG Fu Tzu.

KUNG Fu Tzu, Chinese reactionary philosopher (551 - 479 B.C.); ran school of philosophy extolling propriety and rites.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN : THE FIRST 'TIEN AN MEN SQUARE INCIDENT' (September 1975 - March 1976)

The 'Three Directives' (September 1975)

In September 1975, Teng Hsiao-ping, on behalf of the national bourgeoisie, launched a campaign in support of three directives which he attributed to Mao Tse-tung, namely:

"To study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat to combat and prevent revisionism, to promote stability and unity, and to boost the national economy."

(Teng Hsiao-ping: Speech of September 1975, in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,670).

The New Campaign against 'Unrepentant Capitalist-Roaders (January 1976)

In January 1976, a New Year editorial in 'People's Daily', 'Red Flag' and 'Liberation Army Daily' cited a new directive attributed to Mao Tse-tung:

"Class struggle is the key link, and everything else hinges on it."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,671).

This slogan:

"constituted a repudiation of the 'three-point directive' popularised by Mr.Teng Hsiao-ping".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,671).

and initiated:

"a violent campaign against 'unrepentant capitalist roaders', and in particular against Mr. Teng".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,667).

The Death of Chou En-lai (January 1975)

On 8 January 1976, Chou En-lai died. ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,589).

On 15 January 1975, Teng:

"Delivered the official eulogy at Mr. Chou En-lai's funeral".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,672).

Chou's death:

"Resulted in a direct confrontation between the two factions over the choice of his successor."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,667).

The Appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Premier (February 1976)

On 3 February 1976, the Politburo of the CC of the CPC:

"issued a directive . . . naming HUA (Kuo-feng -- Ed.)* as 'acting premier'".

(Wang Ting: 'Chairman Hua: Leader of the Chinese Communists'; London; 1980; p.101).

Hua 's nomination took place because the political representatives of the pro-US compradors -- the grouping around Chiang Ching -

"refused to serve under Mr. Teng."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,671).

Hua Kuo-feng was:

" widely regarded as politically 'neutral' in terms of the two major factional groupings within the elite. . .

In Peking he successfully steered a course between the rival factions and could not be clearly identified with either. The image he presented was that of the diligent, moderate, modest and loyal follower of Mao".

(John Gardner: 'Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao'; London; 1982; p. 119).

In other words, he was:

" a compromise candidate",

('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 152-53).

who:

" was acceptable to the veterans (the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie -- Ed.) and posed no direct threat to the Gang of Four (the political representatives of the pro-US compradors -Ed.)", (Liao Kuang-sheng: 'Factional Politics after the Cultural Revolution: The Gang of Four and "Old Revolutionaries"' (hereafter listed as 'Liao Kuangsheng (1977)'), in: Steve S. K. Chin (Ed.): 'The Gang of Four: First Essays after the Fall'; Hong Kong; 1977; p. 137).

who, although a firm Maoist, was not linked with the grouping around Chiang Ching -- now becoming widely known as 'the Gang of Four'. He was, in fact:

"The only member of the Politburo Standing Committee who was neither a member of the gang nor a supporter of Teng 's". (Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 207).

Already in the autumn of 1975, Chiang Ching:

"Had begun sniping at the timidity with which the rising Hua Kuo-feng . . . sought to pursue their shared goals". (Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 360).

and after his appointment as acting premier:

"the Gang stepped up their campaign against him (Hua -- Ed.)". (Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 360).

[The First 'Tien An Men Square Incident' \(April 1976\)](#)

At the beginning of April 1976,

"People began to place wreaths, posters and poems in memory of Mr. Chou En-lai on the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tien An Men Square . . . in preparation for Ching Ming, the festival when the Chinese honour the dead".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,805).

"Column after column, dozens of units, thousands of people, marched to the square to place their wreaths, declaim their tributes, and read those of others. On the festival day, 4 April (1976-- Ed.), a Sunday holiday, an estimated two million people visited the square (Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 361).

However, the demonstrations:

"were regarded as a display of popular support for Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping, . . . who was under attack as a 'capitalist-roader'. ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,805).

Indeed:

"the slogans used during these demonstrations gave clear indications of the thrust of the movement: 'Down with the Empress Dowager!' 'Down with Indira Gandhi!' (both directed against Chiang Ching). . . . 'Teng Hsiao-ping shall direct the work of the Party Centre!'"

(Jurgen Domes 'The "Gang of Four" and Hua Kuo-feng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975-76' (hereafter listed as 'Jurgen Domes (1977)', in: 'China Quarterly', No. 71 (September 1977); p. 490).

On the morning of 5 April:

"When the crowds returned to examine the wreaths . . ., they found that they had all been removed during the night, whereupon rioting broke out which continued throughout the day."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,805).

When the crowds refused to disperse:

"Militia contingents, numbering tens of thousands, . . . were sent in. In the ensuing action, heavy casualties were inflicted on both the demonstrators and innocent bystanders".

(Wang Ting: op. cit.; p. 105).

The media controlled by 'Gang of Four' denounced the demonstrations as:

"counter-revolutionary in nature."

(Jurgen Domes (1977): op. cit.; p 490, citing 'New China News Agency' (7 April 1976).

and singled out Teng:

"as the 'chief culprit of the Tien An Men incident."

(Wang Ting: op. cit.; p. 10).

On 7 April 1976, the Politburo of the CC of the CPC:

"on the proposal of our great leader Chairman Mao",

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,806).

confirmed the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as:

"First Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,806).

Another resolution, also made:

"On the proposal of our great leader Chairman Mao";

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,806)

"dismissed Mr. Teng from all his government and Party posts".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,805).

In other words, the comprador bourgeois political grouping:

"were able to use the demonstrations . . . as a pretext for securing the dismissal of Teng Hsiao-ping from his positions in the Party, state and army. But they were still not able to obtain any promotions for themselves. Instead, the chief beneficiary of the Tien An Men incident was Hua Kuo-feng".

(Harry Harding: 'China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao' (hereafter listed as 'Harry Harding (1987)'; Washington; 1987; p. 51).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --12

HUA Guofeng = Pinyin form of HUA Kuo-feng.

HUA Kuo-feng, Chinese revisionist politician (1921-); secretary, Hsiangyin County CPC, Hunan Province (1949-51); secretary, Hsiangtan County CPC,

Hunan Province (1951-56); head, irrigation project, Shaoshan (1956-66); Deputy Governor, Hunan Province (1958-59); secretary, CPC, Hunan Province

(1959-66); Deputy Chairman, Revolutionary Committee, Hunan Province (1966-70); Acting Chairman, Revolutionary Committee, Hunan Province (1970-74); 1st secretary, CPC, Hunan Province (1970~71); to Peking (1971); political commissar, Canton Military Region (1972-74); 1st Political Commissar, Hunan Military District (1973-74); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1973-82); Acting Premier (1976-80); 1st Deputy Chairman, CC, CPC (1976); Deputy Premier and Minister of Public Security

(1975-77); Acting Premier (1976); Premier (1976-8); Chairman, CC, CPC (1976-81); Chairman, CPC Military Commission (1976-81); member, Standing

Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1981-82); Deputy Chairman, CC, CPC (1981-82).

CHAPTER NINETEEN: THE COUP AGAINST THE 'GANG OF FOUR' (September - December 1976)

The Death of Mao Tse-tung (September 1976)

On 9 September 1976, Mao Tse-tung died.

Among the foreign tributes, US President Gerald Ford described him as a man

who had

**"had the vision and imagination to open the doors so the United States and the People's Republic of China could do things in a new era."
('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 28,054),**

From 11 to 17 September:

"Mao's body lay in state . . . in the Great Hall of the People in Peking. . . The mourning period ended on Sept. 18 with a mass meeting in Tien An Men Square, where the Prime Minister Mr. Hua Kuo-feng, delivered the funeral oration."

('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 28,053).

In October 1976, it was announced:

"that Mao's body would be preserved and displayed in a crystal sarcophagus in a mausoleum to be constructed in Peking."

('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 28,054).

The Exacerbation of the Intra-Party Struggle (October 1976)

Mao's death:

"brought to a head the conflict . . . inside the Chinese Communist Party".

('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives', Volume 23; p. 28,205).

After Mao's death:

"the Gang stepped up their campaign against him (Hua Kuo-feng-- Ed.)".

(Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China', Volume 15: 'The People's Republic', Part 2:

'Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution: 1966-1982'; Cambridge; 1991; p. 360).

They:

"made it quite clear that they were not prepared to accept Hua as Mao's successor".

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 215).

and demanded:

"That Chiang Ching should become Chairman".

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 216).

Indeed:

"from 12 September, the Gang promoted a write-in campaign to pressure the Politburo to appoint Chiang Ching Chairman in Mao's place. Pictures published on the occasion of the obsequies for the late Chairman were designed to accustom the public to the idea of Chiang Ching emerging as his

successor."

(Roderick MacFarquahar & John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China', Volume 15: 'The People's Republic', Part 2: 'Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution: 1966-1982'; Cambridge; 1991; p. 368).

These developments caused the comprador bourgeois grouping around Hua Kuofeng to:

"come round to the view that only their (the grouping's around Chiang Ching -- Ed.) arrest could stop them from continuing to fight for total political power

(Richard Evans: *ibid.*; p. 216).

Thus, the grouping around Hua entered into a temporary tactical alliance with the national bourgeois grouping headed by Teng Hsiao-ping to achieve the aim of liquidating the grouping headed by Chiang Ching.

The plan formulated by this alliance provided:

"for a limited purge of the Politburo under the direction of its senior member (Hua) and with the backing of a majority within it. It guaranteed that the army . . . remained united and available to act against the militia units which supporters of the gang had been arming in Shanghai and a few other large cities."

(Richard Evans: *ibid.*; p. 216).

Aware of the moves to stage a coup against her:

"Chiang Ching tried unsuccessfully to seize power with the help of three members of the CPC's Politburo".

('The Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 1; London; 1997; p. 858).

But in comparison with the leaders of the other groupings:

"The backgrounds of the Gang of Four . . . were both narrow and shallow. By 'narrow' I mean that their career experience had been highly specialised, giving them a potential political base in only one functional area, that of culture and propaganda. . . . The background experience of the Four was for the most part confined to relatively few ranks of the bureaucratic hierarchy. . . . Before 1966, they were relatively low-ranking officials; and not until the Cultural Revolution did they become nationally prominent, and not until the 9th Congress (in April 1969-- Ed.) was their position at the summit of Chinese politics officially confirmed".

(Lowell Dittmer: 'The Backgrounds of the Gang of Four', in: Steve S. K. Chin (Ed.): *op. cit.*; p. 6).

Indeed, the primary base of the 'Gang of Four':

"was the Chairman, Mao Tse-tung. . . In their primary reliance on the Chairman as a base of support, the Four played a role similar to what historians of European court politics have termed the 'favourite': the royal adviser whose place in court depends on the favour of the crown".
(Lowell (Dittmer: *ibid.*; p. 7).

In fact, by 1976:

"Their relationship with Mao Tse-tung had become almost their only base of support".
(David D. G. Goodman: *op. cit.*; p. 86).

The Appointment of Hua as Party Chairman (October 1976)

On 7 October 1976, Hua Kuo-feng:

"was elected Chairman of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Commission . . . in succession to Chairman Mao, apparently by the Politburo. . . As he retained the premiership and under the 1975 Constitution the Party Chairman commands the armed forces, he thus acquired control of the Party, the administration and the Army -- an accumulation of functions which even Chairman Mao had never held".
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 23; p. 28,206).

The Arrest of the 'Gang of Four' (October 1976)

The death of Mao in September 1976 removed the keystone of the narrow power structure of the 'Gang of Four' and opened the door to a coup against them by a temporary alliance of the national bourgeois grouping within the Party, headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, and the comprador bourgeois grouping headed by Hua Kuo-feng.

And the narrower power base of the 'Gang of Four' meant that this alliance was decidedly stronger than the 'Gang'.

In the period preceding Mao's death:

"Teng moved about from place to place and . . . actively encouraged those who visited him . . . to make plans to overthrow the gang".
(Richard Evans: *op. cit.*; p. 213).

By mid-October 1976:

"Hua had won control over the press".
(Roxane Witke: *op. cit.*; p. 470).

Final decisions to launch the coup against the 'Gang of Four':

"Were taken at a Politburo meeting, from which the gang were excluded and of which they remained in ignorance, held at a military headquarters on 5

October".

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 216).

On the evening of 6 October 1976, Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wen-yuan were arrested by troops. Chiang Ching and Mao Yuan-hsin were arrested in their homes at about the same time.

On 9 October 1976, Shanghai supporters of the 'Gang of Four':

"Mobilised 30,000 of the militia . . . and issued them with arms and ammunition".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives'; Volume 23; p. 28,207).

Then, at a meeting of the Shanghai Party Committee on 12 October,

"Some of the leadership proposed that the militia should occupy key positions and a general strike be called, but the meeting failed to agree on any action".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives' Volume 23; p. 28,207).

In Peking,

"There was some sporadic street fighting, but it ended in about a week. In other parts of the country, clashes between regular and militia units continued for over a year."

(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 216).

Posters:

"Denouncing the 'gang of four' by name appeared on Oct. 15 in Peking and Tsinghua universities".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 23; p. 28,207).

and, on 21 October 1976,

"fifteen days after the event, widespread rumours that the gang had been arrested were officially confirmed".

(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 218).

The:

"Propaganda campaign against the 'gang of four' was developed throughout November and December".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 23; p. 28,208).

The trial of the 'Gang of Four', however, did not begin until January 1981, nearly five years later, after the ground had been prepared to include the organising of the 'Cultural Revolution' among the crimes with which they could be charged.

CHAPTER TWENTY : THE SECOND RESURGENCE OF

THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS GROUPING (October 1976 - October 1987)

Introduction

HAVING UTILISED THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS GROUPING AROUND HUA KUO-FENG TO LIQUIDATE THE 'GANG OF FOUR', THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS GROUPING, HEADED BY TENG TSIA-PING, NOW EMBARKED ON A CUNNING STRATEGY TO LIQUIDATE THE GROUPING AROUND HUA.

The long-term programme of the grouping around Teng was, of course:

"to get the Party to repudiate the . . . Cultural Revolution, to substitute development for class warfare as the highest order of business, and to allow bold experiment."

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 228).

notably in the field of economic and foreign affairs.

Naturally, as a representative of the pro-American comprador bourgeoisie, Hua Kuo-feng

"resisted Teng's programme".

(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 228).

He:

"had no intention of modifying either the 'revolutionary line' or its underlying theory of 'continuing the revolution under the proletarian dictatorship' that had been implemented in Mao's later years".

(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): 'Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping): Chronicle of an Empire'; Boulder (USA); 1994; p. 18).

and at this time Hua Kuo-feng:

"commanded the leading role on the historical stage of China".

(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): ibid.; p. 41).

THE STRATEGY OF THE GROUPING AROUND TENG WAS, THEREFORE, TO WORK, IN NO MATTER WHAT UNPRINCIPLED WAY, TO END THE DOMINANCE OF THE PARTY GROUPING HEADED BY HUA KUO-FENG:

FIRSTLY, BY HYPOCRITICALLY PLEDGING LOYALTY TO HUA KUO-FENG AND 'MAO TSETUNG THOUGHT' IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE 'REHABILITATION' BY A PARTY MACHINERY DOMINATED BY THE HUA GROUPING;

SECONDLY, BY FORMING A TEMPORARY WORKING ALLIANCE (THE 'SO-CALLED 'DEMOCRACY WALL' MOVEMENT) WITH

ELEMENTS WHICH WISHED TO ESTABLISH FORTHWITH 'PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY' IN CHINA AGAINST THE PARTY GROUPING HEADED BY HUA KUO-FENG;

THIRDLY, BY PRETENDING TO SUPPORT THE PRO-AMERICAN, ANTI-SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OF THE GROUPING HEADED BY HUA KUO-FENG;

FOURTHLY, BY WORKING FOR A RE-DEFINITION OF 'MAO TSE-TUNG THOUGHT' WHICH WOULD LIMIT IT TO PRINCIPLES ACCEPTABLE TO THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS GROUPING OF THE PARTY; AND

FIFTHLY, BY HYPOCRITICALLY SUPPORTING HUA'S TOTALLY UNREALISTIC ECONOMIC PROGRAMME OF 1978-79 (KNOWN AS THE 'GREAT LEAP OUTWARD'), SO THAT ITS INEVITABLE FAILURE COULD BE USED AS A WEAPON AGAINST THE GROUPING AROUND HUA.

The Campaign against the 'Gang of Four' (October 1976 - December 1977)

In October 1976:

**"Posters denouncing 'the gang of four' by name appeared in Peking and Tsinghua universities. . . The press meanwhile published a series of articles denouncing the 'gang of four' without naming them".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 23; p. 28,207).**

Throughout 1977:

**"The propaganda campaign against the 'gang of four' was developed".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 23; p. 28,208).**

and:

**"resulted in changes in the leadership of many of the provincial Communist Parties, new first secretaries being appointed in 10 provinces".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 23; p. 28,718).**

During late 1976 and the first half of 1977, mass meetings took place:

**"at which supporters of the 'gang of four;' were denounced and in some cases arrested".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 24; p. 29,191).**

The 'Two Whatever's' (October 1976 - February 1977)

On 10 October 1976, only four days after the arrest of the 'Gang of Four', the Party grouping around Hua decided to publish:

"The 'Complete Works of Mao Tse-tung' and . . . Volume 5 of the 'Selected Works'. For the second enterprise, Hua Kuo-feng himself wrote an article entitled 'Continue the Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to

the End: A Study of Volume 5 of the "Selected Works" of Mao Tse-tung". (Ruan Ming (Juan Hing): op. cit.; p. 18, citing 'Peking Review' (6 May 1977)).

In February 1977, the Party grouping around Hua Kuo-feng proclaimed a principle of Maoist fundamentalism which crystallised their programme and became known as the 'Two Whatever's', namely:

"Whatever policies Chairman Mao decided, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instructions he issued, we shall steadfastly obey". (Hua Kuo-feng: Statement of Policy (February 1977), in: Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): ibid.; p. 20).

The aim of the policy:

"Was to head off questioning of the actions of the later Mao". (Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 372).

The Central Work Conference (March 1977)

At a Central Work Conference in March 1977, Hua at first:

"Reaffirmed the 'two whatever's', repeated formulas from the Cultural Revolution, maintained that the Tien An Men incident was counter-revolutionary, and asserted that the campaign against Teng . . . had been correct." (Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 373).

Indeed, he denounced the demand for the return of Teng Hsiao-ping as equivalent to a call for the rehabilitation of the 'Gang of Four':

"Under cover of calling for the return of Teng Hsiao-ping, they want to . . . rehabilitate the 'Gang of Four'". (Hua Kuo-feng: Speech at Central Work Conference (March 1977), in: Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 22).

However, under pressure from Teng's supporters, he later:

"gave way." (John Gardner: op. cit.; p. 125).

to some extent, telling the conference:

"That Teng had nothing to do with the Tien An Men Incident and that the Central Committee would give him an opportunity to work again." (John Gardner: ibid.; p. 125).

The Rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping (October 1976 - December 1978)

On 10 October 1976, only four days after the arrest of the 'Gang of Four' Teng wrote to Hua, praised him:

"as a man of 'wisdom' . . . and added that 'he put body and soul behind Hua Kuo-feng as leader of the Party and nation."
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 40).

This letter:

"has never been released",
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 374).

but is known to have indicated Teng' s:

"willingness to support Hua Kuo-feng's continued leadership of the Party, . . . That could be why the letter was not included in Teng's 'Selected Works'".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): *ibid.*; p. 375).

In January 1977, big-character posters appeared which:

"Called for a reversal of the verdicts on the Tien An Men incident and the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 20).

and in the same month, the propaganda campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping was:

"officially ended".
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 23; p. 28,717).

In a second letter to Hua in April 1977, Teng expressed:

"First of all his joy and gratitude for Hua's proposals in March to the Central Committee. He next admitted that during his time at the State Council in 1975, . . . he had committed mistakes and had willingly accepted instructions and criticism from Chairman Mao".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 39).

The way in which:

"Teng's letters to Hua of October 1976 and April 1977 are covered in his 'Selected Works' (the first is only referred to and the account of the second is incomplete) suggests that Teng himself feels that he has something to hide".
(Richard Evans: op, cit.; p. 239).

Finally, in his April letter to Hua, Teng re-defined 'Mao Tse-tung Thought' in terms which would make it acceptable to the national bourgeois grouping of the Party, saying:

"We should use genuine Mao Tse-tung thought taken as an integral whole . . . guiding our Party, our Army and our people".
(Teng Hsiao-ping: Letter to Hua Kuo-feng (April 1977), in: 'The "Two Whatevers" do not accord with Marxism' (May 1977), in: 'Selected Works (1975-1982)'; Peking; 1984; p. 39),

The 3rd Plenum of the 10th CC (July 1977)

The tactics adopted by the group around Teng, despite their unprincipled character,

"Enabled Teng Hsiao-ping to attend the 10th CC's 3rd Plenum (in July 1977 -- Ed.)".

(Roderick MacFarquhar (1991): op. cit.; p. 375).

where he paid hypocritical tributes to Hua's political wisdom, declaring:

"That Hua Kuo-feng possessed the historical attributes that made him worthy of his role as leader".

(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 40).

As a result, at the Plenum Teng was:

"reinstated in all his offices: Party vice-chairman and member of the Politburo Standing Committee; vice-chairman of the MAC (Military Affairs Commission -- Ed.); vice-premier; and PLA chief of staff".

(Roderick MacFarquhar (1991): op. cit.; p. 375).

Thus, from July 1977,

"Teng was directly responsible for education, science and technology, military affairs and foreign affairs."

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 225).

At the Plenum, Teng:

"Repeated his advocacy of an integrated view of Mao Tse-tung Thought, but was discreet enough not to attack the 'two whatevers' frontally at this time.

. . . Instead, he promoted an old slogan which was to become the essence of Teng Hsiao-ping's post-Mao policies:

'Seek truth from facts'".

(Roderick MacFarquhar (1991): op. cit.; p. 375).

In addition, at the Plenum:

"the 'Gang of Four' were expelled from all posts both inside and outside the Party and, for good measure, to their long list of crimes was added the accusation that they had 'feverishly attacked and fabricated accusations against Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping'".

(John Gardner: op. cit.; p. 125).

The 11th National Congress of the CPC (August 1977)

In August 1977, the 11th National Congress of the CPC:

"was held in secret".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archivist, Volume 23; p. 28,720).

**"On the basis of the compromise cemented at the plenum".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 375).**

**between the groupings headed respectively by Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping.
In a weaker position than at the Central Work Conference in March, now:**

**"It was Hua's turn to be discreet, not reasserting the 'two whatevers', or repeating his estimation of the Tien An Men incident as counter-revolutionary. . . . Instead, he opened with a long and effusive eulogy of the late Chairman, went on to reaffirm the necessity for, and success of, the Cultural Revolution, the correctness of the line of the 10th Congress, . . . and the need to persist with class struggle and continue the revolution under the proletarian dictatorship".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): ibid.; p. 375).**

Presenting the report of the Central Committee, Hua alleged that:

**"'the gang of four' had 'colluded with the Lin Piao anti-Party clique' during the Cultural Revolution. . . .
After Mr. Chou En-lai's death, they had brought false charges against Mr. Teng. . .
After Chairman Mao's death, they had . . . distributed arms and ammunition in Shanghai. . .
The smashing of the 'gang of four' marks the triumphant conclusion of our first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
We must carry through the great struggle to expose and criticise the 'gang of four' through to the end".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 23; p. 28,720, 29,721).**

In his report, Hua:

**"Invoked the late Chairman's invocation of the Great Leap Forward, by insisting that China must carry out the general line of ...'achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in "building socialism"".
(John Gardner: op. cit.; p. 126).**

The congress endorsed Mao's policy of:

**"Continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat."
(11th National Congress of CPC: Resolution on the Political Report (August 1977), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 20, No. 35 (26 August 1977); p. 58).**

In elections to the Central Committee:

**"Nearly 80 of the former full members known to be still alive were not re-elected. . .
The new members included . . . General Lo Jui-ching".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 23; p. 28,722).**

At the congress, Teng was elected a Deputy Chairman of the Party, but:

"Succeeded in reinforcing neither his power nor his influence at this congress".

(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 41).

Teng emerged:

"At the Congress as the CPC's third-ranking leader. . . Teng's brief closing speech was the only other address to be accorded publicity. He referred to Hua as 'our wise leader', but did not emulate his wisdom by praising the Cultural Revolution. . . . But he too had to compromise and express support for the current line to 'grasp the key link of class struggle' and 'continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 375-76).

The Pro-US, Anti-Soviet Foreign Policy of the Hua Leadership (August 1977 - September 1980)

On the international situation, as has been said, the Hua leadership followed the line appropriate for the pro-US comprador bourgeoisie. In his report to the 11th National Congress of the Party in August 1977, Hua declared that:

"The Soviet Union and the United States are the source of a new world war, and Soviet social-imperialism in particular presents the greatest danger".

(Hua Kuo-feng: Report to 11th National Congress of CPC (August 1977), in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 23; p. 28,720).

From this time on, until the eclipse to the grouping headed by Hu Kuo-feng, this view formed the basis of China's foreign policy. In particular, it was embodied in the 'Three Worlds Theory', which:

"According to Chinese sources . . . was first formulated by Chairman Mao . . . in February 1974".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 25; p. 29,392).

The theory became prominent in the summer of 1977:

"Chinese foreign policy statements in 1977-78 were dominated by the 'Three Worlds' theory".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 25; p. 29,392).

It rejected:

"the earlier conception of the world as divided into the developed capitalist countries, the 'socialist camp' and the developing countries."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 25; p. 29,392).

In November 1977, the theory was developed in a long article in the 'People's Daily' in November 1977, entitled 'Chairman Mao's Theory of Differentiation of

the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism':

"Of the two imperialist super-powers, the Soviet Union is the more ferocious, the more reckless, the more treacherous, and the more dangerous source of world war. .

**Soviet social-imperialism . . . is the more aggressive and adventurous."
(Chairman Mao's Theory of Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism' (November 1977), in: 'Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 25; p. 29,392).**

In December 1978, a joint Sino-US statement announced that:

**"The People's Republic of China and the USA have agreed to recognise each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of Jan. 1, 1979".
(Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 25; p. 29,534).**

At the same time, the US government announced its intention of:

**"Terminating the mutual assistance treaty . . . (between the USA and Taiwan -- Ed.) and would withdraw its military personnel from Taiwan within four months".
(Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,619).**

In 1978 there was:

**"A major increase in US exports to China, which totalled \$653 million in the first 11 months of the year".
(Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 25; p. 29,537).**

In February 1979, the Chinese government:

**". . . launched a punitive war against Vietnam." . . .
The CARTER* administration viewed this war as an important element of the anti-Soviet strategy the United States and China had in common. . . .
The war . . . lasted exactly one month".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 51, 54).**

In January 1980, the US Defence Department announced:

**"That it was now prepared to sell military equipment . . . to China".
(Keesing' s Contemporary Archives' Volume 26; p. 30,387).**

In February 1980, a trade agreement with the USA:

**"granting China most-favoured nation status . . . entered into force."
(Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,387).**

The 'Great Leap Outward' (February 1978 - early 1979)

At the National People's Council in February/March 1978:

"Chairman Hua Kuo-feng launched a 'Great Leap Outward' to promote

high-speed industrial growth by developing China's oil reserves and exporting them in return for advanced technology".

(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-chuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy (hereafter listed as 'Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-chuang) (1995)', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): 'China in the 1990s'; Basingstoke; 1995; p. 146).

"The plan target for steel output in 1985 was 60 million tons (1977: 23.7 m. tons); for oil, 350 million tons (1977: 93.6 m. tons). . . . Hua called for the construction of 120 major projects, 14 major heavy industrial bases, and capital investment equivalent to that expended in the previous 28 years." (Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 377).

It called for:

"ten new oilfields".

(Dwight H. Perkins: 'China's Economic Policy and Performance' in: Roderick MacFarquahar & John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China: Volume 15: The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution: 1966-1982'; Cambridge; 1991; p. 496).

By the autumn of 1978, however, Hua's ten-year development plan had:

"Been shown to be the stuff of dreams. It had stipulated a more than fourfold increase in oil production, but from fields which remained to be discovered, and a twofold increase in steel production, which could only be achieved by importing equipment on a scale far beyond China's means."

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 237).

"When the excessively optimistic estimates of oil reserves were revised downwards in 1978, the plan collapsed".

(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-chuang): op. cit.; p. 146).

"Hua had mimicked Mao's grandiose visions. Instead of covering himself with glory, he had pointed China towards another economic disaster."

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 377).

As a result:

"Hua's ten-year plan was shelved in early 1979, only a year after it had been announced". (Harry Harding (1987): op. cit.; p. 56).

The fiasco of the 'Great Leap Outward' was followed by a programme of retrenchment, agreed upon at:

"a three-week work conference which . . . substituted a strategy of 'readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement."

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 237).

The Debate on the Criterion of Truth (May - November 1978)

In May 1978, an article was published entitled 'Practice is the Sole Criterion of Truth',

"written under the tutelage of HU Yao-pang*" (Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): *ibid.*; p. 31).

who had headed the Propaganda Department of the Party since December 1977. This

"became a second rallying cry for the Teng forces". (Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): *op. cit.*; p. 378).

and:

"the spark that lit a prairie fire of nationwide debate". (Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): *ibid.*; p. 378).

from May to November 1978:

"Over the criterion of truth". (Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): *op. cit.*; p. 32).

In June 1978, at an All-Army Conference on Political Work, Teng came out in support of Hu Yao-pang's formulation, saying:

"Seeking truth from facts, . . . proceeding from reality, and integrating theory with practice, form the fundamental principle of 'Mao Tse-tung Thought'".

(Teng Hsiao-ping: Speech at All-Army Conference on Political Work (June 1978). in: 'Selected Works'; Peking; 1984; p. 132).

Teng's Criticism of the 'Two Whatever's' (September-November 1978)

In September 1978, Teng:

"first criticised the 'two whatever's' to an audience outside the inner circle". (Richard Evans: *ibid.*; p. 229).

Now,

"Conferences in ten provinces . . . supported his position. By November, leading officials in all provinces and military regions had thrown their weight on Teng's side".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): *op. cit.*; p. 379).

The 'Democracy Wall' Movement (November - December 1978)

In November 1978, the national bourgeois grouping of the Party, headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, formed a temporary coalition with elements, mainly non-Party, calling for multi-Party parliamentary democracy, whose programme was featured on

'Democracy Wall' at Hsitan, near Tien An Men Square in Peking.

At this time:

"a powerful coalition emerged, consisting of the 'Democracy Wall' movement and the democratic reform forces in the Party".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 45).

The debate over the criterion of truth:

"lit the fire under the democratic movement of the Hsitan Democracy Wall".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): ibid.; p. 44).

Big-character posters:

"flourished at Hsitan in greater and greater numbers".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): ibid.; p. 46).

And by the end of 1978 the 'Democracy Wall' movement had:

"swept Peking".
(Harry Harding (1987): op. cit.; p. 61).

The Central Work Conference (November 1978)

In November 1978. just prior to the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CC, a Central Work Conference was held, and:

"Under the influence of the Democracy Wall, . . . completely deviated from the route mapped out by Hua Kuo-feng. . . . The delegates debated topics proposed on Democracy Wall: the 1976 Tien An Men incident, the 1969 Lushan Conference and the purging of Peng Teh-huai and, . . . finally, the issue of Liu Shao-chi".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 47).

In fact, the conference became:

"a full-scale debate on the . . . Cultural Revolution."
(Roderick MacFarquhar (1991): op. cit.; p. 379-80).

with Teng proposing:

"To 'evaluate' Mao Tse-tung as a revolutionary leader and the Cultural Revolution itself".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 230).p. 230).

During the conference,

"One important decision, to reverse the verdict on the Tien An Men incident of April 1976, was announced -- by the Peking Party Committee."
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 230).

The incident was now declared to have been:

"completely revolutionary".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,487).

Three days later, it was announced that:

"Investigations by the Peking Municipal Security Bureau had shown that none of the 388 people arrested in connection with the demonstration was a 'counter-revolutionary', and that all had been rehabilitated".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,487).

The 3rd Plenum of the 11th CC (December 1978)

An important development at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CC, in December 1978,

"was the entry of a group of victims into the Politburo, large enough to tip the balance of the leadership in Teng's favour".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 380).

At the 3rd Plenum,

"it was the close alliance of the democratic reform forces within the Party and the people's democratic movement that would enable the victory over the 'two whatevers'".

(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. c it.; p. 44).

At the 3rd Plenum:

". . the Tien An Men Square demonstrations (of 1976-- Ed.) were recognised as 'entirely revolutionary actions'".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p 30,488).

and:

"the 'two whatevers' were rejected. Class struggle was no longer to be the 'key link'; the four modernisations were to take precedence. The theory of 'continuing the revolution under the proletarian dictatorship' was abandoned".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 381).

In other words:

"the 3rd Plenum rejected Hua's programme".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): ibid.; p. 381).

and accepted that of Teng Hsiao-ping.

An official history of the CPC:

"published in August 1991, states that Teng Hsiao-ping became the 'kernel' of the Party's leadership".

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 231).

at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CC.

Teng as 'Paramount Leader' (July 1983 - October 1987)

In July 1983:

'Selected Works of Teng Hsiao-ping . . . was published in an edition of 12.21 million copies.' ('Keesing' 5 Record of World Events', Volume 29; p. 32,505),

And the 13th National Congress of the CPC in October 1987:

"semi-formally recognised Teng as the 'paramount leader'".

(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.; p. 107).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --13

CARTER, James R. ('Jimmy'), American farmer and politician (1924-); farmer (1953-77); senator, Georgia (1963-67); Governor, Georgia (1971-75); President (1977-81).

HU Yaobang = Pinyin form, of HU Yao-pang.

HU Yao-pang, Chinese revisionist politician (1915-89); Director, North Szechuan People's Administrative Bureau (1950-52); Secretary, New Democratic Youth League (1952-57); member, Executive Committee, All-China Federation of Trade Unions (1953-57); Deputy Chairman, World Federation of Democratic Youth (1953-59); 1st Secretary, Communist Youth League (1957-67); Director, Organisation Dept., CC, CPC (1977-78); Director Propaganda Dept., CC, CPC (1977-80); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1978-89); Secretary-General. CPC (1980-87); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1980-87); Chairman, CC, CPC (1981-82).

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE : THE OUSTING OF HUA KUO-FENG

(December 1978 - June 1981)

Introduction

HAVING GAINED THE DOMINANT POSITION WITHIN THE PARTY, THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY TENG HSIAO-PING, PROCEEDED TO OUST FROM LEADING POSITIONS THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY HUA KUA-FENG.

The 'Rehabilitation' of Peng Teh-huai and Peng Chen (December 1978)

In December 1978, the 'rehabilitation' was announced of:

"Peng Teh-huai, who had survived in prison almost until it (the 'Cultural Revolution' - Ed.) was over and, among the living, Peng Chen".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 231).

In the same month, a memorial meeting in honour of Peng Teh-huai was held. At this:

"Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping delivered the oration."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,488),

The Restoration of Property to the National Bourgeoisie (January 1979)

At a meeting in January 1979, General ULANFU*, a member of the Politburo of the CC of the CPC and a deputy chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, himself a 'rehabilitated' victim of the 'Cultural Revolution', recalled that during the 'Cultural Revolution':

"the former capitalists' bank deposits and other property had been confiscated, although they were protected by the Constitution; their salaries had been reduced; their houses had been taken over; and most of those holding administrative posts had been transferred to manual labour."
(Ulanfu: Statement of January 1979, in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,489).

Ulanfu continued:

"The Central Committee has now decided that all confiscated bank deposits should be returned to the owners, along with the interest due; that houses and other confiscated property should be restored; and that industrialists and other businessmen whose salaries had been cut should be paid their original salaries, together with arrears due to them. Such people should be employed in posts where they could use their specialised skills; they should receive arrears of interest on their shares, payment of which had been stopped in 1966, and their children should not be discriminated against in any way."
(Ulanfu: Statement of January 1979, in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,489).

The Re-defining of 'Mao Tse-tung Thought' (March 1979)

At a meeting of Party theoretical workers in March 1979, Teng Hsiao-ping re-defined 'Mao Tse-tung Thought' in a way which would make it acceptable to the national bourgeoisie, as:

"the crystallisation of the experience of the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle over half a century".
(Teng Hsiao-ping: Statement of March 1979, in: Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.

236).

The Suppression of the 'Democracy Wall Movement' (December 1979 - January 1980)

The political representatives of the national bourgeoisie, headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, did not at this time favour the principal aim featured on the 'Democracy Wall', that is, to establish multi-party 'parliamentary democracy since this would completely expose their false facade of being Marxist-Leninists:

Thus, having successfully utilised the 'Democracy Wall' movement to assist in the overthrow of the pro-US comprador grouping headed by Hua Kuofeng, the now dominant Party grouping around Teng moved to suppress the movement.

In December 1979,

"the 'Democracy Wall' at Hsitan was . . . scrubbed clean".
(John Gardner: op. cit.; p. 167).

and:

"the Peking authorities forbade the display of posters except at a designated site in Yuetan Park or at the author's place of work, required their authors to register their names, addresses and places of work, and stated that . . . authors would be held responsible for their contents".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,496).

The new site was, in fact, merely:

"a small enclosed park, where signed posters could be put up under the watchful eye of the police".
(John Gardner: op. cit.; p. 167).

In January 1980, Teng Hsiao-ping:

"proposed the removal from the Constitution of Article 45
-- the right 'to speak out freely, air one's views fully, write big character posters and hold great debates'".
(David S. G. Goodman: 'Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography'; London; 1994; p. 97).

The 5th Plenum of the 11th CC (February 1980)

At the 5th Plenum of the 11th CC, in February 1980, Hu Yao-pang was promoted:

"to the newly-revived office of General Secretary".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,485).

of the CPC, and, since:

"Hua's four principal supporters in the Politburo . . . had been voted off that

body", (Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 237).

Hu Yao-pang was:

"at the head of a secretariat which consisted almost entirely of men on whose loyalty Teng could rely".

(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 237).

The new

"Party Secretariat, headed by Hu Yao-pang, . . . gradually assumed the responsibility for national policy-making that had previously rested in the Politburo under Hua's chairmanship".

(Harry Harding (1987): op. cit.; p. 63).

At this Plenum, Teng's proposal (previous paragraph) to limit democracy was approved, and at the 1980 session of the NPC:

"the clause in the state constitution... was shorn of..., the right to engage in great debates and to put up big-character posters".

(Roderick MacFarquhar (1991): op. cit.; p. 185).

The Rehabilitation of Liu Shao-chi (February 1980)

It was also at the February 1980 Plenum that:

"Liu Shao-chi was posthumously rehabilitated",

(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.; p. 96).

and in January 1982:

"the first volume was published . . . of the 'Selected Works' of Liu Shao-chi.

.

His writings were described by the 'New China News Agency' in January 1982 as 'an important treasure-house of theory.'

('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p., 31,815).

The Eclipse of Hua Kuo-feng (February 1980)

By February 1980:

"Hua was now isolated",

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 237).

on the Politburo, and:

"became a figurehead".

(Edwin P-w. Leung: op. cit.; p. 169).

He had:

"watched helplessly as an 'anti-whatever' coalition was inexorably built up within the top leadership".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 386).

The Politburo Conference (August 1980)

At a Politburo conference in August 1980:

"The top leadership agreed that Hua should be replaced as premier by CHAO Tzu-yang*".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): ibid.; p. 387).

In other words:

"Hua was forced to resign as Premier. In name, Hua stayed on as Chairman of the Central Committee and the military commission until June 1981. But it was only in name".

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 237-38).

And Chao Tzu-yang:

"Was elected Prime Minister".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,941).

At the end of 1980 and in the first months of 1981:

"the Communist Party leadership passed through a serious crisis".

(Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,943).

The Enlarged Politburo Meeting (November/December 1980)

At an Enlarged Politburo meeting in November/December 1980:

"Hua was severely criticised. . Many Politburo members attacked him for committing 'grave mistakes in political and economic policy since Mao's death. These included showing an 'unclear attitude' on questions of 'rehabilitation'. It was said that he had deliberately delayed the return to power of Teng Hsiao-ping . . . and had opposed the posthumous rehabilitation of Peng Teh-huai. . . . Ideologically, he had advanced the 'two whatevers' slogan and had been reluctant to support the alternative advanced by Teng that 'practice is the sole criterion of truth'. . . Furthermore, he had fostered his own personality cult. . . The Politburo . . . considered him unfit for the high offices he held, and Hua offered to resign. It was agreed that his resignation should be offered to the 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, and that that body should be asked to appoint Hu Yao-pang as Party Chairman and Teng as Chairman of the Military Commission. In the interim, Hu and Teng would assume these responsibilities informally".

(John Gardner: op. cit.; p. 184).

The Enlarged Politburo meeting of November/December 1980 agreed that Hua lacked

"the political and organisational ability to be the chairman of the Party".
(Roderick MacFarquhar (1991): op. cit.; p. 388).

Humiliated, Hua:

"asked to be relieved of his Party posts".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 238).

However, it was agreed to appoint him:

"as a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee."
(John Gardner: op. cit.; p. 184).

-- a very minor post.

Thus, the Enlarged Politburo Meeting of November/December 1980:

"effectively completed the conversion of all the powers of Hua Ko-feng to Hu Yao-pang and Teng Hsiao-ping."
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 95).

[The 6th Plenum of the 11th CC \(June 1981\)](#)

The 6th Plenum of the 11th CC was postponed. It eventually met in June 1981, but:

"had nothing left to do but to formalise this transfer after the fact".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): *ibid.*; p. 95).

The Plenum:

"accepted Mr. Hua Kuo-feng's resignation from the post of Chairman of the Party . . . and replaced him by Mr. Hu Yao-pang. . Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping succeeded Mr. Hua as chairman of the Party's military commission. . . . No new General Secretary was elected".
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 28; p. 31,317).

It was now charged that Hua had:

"promoted the erroneous 'two whatevers' policy. . . . He procrastinated and obstructed the work of reinstating veteran cadres in their posts and redressing the injustices left over from the past (including the case of the Tien An Men Square incident of 1976)".
(*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 28; p. 31,318).

and that the 11th National Congress of the CPC in August 1977 had:

"owing to the influence of Comrade Hua Kuo-feng's mistakes reaffirmed the erroneous theories, policies and slogans of the Cultural Revolution instead of correcting them. . . . Obviously under his leadership it is impossible to correct 'left' errors within the Party". (*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'*, Volume 28; p. 31,318).

Although Hua retained his titles:

"Until the end of June 1981, at which point he would be demoted to a vice-chairmanship of the Party, his jobs were immediately taken over: the Party chairmanship by Hu Yao-pang, and the MAC chairmanship by Teng himself".

(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991): op. cit.; p. 388).

Hua:

"remained vice-chairman of the Party until September 1982".

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 238).

At the 12th National Congress of the CPC in September 1982, Hua was:

"then dismissed from the Politburo".

(Harry Harding (1987): op. cit.; p. 64).

He then:

"disappeared from sight and his name ceased to appear in the press".

(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 238).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES - 13

CHAO Tzu-yang, Chinese revisionist politician (1919-); General Secretary, South China Sub-bureau¹ CPC (1951-54); Deputy Secretary, Kwangtung Province CPC (1955-57); 2nd Secretary, Kwangtung Province CPC (1962-65); Secretary, Central-South Bureau, CPC (1964-67); 1st Secretary, Kwangtung Province CPC (1965-67, 1974-75); Secretary, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region CPC (1971-72); 1st Secretary, Szechuan Province CPC (1976-80); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1979-80); Premier (1980); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1980-89); Premier (1980-87); Deputy Chairman, CC, CPC (1981-82); Acting General Secretary, CPC (1987); General Secretary, CPC (1987-89); Deputy Chairman, Central Military Commission (1988); dismissed from all posts (1989).

ULANFU, Mongolian revisionist military officer and politician (1906-88); Chairman, Inner Mongolian Region People's Government (1947-55); Deputy Chairman, Suiyuan Military and Administrative Council (1949-52); member, People's Government Council (1949-54); secretary, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region CPC (1949-55); Governor, Suiyuan Province (1952-54); member, National Defence Council (1954-66); commander, Inner Mongolia Military Region, PLA (1954-67); Deputy Premier (1954-67); general (1955); 1st Secretary, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee (1955-57); 2nd Secretary, North China Bureau, CPC (1965-67); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1977-85); Deputy President, PRC (1983-88).

ULANHU = Pinyin form of ULANFU.

ZHAO Ziyang = Pinyin form of CHAO Tzu-yang.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO: THE TRIAL OF THE 'GANG OF FOUR' (November 1980 - January 1981)

Introduction

ALTHOUGH THE 'GANG OF FOUR' HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN OCTOBER 1976 (page 167), IT WAS NOT UNTIL FOUR YEARS LATER - AFTER THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS PARTY GROUPING AROUND TENG HSIAO-PING HAD SECURED DOMINANCE AND THE COMPRADOR PARTY GROUPING AROUND HUA KUO-FENG HAD BEEN OUSTED - THAT THEY WERE PUT ON TRIAL. THIS DELAY ENABLED CHARGES OF FOMENTING THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION' IN 1966-69 TO BE INCLUDED IN THE INDICTMENT.

The Trial (November 1980 - January 1981)

In November 1980, the 'Gang of Four' (Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching, Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wen-yuan), together with:

"six political and military associates of the late Marshal Lin Piao, appeared before a special court on charges of counter-revolutionary activities". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,833).

The other defendants included Chen Po-ta and General Huang Yung-cheng:

"Chen Po-ta had been under arrest since October 1970, the five officers since September 1971". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,836).

However,

"What was really on trial . . . was . . . the twenty-year rule of Mao." (Wu Tien-wei: op. cit.; p. 206),

Chiang Ching's main crimes:

"As laid out in the indictment, were her attempt to poison Mao's mind against Chou En-lai and Teng Tsiao-ping, her involvement in the framing of Liu Shao-chi and her arch-rival, his wife Wang Kuang-mei, her role as kingpin of the Gang of Four, purporting to serve as a direct channel to Mao, . . . her ordering of illegal house searches and the destruction of compromising material about herself; and her persecution of old friends and

acquaintances, right down to her former housemaid".
(David Bonavia: 'Verdict in Peking: The Trial of the Gang of Four';
London; 1984; p. 45).

Among the 48 specific charges listed in the indictment were those of:

"Bringing false charges against Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Lu Ting-yi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Marshal Chu Teh, Marshal Peng Teh-huai, . . . General Lo Jui-ching and others; plotting a military coup in 1970-71; plotting a rebellion in Shanghai in 1976."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,833-34).

The indictment gave further information concerning the 'Lin Piao Affair', charging that Lin Piao had planned:

"To launch a pincer attack from north and south in alliance with the Soviet Union, should fighting be necessary".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,834).

Most of the defendants admitted the charges, wholly or partially. Yao Wen-yuan:

"Although insisting that he had committed 'mistakes' rather than 'crimes', was generally cooperative. . . .

Wang Hung-wen, a pathetic shadow of his former self, confirmed his guilt and implicated his colleagues.

Chang Chun-chiao, evidently convinced that he had nothing to lose, treated the court with open contempt, refusing to say a word".

(John Gardner: op. cit.; p. 179).

But Chiang Ching:

"unlike the other accused, vigorously defended herself".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,835).

In a two-hour speech in her defence on 24 December:

"She maintained that during the Cultural Revolution she had acted on behalf of Chairman Mao or in accordance with his instructions, and declared that 'arresting me and bringing me to trial is a defamation of Chairman Mao Tse-tung'".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,835).

Later in the proceedings:

"She challenged the court to have her publicly executed in Tien An Men Square, and was forcibly ejected from the court".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,835).

In January 1981, the court found:

"All the accused guilty".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,836).

and the following sentences were passed:

**"Chiang Ching and Chang Chun-chiao: death with a two-year reprieve;
Wang Hung-wen: life imprisonment;**

The other defendants: imprisonment for between 10 and 20 years."

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,836).

When the sentences were read out, Chiang Ching:

"shouted protests and was removed from the court".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,836).

Trials of alleged supporters of the 'Gang of Four':

"for crimes committed during the Cultural Revolution continued during the later months of 1982 and the early months of 1983, most of the accused being sentenced to over 10 years' imprisonment".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 29; p. 30,505).

Postscript

In January 1983:

"The death sentences, suspended for two years, which had been passed on Jan. 25 1981 on Miss Chiang Ching (Chairman Mao's widow) and Mr. Chang Chun-chiao, a former Deputy Premier, . . . were commuted to life imprisonment by the Supreme People's Court", ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 29; p. 32,505).

and journalists were officially informed:

"that of the 10 'counter-revolutionaries' tried in 1980-81, Mr. Chen Po-ta and the five officers had already been released on health grounds, leaving only the 'gang of four' . . . still in prison."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 29; p. 32,505).

In 1984, Chiang Ching was released from prison to house imprisonment in a:

"Peking villa".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,290).

And in June 1991, the death by suicide of Chiang Ching:

"was officially confirmed".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,290).

to have taken place in May. In August 1992, Wang Hung-wen:

"died . . . while serving a life sentence imposed in 1981 for his role as a

member of the so-called 'Gang of Four'".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,051).

and finally, in October 1996:

"the authorities announced that Yao Wen-yuan, 64, sole surviving member of the 'Gang of Four', . . . had been released after serving a 20-year prison term".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 42; p. 41,321).

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE : THE REASSESSMENT OF MAO TSE-TUNG (January 1978 - September 1982)

Introduction

WITH THE DOMINANCE OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS PARTY GROUPING AROUND TENG HSIAO-PING AND THE OUSTING OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS GROUPING AROUND HUA KUO-FENG - THE WAY WAS OPEN TO REASSESS THE ROLE OF MAO TSE-TUNG IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE.

The Reassessment of Mao Tse-tung (January 1978 - December 1980)

Although the Party leadership continued to pay lip-service to Mao Tsetung,

"from January (1978-- Ed.) onwards, the 'People's Daily' gradually abandoned its practice of printing a quotation from Chairman Mao on its front page, and in March the press stopped printing all quotations from him in bold type - both practices having originated during the Cultural Revolution."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 24; p. 29,190).

From June 1978 onwards:

"the press repeatedly . . . emphasised that Chairman Mao must not be regarded as an infallible genius and that his thought must be reinterpreted. . . . The campaign . . . represented a further development of the tendency to play down the personality cult of Chairman Mao which had become apparent in the early months of the year. .

On Oct. 27 the 'People's Daily' attacked the 'Little Red Book' of 'Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung' . . . saying that it 'turned Mao Tse-tung thought into a mechanical sum total of fragmentary statements.'"
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,486).

In an interview with a Japanese delegation in November 1978, Teng Hsiao-ping, referring to the Political Bureau resolutions of April 1976 appointing Hua Prime Minister and removing Teng from all his posts:

"said that when the two resolutions had been adopted, Chairman Mao had been so ill that he could hardly speak and was unable to make judgments. Only one member of the 'gang of four' (apparently his wife Chiang Ching) had been allowed to see him, and the 'gang' had 'disposed of matters as if they had his approval'".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,488).

In March 1979, Teng told a meeting of Party theoretical workers:

"Comrade Mao, like any other man, had his defects and made errors".

(Teng Hsiao-ping: Statement of March 1979, in: Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 235).

In September 1979:

"The large hoardings in Peking displaying quotations from Chairman Mao were painted over . . . and used for advertisements".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,494).

During the autumn of 1980,

"the Chinese press adopted a highly critical attitude towards Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and especially towards the personality cult surrounding him. . . . Unlike in previous years, the fourth anniversary of his death on Sept. 9 was completely ignored by the press".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,942).

In December 1980, the 'People's Daily':

"strongly criticised Chairman Mao . . . for having 'personally initiated and led' the Cultural Revolution".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,944).

The 6th Plenum of the 11th CC (June 1981)

In June 1981, the 6th Plenum of the 11th CC adopted a resolution 'On Questions of Party History', which summarised the view of the now dominant national bourgeois grouping of the Party, headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, on the role of Mao Tse-tung. The resolution had been drafted:

"Under the supervision of Teng and Hu Yao-pang".

(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.; p. 96).

It:

"marked the Party's formal acceptance of Teng's political and economic programme. It repudiated the Cultural Revolution and the ideological tenets connected with the later years of Mao Tse-tung. It called for a reform of the economy."

(Harry Harding (1987): op. cit.; p. 64-65).

It declared that, during the 'Great Leap Forward',

""Left' errors, characterised by excessive targets, the issuing of arbitrary directions, boastfulness and the stirring up of a 'communist wind', spread unchecked throughout the country. This was due . . . to the fact that Comrade Mao Tse-tung and many leading comrades . overestimated the role of man's subjective will and efforts. . . . The Great Leap Forward and the movement for rural people's communes were initiated without careful investigation and study and without prior experimentation."

(CC, CPC: Resolution 'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 19).

It blamed the 'Great Leap Forward' for the economic crisis of 1959-61, saying:

"It was mainly due to the efforts of the great leap forward and of the struggle against 'Right opportunism' . . . that our economy encountered serious difficulties between 1959 and 1961, which caused serious losses to our country and people".

(CC, CPC: Resolution 'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 19).

It alleged that Mao:

"erred in initiating criticism of Comrade Peng Teh-huai and then in launching a Party-wide struggle against 'Right opportunism'. The resolution . . . concerning the so-called anti-Party group of Peng Tehhuai . . . was entirely wrong".

(CC, CPC: Resolution 'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 24, No., 27 (6 July 1981); p. 19).

It charged that:

"the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrongly assessed the nature of the Tien An Men incident, and dismissed Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping from all his posts".

(CC, CPC: Resolution 'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 24, No., 27 (6 July 1981); p. 23).

and that at the 10th Plenum of the CC in September 1962, Mao:

"Widened and absolutised the class struggle . . . and carried forward the viewpoint . . . that the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie remained the principal contradiction in our society. As a result, . . . early in 1965 the erroneous thesis was advanced that the main target of the movement should be 'those Party persons in power taking the capitalist road'".

(CC, CPC: Resolution 'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in:

'Peking Review', Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 19-20).

The resolution declared during the period 1956-66, Mao's:

"theoretical and practical mistakes concerning class struggle in a socialist society became increasingly serious, his personal arbitrariness gradually undermined democratic centralism in Party life and the personality cult grew graver and graver. . . Careerists like Lin Piao, Chiang Ching and Kang Sheng, harbouring ulterior motives, made use of these errors and inflated them. This led to the inauguration of the 'Cultural Revolution'".

(CC, CPC: Resolution 'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 20).

In particular, it condemned the 'Cultural Revolution':

"The 'Cultural Revolution . . . was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People's Republic. It was initiated and led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung".

(CC, CPC: Resolution 'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 20).

The 9th National Congress of the Party:

"legitimised the erroneous theories and practices of the 'Cultural Revolution', and so reinforced the positions of Lin Piao, Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng and others in the Central Committee."

(CC, CPC: Resolution 'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 22).

The 10th National Congress of the Party:

"Perpetuated the 'left' errors of the 9th Congress. Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan and Wang Hung-wen formed a gang of four inside the Political Bureau".

(CC, CPC: Resolution 'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 22).

The 12th National Congress of the CPC (September 1982)

Among the changes in the Party Constitution adopted by the 12th National Congress of the CPC in September 1982:

"Were the deletion of numerous references to Chairman Mao and of all favourable references to the Cultural Revolution and to 'continuous revolution'".

'Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,819).

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR THE 'ECONOMIC REFORMS' **(summer 1978 - August 1993)**

Introduction

HAVING DEFEATED THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY HUA KUO-FENG, THE MAJORITY OF THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY TENG HSIAO-PING, CAME TO THE CONCLUSION -- LIKE THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF MANY OTHER NATIONAL BOURGEOISIES OF COLONIAL-TYPE COUNTRIES -- THAT THEIR INTERESTS WOULD NOW BEST BE SERVED BY ABANDONING THE AIM OF ESTABLISHING A NATIONALLY INDEPENDENT CAPITALISM AND SEEKING A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITH THE REMNANTS OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COLONIAL-TYPE CAPITALIST SYSTEM DEPENDENT UPON IMPERIALISM.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE CHINESE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE TRANSFORMED ITSELF, FOR THE MOST PART, INTO A COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE.

FURTHERMORE, IT THREW OFF, IN THE MAIN, ITS PSEUDO-SOCIALIST MASK AND EMBARKED ON A PROGRAMME OF ECONOMIC REFORMS WHICH WOULD ABOLISH CENTRALISED ECONOMIC PLANNING IN FAVOUR OF AN ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY IN WHICH PRODUCTION WAS DETERMINED BY PROFIT.

Thus, in the summer of 1978:

"the Government abandoned . . . its previous policy of relying on its own resources". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,765).

and began to seek foreign loans and investments.

The policy changes:

"Aimed at increasing the integration of the Chinese economy into the international economy".

(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David Wall & Wu Mingyuan: 'China's Long March to an Open Economy'; Paris; 1994; p. 24).

and were known as 'Opening Up'.

Special Economic Zones

At first,

"a cordon sanitaire was erected around foreign investments, with the establishment in 1980 of four Special Economic Zones in the south, offering tax and other incentives."

(Economist Intelligence Unit: 'Country Profile: China: 1995-96'; p. 14).

The original inspiration for these Special Economic Zones:

"was the export processing zones (EPZs) of East and South-east Asia".

(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David Wall & Wu Mingyuan: op. cit.; p. 47).

The SEZs:

"offer incentives to foreign business that include favourable tax rates, reduced tariffs, ease of entry and exit for personnel, and a relatively free hand in managerial practices."

('China Business: The Portable Encyclopedia for doing Business with China'; San Rafael (USA); 1994; p 17).

Later:

"such privileges were . . . extended across most of the country".

(Economist Intelligence Unit: 'Country Profile: China: 1995-96'; p. 14).

By 1987:

"the areas open to foreign investors included nearly 30% of China's population, and generated over 60% of the country's industrial output".

(John Thoburn & Jude Howell: 'Trade and Development: The Political Economy of China's Open Policy', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 17).

In April 1990:

"The Chinese government declared the opening of the Putung area of Shanghai as a Special Economic Zone for foreign investment. The government has offered a package of preferential treatment to foreign investors in this newly established zone similar to those provided in other Special Economic Zones".

(Dong Shizhong, Danian Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton R. Larson): 'Trade and Investment Opportunities in China: The Current Commercial and Legal Framework'; Westport (USA); 1992; p. 18).

Thus:

"by the 1990s . . . localities were competing with each other to offer foreign investors the most attractive terms. By the end of 1994, there were 206,096 registered enterprises with foreign capital in China, with a total capital of

**\$382.54 bn., of which \$196.3 bn. was provided by foreign partners."
(Economist Intelligence Unit: 'Country Profile: China: 1995-96'; p. 14).**

International Loans

In April/May 1981, China joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,334).

In June 1982, it was announced that:

"The International Development Association (IDA -- the World Bank Affiliate) was granting China an interest-free credit of . . . \$60 million -- to assist a project for drainage and irrigation."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 29; p. 32,508).

In November 1982, the World Bank announced:

"That it had granted China a 20-year loan of \$124 million to help finance the modernisation and expansion of facilities at the ports of Canton, Shanghai and Tientsin. The IDA at the same time granted China an interest-free credit of . . . \$75~4 million for the development of agricultural education and research".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 29; p. 32,508).

In May 1991:

"the Asian Development Bank (ADB) resumed lending to China approving a \$70 million loan to finance the building of a bridge in Shanghai".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,190).

Foreign Loans and Investment

In the summer of 1978,

"the Government . . . decided to seek loans from foreign banks and to accept loans from foreign governments".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,765).

as well as to open the door to foreign investment. Virtually non-existent in 1978,

"the cumulative total of foreign investment in China reached \$20 billion by 1990. In mid-1980s, the country became the largest borrower from the World Bank; by 1989 Peking had overtaken New Delhi in becoming the world's largest recipient of official bilateral and multilateral aid, receiving almost \$2.2 billion a year."

(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 236).

Such investment was encouraged by preferential treatment:

"The Chinese government has granted significant preferential treatment to foreign investors that is not enjoyed by domestic enterprises in order to attract foreign capital".

(Dong Shizhong, Danian Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton R. Larson): op. cit.; p. 152).

As a result, by the early 1990s China:

"was the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the developing world".

(Economist Intelligence Unit: 'Country Profile: China: 1995-96; p. 14).

Of total foreign direct investment in China of \$33 billion in 1989,

63% came from Hong Kong;

11% came from the USA;

7.5% came from Japan;

2% came from Taiwan."

(K. K. Seo: 'Economic Reform and Foreign Direct Investment in China before and after the Tien An Men Square Tragedy', in: Lane Kelley & Oded Shenkar (Eds.): 'International Business in China'; London; 1993; p. 122).

Foreign Indebtedness

At the end of 1995,

"China's foreign debt . . stood at \$106.59 bn., up by \$13.78 bn. or 14.8% compared with the end of 1994".

(Economist Intelligence Unit: 'Country Report: China: 2nd Quarter, 1996'; p 42).

The World Bank:

"expects China's debt service will be over \$10 bn. annually by 2000".

(Economist Intelligence Unit: 'Country Report: China: 2nd Quarter, 1996'; p 42).

Joint Ventures

Some foreign investment in China took the form of 'joint ventures' with Chinese companies. These also received preferential treatment.

In July 1979:

"a law on joint ventures was adopted by the National People's Congress . . . and came into force a week later.

The law stated that foreign companies were permitted to form joint ventures with Chinese companies, and that the Government protected the resources invested by the foreign participant and the profits due to him. . . .

A joint venture equipped with up-to-date technology might apply for a reduction of or exemption from tax for the first two or three profitmaking years. . . . A foreign participant's share of the profit and the earnings of a foreign employee of a joint venture might be remitted abroad".
(**'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,766).**

In December 1980,

"a Chinese spokesman stated . . . that over 300 agreements on joint ventures with foreign firms had been signed in the past year".
(**'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,766).**

In February 1984, it was announced that:

"1) joint ventures in most fields would be exempted from paying import tax and industrial and commercial consolidated tax on a range of imported goods, especially advanced technology;
2) such companies would be allowed to sell part of their output in China and to collect foreign exchange . . . in order to help achieve a favourable foreign exchange balance; and 3) foreign nationals working in China would be able to remit over half of their income." ('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 30; p. 32,982).

In May 1984:

"the largest ever Sino-foreign joint venture was formally signed . . . by the China National Coal Development Corporation and the US company Occidental Petroleum, to develop an open-cast mine with a capacity of 15 million tons of coal per year".
(**'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 30; p. 32,982).**

At a symposium on joint ventures held in Hong Kong in November 1984, a Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations announced

"foreign investment concessions including tax reductions for 'technology intensive' projects, for projects involving foreign investment of more than \$30 million, and for projects in energy, transport and the construction of harbours".
(**'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,925).**

In April 1985, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade stated that:

"In 1984 foreign investment in joint ventures was \$1,067 million and that since 1979 more than 930 joint ventures had been established".
(**'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,925).**

In April 1990:

"The Chinese Equity Joint Venture Law was amended . . . to improve the investment environment in China. .

A significant provision protecting foreign interests from nationalisation or expropriation was added".

(Dong Shizhong, Danian Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton R. Larson): op. cit.; p. 165).

Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises

Since 1979,

"Foreign investors have been allowed to establish wholly foreign-owned enterprises in China".

(Dong Shizhong, Danian Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton R. Larson): ibid.; p. 166).

"The 'Law on Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises' was enacted in April 1986."

(Dong Shizhong, Danian Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton R. Larson): ibid.; p. 166).

In this law:

"Article 4 specifies that 'the investment made by foreign investors in China, their rights and legal rights and interests, shall be protected by Chinese law'. Article 19 allows for the remittance of legitimate income after taxes are paid. Article 5 stipulates that, except under special circumstances, the state shall not nationalise or expropriate foreign enterprises.

Should it be necessary to take such measures, legal procedure must be followed and appropriate compensations must be paid".

(Dong Shizhong, Danian Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton R. Larson): ibid.; p. 169).

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Enterprise Autonomy

A key feature of the 'economic reforms' introduced in December 1978 was the abolition of centralised economic planning, a process euphemistically called:

"decentralisation".

(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David Wall & Wu Mingyuan: op. cit.; p. 24).

Under this system, production units:

"are no longer rigidly tied to the planning system".

(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David Wall & Wu Mingyuan: ibid.; p. 25).

The regulation of production by centralised economic planning was replaced by regulation:

**"Through the market",
(Zhou Xiao-shuang (Chou Hsiao-shuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 145).**

through:

**"Reliance on market forces".
(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David Wall & Wu Mingyuan: op. cit.; p. 24).**

In September 1980, the State Council approved:

"A report by the State Economic Council on self-management by enterprises. Under this system, . . . instead of paying over all its profits to the state, the enterprise would pay a part of its profits as a tax and would retain the remainder. It would arrange its own production plan according to market demand".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,768).

In January 1981, the 'New China News Agency' reported that:

"Over 4,000 enterprises had been given enlarged powers of selfmanagement in 1979, and that the number had increased in 1980 to over 6,000".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,768).

State controlled prices were replaced by prices determined by supply and demand, by the market, The 3rd Plenum of the 14th CC of the CPC in November 1993 decided that:

"Market pricing would be extended from goods markets (where, currently, some 90% of prices were set by market forces) to sectors such as labour, property and financial services."

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,735).

At the 13th National Congress of the CPC in October 1987, Prime Minister Chao Tzu-yang:

"Highlighted the role of the market as a legitimate mechanism for the determination of prices and distribution. . . The system of rigid centralised planning . . . threatened to impede the development of the country's productive forces. It was essential that it be replaced. In practice, this involved the encouragement of market forces as the arbiter of relationships between individual enterprises and between enterprises and the state, as well as the implementation of managerial autonomy so that individual concerns could assume sole responsibility for profits and losses".

(Chao Tzu-yuan: Report of the CC to the 13th National Congress of the CPC (October 1987), in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 33; p. 35,577).

In place of the financing of the construction of new enterprises by means of state

grants, in November 1979 the State Council decided:

"That experiments should be made in financing capital construction by means of bank loans instead of state grants."
(Keesing's Contemporary Archivist, Volume 27; p. 30,768).

At the end of 1981:

"Central government allowed most enterprises to shift to a new profit-retention method . . . where each enterprise negotiated a 'base figure' of profits which it was required to deliver to the state, and retained a high proportion of all profits above this figure."
(Zhou Xiao-shuang (Chou Hsiao-shuang): op. cit.; p. 148).

The remaining profits were:

"Retained by the enterprise. . . . After paying tax, enterprises would assume full responsibility for their profits or losses, and no funds would be allocated to them by the state."
(Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 29; p. 32,508).

In 1986, the government:

"Endorsed the principles that:
enterprises that are not profit-making should declare bankruptcy".
(Joe C. B. Leung: 'Social Welfare Reforms', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 220).

From late 1986:

"management responsibility systems were introduced. . . .
The right to manage the means of production meant responsibility for both profits and losses. . . .
By the end of 1987 75% of all state-owned industrial enterprises were using it."
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-shuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 151).

In October 1994, it was announced that:

"Bankruptcy procedures would be streamlined to enable more effective liquidation of loss-making enterprises. According to official estimates, approximately one-third of China's 11,000 large and medium-sized companies were losing money".
(Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 40,230).

'Price Reform'

In 1986, the government introduced a programme of:

"price reform by . . . freeing all prices within a short period of time."
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-chuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 150).

The 3rd Plenum of the 14th CC in November 1993 decided that:

"Market pricing would be extended from goods markets (where, currently, some 90% of prices were set by market forces) to sectors such as labour, property and financial services
('Keesing 's Record of World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,735).

Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls

In November 1984, the State Economic Control Administration:

"Relaxed the foreign exchange controls for foreign enterprises and joint ventures in order to accelerate the introduction of foreign capital and advanced technology."
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 31; p. 33,926).

Exchange Rates

In January 1994, the People's Bank decided that in future:

"The official exchange value of the yuan was to be determined by its average market rate."
('Keesing 's Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 39,816).

Economic Growth

Following the 'economic reforms':

"Gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 10% per year in real terms in the 1980s",
(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David Wall & Wu Mingyuan: op. cit.; p. 11).

And in the 1990s:

"China has resumed rapid economic growth, recording doubled digit rates since 1992".
(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David Wall & Wu Mingyuan: ibid.; p. 11).

The Growth of Foreign Trade

As a result of the 'economic reforms', there was:

"a major expansion in China's exports."
(John Thoburn & Jude Howell: 'Trade and Development: The Political Economy of China's Open Policy', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; ; p. 177).

In fact:

**"In the period 1978-87, the share of foreign trade in China's gross total national product . . . increased from 10.25% to 29.7%",
(Lowell Dittmer (1989): op. cit; p 13).**

so that by 1992, China had become:

**"The 11th largest trading nation in the world".
(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in:
Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit. ; p. 239).**

The Growth of Private Enterprise

From 1978 onwards:

**"The non-state sector . . . expanded rapidly".
(Zhou Xiaosshuang (Chou Hsiao-shuang): 'Industry and the Urban
Economy', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 149).**

This:

**"Revival of small private businesses . . represented a major change of
policy".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,769).**

In August 1980, the 'New China News Agency' reported:

**"That the Bank of China had recently made its first loans to private
businesses since 1956; that the Peking municipality had decided to make
loans to small businesses . . . and that there were now over 900 family
businesses in 48 trades in Peking. Private shops also began to reopen in the
summer of 1980 in Shanghai".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives;', Volume 27; p. 30,769),**

In March 1984, figures released by the State Council showed:

**"That there had been widespread growth in 'controlled capitalism' or private
commerce. . .
Of the new businesses, 80 were privately owned: food stores and
restaurants in the private sector outnumbered state-run enterprises by two
to one, while there were as many privately owned retail stores as state-owned
ones. . . In 1983 the number of private enterprises more than doubled to 5.8
million . . . employing over 7.5 million people (compared with 3.2 million
the previous year.'
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 30; p. 32,981).**

Private enterprises:

**"Were granted formal legal status when the Chinese Constitution was
amended on April 12, 1988 and the 'Regulations on Private Enterprises'
were adopted on June 25, 1988. . . . An individually owned enterprise with**

more than eight employees by definition becomes a private enterprise. A private enterprise can be established in one of three legal forms: proprietorship, partnership or company with limited liability." (Dong Shizhong, Danian Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton R. Larson): op. cit.; p. 31).

By 1994:

"The state sector of the economy only produced a little over half of the output value of industrial production, compared to close on 80% in 1978". (David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.; p. 90).

Removal of Subsidies

To keep many of the ailing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) afloat:

"The central government has subsidised them, both directly and indirectly. . . The government dares not throw thousands of workers on to the streets by cutting off the subsidies". (Economist Intelligence Unit: 'Country Profile: China: 1995-96'; p. 15).

The subsidy programme has added to the growing central government budget deficit, the budget report in March 1991 revealing:

"A record deficit for 1990 of 15,000 million yuan." ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,096).

In May 1985:

"Food prices in Peking (the Chinese capital) rose dramatically when subsidies on many items were removed". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,721).

In 1991:

"As part of its bid to join the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), China eliminated export subsidies". ('China Business: The Portable Encyclopedia for doing Business with China'; op. cit.; p. 18).

The 'Financial Times' of 12 March 1991 reported that as:

"A first step towards removing food subsidies, a pilot project to replace state subsidised grain with a free market was to begin on April 1. . . Grain prices were expected to treble". ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,097).

Inflation

The chief engine:

"Of China's economic growth in the 1990s was the explosive expansion of

'new' consumer industries, e.g., colour television sets, refrigerators, washing machines",

(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-shuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 152).

and to establish and sustain:

"These 'new' industries . . demanded massive bank credit".

(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-shuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 152).

During 1984:

"bank loans rose by 29%".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,721).

and from mid-1986:

"Credits expanded at growth rates of 20-25% per annum, which greatly exceeded the growth of industrial production".

(K. K. Seo: 'Economic Reform and Foreign Direct Investment in China before and after the Tien An Men Square Tragedy', in: Lane Kelley & Oded Shenkar (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 116).

This process:

"Led in the final quarter of 1984 to a massive inflationary boost to the economy as enterprises took advantage of their new-found freedoms".

(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.; p. 103).

By July 1988, it had become clear:

"That China was heading for an inflationary crisis. Prices soared, goods were stockpiled and there was a run on the banks".

(David S. G. Goodman: *ibid.*; p. 107).

Thus, 'price reform':

"Has been, by and large, a euphemism for increasing prices."

(Economic Intelligence Unit: 'Country Profile: China: 1995-96'; p. 15).

In consequence, the 3rd Plenum of the 13th CC in September 1988 decided:

"To impose an austerity policy over the next two years".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 37,002).

based on an:

"Abrupt credit squeeze."

('China Business: The Portable Encyclopedia for doing Business with China'; op. cit.; p.23).

As a result, by September 1989:

**"Price increases fell to zero and inflation had been controlled".
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-shuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy'
in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 152).**

Stock Exchanges

Following the opening of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in December 1990, in July 1991:

**"China's second stock exchange officially opened in the Shen-chen Special Economic Zone."
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,340).**

The Social Results of the 'Reforms'

With the 'reforms', which amounted in reality to the establishment of an unplanned capitalist society, came the social evils traditionally associated with such a society:

**"Social concerns such as poverty, family breakdown, rural migrants, school drop-outs, unemployment, prostitution, drug addiction, juvenile delinquency, the care of abandoned children, the elderly, the physically disabled and the mentally ill have become more critical."
(Joe C. B. Leung: 'Social Welfare Reforms', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit. p. 217).**

**"Escalating inflation, unemployment, crime, corruption and social disintegration . . . wreaked added hardship on the populace, triggering popular discontent".
('Chinese Business: The Portable Encyclopedia for doing Business with China'; op. cit.; ; p 23).**

As early as 1978:

**"The Chinese press admitted for the first time the existence of an unemployment problem".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,768).**

In October 1979, the Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission:

**"Told visiting Japanese businessmen . . . that there were 10 million unemployed, but some unofficial estimates put the number as high as 20 million. . . Unemployment led to a sharp increase in legal and illegal immigration".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,768, 30,769).**

As early as July 1983, the Secretary of the Party's Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline stated:

"That economic crimes, including smuggling, tax evasion, illicit trading in foreign exchange, speculation, fraud, embezzlement and bribery, had reached an unprecedented level, and that, up to the end of April (1983-- Ed.) over 30,000 offenders had been sentenced and 8,500 expelled from the Party". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 29; p. 32,506).

In October 1989:

"The State Council ordered a probe into economic crime in government departments and state-run enterprises. .

The 'People's Daily' reported on Feb. 17, 1989 that 9,729 cases of corruption and 1,930 cases of bribe-taking had been uncovered in 1988".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 37,002).

In August 1993, an assessment published by the Ministry of Labour:

"Projected that official unemployment would rise to 4 million to 5 million by the end of the year, mainly because of cuts in the workforce of state companies (which would continue at higher levels in the coming decade). . . A Labour Ministry official projection for the year 2000 suggested an unemployed total of 68 million in the cities and 200 million in rural areas". ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 40,101).

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE : THE NEW COLONIAL-TYPE STATUS (summer 1980 - April 1996)

Introduction

AS HAS BEEN SAID, AFTER THE SUMMER OF 1978 THE MAJORITY OF THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHINESE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE ABANDONED THE AIM OF SEEKING TO ESTABLISH A NATIONALLY INDEPENDENT CAPITALISM, AND TRANSFORMED THEMSELVES INTO POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE.

The Fostering of Colonial-Type Dependence

With the adoption of the 'economic reforms', the pattern of a colonial-type economy dependent upon foreign imperialism was clearly evident in China. By 1980:

"The growth rate for light industry was 18.8%, and that of heavy industry only 1.9%".

(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-chiang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 148).

In May 1981, the chief economic adviser to the State Planning Commission told Japanese economists that:

"In the past three years the rate of growth of heavy industry had been slowed down. In 1979 growth rate had been 7.7% for heavy industry, 9.6% for light industry and 8.6% for agriculture, while in 1980 the rates had been 1.4% for heavy industry, 18.4% for light industry and 2.7% for agriculture". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,322).

Premier Chao Tzu-yang admitted to the National People's Congress in November 1981 that this meant that priority would be:

"Given to the development of consumer goods industries." ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,325).

and in his report to the 12th National Congress of the CPC in September 1982, General Secretary Hu Yao-pang confirmed emphasis:

"On light industrial development". (David W-w. Chang: 'China under Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping): Political and Economic Reform'; Basingstoke; 1988; p. 81).

In other words, development patterns shifted in 1979:

"To the use of foreign capital and technology for development of light manufacturing and service industries. The new policy recognised that light manufacturing and service industries could make better use of China's abundance of cheap labour while producing exportable goods capable of earning foreign currency".

(K. K. Seo: 'Economic Reform and Foreign Direct Investment in China before and after the Tien An Men Square Tragedy', in: Lane Kelley & Oded Shenkar (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 113).

In the 1990s, the government dismantled much of the mechanism designed to protect Chinese industry from the competition of more technologically advanced foreign industry.

For example, in 1992:

"The government abolished regulatory tariffs and reduced tariffs on a total of 3,596 import categories for an overall reduction in tariffs of 7.3%. The authorities have announced that a further reduction of 8.8% on 2,900 items will go into effect in 1994".

('China Business: The Portable Encyclopedia for doing Business with China'; op. cit.; p. 18).

In January 1994:

"China abolished quotas and import licences on 283 products and reduced tariffs on a further 234. The action was taken in accordance with the October

1992 market access agreement between the USA and China under which China had agreed to remove 75% of its non-tariff barriers within two years."

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 39,816).

In November 1995, the Chinese government:

"Unveiled a package of . . . tariff reductions and the elimination of quotas which was interpreted as an attempt to facilitate entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO)".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 42; p. R68).

Neutral Dependence upon Imperialism

HOWEVER, THE NEW POST-1980 DEPENDENCE OF CHINA UPON IMPERIALISM WAS NO LONGER A DEPENDENCE UPON A PARTICULAR IMPERIALIST POWER, BUT A NEUTRAL DEPENDENCE UPON IMPERIALISM IN GENERAL.

ITS FOREIGN POLICY THEREFORE INVOLVED THE REPUDIATION OF THE PREVIOUS FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PARTY GROUPING AROUND HUA KUO-FENG, WHICH HAD HELD THAT THAT SOVIET IMPERIALISM WAS CHINA'S MAIN ENEMY.

In the early 1980s:

"The PRC moved to lessen its extreme hostility toward the Soviet Union. Peking's verbal assaults on Moscow were curtailed; political relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union improved, and trade increased substantially".

('Encyclopedia Americana', Volume 6; Danbury (USA); 1992; p. 544d).

In March 1980:

"The first issue of a magazine entitled 'Soviet Literature' was published in Peking".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,561).

In April 1980, Peking:

"Made it clear . . . that it had abandoned its charge of revisionism against the Soviet Party (CPSU)".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,559).

and the 'People's Daily':

"Condemned . . . a series of nine articles attacking the Soviet Union which it had published between Sept. 6 1963 and July 14 1964".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,561).

Also in April 1980:

**"The street in Peking in which the Soviet Embassy stood, which at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution had been renamed 'Struggle against Revisionism Street', reverted to its original non-political name."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,561).**

During the first half of the 1980s, Teng Hsiao-ping mapped out:

**"A genuinely independent foreign policy."
(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.; p. 92).**

and the period from April 1984, in particular:

**"Was a time when China enjoyed good or steadily improving relations with both super-powers."
(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 235).**

On the other hand, the total value of Sino-US trade:

**"increased from \$1,100 million in 1978 to . . . \$5,500 million in 1981".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,623).**

and a US State Department spokesman said in June 1981:

**"That the Administration had decided to permit China to purchase additional US technology with potential military uses".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,620).**

In March 1982, Soviet President Leonid BREZHNEV*:

**"made an appeal for normalisation of relations",
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,562).**

with China. In 1982,

**"Ambassadorial talks between the two countries (China and the Soviet Union -- Ed.) resumed and . . . trade began to increase from 1984".
(Paul Wingrove: 'China and the Pacific Rim', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 251).**

In August 1982, a US communique stated that it had been agreed:

**"Gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 30; p. 32,736).**

At the 12th National Congress of the CPC in September 1982, Party Chairman Hu Yao-pang stated that China:

**"Never attaches itself to any big power or group of powers."
(Jonathan D. Pollack: 'The Opening to America', in: Roderick**

MacFarquahar & John K. Fairbanks (Eds.) (1991): op. cit.; p. 468).

and in October 1982, the 'New China News Agency' declared that:

"China is independent of all the superpowers".

(Harry Harding: 'China's Changing Roles in the Contemporary World', in: Harry Harding (Ed.): 'China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s'; New Haven (USA); 1984; p. 198).

Following a visit to China in September 1983 by US Defence Secretary Caspar WEINBERGER*:

**"Military cooperation between China and the USA developed significantly".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 30; p. 33,033).**

In December 1983, China:

"Joined the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA -- an agreement on the international textile trade under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade -- GATT".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,923).

The value of Sino-US trade in 1984:

"Increased from \$4,300 million in 1983 to a combined total of \$6,060 million".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,923).

In January 1984, Hu Yao-pang, General Secretary of the CPC, in a press interview:

**"Made a renewed appeal for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 30; p. 33,034).**

In April/May 1984, US President Ronald REAGAN*:

"Visited China, . . the first visit to China by a US president since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1979. During his visit four protocols were signed . . . and a pact on nuclear cooperation was initialled".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 30; p. 33,031).

During his visit, Hu Yao-pang reiterated to Reagan:

"China's commitment to an independent foreign policy".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 30; p. 33,031).

In June 1984, Chinese Defence Minister General CHANG Ai-ping* made a 15-day visit to the USA:

"The visit was given minimum publicity at General Chang's request, signalling China's concern about its image as a non-aligned power and its desire not to disturb relations with the Soviet Union."

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 30; p. 33,033).

During his visit, the US Defence Department:

"Announced that an 'agreement in principle' had been reached for the sale of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to China."

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 30; p. 33,033).

In June 1985:

"China, in effect, accepted the constraints on nuclear proliferation incorporated in the non-proliferation treaty. The Chinese assurances . . . were sufficient to satisfy the US Energy Department and State Department".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,923).

An associated agreement provided:

"For the sale of US nuclear reactors and related equipment to China".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,923).

In July 1985:

"A nuclear cooperation agreement . . . was . . . concluded during a visit to the USA by the Chinese President Mr. LI Hsien-nien*".

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,922).

In April 1986, US President Ronald Reagan notified Congress:

"That the sale of high-technology electronic aviation equipment worth \$550 million had been agreed with China."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 32; p. 34,674).

In October 1986, US Vice-President George BUSH* paid a six-day visit to China, during which he announced:

"That the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM -- a 15-nation organisation created in 1950 to supervise the export of Western technology to communist nations) had agreed to the easing of licensing controls on 27 categories of high-technology equipment with a potential military application."

('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 32; p. 34,674).

In November 1986, three ships of the US navy visited China for:

"a friendly port call".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 34; p. 35,965).

By 1988:

"China had joined . . . thirty-seven inter-governmental organisations,".

(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 236).

while:

**"Its participation in non-governmental organisations (NCOs) also rose dramatically . . . to 574 in 1988",
(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era' in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 236).**

while:

**"Peking also started to become involved with the UN's peacekeeping operation, sending PLA officers to join the UN's truce supervisory organisation and applying for membership of the UN's 'Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations'".
(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 236).**

In February 1989:

**"Edvard SHEVARDNADZE*, the Soviet Foreign Minister, visited China . . . for talks. . . . Agreement was reached on the holding of a Sino-Soviet summit, the first since 1959".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 35; p. 36,465).**

In May 1989:

**"Mikhail GORBACHEV*, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and . . . Soviet head of state, arrived in Peking . . . at the start of an official four-day visit for summitlevel talks with senior Chinese leaders.
His visit marked the formal normalisation of state and Party relations between China and the Soviet Union".
('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives', Volume 35; p. 36,641).**

In May 1991:

**"CHIANG Che-min*, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), paid a historic visit to the Soviet Union for talks with his Soviet counterpart, President Gorbachev".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,189).**

In the Gulf War of 1991, although:

**"China's power is maximised in the UN because of its veto."
(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 241).**

China:

"Voted for all ten UN resolutions that ordered military and economic sanctions against Iraq, and abstained on resolution 678 that permitted the

use of force to compel an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait."

(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 240).215

In January 1992, China and the USA signed an agreement:

"On the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR).. . .

China agreed to provide protection for US inventions and copyrighted works, including computer software, product patents, sound recordings and trade secrets."

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 38,722).

In November 1993, Russian Defence Minister Pavel GRACHEV* visited China, becoming:

"The first Russian Defence Minister to visit the country since the collapse of the Soviet Union".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,735).

In January 1994, the USA and China signed:

"A three-year textile agreement which effectively reduced China's access to the US market by some 13%.

The agreement followed months of negotiation over the problem of Chinese textiles exceeding their allotted quota of the US market by some \$2,000 million per annum."

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 39,816-17).

In May 1994, Russian Premier Viktor CHERNOMYRDIN*:

"made an official visit to China.. . . A number of agreements were signed covering trade, scientific technical and military cooperation, and border management. The two countries expressed their common desire to 'expand and strengthen' cooperation in all such areas

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 40,007).

In May 1994, US President Bill CLINTON* announced:

"His decision to renew the most-favoured-nation (MFN) status applying to China's relations with the USA since 1980. He also announced that he had abandoned his previous insistence on linking the issues of trade and human rights".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 40,007).

In September 1994, Chinese:

"President Chiang Tse-min visited Russia for talks with President Boris YELTSIN*".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 40,181).

In May 1995, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said that the visit to Russia of Chinese President Chiang Tse-min:

**"Signified that both countries were ready to proceed to partnership".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 41; p. 40,550).**

In June 1995, Chinese Premier LI Peng* visited Russia, delivering:

**"An invitation to Russian President Yeltsin to visit China."
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 41; p. 40,600).**

In November 1995, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum conference, President Chiang Tse-min announced:

**"The largest single trade liberalisation since the country began opening its markets in 1979. . . . The effect of the measures was expected to lower average tariffs from the current 35.9% to about 22%. . . Analysts interpreted the package as designed to accelerate the negotiations on China's application for membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 41; p. 40,825).**

In February 1996, the United States:

**"Lifted sanctions blocking the sale to China of telecommunications, satellites and subsequently approved the sale of two non-military satellites".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 42; p. 40,952).**

In February 1996, the Chinese government:

**"Reached agreement to manufacture Russian-designed jet fighter aircraft. . . Arms analysts described the development as highly significant".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 42; p. 40,952).**

In April 1996:

"During a visit to China . . . Russian President Boris Yeltsin celebrated with Chinese President Chiang Tse-min what he called 'a new strategic partnership' between the two countries, spanning economic and security ties and intended to last into the 21st century. . . . Yeltsin offered unequivocal support for China's claims on Taiwan and Tibet, while Chiang recognised Russia's position over Chechnya and described as 'impermissible' the eastward expansion of NATO". ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 42; p. 41,048).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --14

BREZHNEV, Leonid I., Soviet revisionist politician (1906-82); secretary, Dnepropetrovsk District Committee, CPSU (1939-41); major-general (1946);

1st Secretary, CP of Moldavia (1950-53); secretary, CC, CPSU (1952-60); deputy head, Chief Political Administration of the Armed Forces (1953-55); 1st Secretary, CP of Kazakhstan (1955-57); President, USSR (1960-64, 1977-82); 1st Secretary/General Secretary, CPSU (1964-82).

BUSH, George H. W., American oil executive and politician (1924-); US Ambassador to UN (1971-73); congressman (1967-71); chairman, Republican National Committee (1973-74); chief, US Liaison Office in Peking (1974-75); director, CIA (1975-76); Chairman, First National Bank, Houston (1976-79); Vice-President (1981-88); President (1989-93).

CHANG Ai-ping, Chinese revisionist military officer (1910-); chief of staff, East China Military Region (1948-54); commander, naval HQ, 3rd Field Army (1949-51); commander, Chekiang Military District (1952-53); member, National Defence Council (1954-67); lieutenant-general (1955); Deputy Chief of General Staff (1977-80); Deputy Premier (1980-82); Minister of National Defence (1982-88); State Councillor (1983-88); member, Central Military Commission (1983-88).

CHERNOMYRDIN, Viktor S., Soviet/Russian revisionist engineer and politician (1938-); director, oil processing plant, Orenburg (1973-78); Deputy Minister of Gas Industry (1982-85); Minister of Gas Industry (1985-89); chairman of board of directors, State Gas Consortium (1989-92); Premier, Russian Federation (1992-).

CHIANG Che-min, Chinese revisionist politician (1926-); commercial counsellor, Moscow (1950-55); assistant minister, Machine-building Industry (1956-59); Deputy Minister, State Administrative Commission for Import and Export Affairs (1980-82); general secretary, CPC (1980-); Deputy Minister, State Foreign Investment Commission (1981-82); Deputy Minister, Electronics Industry (1982-83); Minister, Electronics Industry (1983-85); mayor, Shanghai (1985-88); deputy secretary, CPC Shanghai (1985-87); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1987-); secretary, CPC Shanghai (1987-); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1987-); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1989-).

CLINTON, William J. ('Bill'), American lawyer and politician (1946-); lawyer, 1973-76); attorney-general (1977-79); state governor (1981-82); President (1993-).

GORBACHEV, Mikhail S., Soviet revisionist lawyer and politician (1931-); 1st secretary, CPSU, Stavropol (1970-78); member, Politburo, CC, CPSU (1980-91); general secretary, CPSU (1985-91); President, USSR (1990-91); awarded Nobel Peace Prize (1990).

GRACHEV, Pavel S., Soviet/Russian military officer (1948-); major-general

(1986); commander, Soviet airborne troops (1990-91); chairman, RSFSR State Committee of Defence (1990); Minister of Defence, Russian Federation (1992-); general of the army (1992).

JIANG Zemin Pinyin form of CHIANG Che-min.

LI Hsien-nien, Chinese revisionist politician (1909-); deputy commander, 2nd Field Army (1949); commander and political commissar, Hupei Military District (1949-50); member, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1949-54); secretary, Hupei Provincial CPC (1949-54); member, National Defence Council (1954-67); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1977-87); Minister of Finance (1954-75); Deputy Premier (1954-80); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1956-87); secretary, CPC (1958-69); deputy chairman, State Planning Commission (1962-67); deputy chairman, CPC (1977-82); Deputy Chairman, State Financial and Economic Commission (1959-81); President (1983-88).

LI Xiannian = Pinyin form of LI Hsien-nien.

LI Peng, Chinese revisionist politician (1928-); director, North-east China Electric Power Administration (1960-64); director, Peking Electric Power Administration (1966-80); Deputy Minister of Power Industry (198~81); Minister of Power Industry (1981-82); Deputy Minister, Water Conservancy and Power Industry (1982-83); Deputy Premier (1983-87); Chairman, State Environment Protection Committee (1984-87); Minister, State Education Commission (1985-88); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1985-); secretary, CC, CPC (1985-87); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1987); Acting Premier (1987-88); Premier (1988-); Minister, State Commission for Restructuring the Economy (1988-).

REAGAN, Ronald W., American actor, sports commentator and politician (1911); film actor (1937-64); president, Screen Actors' Guild (1947-52, 1959-60); state governor (1967-74); President (1981-89).

SHEVARDNADZE, Edvard A., Soviet/Georgian politician (1928-); 1st Deputy

Minister for the Protection of the Public, Soviet Georgia (1964-65); Minister for the Protection of the Public, Soviet Georgia (1965-); member, Politburo, CC, CPSU (1985-90); Foreign Minister, USSR (1985-91);

Foreign Minister, Georgia (1991-); President, Georgia (1991-).

WEINBERGER, Caspar W., American lawyer, publisher and politician (1917-); book reviewers, 'San Francisco Chronicle' (1959-68); chairman,

Federal Trade Commission (1970); Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget (1970-72); Director, Office of Management and Budget (1972-73); Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (1973-75); Secretary of Defence (1980-87).

YELTSIN, Boris N., Soviet revisionist/Russian politician (1931-); 1st secretary, Sverdlovsk CPSU (1976-85); 1st Secretary, Moscow City CPSU (1985-87); member, Politburo, CC, CPCU (1985-87); President, Russian Republic (1990-).

ZHANG Aiping = Pinyin form of CHANG Ai-ping.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE : THE NEW INNER-PARTY DIFFERENCES (spring 1980 - January 1996)

Introduction

AFTER THE OUSTING OF THE COMPRADOR GROUPING HEADED BY HUA KUO-FENG IN 1981 - AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE REMNANTS OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE INTO A COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE, A **NEW POLITICAL DIFFERENCE EMERGED WITHIN THE REVISIONIST COMMUNIST PARTY -- ONE BETWEEN '**RADICAL REFORMERS**' WHO WISHED TO INTRODUCE A FREE ENTERPRISE CAPITALIST SYSTEM IMMEDIATELY, AND '**CONSERVATIVE REFORMERS**' WHO WISHED TO RETAIN THE PSEUDO-SOCIALIST FACADE OF STATE CAPITALISM.**

To the first of these new groupings, (ie the 'Radical reformers'):

"Hu Yao-pang and Chao Tzu-yang belonged",
(John Thoburn & Jude Howell: 'Trade and Development: The Political Economy of China's Open Policy', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 171).

and had its principal strength in the student democracy movement.

The second of these new groupings (ie the Conservative Reformers') was headed by Teng Hsiao-ping who, in a speech to the Central Advisory Commission of the CPC in October 1984:

"Attempted to assuage the concerns of some 'old comrades' who 'fear that after they had fought all their lives for socialism, for communism, suddenly

capitalism is coming back'. Their fears, he said, were unwarranted; and the basic means of production would remain in the hands of the state". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,722).

This grouping took their stand on:

"Ideological aspects such as 'spiritual pollution'. They . . . were behind both the Spiritual Pollution Campaign of 1983 and the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalisation Campaign of 1987".

(John Thoburn & Jude Howell: 'Trade and Development: The Political Economy of China's Open Policy', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 171).

In the spring of 1980, 'conservative reformers' in the military:

"Got together with like-minded allies in the Party to launch an attack on the wave of reforms that were now approaching the cities. Their slogan:

'Promote proletarian ideology and eliminate bourgeois ideas."

(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op. cit.; p. 76).

[The Election of Chao Tzu-yang as Premier \(August 1980\)](#)

In August 1980, Chao Tzu-yang, one of the leaders of the radical reformist' grouping of the Party,

"Replaced Hua as Premier".

(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.; p. 97).

[The 12th National Congress of the CPC \(September 1982\)](#)

At the 12th National Congress of the CPC in September 1982, 'radical' reformers:

"Consolidated their hold on political power."

(Jonathan D. Pollack: 'The Opening to America, in: Roderick MacFarquahar & John K. Fairbank (Eds.) (1991): op. cit.; p. 461).

and Hu Yao-pang, one of the leaders of the 'radical reform' grouping:

"Was elected as General Secretary".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 28; p. 31,819).

of the Party.

[The Election of Li Hsien-nien as State President \(June 1983\)](#)

In June 1983, Li Hsien-nien:

"Was elected President of the Republic by the NPC . . . and General Ulanfu Vice-President. The office of President had been vacant since the removal of Mr. Liu Shao-chi from the post in 1968 and had been abolished by the 1975 Constitution, . . . but was restored by the new Constitution adopted in December 1982".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 29; p. 32,503).

The Fight Back of the 'Conservative Reformers' (June - July 1983)

In spite of the ascendancy of the 'radical reformist' grouping of the Party at the 12th National Congress of the CPC in September 1983, the fight back of the 'conservative reformists' was not without its successes.

In June 1983, the National People's Congress:

"Elected Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping chairman of the Central Military Commission".

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 29; p. 32,503).

and in July 1983,

""Selected Works of Teng Hsiao-ping' . . . was published . in an edition of 12.21 million copies."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 29; p. 32,505).

The Retirement of Teng Hsiao-ping (September 1985 - March 1990).

Nevertheless, as a result of advanced age and failing health, Teng Hsiao-ping:

"Retired from daily administration in September 1985, from the CPC Political Bureau at the 13th Congress of the CPC (in October 1987 -Ed.), and from his last formal (CPC -- Ed.) position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in November 1989".

(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.; p. 102).

Finally, at the National People's Congress in March 1990, Teng Hsiao-ping:

"Resigned from his last official post as Chairman of the State Central Military Commission (CMC), which he had held since 1983".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,318).

The Ousting of Hu Yao-pang (January 1987)

At the end of 1986:

"student street demonstrations for greater democracy erupted"

(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.; p. 106).

on the initiative of the 'radical reformist' grouping of the Party, headed by Hu Yao-pang and Chao Tzu-yang.

These demonstrations:

"Provided the opportunity and the excuse";

(David S. G. Goodman: ibid.; p. 106).

for the 'conservative reformers':

"To demand Hu Yao-pang's removal".

(David S. G. Goodman: *ibid.*; p. 106).

In January 1987, therefore, Hu Yao-pang:

"Was dismissed from his post as CPC general secretary for his liberal political views and for his failure to suppress the growing student democracy movement."

(Edwin P-w. Leung (Ed.): *op. cit.*; p. 166).

The 13th National Congress of the CPC (October 1987)

At the 13th National Congress of the CPC in October 1987, Prime Minister Chao Tzu-yang openly raised the question of 'radical reform' of the one-party political system, declaring that it was:

"High time to put political structural reform on the agenda of the whole Party".

(Chao Tzu-yang: Report of the CC to the 13th National Congress of the CPC (October 1987), in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 33; p. 35,577).

Nevertheless, the continuing influence of the 'conservative reformers' was demonstrated by the fact that the congress:

"Semi-formally recognised Teng as the 'paramount' leader".

(David S. G. Goodman: *op. cit.*; p. 107). and called for

"Struggle against bourgeois liberalism".

(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): *op. cit.*; p. 45).

The 1st Plenum of the 13th CC (November 1987)

At the 1st Plenum of the 13th CC of the CPC in November 1987, Chao Tzu-yang:

"Was formally elected as general secretary of the CPC",

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 33; p. 35,578).

and at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC later in the month, Chao announced:

"His intention to resign as Premier of the State Council . . . which he explained was a direct consequence of his election as general secretary of the CPC. . . Mr. Li Peng was appointed as his successor."

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 33; p. 35,578).

The Second Tien An Men Square Incident (May 1989)

The death of Hu Yao-pang in April 1989:

"Triggered weeks of massive protests",

(Edwin P-w. Leung (Ed.): *op. cit.*; p. 166).

On 4 May 1989:

"An estimated 50,000 students, watched and supported by large numbers of workers, marched from their campuses in Peking to Tien An Men Square, the city's centre."

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).

The demonstrations started:

"Following the death of former CPC general secretary Hu Yaopang, and were organised in support of increased democracy and in opposition to corruption and nepotism".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).

The student demonstrations were supported by the 'radical reformist' grouping, headed by Hu Yao-pang and Chao Tzu-yang, but opposed by the 'conservative reformist' grouping, headed by Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Peng.

The Party and government were:

"Divided into two sections: one generally supportive of the students' demands (led by Chao Tzu-yang, the CPC general secretary) and the other favouring a hard-line military response to the unrest (led, ostensibly, by the Premier Li Peng, but ultimately supported by the country's 'elder statesman' leader, Teng Hsiao-ping".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).

For example, Chao, in an address to the Asian Development Bank on 4 May demanded that:

"..'reasonable demands from students . . . should be met'..."

(Chao Tzu-yang: Address to the Asian Development Bank (May 1989), in: 'Keesing 's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).

while, in contrast, the 'People's Daily':

"Described the student demonstrations as 'a planned conspiracy'".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).

On 13 May 1989:

"students occupying Tien An Men Square began a hunger strike to dramatise their call for 'genuine dialogue' with the Chinese leadership. . . .

By May 14 at least 100,000 people, including a large number of teachers, had gathered in Tien An Men Square in support of the fasting students".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).

On 17 May 1989, Chao Tzu-yang:

"Issued a written statement describing as 'commendable' the students'

'patriotic spirit in calling for democracy and law, opposing corruption and promoting reform'.

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,641).

The Ousting and Arrest of Chao Tzu-yang (May - June 1989)

On 17 May 1989, the Politburo of the CC of the CPC:

"Voted to relieve Chao of his duties as CPC general secretary, appointing Li Peng in his place in an acting capacity. . . . The meeting also approved a decision taken by Teng to begin the movement of military units from the provinces to Peking. Teng's sole remaining official position was as Chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission."

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,641).

In addition, the grouping around Li and Teng placed Chao:

"Under virtual house arrest."

(Lowell Dittmer: 'The Tien An Men Square Massacre', in: 'Problems of Communism', Volume 38, No. 5 (September/October 1989); (hereafter listed as 'Lowell Dittmer (1989)'); p. 11).

On 20 May 1989,

"Over 1 million people, including large organised groups of workers and government officials, demonstrated".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,641).

And:

"Substantial numbers of Army units were deployed around Peking".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).

At midnight:

"Li Peng declared martial law in a nationally televised speech. . . Chao's conspicuous absence from the group of five on the stage. . . made the split in the leadership public".

(Lowell Dittmer (1989): op. cit.; p. 11).

After the news of the imposition of martial law had been broadcast:

"Large numbers of Peking residents converged on six or more points around the capital, successfully halting the progress of the troop convoy towards Tien An Men Square. . Citizens' barricades against the troops were quickly erected".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,641).

On the night of 3-4 June 1989, the PLA used:

"Overwhelming firepower to clear the streets, killing at least several

hundred civilians in and around Tien An Men. . . . The number of officially reported arrests as of early July 1989 exceeded 2,500; unofficial estimates put the figure at more than 10,000".
(Lowell Dittmer (1989): op. cit.; p. 12).

The second Tien An Men Square Incident of June 1989 was the reason given for action:

"To remove Chao Tzu-yang from his post as General Secretary".
(Tony Saich: 'The Rise and Fall of the Beijing (Peking) People's Movement', in: Jonathan Unger (Ed.): 'The Pro-Democracy Protests in China: Reports from the Provinces'; New York; 1991; p. 25).

and at the Standing Committee of the NPC later in the month:

"Teng Hsiao-ping personally moved to dismiss Chao Tzu-yang from his last remaining governmental position, that of Vice-Chairman of the state Central Military Commission."
(Lowell Dittmer (1989): op. cit.; p. 13).

July 1989 saw:

"Increasingly virulent attacks on the disgraced former CPC general secretary Chao Tzu-yang and his . . . supporters."
('Keesing '5 Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,815).

and in June 1991 it was officially stated that Chao:

"had been held under house arrest since his dismissal in June 1989".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,290).

The 9th Plenum of the 13th CC in October 1992 held that Chao Tzu-yang:

"Had supported the 1989 'turmoil' (the pro-democracy Tien An Men demonstrations) and had split the Party".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,127).

The 14th National Congress of the CPC (October 1992)

The 14th National Congress of the CPC in October 1992 was:

"a triumph".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,126).

for the 'conservative reformers', headed by Teng Hsiao-ping,

"Both in terms of policies adopted and of personnel appointed".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,126).

and the report to the congress of CPC general secretary Chiang Tse-min was:

"a recapitulation and celebration of Teng's economic reform line".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,126).

Chiang Tse-min as Paramount Leader (March 1993 - April 1995)

In October 1989, Chiang Tse-min, a prominent leader of the 'conservative reformist' grouping of the Party,

"Took over Teng Hsiao-ping 's chairmanship of the Communist Party's Military Commission; six months later he inherited the same post in the parallel State Commission."

(Simon Long: 'Leadership Politics since 1989', in: Robert Benedick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 54).

In March 1993, Chiang Tse-min:

"Was elected as state President by the NPC. . . Chiang's election as President appeared designed to bolster his authority as the chosen successor of paramount leader Teng Hsiao-ping".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,365-66).

The communique of the 4th Plenum of the 14th CC of the CPC in September 1994:

"Emphasised the position of President Chiang Tse-min, the CPC general secretary, as the 'core' of China's third generation leadership".

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 40,181).

Thus, by April 1995 Prime Minister Li Peng could officially state that:

"The core of political leadership has already been transferred from Teng Hsiao-ping, the second generation leader, to President Chiang Tse-min, who represents the third generation of Chinese leadership."

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 41; p. 40,500).

Repressive Measures (June 1992 - January 1996)

In an effort to maintain for as long as possible the pseudo-socialist facade of state capitalism against the efforts of the 'radical reformist' grouping of the Party to replace it by multi-party free enterprise capitalism, in the 1990s the dominant 'conservative reformist' Party grouping instituted a series of repressive measures.

In June 1992:

"The authorities published the text of new regulations which tightened restrictions on demonstrations. . In addition to making it more difficult to organise a legal protest, the regulations gave the authorities the right to use 'all police measures to suppress illegal demonstrations."

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 38,960-61).

In October 1993, a new law:

**"Placed tight restrictions on the manufacture, import, sale and installation of satellite dishes, all of which would be subject to strict licensing".
('Keesing's Record of World Events'. Volume 39; p. 39,688).**

In May 1994:

"The already extensive powers of the police to detain and restrict dissidents were broadened".

('Keesing's Record of World Events1. Volume 40; p. 40,007).

In December 1995, draft legislation was submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress:

"Designed to give the government the power to impose martial law."

('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 41; p. 40,865).

In January 1996, the State Council:

"Invested the official news agency 'Hsinhua' with exclusive authority to oversee the dissemination of all business and economic information. The decision was interpreted by Western business analysts as an effort by sections of the government to exert greater control over proliferating electronic information services, including the Internet".

('Keesing's Record of World Events'. Volume 42; p. 40,903).

CONCLUSION

UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF MAO TSE-TUNG AND HIS SUCCESSORS, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA PURSUED NOT MARXIST-LENINIST, BUT REVISIONIST POLICIES WHICH SERVED THE INTERESTS OF SECTIONS OF THE CHINESE BOURGEOISIE.

SUCH REVISIONIST POLICIES COULD NOT BRING ABOUT A SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN CHINA, SO THAT THE 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS' WHICH CAME INTO EXISTENCE IN CHINA WAS MERELY A VARIETY OF CAPITALISM CARRYING ALL THE SOCIAL EVILS INEVITABLY ASSOCIATED WITH CAPITALISM.

THERE IS NO WAY FORWARD FOR THE WORKING PEOPLE OF CHINA EXCEPT TO REPUDIATE REVISIONISM AND TO RE-FORM A GENUINE MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY WHICH -- IN SOLIDARITY WITH MARXIST-LENINIST PARTIES AND ORGANISATIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES -- CAN LEAD THEM TO GENUINE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.

THERE IS NO WAY FORWARD FOR THOSE WHO REGARD THEMSELVES AS MARXIST-LENINISTS EXCEPT TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE THAT POLITICAL POLICIES MUST BE BASED UPON FACTS, NOT UPON WISHFUL THINKING.

FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ON THE BASIS OF SCIENTIFIC MARXISM-LENINISM!

FOR THE EXPOSURE OF ALL BRANDS OF REVISIONISM -- WHICH CAN ONLY DECEIVE AND MISLEAD WORKING PEOPLE AND SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THEIR ENEMIES!

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