THE TRUTH ABOUT HUNGARY
The Truth About Hungary

by Herbert Aptheker
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Away with themes of War, away with War itself!
Hence from my shuddering sight, to never more return,
that show of blacken'd, mutilated corpses!
That hell unpent, and raid of blood—fit for wild tigers,
or for lop-tongued wolves—not reasoning men!

—WALT WHITMAN (1871)

Author's Foreword

In the preparation of this volume the author has had the generous assistance of many friends. He finds it painful that, under present circumstances in the U.S., it is not wise to name each of the many who were helpful and to whom a great debt of gratitude is due. The assistance of some Hungarian friends, in particular, was indispensable. It is possible for him, however, to thank most warmly the following individuals for their suggestions, and for calling to his attention many particular items he might otherwise have missed: Art Shields, William Weinstone, Holland Roberts, Milton Howard, Aurelia Johnson, Amy Shechter, Emanuel Blum, Charles Humboldt, Sidney Finkelstein, Nemmy Sparks, Robert W. Dunn, William Allan. In the body of the text itself acknowledgement will be found, of course, to the works of many individuals throughout the world, which were basic sources for this book.

The author is pleased to thank especially Jessica Smith for her most generous aid. Herself the author of a penetrating estimate of the Hungarian events—written while they were still occurring—Miss Smith also made available to me a splendid collection of clippings dealing with the subject.

In this work, as in everything the author has undertaken, the criticisms and suggestions of his wife have been invaluable. It is a joy for him, too, to acknowledge the help offered by his daughter.

No one except the author, is responsible for any failings that may mar the volume. The views expressed may or may not coincide with those of the people named above; in any case, of course, the responsibility for them falls upon the author alone.

March, 1957.
1. Introduction

Shelley wrote: “Everybody saying a thing does not make it right.” Of course, it does not make it wrong, either; but it is the poet's thought which merits emphasis, and is comforting to a dissenter.

One of the hazards of inquiry was indicated in Kierkegaard's remark that, “Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards”—which helps explain, no doubt, the terrific amount of staggering that makes up so much of living. One might add to the philosopher's comment, also, that, generally speaking, the further back one goes—the longer the perspective—the better the understanding.

Even with a fairly good time-perspective, however, evaluations of identical events often differ very sharply. Indicative is the fact that a young professor has recently produced a stout volume devoted to elucidating the opinions of American scholars as to the causes of their own country's Civil War. His work shows that the opinions are nearly as distinct one from the other as are the scholars themselves.

This being the result in regard to a major event occurring nine decades ago, and in one's own country, and concerning which government archives are fully accessible and published studies very abundant, one trained in the field of history, such as the present writer, would naturally be very hesitant to attempt an evaluation of something so recent in time, and distant in space, as the Hungarian upheaval of the Fall of 1956.

Nevertheless, that is the attempt made in the following pages. It is made though the author comprehends the extreme difficulty of achieving anything like a sound result on such a subject. It is attempted though the author knows, and reminds the reader, that Thomas Henry Huxley asked: “If a little knowledge is

dangerous, where is the man who is out of danger?” The author knows that if there be such a one, it is not he.

Still the attempt is made—the reader having been forewarned—because the author had to try to understand that upheaval, is bold enough to feel that he has gained some kind of a reasonable picture of the event, and desires to put that picture to the finality of print and the ordeal of careful scrutiny.

* * *

One may begin with typical expressions of widely-held American opinion concerning the Hungarian events. We cull these not from the big-chain press, or from such newspapers as the New York Times or Herald Tribune, themselves multi-million dollar corporations, well-known as dedicated partisans of capitalism, but rather from three very much smaller liberal, or Left or socialist-oriented journals.

The New Republic, in an editorial entitled “Myth With Nine Lives” (Nov. 26, 1956), finds that the “myth” that Communism was somehow to be preferred over Capitalism, has finally and at last been destroyed by the events in Hungary: “It is this myth that the Russian tanks crushed as they lurched into Budapest.” The American Socialist editors (Jan. 1957) see “Russian butchery in Hungary”; they find that the idea of a serious threat of the restoration of fascism in Hungary early in November, 1956 “is a slanderous fable.” They “reject the fabrications about a fascist counter-revolution” and insist that “the real trend of the Hungarian revolution was not toward fascism, or capitalism, or feudal landlordism, but to get the Russian troops out, to get Hungary out of the Warsaw bloc and neutralize the country.”

Paul M. Sweezy, in the Monthly Review (December, 1956) writes:

An uprising of classic form and proportions took place in Hungary. It was drowned in blood by the Soviet army. These are simple facts which no amount of arguing and no conceivable new evidence can change.

This opinion is dated November 12, and while it asserts that “no amount of arguing and no conceivable new evidence” could alter it, nevertheless the writer added a postscript—presumably a few days later—stating: “In the interval between writing and going to press, a great deal of new material on Hungary has appeared. It tends to prove that by November 4th the forces of extreme reaction were definitely getting the upper hand.”

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One must assume that since “extreme reaction” was getting the upper hand, this might throw askew the estimate of the event as “an uprising of classic form.” On the other hand, that so astute and socialist-minded an observer as Dr. Sweezy should view an event, at any time, as a classical revolution, would lead one to believe that even if this first estimate should be wrong, still the event was hardly likely to be a classical counter-revolution. One cannot be sure just what is Dr. Sweezy's opinion; but certainly his view as expressed on November 12 is the overwhelmingly dominant one in the United States.

One must add that it is not a unanimous opinion in the United States for many (probably most) Communists disagree, and some non-Communists also have serious doubts that the dominant view is valid. Dissidents may draw encouragement from the fact that the dean of American scholars, Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois, is with them. He finds that the fundamental feature of the Hungarian outbreak, as it developed, “was not against the failure of socialism, but against socialism itself, with the help of former Hungarian capitalists and landholders now gathering in Austria, together with the great capitalist and colonial interests in America and the West.” (The American Socialist, Jan. 1957, pp. 8-9.)

It is significant, also, that in Western Europe, where political maturity is greater, where fascism is better understood and carries more bitter memories, and where a deeper comprehension of the realities of Hungarian history and life is more widespread, the estimates offered by the prototypes of the New Republic and the Monthly Review and the American Socialist are quite different.

Thus in West Germany, the organ of the Social-Democratic Party, Vora waerts, editorialized (Nov. 11, 1956) that the downfall of Nagy had come about because he pursued a policy of continually granting concessions in order “to appease the insurgent movement.” This, says the Social-Democratic paper, “was bound to fail because the insurgents were being excited to extremism under the influence of reactionary and fascist elements which had come to the surface.”

Two weeks later, Herbert Wehner, a member of the Central Board of the West German Social-Democratic Party, reported in Hamburg to Party leaders on the world situation: Wehner was at pains to point out that a veritable White Terror had appeared in Hungary in the last days of October, 1956, so that “a sort of
fear of destruction against everybody believed to be members or officials of the Communist Party" developed and that "not only they, but also their wives and children were being persecuted and killed in indescribably brutal ways."**

Wehner felt the restoration of clerical-fascism was a real danger, and referred to Cardinal Mindszenty as having "found nothing better to do than to call for a return of land to the landowners, and the restoration of the property of the Catholic Church"; but his greatest worry was that the Hungarian events had invigorated the Cold War. The main problem, as he saw things, was:

How can a way be found out of this crisis except by political means? Must there be shooting? It is now clear that the loudmouthed radio promises to help Hungary, parachute troops and so on, sent out from West Germany, but not only from here, were absolutely worthless.

*Le Peuple*, organ of the Socialist Party of Belgium, as early as November 1, 1956, denounced "certain personages of small scruples" who, it said, were threatening to throw Hungary (and Poland) "back into the darkness of the past, and to return to views which menace the system of socialism." Especially, once again, the Socialist editor shuddered at those who rejoiced: "War goes on." There was "an easy lyricism" in those words, "but shield us from those who, under pretext of liberation, wish to plunge Europe and the world into a new blood bath."

*Avanti*, organ of the Italian Socialist Party, quoted the assistant General Secretary of that Party, in its issue of November 3, 1956, as disturbed because "the spirit of reaction haunts Hungary." He was troubled because clerical-fascists "intend to turn the country back and annul all reforms." These people do not want "the building of socialism on the basis of democracy and freedom, which is what we socialists want, but the destruction of socialism and the triumph of relentless reaction. That is why," concluded the Italian socialist leader, "we stand by our Communist comrades in Hungary, the victims of unbridled reaction."

In Italy, the spirit of the remarks of the Socialists no doubt reflects the appreciation there of the vital need for working-class and progressive unity. This was made explicit by Silvano Armaroli, secretary of the Bolognese Federation of the Socialist

**Extensive excerpts from this speech are printed in the Democratic German Report (Berlin, December 7, 1956, pp. 205-206).**

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Party, in a speech of greetings he delivered at a Bologna convention of the Communist Party. Speaking there, November 17, 1956, Armaroli said:

Our salute is not merely formal, but derives from the consciousness of the common responsibility which Communists and Socialists have in defense of the workers... It is when opinions diverge that we must make the greatest effort to preserve the essential values of the unity of the working class in all its organizations...

When we affirm this unity, disruptive voices are raised, saying they cannot understand. It is clear why not. But we Communists and Socialists speak the language of the workers; we criticize from within, in order to go forward, to break down what is dividing us... The things that happened in Hungary have revived a new attempt at religious conflict and manifestations of hooliganism. We condemn both. Democratic policy in Italy demands the united strength of the workers. This is achieved by carrying on polemics; it is not gained by splitting... (L'Unita, Rome, Nov. 18, 1956).

Again, the French socialist paper, Populaire, on November 2, stated: "The danger in Hungary is the revival of Horthyism"; and even the British *New Statesman and Nation*, in an editorial appearing as early as October 27, declared that while the movement in Poland "is neither counter-revolutionary nor anti-Soviet," the situation in Hungary seemed "to present a very different picture"; that there "the regime has for the present lost control" and that "it was, in fact, to repress a threatened counter-revolution that the Red Army went into action in Hungary."

So do the commentators of the United States and of Western Europe differ. Sir Walter Raleigh, faced with conflicting reports concerning a contemporaneous event decided, therefore, to abandon his project of writing a truthful history of ancient Rome as completely impossible. This writer, much less wise than Sir Walter, will not follow his example. Rather, we turn now to an effort to comprehend the Hungarian events of October-November, 1956.
II. Special Features of Hungary's Development

Hungary, as part of Central and Eastern Europe, shares in certain historical experiences and institutional forms common to most of her neighbors. She is a land which, until 1945, had a basically clerical-feudal social form. She was monarchical, aristocratic, oligarchic, agrarian; she had been dominated through most of the thousand years of her recorded history by one or another alien power—the Mongols, Turkey, Russia, Austria, Germany. The Reformation touched Hungary, and especially in its eastern sections made a deep impression, but on the nation as a whole, its impact was not great. Similarly, the bourgeois-democratic revolution reached heroic levels, particularly in 1848-49, but here, too, fell short and did not penetrate within the life of the country. Her politics were controlled exclusively by a minute elite; her foreign policy—usually under Hapsburg influence—was bound to interests other than national.

Hungary's nationalism was tied, quite consciously, to political reaction; her Catholicism served to sanctify both the nationalism and the reaction.

After World War I, Hungary in common with, though preceding, her neighbors (with the exception of Czechoslovakia), adopted a fascist-dictatorial political form and maintained this, unchanged—except for increasing Nazi influence—for twenty-five years.

The specific features of Hungarian development are of particular relevance, of course, to any effort to understand the recent upheaval.

One finds, first, in Hungary, a non-Slavic people surrounded by Slavic neighbors. This served to expedite an alignment of Hungary with Western dominant powers, particularly Austria and Germany; it served, also, to help keep Hungary out of the French-created Little Entente, and thus, again, to direct Hungary into the Germanic sphere. At the same time, Hungary's clerico-

feudalist-fascist character kept her a prime member of imperialism's cordon sanitaire surrounding the Soviet Union. In Hungary's case, however, this membership had a special quality in that Magyar hostility to the Slav, and especially to Russia, the major Slavic power, added a nationalistic and deep-seated fervor. Also, in the case of Hungary, her nationalism contained intense chauvinistic and aggressive features, for Magyar expansionism fell easily into line with German imperialism. Both sought to set themselves upon their Slavic neighbors, and Hungary, as a "natural" helpmate of German ("our best ally," was Hitler's characterization of Hungary), served as a particular source of exasperation and war danger in the always nervous Balkans.

This alignment had a logic of its own. Thus, while German defeat in World War I brought her the Treaty of Versailles, Hungarian defeat in the same effort brought her the Treaty of Trianon (1920). This reduced Hungary to about 35,000 square miles—that is, 30% of her pre-Treaty size—and to about 8 million inhabitants—that is, about 35% of her pre-Treaty population. The result, given post-war reactionary domination, was an Hungarian foreign policy geared to the slogan, "No, No, Never!" meaning a refusal to acquiesce in the Trianon settlement and a determination to regain former possessions. This, in turn, helped cement relations between Hitler and Horthy and helped assure that one of the main outcomes of the Munich and post-Munich settlements, in 1938-39, was the award of large slices of neighbors' lands to Hungary. The pay-off was Hungary's early and full-scale association with Hitler in the Second World War.

Competent observers and historians are unanimous in noting the extreme chauvinism that characterized Hungarian politics and thought, especially from 1918 to 1945. Typical is this paragraph from John Gunther's well-known Inside Europe (N. Y., 1936, p. 324):

In Hungary is the strongest, the most pervasive nationalism in Europe. In the chauvinism sweepstakes the Hungarians beat even the Poles.

Other commentators, as the Englishman, James D. Evans (That Blue Danube, London, 1935, p. 127), refer to nationalism in Hungary as "a veritable obsession"; again, Leigh White, for several years European correspondent for the Overseas News Agency and the New York Post, wrote that "the Magyar curse is
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chaunism...it is simply a dementia" (The Long Balkan Night, N. Y., 1944, p. 15).

As Hungary stands out as the most nationalistic and chauvinistic of nations in an environment of chauvinist neighbors, so is her system of land concentration, prior to 1945, extraordinary in a region where such concentration was normally quite notable. In this connection, it is important to note that just as Hungarian foreign policy depended upon German support, so her system of abnormal land concentration required, for its maintenance, German support. The direction of Hungary's foreign policy and the semi-feudal structure of her social order were, in fact, as the Hungarian scholar, G. Paloczy-Horvath, has written (In Darkest Hungary, London, 1944, p. 7) "indissolubly linked. For," he continued, "without the help of the Germans it would have been impossible for Hungary's lords to maintain their anachronistic rule in modern times." By the same token, it was the crushing of the Germans (and the Hungarian lords) by the Red Army that made possible—indeed, inevitable—the smashing of the latifundia system and the Land Reform law of 1945—of which more later.

The special dimension of land concentration in Hungary finds unanimous agreement again among all analysts. Thus, Oscar Jaszi, a leading Hungarian scholar and a member, after World War I, of the cabinet of the first Republican government of Michael Karolyi, stated: "There is no country in Europe with so unhealthy a land system" (Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary, London, 1924, p. 190); Emil Lengyel, in his study of central Europe (The Danube, N. Y., 1939, p. 225) declared: "Today Hungary is the classical land of large estates"; Elizabeth Wiskemann, a leading English authority, stated that, after the First World War, "In Hungary the distribution of land remained, judged by twentieth century criteria, the most unjust in central Europe" (in R. R. Betts, ed., Central and South East Europe, London, 1950, p. 98); Ilyona Polanyi's estimate may stand as an authoritative summation of this feature of Hungarian development:

Among East European countries, Hungary was the worst instance of the system of giant landed estates and their complement, a vast agricultural proletariat, living below subsistence level. This state of affairs was preserved unimpaired up to 1945. (World Affairs, a magazine published by the London Institute of World Affairs, April, 1949, p. 134.)

Special Features of Development

In pre-1945 Hungary, some 2,000 land magnates owned 50% of the arable acreage in the country; an additional 6% of the total, or some 1,200,000 acres, was owned by the Roman Catholic Church, the largest single landowner in the nation. Hungary had about 1,900,000 landholding units, which meant that about one-tenth of one percent of the landholding units possessed 56% of the land and 99.9% were required to share the remaining 44% of the soil.

The great land-holding families were the Esterhazys, Andrassy, Karolyis, Czehonits, Telekis, Hunyadis and Szaparys—having named these and included their more or less immediate relatives (and the magnates married only amongst themselves) and added the Roman Catholic Church, one has a listing of the actual physical possessors of more than half pre-1945 Hungary. Characteristic was Prince Paul Esterhazy who personally owned 270,000 acres in Hungary, and 170,000 acres in Austria and Bavaria, a veritable state within states. It is worth adding that major portions of the magnates' land were held in feudal tenure, with the medieval laws of entail—only the eldest son could inherit the land—in full sway.

The result was that pre-1945 Hungary contained 500,000 landless peasant families, i.e., about 2,000,000 agrarian peoples who owned no land whatsoever; and an additional 300,000 families who possessed what were called dwarf holdings, that is, such a small quantity of land that they were practically landless, i.e., about 1,500,000 agrarian peoples whose landholdings were minute and far below the minimum needed for a living. Thus, about 35% of the total population of old Hungary "remained," as Elizabeth Wiskemann wrote, "dependent upon the land, yet to all intents and purposes landless."

Certain of the social and economic results of this system are aptly summarized by Howard K. Smith:

This vast agricultural proletariat eked out an existence by doing day labor for the magnates for a few pennies, or sharecropping for a negative income of debt. With so large a force of...

According to Rustem Vambery, a leading democratic Hungarian intellectual: “Early in 1944 a member of the Hungarian Upper Chamber declared that 70% of the population were practically starving” (Hungary: To Be or Not To Be, N.Y., 1946, p. 22).

The authority of this tightly-knit nobility, with its millions of acres, over the lives of their millions of serfs was complete and absolute. As Jasi, again, put it (The Nation, June 15, 1928, p. 331), “the greater part of the agricultural population is still kept in servitude and is compelled to toil for a starvation wage on the latifundia of petty kings.” In the counties, the autonomous political and taxing power of the nobility was decisive and had existed for over five centuries. Until the end of World War I, the hereditary aristocracy paid no taxes; thereafter the main burden of taxes was legally placed upon the peasantry and the city populace. Until after World War I, the peasantry did not vote and seats in the Upper Chamber—called the House of Magnates—went with one’s title (or Church office), while those in the Lower House were openly bought, for all the world like the House of Commons in the early days of George III; thereafter the peasantry were permitted to vote, but openly, not secretly, and this simply registered the political overlordship of the magnates.

In a personal sense, in every-day relationships and in the decisive terms of actual living, the aristocrats’ power was as direct and complete as it had been in the heyday of feudalism. Michael Karolyi, scion of one of the great Hungarian families and leader after World War I of the First Republic, brings this vividly before the reader in his posthumously published autobiography (Memoirs of Michael Karolyi, N.Y., 1956). “To beat a servant,” he writes, “was quite usual. They would never dare to complain to the authorities.” He tells of hunting parties at one of the estates of an uncle. There, “the guests were supplied not only with wags but also with women. Peasant girls from the village were ordered in for the night by the superintendent.”

Industries were exceedingly few in pre-1945 Hungary. The major companies controlling what industry there was—as coal and bauxite mining, communications, some oil drilling, some steel and textile manufacturing—were to a considerable extent foreign owned or dominated; British, Dutch, German, French, American capital were especially heavily represented. The bank-
ing system of Hungary also had heavy foreign, particularly Anglo-American, representation.

Enlightened labor laws were absent; there was no social welfare or security program; no public relief system; no unemployment insurance. Unions were forbidden until the first decade of the 20th century; thereafter, following a brief spurt ahead under Socialist inspiration just before World War I, they were legally circumscribed from 1920 on. Throughout the Horthy era, no more than 100,000 were enrolled in these trade unions, whose existence was allowed by the Fascist regime.

In all of this there was nothing very unique, so far as central and eastern Europe was concerned. But there were some particular circumstances in Hungary, in relation to the trade-union or labor movements, of great consequence in understanding that country’s post-1944 development.

One of these was the effort to establish a proletarian dictatorship, headed by Bela Kun, and the manner in which this was suppressed—this will be considered at another point. Related to that suppression and the subsequent relative stability of the Horthy-fascist regime, which lasted 24 years, was the behavior of the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party. That behavior, on the official level, amounted to shameless betrayal of the cause of Socialism and of democracy and to complete subservience to the needs of capitalism and fascist dictatorship.

With the end of the First World War, and with the workers of Europe, in the first place those of Russia and then those of Germany, Hungary and Finland, rebelling against capitalism and themselves turning to an effort to assume state power and to establish Socialism—the statesmen of the Western world, from Wilson to Hoover to Churchill to Clemenceau, turned their attention first of all to the task, as Churchill delicately put it, of “smothering the infant in the cradle” and simultaneously upholding capitalism.

In each of the smaller states of Europe, all of which were economically, politically and diplomatically dominated by the Western Powers, arose domestic statesmen to carry out this policy—Mannerheim, Pilsudski, Horthy, etc.

In Hungary, after the White Terror of Horthy, the Prime Minister under his Regency in the early 1920’s was Count Stephen Bethlen. This man grasped the issue with extreme clarity. Said he to Michael Karolyi, as the War ended: “There is but one vital question now, all the rest is secondary and that is, how to save private property.” Later, as Prime Minister, he said in Parliament: “In this State, private property is sacred.”

In the privation following the War, in the contagion of the Bolshevik revolution, and in terms of Bethlen’s “one vital question,” it was, as Karolyi tells us: “The Social Democrats [who] held the trumps . . . they could stop the 'Jacqueries,' save the landlords, the factory owners, the bank directors. Paradoxically it was the Social Democrats who were the only safeguard of private property.”

While in all Europe, Social Democracy played this role, nowhere did the Social-Democratic Party so openly and officially undertake to do so as in Hungary. The undertaking was, indeed, entered into in writing and almost in terms of a treaty between a superior and a subordinate power.

In Budapest, on December 22, 1921, an agreement was signed by the Prime Minister and four Cabinet Members, on behalf of the Horthy Regency, and by five leaders of the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party—Messrs. Peyer, Farkas, Miakits, Popper and Bencs. Here:

The delegates of the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party declare that they agree to the wishes expressed by the Prime Minister, both with regard to foreign and home policy, and give assurance of fulfillment on their part.

They agreed “not only to abstain from all propaganda injurious to the interests of Hungary, but on the contrary will carry on an active propaganda on behalf of Hungary.”* For the rest we may turn to the accurate summarization offered by Professor C.A. Macartney, the very conservative and outstanding English authority on Hungarian history (Hungary, London, 1934, p. 264):

The terms are believed to amount to the following: It was noted that large open-air meetings were prohibited, and the unions of the State officials, railways, and postal workers, which had been dissolved, could not be revived. The Social-Democrats agreed not to make anti-Hungarian propaganda abroad, to dissipate false (1) rumours of terrorization current among foreign Socialists, and to adopt the “national” internal policy, they agreed to collaborate on economic policy with the national parties, to abstain from political strikes, and to refer wage disputes to arbitration. They would break with the revolutionary parties. They agreed not to

*The text is in The Labour Monthly (London) April, 1925, VII, pp. 242-44.
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extend their agitation to the agricultural labourers, although they did not agree that the existing Union of Agricultural Labourers cease its activities. They would also confine their agitation among the miners within such limits as not to endanger the continuity and measure of production.

In return the Government agreed to arrest and intern none but "terrorists, Communist agitators, and other dangerous persons" and to amnesty all political prisoners convicted between October 31, 1918 and March 21, 1919—that is, the period of the Karolyi government, so that prisoners held as a result of the White Terror after the summer of 1919 and to the date of the agreement were in no way benefitted.

This agreement became more or less public knowledge three years after it was made. Thereupon, an investigating committee was appointed by the Second International (including Karl Kautsky and Otto Bauer), but its majority report urged the maintenance of unity in the Party involved, though, it added, "one can understand that the conclusion of a Pact so thoroughly in contradiction in its contents and its form to all the traditions of the international labour movement would cause opposition in the Party."

The leadership which consummated this agreement continued in office throughout the Horthy era—thus Peyer, in the summer of 1941, was Chairman of the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party and General Secretary of the government-recognized Hungarian Trade Union Federation. This leadership also won the stipulation from the Horthy government that it would be permitted a certain number of seats, as the Loyal Opposition, in the Parliament. The gentlemen already named were long-time officeholders under such conditions, as was Anna Kethly, who sat in the Hungarian Parliament from 1920 until the closing months of World War II.

Invariably, also, Hungarian foreign delegations, as those appearing at the League of Nations, were made up largely of Social-Democratic leaders, men such as the ubiquitous Peyer, or Pidl or Garami. In the struggles of the workers within Hungary, especially during the terrible depression years, the function of the Social-Democratic Party is indicated in this headline in the New York Times, of September 2, 1930: "Reds Lead Jobless in Budapest Battle; 2 Die, 257 Wounded. Workers, Erecting Barricades, Driven Out by Tanks. Socialists Unable to Control Protests."

Special Features of Development

Throughout Horthy’s war alliance with Hitler and Hungary’s participation in the Second World War, as an important Axis partner, from 1941 through most of 1944, the Social-Democratic Party functioned legally and undisturbed by Horthy. In return, the Horthy government was favored by the kind of services indicated in the following letter* from Karoly Peyer, signer of the 1921 treaty, and Chairman of the Party in 1941 and head of the Hungarian Trade-Union Federation. On July 1, 1941, after Hungary had joined Hitler in his attack upon the Soviet Union, Peyer, as a Member of Parliament, wrote to Aladar Boor, Under-Secretary of State, in Budapest:

During the last few days individuals have repeatedly appeared at the premises of the trade unions under my leadership and attempted to persuade the workers present to commit various unlawful acts. I have the honour to present with respect the reports I received.

During the years of the war, and the Hitler-Horthy invasion of the USSR, the Social-Democratic apparatus, including its parliamentary delegation and its press (its official newspaper regularly appeared), though exercising a critical approach, sought fundamentally, as Rustem Vambery wrote, “to make the war popular with the working class.”

Towards the closing months of the war, when the Hitler-Horthy defeat impended—we are told by Ferenc Nagy,** founder in 1941 of the Smallholders Party, and Secretary of the Horthy Parliament during the War—“the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party” (Nagy names Charles Peyer, one of the signers of the 1921 agreement, Anna Kethly, and others) “met with us [of the Smallholders Party] to discuss how the parties would react to the unavoidable entry of the Communists into the post-war political arena.” Nagy continues:

Social-Democratic leaders, aspiring to a truly democratic state, promised to fight any thrust of Communism, and declared that their platform was general suffrage, private property and self-government; and believed that on this basis our efforts could be coordinated.

Again, the “one vital question”—protection of private property

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**This is the Ferenc Nagy who became premier from 1945 to 1947 and then obtained exile in the United States. The quoted passage is from p. 38 of his already cited book.
and again the efforts of the Right and the “Left” could be “coordinated”—or was there some difference between 1919 and 1945?

But at this point, our aim is to show distinctive features in the development of Hungary. One of these was the open betrayal by Social-Democracy of the socialist cause. In Hungary, the depth of this betrayal was greater and the institutionalized, legalized form of the betrayal was more pronounced and lasted longer than in any other country.

This is very consequential for the post-1945 period. First of all, as Elizabeth Wiskemann points out, the political reputation of the Social Democrats was “soiled” and this “left them in a weak position when the revolution came.” More important, the Social-Democratic agreement with the fascist Regency had seriously weakened all levels of working-class trade-union organization and had totally neglected the mass of the peasantry in the face of the vilest kind of chauvinistic, anti-Semitic and fascist propaganda. There had been, therefore, a minimum of any kind of democratic or popular opposition—on an ideological, political or organizational level—to extreme reaction and ultra-nationalism, let alone any kind of espousal of socialism, if only in diluted and argumentative form.

Meanwhile, the Communist movement had been illegalized, its members arrested, imprisoned for long terms, executed and, not infrequently, summarily murdered by the police or other agents of the Regency. We wish, at this point, to do no more than to convey some idea of the toll, in a physical and organizational sense, that was taken of the Hungarian Communist Party by the murderous ferocity of the Fascist regime for almost twenty-five years.

The proletarian dictatorship, headed by Bela Kun—in which some Socialists also played leading roles—lasted from March to July, 1919. It was overthrown by an invasion of Rumanian troops from the North and the activity of counter-revolutionary forces, under Admiral Horthy, in the South; and by the active hostility of the French, British and American governments. This hostility manifested itself in de facto support of the Rumanian and Horthy forces and the stringent blockade of the Kun government, so that it could get no food, no medicines, no industrial supplies and no credit. Despite heroic efforts, supported by large segments of the industrial working class, the Kun government fell, the final blow being the hostility against it of many peasants, impatiently waiting for the implementation of a land reform law which never came. Overwhelmed by external force, its army betrayed to the Rumanians by generals defecting to Horthy, starved and without credit and unable to receive material assistance from the Russian Workers’ Government to the East, itself fighting for its life, the Kun government was overthrown.

There followed months of atrocious White Terror and this was followed—despite the Allies’ pledge to support only a liberal truly democratic regime—by a generation of benumbing fascist terrorization, thrown off only with the military defeat, by the Soviet army, of the Hitler-Hungarian fascist forces.

The Hungarian White Terror equalled the worst of past counter-revolutionary scourges, from the mass murders of the Ku Klux Klan after the American Civil War, to the revenge of Thiers after the Paris Commune, to the barbarism of Denikin and Kolchak in Russia, that of Mannerheim in Finland, Mussolini in Italy, Chiang Kai-shek in China, Hitler in Germany and Franco in Spain.

The Kun government itself consisted, as Karolyi has written, of "a group of humanitarian idealists, patriotic sentimentalists, Marxist theoreticians, and, as in all upheavals, of doubtful characters seeking personal gain and private vengeance." Its basic aim was the ending of feudalism, capitalism and tyranny and their replacement by Socialism. Its exercise of power was exceedingly—excessively—mild. No more than five members of the upper classes, and no leading politicians of the previous regime lost their lives. According to the claims of the Horthy government itself, the counter-revolutionists lost a total of about 700 people of whom some 500 died in regular battle.

When the Kun government fled, it was succeeded, in Budapest, by a Social-Democratic, liberal-bourgeois regime, headed by Peidl. But already in the South, with headquarters at Szeged, was the Horthy junta, and the two groups each sought Entente support.

In August, 1919, the Rumanians having left, Horthy entered Budapest; in November, 1919, the Allied Supreme Council, with the acquiescence of the Social-Democratic, liberal-bourgeois group, recognized the Horthy group as the Hungarian government. The main condition in the Allied recognition, as released to the world, was that the Horthy government "shall secure to every Hungarian citizen full civil rights, including freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and universal suffrage on a secret and democratic basis."

Actually all the signatories knew at the time that this condition was the sheerest demagoguery and that reactionary terror was then engulfing Hungary; and, of course, never in the generation of Horthy rule was anything remotely resembling the conditions pledged to the Allies carried out. In addition to violence, starvation was the fundamental political weapon of Hungarian and Western reaction. Writes Karolyi:

The United States food relief under Herbert Hoover and the food relief of Holland were denoted to the entire country as long as the Liberals, Social Democrats or Communists were in power. Later, under the Horthy Dictatorship... food relief was denied to any organization or party which could be accused of Left-wing tendencies. The choice for the needy population was submission to the ruling clique or starvation.*

Basic, also, to the motivations of the Allied Powers was not only the crushing of Socialism in Hungary and so preventing its contagion throughout the Balkans, but the use of Hungary as a springboard for a war against Soviet Russia. Those who, in 1919 and 1920, were actively planning a crusade of annihilation against the Bolsheviks—and were conducting relatively limited interventionist assaults—"needed a bridgehead," as Karolyi says, "for which Hungary was very suitable." Karolyi continues: "They needed a Hungarian Government which would help them to start war against Lenin's Russia." This, too, is why they went back on their democratic pledges to the world; and with their power they had no difficulty at all in overcoming whatever scruples the Social-Democrats and Liberals may have had, in "coordinating" plans in the name of securing "the one vital interest, private property," crucifying the Hungarian people for over two decades. At the time, there was no power anywhere in the world that could oppose them effectively.

With Horthy in and the noble promises out, the slaughter began. Very brief was the summary of the New York Times in those days and of these events; in its issue of March 15, 1920 it simply referred to Horthy's "countless political murders." More than that needs to be said.

*For the documents on the Allied diplomacy and for a very sober account of the overthrow of the Kun government, by a rather conservative Hungarian statesman, see Francis Deak, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference (N. Y., 1942), especially pages 93-172.

John Gunther, writing in 1936, said that Horthy's regime "was the worst dictatorship in Europe," and that "the most unpleasant thing about Horthy is his White Terror history"—this would appear to be a combination of superlatives that exhausts the English language. During that Terror, he adds, "at least several thousand innocent Jews and Communists were tortured and murdered." Jaszi refers to the "hanging mania" which beset the Horthy government and calls the White Terror "one of the darkest pages of Hungarian history." Writes Emil Lengyel:

The political underworld rose to the surface, and mass murder became patriotism. The freebooters...rounded up scores of Liberals and Jews, made them dig their graves in the forest of Orgovany and buried them then and there. Concentration camps were opened for the politically suspect. The fury of the reaction vented itself with particular vehemence upon the Jews.

William Bohn, Minister of War in the Karolyi government, writing in 1924, declared:

The terrorist domination of the Horthy bands will always remain one of the most detestable and shameful chapters in our history. Hundreds of innocent people were murdered and thousands arrested, more than 5,000 revolutionaries were massacred... Unarmed people were sought, hung, castrated, blinded; women were violated and children killed... Parents were killed in front of their children; husbands in front of their wives; young girls in front of their fiancées and by means of the most inhuman and refined tortures.

Karolyi himself writes:

Workers and peasants were hurled alive into burning furnaces, a proceeding jokingly called "using them as fuel." Innocent Jews were dragged out of a train and hung on trees... Wives of Communists were raped by officers and then turned over to the ranks. The editor of the Socialist paper, Somogly, and his associate, Baesco, were one day found murdered... Although well known, the murderers were not arrested.

Meanwhile the Inter-Allied Military Mission was reporting, in February and March, 1920: "There is nothing in the nature of a terror in Hungary"; that all was placid, and life as secure as in London. Admiral Sir Troubridge, a British member of that Mission, allowed himself to be quoted as admiring his fellow-Admiral, the Regent, as "a strong character, a man of Liberal tendencies," whose government was "a Christian Government in a Christian country."
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The fundamental motif of the Hungarian magnates in all this is plain, and is well stated in these words from Oscar Jaszi:

The "extermination of communism" became the cloak to systematic terrorism, applied more and more openly for the realization of its definite aims: to make impossible any democratic administration; and to re-establish the economic and political system of pre-war days...

Of this ruling class, from which Karolyl came and whose members he knew intimately, Karolyl wrote, "their patriotism was but lip-service, their much-talked of 'honour' but a code without reality, their loyalty to the sovereign self-interest, their Catholic fervor a means to rule over the uneducated."

But the point to be noted here is that these treasonous murderers did succeed, thanks to Allied and later German support, for they did maintain their grip on the State. They used that grip to bleed the country white, impoverish its inhabitants, turn over its resources to British, French, American and German capitalists, prepare for war upon the Soviet Union and to exterminate the Communists.

They did not wholly succeed. It was these non-destructible Communists who led great demonstrations of unemployed in the 1930's and desperate strikes by thousands of coal miners in the same period. A paragraph in the work of the decidedly anti-Communist historian, C. A. Macartney, published in 1934, is indicative of the steady, heroic leadership offered by Communists in the struggle against Horthyism:

The Communist Party has been dissolved and any radical agitation is instantly visited with severe penalties. Yet the very frequency of the trials for Communist agitation—a month rarely passes without at least one such trial, often involving a score of defendants—shows that discontent is still very widely spread (cited work, p. 270).

J. D. Evans, in a study published a year later, also conveyed the thought of persistent working-class struggle, accompanied by brutal repression, taking a heavy toll of the leadership:

The chief object of the police force, the gendarmerie, and the legislature, appears to be assurance of complete liberty and freedom for the dominating classes to exploit the other classes. Labour leaders have an unfortunate habit of jumping out of second-story windows and killing themselves when "questioned" by the police (cited work, pp. 110-11).

This physical terrorization, plus twenty-five years of anti-Com-
about rank and society. Under Horthy was brought to fullest flower the rank-consciousness that had marked the Hapsburgs: "A new and wide caste system developed around the civil and municipal and other public services, with guaranteed jobs bequeathed from father to son," wrote the English authority, George A. Floris (Contemporary Review, London, October, 1938, p. 218).

Indicative is the fact that, in the Hungarian language, forms of address based on rank are obligatory in personal intercourse. Thus, everyday usage requires (in literal translation) "your respectability," "your magnitude," "your dignity," etc. Vambery, commenting on this, wrote: "All this would be of little consequence if it were not typical of an out-of-date Oriental servility" (cited work, p. 180).

The ritualized "respect" expected by each rank from every other; the petty tyrannies and colossal jealousies that developed; and, above all, perhaps, the vested interest in the status quo of ten thousand different "officials"—all these were extremely corrupting features of old Hungary and basic components of Horthy's machinery of control.

The snobishness of the Hungarian aristocracy was of legendary proportions, making the Cabots and Lodges of Boston appear as downright levellers. Wrote Leigh White: "The snobismus in Hungary was the most virulent manifestation of the disease that I have ever encountered." It is this characteristic that also struck John Gunther and made him refer to the "shadow-glamour like nothing else in Europe" that pervaded Hungarian aristocratic society. Emil Lengyel makes a similar point: "In no other country is the ruling class as contemptuous of the masses it exploits."

Michael Karolyi's Memoirs is dotted with references to this virulent arrogance. His nephew, at the age of seven, inquires: "Do aristocrats die, too?" His own monthly allowance as a university student equaled the Prime Minister's salary; his brother went off to the Army during World War I with "all his 'indispensable' belongings, such as Persian carpets, a dozen special uniforms, hot-water bottles, electric contraptions, and his cook."

Note, again, as Karolyi wrote: "In Hungary the caste system did not apply only to the upper classes—aristocracy, gentry, middle classes, etc.—but the feudal hierarchy extended to the lowest ranks as well." No wonder Vambery, writing in the Annals of the Ameri-
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Left, and, in the first place, among the outlawed Communists, that Jews found a policy of equality. Further, so intolerable were conditions in general in Hungary and doubly so for a Jew, that radical and Communist movements naturally attracted, as they welcomed, Jewish adherents. It is to the indelible honor of Hungarian Jewry, that a notable number contributed heroically to the struggle against reaction and fascism. At the same time, it is an indubitable fact that this served as the grain of "truth" making more convincing to the deeply anti-Semitic masses, the Nazi-like hoax labelling Communism a "Jewish plot."

* * *

The power of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary was probably greater than anywhere else in eastern Europe, including Poland and Rumania. The establishment of the Hungarian nation was organically connected, almost a thousand years ago, with the acceptance of Catholicism. Hungary's first King, Stephen—St. Stephen (997-1038 A. D.)—was particularly devout and consciously united in his policy the adoption of the Roman Catholic faith with the creation of his realm. Ever since—for almost ten centuries—the Kingdom of Hungary was held by the Roman hierarchy, as Elizabeth Wiskemann put it, "to belong in an especial way to the Holy Roman Church." Under Stephen, the clergy were given particular privileges and his enormous grants of lands to the Church were remarkable even for medieval Europe.

For nearly a thousand years the Cardinal in Hungary—the Prince-Primate—was in fact and in law the second political officer, yielding in that respect only to the King. He was, for a thousand years, presiding officer, ex-officio, of the House of Magnates, in which sat all his Bishops; his salary, paid by the State, was twice that of the Prime Minister. The lands of the church totalled scores of thousands of acres; its serfs (and later peons) numbered in the tens of thousands.

The Catholic Church was, of course, the established one; others might or might not be "tolerated"—there was, however, one truly Hungarian Church and it was the Roman Catholic. Under Horthy there prevailed a Concordat with the Pope, identical with that existing still between Franco and the Vatican.

Up to 1948, in Hungary all schools and most institutions of higher learning were Church schools. The Roman Catholic Church controlled about 65% of them. This control included physical ownership of the land and plants, absolute authority over textbooks, the appointing, paying and firing of all teachers and administrators, and the untrammeled control over the curriculum.

In 1945, the Roman Catholic Church was, next to Prince Esterhazy, the largest landowner in Hungary (about 1,200,000 acres), holding actually one-seventeenth of all the land; the Church was an employer of agricultural labor in 500 out of Hungary's 3,000 villages. The Cardinal himself, as the Bishop of Esztergom, owned scores of thousands of acres.

The Reformation, and later, the French Revolutionary eruption had a minimum impact upon the Hungarian Church. This point is put accurately in the introduction by Akos Zombory to the "authorized white book," published by order of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty in 1949:

When in Germany and France, the Catholic Church had to fight against the forces of secularism, the Hungarian Church remained untouched. Church landholdings granted by the various kings and noblemen remained intact; the bishops continued to play the same role in the Upper House and in public life (Cardinal Mindszenty Speaks, N. Y., 1949, p. 10).

In a nutshell, again quoting Miss Wiskemann: "In 1945 the position of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary, to which about 66% of the population belonged, was in almost every way medieval."

Throughout its history, in Hungary, "the Catholic Church was seldom on the side of the Hungarian people," as the London Times has stated. Howard K. Smith, who quoted the Times, went on to write:

Almost invariably it threw its tremendous weight on the side of the magnates with whom, indeed, the hierarchy, as the country's first landowner, enjoyed identical interests. It is illuminating to recall that when between the two wars the aged prelate Monsignor Janos Hock was thrown into prison by the magnate government for preaching pro-democratic sermons, not a word of protest was uttered by the Hungarian hierarchy, to which Bishop Joseph Pehm, the later Cardinal Mindszenty, belonged. Nor, for that matter, were there any diplomatic or press protests from the West (cited work, p. 310).

We get some idea of the situation when we note that George N. Shuster, president of Hunter College and a leading lay Catholic in the United States, in his elaborate apologia for the Hungarian hierarchy entitled In Silence I Speak (N. Y., 1956, p. 10), can do no better than this: "The fact remains that the Hungarian
Church was unable to prevail either against the feudalism which was so skillfully supported by the ruling class, or against the much more loathsome excrescences of nationalistic sentiments."

The truth is that the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary as an institution was an integral part of the ruling class; in property, politics and ideology, it was identical with and a bulwark of the clerico-feudalist-fascist regimes which tormented Hungary for a thousand years.

* * *

From what has been written to this point, one would expect that Nazism would attract considerable support in Hungary. The expectation accords with reality. Hungary's foreign policy of irredentism, to be realized at the expense of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, in particular, fell right into line with Hitler's plans for Central and Eastern Europe. Her domestic policy, saturated with anti-Semitism and anti-Communism, and directed toward the efficient maintenance of a brutal feudalist-capitalist system of exploitation, coincided perfectly with the ideas and practices of Hitler's Germany. There was some feeling among the landed aristocracy that the Nazis were rather vulgar upstarts; there also was some opposition from old-hand Horthy fascists to the challenge for power and loot represented by the new, Nazi Arrow Cross party (under a Major Szalasi); but both these objections were tactical and adjustments could easily be and were being made. Furthermore, the strength of Hitler Germany was mounting; it was meeting encouragement rather than real resistance from the West; and in the East stood the Soviet Union—embodiment of everything basically challenging Horthyism and Hitlerism.

The point we seek to make now is that Nazism seems to have attracted very considerable support from large segments of the ruling class, perhaps most notably, the armed forces, and to have seriously infected considerable sections of the populace, including much of the middle class and parts of the peasantry and even of the industrial working class. Certainly, the Arrow Cross party did have a mass base in both country and city, in the Army and among students and in financial and professional circles.

Stephen D. Kertesz—a diplomat in the service of the Horthy government during the War, and since a professor at Notre Dame University in the United States—makes the point that: "Some features of the political situation in Hungary were particularly favorable to the spread of Nazi doctrines, and some sec-

tions of the Hungarian middle class became infected by them." Earlier he had remarked that, especially with the Premiership of General Gyula Gombos, (1932-1936)—himself "an outstanding representative of the strongly pro-Nazi elements in the Hungarian army"—the army was honeycombed with Nazism; within it and under the Premier's protection, "extremist secret societies were organized." (Diplomacy in a Whirlpool, South Bend, Indiana, 1953, pp. 59, 27).

Professor Frederick L. Schuman notes a similar trend in Hungarian life and sees it as closely related to strong Budapest enmity against Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade. He notes also the formation of several quasi-legal mass terrorist-Nazi organizations, including one called Turul, which developed considerable influence among college students. All this was accelerated under the Premiership of the bank president, Imrely, beginning in 1938 (Europe on the Eve, N. Y., 1939, pp. 247-48; 392-93).

Then, from 1938-1941, Hungary's close alignment with Hitler began to pay off: she gained the Banat area from Yugoslavia, all of Transylvania from Rumania, a big portion of Slovakia and all of the Carpatho-Ukraine from Czechoslovakia. Internally, too, things seemed to be paying off. In June, 1938, the Arrow Cross party—backed now by such people as Archduke Albert of Hapsburg, Alexander Festetics (the husband of a Karolyi), and members of such magnate families as the Palfy and Andrassy—received 23% of the total vote, i.e., over 575,000 out of 2,500,000. Most of this, it is true, came from the rural areas where the magnates controlled whole blocs of votes since corruption and terror were rife, and balloting was not secret. Still, the total vote was impressive.

Further, in May, 1939, Budapest registered a very large Arrow Cross vote; there balloting was secret.

It seems clear, then, that in Hungary, more than elsewhere in eastern Europe, not only had fascism succeeded in winning over—for whatever reasons, with whatever promises—a large portion of the population, but more in Hungary than anywhere else except Germany itself, an open pro-Hitler brand of fascism, Nazism, won a notable degree of popular support.

* * *

Another feature of Hungarian development, to 1945, which marks the country off from its neighbors, is the different quantity
and quality of resistance to the war that appeared in Hungary as compared to the other European countries.

All writers agree that during World II, in Hungary, there was, as Vambery wrote, an "apathy of the people as evidenced in the infrequency of acts of sabotage and the absence of an active underground movement such as developed in other Nazi-ridden countries" (cited work, p. 27). Indeed, one of the points to be noted is that Hitler did not feel it necessary to fully occupy Hungary until March, 1944; during the prior war-years, while it is true that certain Nazi officials and "specialists" were in direct supervision of key aspects of Hungarian activity, it is also true that Hitler felt—correctly—that his "best ally" could be allowed to run things more nearly on his own than any of the other "allies."

The activities of French, Italian, Dutch and Norwegian patriots resisting Nazi occupation were, of course, of enormous dimensions; so great, indeed, as to affect the course of the military conflict. The colossal mass folk resistance of the peoples of the USSR to the Nazi invader and occupier was of epic proportions and played a major part in the defeat of Hitler. Again, it was a popular uprising which liberated Sofia, just as the Red Army had barely reached Varna, over 200 miles to the east; the Yugoslavs themselves, of course, drove the Nazis out of Belgrade; and in Warsaw and Bucharest national resistance was noteworthy.

The exception is Budapest. There Hungarian fascist troops, under the maniacal sadist, Szalasi, fighting with crack Nazi divisions, resisted an all-out Red Army assault for seven weeks. For almost two months this city of over a million people was held by fascist troops, in a battle that in duration and ferocity exceeded Hitler's last stand at Berlin.

This author certainly does not desire to minimize whatever Hungarian resistance there was, and there was some. Socialists and Communists especially—the latter under the banner of a Peace Party—in many cases did what they could, but this remained basically a sporadic and almost individualized effort. Ivan Boldizsar, himself a member of the resistance, in his study of this phenomenon, The Other Hungary (Budapest, 1946), does show that some blows were inflicted upon the Nazis, there were some illegal publications and some magnificent men and women in Hungary gave their lives in the battle against fascism and war. Yet, Boldizsar himself states that when, in March, 1944, Hitler openly and fully occupied Hungary, the hoped-for national resist-

ance did not materialize. He writes: "The anti-Semitic and chauvinistic propaganda had by that time broken the backbone of Hungarian society. The organized open resistance did not break out."

Doreen Warriner, a correspondent for the London New Statesman and Nation (who was in Hungary, 1947-1949), in her excellent study, Revolution in Eastern Europe (London, 1950, p. 13) has put the matter of Hungarian resistance very well:

In Hungary, there could be no alliance between the national and revolutionary resistance, for on national lines there was no resistance. Hungary, it must be remembered, had been a fascist country for 25 years, and fascism had deep roots in the class system; its nationalism was identified with the rule of its powerful upper class, and with the Axis alliance...

In the last year of the war, therefore, when the power of the Axis was breaking, the political struggle in Hungary was waged not between government and resistance, but between different brands of fascism, the dynamic and fiercely nationalist Arrow Cross brand, and the reactionary pro-German fascism of Horthy.

Even the last-minute, October, 1944, appeal by Horthy for an armistice and his direction to the Hungarian Army to stop fighting does not and did not alter this picture. First of all, Horthy had given no prior warning of his move and had prepared no one and nothing for it. As a result, it had very little practical result, except to expose for the Nazis some opponents and lead quickly to their annihilation. Indeed, Horthy's act was so poorly prepared and so ineptly done that it is quite possible it was a Hitler-inspired provocation. It was at this point that Horthy and other leading figures of his regime—including Cardinal Mindszenty (then still a Bishop)—were arrested. But the Regent was held in "protective custody," and legally turned power over to the unspeakable Szalasi. Later, he made his way West and surrendered to the very tender ministrations of the American forces.

Earlier, Horthy had made several moves to mend his fences, so far as the Western Allies were concerned, should Hitler be defeated. Among the more noteworthy of these was his dispatch of Tibor Eckhardt to England early in 1942. Great Britain, at that point, however, refused to receive him and he went on to the United States. Mr. Eckhardt had been a leader of the Smallholder's Party, a long-time member of the Horthy Parliament and occasional representative of Hungary, at the League of Nations. Daniel Bell and Leon Dennen, in a study of "The System of Gov-
ernments in Exile,” selected three leaders of reactionary “exile” movements for discussion: one was King Carol of Rumania, the second was Archduke Otto of Austria, the third was Eckhardt.

They say, merely, that he had “made an unenviable record for himself in his country as a reactionary and a supporter of anti-Semitic legislation.” In Washington, Eckhardt established a “Free Hungarian” movement, and claimed the support of the State Department. Public protest led, in the end of 1943, to a formal repudiation of his claim by Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, but that was 1943 and times change. (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, March, 1944, p. 148.)

Karolyi further describes Eckhardt as a former President of the “Wakening Magyars,” “the first terrorist organization to hunt down Communists, Jews, Socialists and Liberals” (cited work, p. 381). In the recent past, down to the present, this gentleman has had his status very much uplifted and once again he is a leading representative of “Free Hungary.”

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A final feature of Hungarian development, up to 1945, which must be taken into account in any effort to comprehend its history since that period, is the impact upon the country of World War II. Hungary, fighting with Hitler, sent troops into Yugoslavia and, in particular, into the Soviet Union.

In Yugoslavia, Hungarian troops were used mainly for occupation and police duties. One of the starkly terrible events of World War II occurred in January, 1942, in the course of these duties. Kertész, a Horthy official and now a thoroughly respectable American professor-in-exile, and far from prone to be severely critical of pre-1945 Hungary, writes:

Under the pretext of reprisals, the Hungarian Army and gendarmarie carried out organized massacres of the Serbian and Jewish population...The army instituted a regime of terror and isolated the area...The indiscriminate murders were accompanied by extensive looting (cited work, p. 57).

On the Soviet front, the Horthy troops were not behind those of Hitler in bestowing fitting signs of Christian civilization upon Bolsheviki. There, however, resistance mounted and so did

*Goebbels, in a diary entry of May 19, 1942, states that partisan activity at one point had become “extremely discomforting.” Goebbels goes on: “To the south of this region, Hungarian elements are fighting under great difficulties. They must now capture one village after another and pacify it, a thing that has not proved any too constructive. For when the Hungarians report that they have ‘pacified’ a village, this usually means that not a single inhabitant is left. That means, in turn, that we can hardly get any agricultural work done in such regions” —L. P. Lochner, ed., The Goebbels Diaries (N. Y. 1948), p. 219.
locomotives in Hungary; by 1945 there were 450. Early in the war there had been 45,000 railway cars in the country; by 1945 there were 7,000. Literally every bridge in the nation was destroyed; broken were all signaling apparatus, railroad switches, telegraph and telephone lines. Not an ambulance and not a fire engine was left in Hungary after the Germans fled. About one-third of all agricultural equipment had been destroyed; exterminated were 60% of the livestock, 71% of the horses, 80% of the pigs, 81% of the sheep.

With the war's settlement (finally agreed to in 1947), Hungary's territorial appropriations from Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were returned, and reparations, for damages inflicted by her invading troops, were to be paid to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and to the Soviet Union—the latter, in kind, to total $200,000,000 and to be paid in six years; the first two countries were to be paid a total of $100,000,000.

* * *

In the preceding pages has been presented some description of the particular features of Hungary's history and development that must be borne in mind by anyone who seeks to comprehend its post-1944 history, including the crisis of the Winter of 1956. Presented also, has been some picture of the actual demographic and physical conditions that the post-war Hungarian government found and with which it would have to grapple before anything further could be done.

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III. Reconstruction and Revolution

The shift in the European balance represented by the defeat of Nazi Germany made possible the long-overdue revolutionizing of Hungarian society. From 1945 to 1949, Hungary sought to reconstruct its shattered physical resources and to transform its archaic social structure. In those four years, beginning literally in ruins, with the dead and maimed numbering hundreds of thousands, this nation of less than nine millions proceeded to pass through its 1789, its 1848 and its 1917. And this was to be done by a nation bordering five other nations, traditionally hostile to it; sitting in the middle of the always nervous Balkans; and centering in a Europe upon which was to be played out the main drama of the contest between Anglo-American imperialism and Soviet socialism.

And it was all to be done by a people steeped in a thousand years of a clerical-feudal-fascist past, educated in chauvinism, anti-Semitism and obscurantism. At the same time it was to be done by a people who had endured almost unbelievable hardships and suffering and yet had survived and by a people who, in the thousands, had struggled valiantly for progress and liberty. In any case, the bringing about of Hungary's reconstruction and its transformation had to be done by the Hungarian people, themselves, as best they knew how, with the resources and traditions and backgrounds and skills they had. History was to be made, as always, by real human beings in a real world; not by ideal constructs of someone's imaginings, functioning in a more or less idyllic void.

* * *

On October 15, 1944, Horthy ceded power to the Hungarian Quisling, Major Szalasi. Four days later, the Red Army liberated Debrecen, a major city in eastern Hungary. After the brief existence of an emergency government headed by Gen. Miklos, there was formed a Free Hungarian Coalition Government, headed by Ferenc Nagy, the leader of the strongest, non-Nazi, legal party, the Smallholders, and including representatives from the Social-
Democratic, Communist and Peasant Parties. An outstanding personality in this new government was the almost legendary figure of the Communist leader, Matyas Rakosi, a member of the Bela Kun government, a man who had endured 16 years imprisonment and torture under Horthy and who had been living in exile in the Soviet Union for several years. When he returned, there were probably still alive 10,000 Hungarians in the country who had held firm in their Communist Party beliefs and affiliations. The other parties had functioned legally under Horthy, and while some of their members, especially among the Social Democrats, had suffered persecution, none had endured anything like the repression and physical annihilation which had hounded the Communists. On the other hand, none had so unquestioned a title to anti-fascism, and it was clear that this was to be a minimum requirement for all allowed to participate in the New Hungary.

On December 24, 1944, the siege of Budapest began; on February 13, 1945, all of Hungary was liberated. Even while the fighting proceeded, so did reconstruction. In leading this effort, the Coalition government acted very ably; in accomplishing it within about two years, the Hungarian people accomplished miracles.

All parties and all participants deserve a share in the glory of this accomplishment, yet observers agree that the Communists—and especially Erno Gero, who was Minister of Public Works and Reconstruction in the early period—played a major part, with their tremendous spirit, fervour and self-sacrificing work, in rebuilding the bridges, roads, homes, factories, communication lines and public establishments, including churches.

Karolyi points out that since Hungary “had been systematically demoralized by dictatorial regimes for so many years, its recuperation in so short a time could not have been expected.” Yet, as he also points out, the ruins were conquered and physically Hungary was rebuilt quickly with the “competence,” “dynamism” and “energy” of the Communists, in particular, “recognized by everyone” (cited work, p. 354.)

* * *

In agrarian Hungary, social transformation would have to begin with and proceed on the basis of fundamental land reform. On March 15, 1945 (March 15 is the national holiday of Hungary—the equivalent of July 4 in the United States) the Land Reform Act of the Coalition Government became effective. It is to be noted, as Hilde Spiel, special correspondent in southern Europe for the New Statesman and Nation, wrote shortly afterwards, that “though in 1944 the Smallholders Party had fully agreed to land reform, and was still committed to carrying it through with the help of the other parties, it became less and less inclined to fulfill further obligations” (The Nation, August 24, 1946), which included the Act’s implementation. This implementation was also retarded, especially in the lush western regions of Hungary, where the greatest estates lay, because of fear among the peasantry. The fear sprang not only out of wariness as to the return of the magnates, but also out of the nearness of British forces to the south and west, and doubt as to whether or not the Western allies would permit social revolution to proceed. This, indeed, was a basic reason for the fact that so many peasants in western Hungary did not sow the land in 1945, raising additional problems for the Government in 1946, and contributing to the terrible inflation of that year—of which more later.

Nevertheless, the Act was passed and within two years its provisions had been enforced. It transformed Hungary and remains a basic and lasting achievement of the post-war coalition government. Once again, the actual carrying out of its provisions was led, all observers agree, by the Communists.

The Land Reform Act of 1945 made possible the destruction of feudalism in Hungary; its implementation did, in fact, destroy the material base for feudalism and laid the necessary groundwork for the more lengthy task of destroying the ideological remnants of feudalism. In the words of the New York Times (Sept. 22, 1946): “The old class of landed barons has been removed. In the past it was this class that lined up Hungary on the side of the warmakers—Hapsburg and Hitler.”

The extreme being normal for Hungary, as we have seen, it is not surprising that the land reform program there was, as Doreen Warriner wrote, “by far the greatest and most dramatic change in East Europe at the time.” For, she continued: “Nowhere else was the old order overthrown so completely, and nowhere else was the opposition so strong and so embittered” (cited work, p. 15).

The Land Act of 1945 involved the expropriation and redistribution of about eight million acres of land, or about 35% of Hungary; together these had constituted over 75,000 estates. Of the land distributed, 60% went to peasants; 26%, made up of
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forest land, became state preserves; almost 8% was set aside for communal pastures; 2% for public building sites; about 4% was given to poor church parishes.* Further, the State took over 1,509 castles and about 11,000 acres of private parks—these were to be converted into hospitals, public rest homes and schools. Approximately 650,000 agricultural proletarians—invoking about 3,500,000 people, or about 40% of the total population—were given land. Those former landlords who had distinguished themselves for an anti-Nazi stand, or for participation in the resistance (and there were a few) were permitted to keep 100 acres of land; peasants who had been heroes of the resistance were allowed a maximum of 200 acres.

The average size of the allocations, however, in view of the enormous number of claimants, came to 7.1 acres; to hitherto landless peasants and farm workers the average was 6.9 acres; to dwarf holders, the additional grant averaged not quite 6 acres. Agricultural experts agree that in Hungary, under the technical conditions then prevailing, a minimum of about 12.5 acres of land was needed for a farmer to produce an adequate living (by East European standards, of course) for himself and his family.**

But the land distribution program was able—given the facts of life in Hungary, i.e., available land and the numbers of families and administrative problems—to see to it that about 109,000 formerly landless or nearly landless families averaged almost 12 acres; an additional 261,000 formerly landless peasant families now possessed an average of not quite 7 acres; the 218,000 former dwarf holders realized an increment averaging under 6 acres and this meant that many of them still owned less than 12.5 acres. Finally, there still remained perhaps 100,000 farm workers who were landless, or practically so, and employment for them, on the generally diminished farms of the country, presented a very difficult problem. The facts for Hungary and for several of her neighbors, in this connection, in 1946-47, when the Land Act was being applied, are set forth in the following table:

*About 90,000 acres was set aside for the churches. Said the Budapest correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor (Feb. 13, 1948): "The transfer of church land to landless peasants was not an anti-religious act. For one thing, the lower clergy could retain enough land for their own maintenance and for the support of their schools. And secondly, the transfer was free from any anti-religious campaign or violence."

**A good and readily available study of the Land Reform Act was published by Leland Stowe in Foreign Affairs, April, 1947.

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Reconstruction and Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Farms: Large and Small Peasants, 1946-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Peasants (under 12 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Peasants (12-25 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Peasants (25-125 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Property</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Warriner, cited work, p. 150)

One sees at a glance that once again Hungary is exceptional; she had, immediately after 1945, a very much higher percentage of her farms distributed in very small holdings (below subsistence level, actually) than did other Central and East European countries.

The land reform in Hungary decisively benefitted millions of people, but its greatest boon came to the nation's peasantry. This was a numerous class of people who, in Horthy's Hungary, were for all the world like Mississippi sharecroppers—debt-ridden, owning nothing, politically helpless, illiterate, impoverished, and held at the bottom of the social ladder. Two experts writing on the subject after visiting Hungary in 1947-1948, declared:

The biggest change has occurred in the lives of the hundred thousand families formerly employed on yearly contracts as farm hands on the great manorial estates. Living outside the community of the village, theirs had been the lowest social status in the rural hierarchy...(they) were paid in produce, lived in miserable barracks in the manorial courtyard, and worked under the supervision of bailiffs for practically unlimited hours. After the land distribution, these 500,000 people were still at a very low standard of living, but as the authors write, by the summer of 1948, there was already "every sign of human reconditioning" among them* ("Land Reform in Hungary," signed I. P. and E. W., in The World Today, London, Jan. 1949, V, p. 22).

*The Budapest correspondent of the New York Times (Sept. 11, 1948) wrote that Hungary "reflects tremendous efforts for reconstruction and human rehabilitation": he reported that already in 1947 the infant mortality rate in Hungary was below what it had been in 1937—11.2 per 100,000 as compared with 14.7 per 100,000.
Further, there remained not only the problem of inadequate size farms after distribution, but also the fact that the perennial Hungarian problem of agrarian over-population, with consequent unemployment and under-employment, while much reduced in consequence, was not fully solved. There still remained perhaps 25,000 landless agrarian families, and, inevitably, a certain number of those who had received land did not succeed. These, either because of lack of implements or animals or initiative or prolonged illness found themselves renting out their lands and services to better-off peasants. From the landless and from the “failures” there arose an acute danger that some of the most fortunate would be able to become big landlords again, and the seeds might be sown of the undoing of the revolution in land relationships.

This, from an economic point of view, presented, in less aggravated and chronic form, a basic problem of the overwhelmingly agrarian—and hitherto foreign-dominated—Balkans. For, of course, the agrarian question was not something that could be resolved if it were divorced from the totality of Hungary’s development.

Actually, Hungary was overwhelmingly agrarian for the same reason that its agrarian system had been oligarchic. That is, the reactionary social organization depended upon and reflected the semi-colonial status of Hungary, economically speaking, and its domination by Western capitalism. This domination, in turn, required that Hungary not be industrialized and that it remain a supplier of raw materials for the industrialized imperialist powers.

But when Hungary sought to transform its social organization, it necessarily also sought to break this dependence and subordination to imperialism. Fundamental, as we have shown, was the destruction of the magnates’ status; but related to that was the building of industry in Hungary. And it was only in this way that the “excess” agrarian population of the nation could be effectively and creatively employed; and this necessity would grow as the methods of soil cultivation became increasingly scientific and mechanized and socialized. Miss Warriner has expressed the fundamental economic problem involved very succinctly, albeit somewhat technically:

Now of course it is true that the increased investment (in industrialisation) must be made at a cost; if a big proportion of labor is occupied in building dams and blast furnaces it will not bring in any immediate return in a bigger output of consumer goods and food. That in itself is no objection to the plans; it is indeed their real justification. For precisely what was wrong with the economy of E. Europe before was that it did not invest enough; the rate of capital accumulation was too low to employ the increase in population. Any policy for raising the living standard must necessarily aim at raising the rate of investment; against the cost involved there must be weighed the alternative incalculable cost of keeping millions of peasants half-employed (cited work, p. 110).

In this connection, the special burden represented by the Cold War’s economic aspect, symbolized by the Marshall Plan, becomes clear. Its embargo upon East-West trade, and especially its placing practically all machinery and capital equipment upon the State Department’s secret, prohibited list, made doubly difficult the creation of the capital needed for the industrialization plans. If to this is added the military aspects of the Cold War—of which more will be said—and its economically devastating requirements of expenditure upon armaments, then the totality of the inhibiting effects of the Cold War upon the smoothness of the social transformation in East Europe—a basic motive, of course, for the Cold War—may be appreciated.

While, then, the chronic Hungarian problem of agrarian over-population was very much relieved with the revolutionary land act of 1945, it was not fully solved with that act’s implementation. When non-socialist members of the Coalition government considered this question, their solutions were clearly not solutions at all. Indicative was the book, written early in 1948, by Peter Veres, veteran leader of the National Peasant Party, and then Minister of War. Mr. Veres, described by two English observers, as “a peasant mystic,” believed that the solution of agrarian under-employment in Hungary would have to wait upon the Mohammedans of the world giving up their “prejudice” and turning to the consumption of pork!

All other leaders, having any kind of socialist orientation, “found the answer to the weakness of the new small farmer in the development of agricultural cooperation”—and by 1947 there were 800 farmer’s cooperatives in the country. Further, one is to understand the launching of Hungary’s Three-Year Plan, in the summer of 1947 as, in part, an effort directed towards “the absorption of the surplus agrarian population into industry through the scientific industrialization of the country” (The World Today, London, Jan. 1949, VI, pp. 25, 28).
THE TRUTH ABOUT HUNGARY

Perhaps one of the most glowing tributes to the Land Reform Program of the New Hungary came from the pen of Ferenc Nagy, the Smallholders leader, and premier of Hungary from 1945 to 1947: “Nearly three years have passed (he wrote, in exile in the United States) since the agrarian reform in Hungary, and despite many injustices and excesses it must be admitted that its swift and radical execution was the surest course to follow” (cited work, p. 12).

Others have described the event with more warmth; it was comparable only to other wonderfully dramatic moments of mass release and emancipation—very much like what Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation meant to 4,000,000 American slaves. In some cases, in Hungary (as in Alabama) the event was overwhelming and unbelievable. Wrote Ilona Polanyi, of the 600,000 former completely landless farm “hands” in Hungary:

When they were actually given the land they found it difficult to believe and to live up to the occasion. The wish-dream had lasted too long. They were conditioned to servility, they were open to intimidation, short of initiative, and broken by over-work (World Affairs, London, April, 1949).

This was the result of a thousand years of what is sometimes called freedom—those who worked so that others might rule, stood “broken by over-work,” at the moment of liberation. This, too, must be weighed, when the task of making that liberation real and lasting is considered. By 1949, the American correspondent, Howard K. Smith, thought he saw, in Hungary, real progress: “The tone of life in Hungary is changed. The peasant has lost his demeanor of chronic servility” (cited work, p. 217).

* * *

So urgent was the question of Land Reform that it was undertaken, as we have seen, by what amounted to an ad-hoc committee of non-Fascist and anti-Fascist leaders, acting in a purely emergency fashion as a quasi-government. Backed by the might of the Soviet Army, and because of that might, it was possible for this Committee to come into existence, exercise authority and take the initial measures destroying the latifundia system.

But clearly some more stable kind of governing body was needed. This new governing body would then have the responsibility of really governing in the name of the nation, of remaking the political-institutional forms of Hungary—Horthy and Szalasi being done for—and of making a Treaty of Peace.

Reconstruction and Revolution

For these purposes, the emergency governing committee, while engaged in desperate measures of reconstruction and transformation, also undertook the preparations necessary for a nation-wide, secret, free election. This was the first attempt of the kind ever made in the thousand years of Hungarian existence. The preparations were approved by the Allies and actively assisted, with complete impartiality—as observers of all opinions agree—by the Red Army.

In these national, secret and free elections, however, by no means were all to have equal rights. The elections—scheduled to be held October 7, 1945—were to be conducted in accordance with the whole purpose and spirit of the war—insofar as these had been made explicit by its Allied leaders. This purpose and spirit were solemnly stated, in treaty form, legally binding upon its signatories (the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union) in the “Declaration on Liberated Europe” forming Section II of the Yalta agreement of February, 1945:

The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice.

With this stipulation the Allies at Yalta agreed to the holding of “free elections” open to “all democratic elements in the population.” These agreements meant, if they meant anything at all, that Nazi and fascist and anti-democratic elements were not to participate in the elections; that organizations and parties of that nature were to be extirpated and forbidden and that the people who could participate could choose freely any kind of government they wanted, except an anti-democratic, fascist one.

In Hungary, this presented an enormous problem, because the historical fact is that there only one party refused to live with or abide by Horthy-fascism, and that was the Communist Party. The result was a campaign of extermination conducted by the clerical-feudal-fascist regime against Communists and their sympathizers. That campaign, conducted ruthlessly for an entire generation, succeeded not fully in annihilating, but certainly in decimating the ranks of the Communist Party of Hungary.

Further, the Communist Party of Hungary faced two more tremendous obstacles in terms of winning public support after 1944. One was that the exaggerated nationalism of Hungary was
a thoroughly reactionary one and this had not been relieved
during the war by any notable national resistance movement
against the war or against fascism. On the contrary, as we have
seen, what split there were in war-time Hungary, of any real con-
sequence, revolved around different brands of fascism. And this
completely reactionary, ultra-nationalism was absolutely infested
with anti-Semitism.

Moreover, a traditional enemy of the Magyar was the Slav;
and the most potent Slavic nation was Russia. This nation was
the land of Communism and it was the land against which Hun-
gary was waging war. The illegal Communist Party’s effort to
end the war in Hungary was taken very widely to mean actually
support of the war effort of the Soviet Union. In addition to
the foreign agent charge, the Communists of Hungary had been
assailed for a full generation by the vilest propaganda of which
a fascist regime was capable, and to object to the propaganda
was to place oneself in danger of imprisonment or execution.

And, the election was held with the Red Army as an occupation
force. The stories of the misconduct and even atrocities com-
mitted by the Soviet Army in Hungary are manifestly exaggerated,
and when levied against the Army itself or its command or its
policy, are undoubtedly false. For example, Ferenc Nagy, among
other writers, seriously charges that Russian women attached
to units of the Red Army—comparable to our Wacs—“raped and
forced to unnatural excesses many thousands of Hungarian men”;
and that in occupied Hungary one had “the peculiar situation
of women and girls hiding, not themselves, but their men in the
forests and haystacks to keep them from the disease-ridden
Soviet women troops” (cited work, p. 63). “Peculiar situation,”
indeed!

But after this is said and understood, it nevertheless remains
true that never has an occupying army endeared its nation to
the citizens of the enemy land being occupied; and when one
remembers the provocation offered the Red Army by the bona-
ﬁde and government-directed horrors committed in the Soviet
Union by invading German and Hungarian troops, one must
conclude that this occupation experience did not serve to endear
Soviet Russia to the Hungarian populace. Elections held in the
midst of such circumstances surely would not help the Com-
munist candidates.

At the same time all other Parties, including the Social-Demo-
icratic, the Smallholders and the Peasant—not to speak of out-
right fascist Horthy parties, as that dominated by the Catholic
hierarchy—had been legal and tolerated under Horthy and had
functioned openly as supporters—in domestic and in foreign
policy—of the fundamental program of the Horthy regime. This
was true of such acknowledged leaders of these parties as Ferenc
Nagy of the Smallholders, who actually was the Secretary of the
Hungarian Parliament during the war (as he, himself, states
in his book, cited work, p. 39), and as Anna Kethly of the Social
Democrats, who was a member of that Party’s delegation in
Horthy’s Parliament from 1920 through World War II (as stated
in a story devoted to her, published in the N. Y. Herald Tribune,
August 19, 1946).

The problem was intensiﬁed by the fact that, right after 1944,
practically the entire active membership of the Horthy-fascist
parties entered that Party which was as far to the Right as they
could ﬁnd, i. e., the Smallholders Party. Howard K. Smith writes
on this point: “Among its other components, the Smallholders
party was shot through with dispossessed old feudal reactionaries
who joined it because it was the nearest thing to conservatism
in Hungary” (cited work, p. 306). And Doreen Warriner, some-
what more fully and with irrefutable accuracy, wrote:

In 1944 the entire state machine, the Army, the Church, the
richest peasants, most of the middle class, as well as the real upper
class of magnates and capitalists supported the Horthy regime; they
now (after the war) supported the Smallholders (cited work,
p. 28).

Now, it is certainly a fact that many reactionary and opportu-
nistic (and no doubt, worse) elements joined other parties,
including the Communist Party. There is, indeed, evidence that
quite early, the Communist Party—their forces very nearly exter-
minated—desperately sought members, just in terms of having
people to get things done and accomplish necessary chores, let
alone exercising some kind of guiding or leading function. And,
certainly, this policy reached dangerous, if not absurd, lengths,
when by the 1950’s the Communist Party of Hungary—even
accepting the fact of merger with the Social-Democrats in 1948,
when its name became the Hungarian Workers Party—announced
its membership as some 800,000, in a land totalling but eight
million men, women, and children!

But, to return to the election of 1945. In terms of the purposes
of the war, of Hungary as a defeated enemy nation, and of its
special history of 25 years of fascism—with recognized, legally-
functioning "opposition" parties—that election was a real problem.
The problem was solved by a minimum of disfranchisement,
because of past fascist allegiance and activity, and permission to
the hitherto-existing parties and the hitherto illegalized Com-
munist Party to participate equally. The result, given the facts
of Hungarian life and history, was that which was to be expected,
except perhaps that it was somewhat surprising that the Com-
munist Party did as well as it did.

In the secret elections held throughout Hungary in October,
1945, about 5,150,000 people voted, very much more than had
ever voted before in that country's history. The votes went as
follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes</th>
<th>Number of Seats in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smallholders</td>
<td>2,691,384</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-Democrats</td>
<td>822,666</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>801,341</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Peasant</td>
<td>323,571</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Other parties received scattered returns)

The result, announced November 15, 1945, was a coalition
government headed by a Smallholder Minister, and with a cabinet
of seventeen members, eight of the majority party, four each of
the Social-Democratic and Communist, and one of the National
Peasant. Confining ourselves purely to major institutional changes
that followed from this national election, until the next one,
held August 31, 1947, the facts are these.

On December 6, 1945, the Parliament adopted unanimously
a proposal introduced by the Communist members, for the
nationalization of the coal industry. This industry, heavily damaged
by the war and therefore requiring tremendous investments to
get it producing again, was fundamental to the national economy,
since it was the basic source of energy. Hence its being taken
by the nation was regarded by practically everyone as a matter of
necessity, and it was accomplished, as indicated, without a nega-
tive vote.

The second order of business was the revamping of the nation's
political structure. That structure—a monarchy without a king,
headed by an absent Regent who was an Admiral without a

navy—was generally recognized as an absurdity and anachronism.
On February 2, 1946 was proclaimed the Hungarian Republic
(with Zoltan Tildy, a Smallholder, as the President, an office
comparable to that in France, not the United States), and thus
came to an end the 945-year old monarchical structure. This,
too, had unanimous Parliamentary approval; but the objection
voiced by the Prince-Prime, Cardinal Mindszenty (made a
Cardinal in October, 1945), and his rejection of the legality of
the act was an ominous note.

At this point unanimity ceased and one of the fundamental
sources of divergence was the question of Socialism. The National
Peasant Party and the leadership of the Smallholders—not to
speak of groups to their Right—and the Right-wing of the Social-
Democrats, opposed the elimination of the private ownership of
the means of production; the Communist Party, a considerable
segment of the Socialist leadership and most of its mass following
and an uncertain proportion of the Smallholders favored the
elimination of such private ownership (quite gradually when
it came to agriculture) and the creation of a Socialist society.

This basic split was formalized in the Parliament quite early:
by March, 1946, a Left bloc advocating Socialism stood opposed
to a Center-Right bloc which supported capitalism. This was,
needless to say, a fundamental conflict, and since Socialism was
on the agenda in post-war Hungary it was a pressing and emotion-
packed conflict.

The Left pressed for Socialism and—given the devastation
of the war, the Land Reform Act, the nationalization of the coal
industry, and the might of the Soviet Union—the development
of politics and economics in Hungary was Left-ward. All observ-
ers agree that this reflected the actual development of the will
of the majority of the Hungarian people, mixed though their senti-
ments were with hangovers from the reactionary past.

In November, 1946, the five largest industrial enterprises were
placed under state management. In May, 1947, a more decisive
step was taken when the five largest banks in Hungary were

*At its 36th Annual Congress, held in Budapest in February,
the Social-Democratic Party adopted a distinctly Left orientation
and, by a large majority, voted "to integrate its activities with
those of the Communist Party" (Andrew Gyorgy, Governments
of Danubian Europe, N. Y., 1949, p. 117). A leading and bitter op-
ponent of the Left Socialists was Anna Kethly. Her stand is dealt
with most sympathetically in a dispatch from Budapest, in the
put under government control. Both these acts were done by Parliament, with large favoring votes, but in each case, and especially the last, (which led directly to Nagy's resignation as Prime Minister) the opposition was extremely bitter.

One of the motives behind the nationalizing of the banks was the intent of the Communist-Socialist bloc to press forward with a Three-Year Plan for the economy generally. But, as everyone understood, how to finance such a plan was a key question as to both its substance and its execution. So, on two grounds—the challenge to capitalism represented in the bank-nationalization proposal and the connection between that proposal and the projected Plan—the Right opposed the move, and a first-rate political crisis emerged.

A further point must be made. The government and the whole fabric of Hungary faced collapse in 1946 due to the fantastic inflation of the currency and this threat was resolved, all agreed, by the work of Communist Ministers and economists; and the carrying out of the remedy, in terms of rallying mass support, was the work of the Left.

The inflation, which saw the cost of a postage stamp rise to several billion pengoes, resulted from the war's destruction, the poor crop due to the failure of many farmers to sow their land in 1945, the freezing of the Hungarian gold reserve in the United States and the holding by the United States of several millions more in Hungarian assets in its German zone, and the drain caused by reparations due the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. As the spring of 1946 passed on, the inflation intensified, until in the Summer, as Hilde Spiel, special correspondent in southern Europe for the Nation, wrote from Budapest (August 24, 1946, pp. 211-13): “The wildest inflation in history has ravaged Hungary during these last few weeks. Life was insane... from one hour to the next prices doubled and trebled.” Miss Spiel went on to state that the former “feudal landlords” and “a number of large financiers left in Hungary, besides a large and bloated bureaucracy” were actively opposed to the government's effort to rescue the economy. She concluded:

The only danger to the country seems to lie with those citizens who are determined at all costs to prevent economic stabilization. They are to be found among the few remaining big financiers and industrialists, the disgruntled state officials, and the landed gentry deprived of their property. Aided by their social standing, and their undeniable charm, they try to influence members of the Western Allied missions against the government, hoping to obstruct the financial reconstruction and thus unseat the present regime.

By heroic and drastic measures—including the replacing of the entire old currency with a new currency, rigorously controlled—and the support of most of the population, economic chaos was overcome, and the reactionary political schemings thwarted.

But, without control over the banking system, the Left felt that the economy of the nation would remain at the mercy of the Right, and that further plans for the enhanced socialization of the country might be defeated. Hence the move, in the Spring of 1947, to take over the five major banks, and especially the so-called Big Three—the Credit Bank, the Commercial Bank, and the Discount Bank—which together controlled seventy percent of the country's industry. A further purpose behind the move for bank nationalization and another source of the bitter resistance to it lay in the fact that a considerable part of the capital holdings in the banks were foreign—particularly British. (On this, see, especially, Warriner, cited work, p. 29.)

Thus, after bitter struggle, the Left won; on May 28, 1947, the Hungarian Parliament enacted the law which nationalized the country's banking system. The question and the surrounding political crisis were analyzed by Tibor Mende, financial editor of the European edition of the New York Herald Tribune, as follows (June 6, 1947):

The issue that led to the present climax... developed around how to finance the Three-Year Plan aimed at raising living standards by 1951, 15% above 1938... The working-class parties insisted that the plan should be executed without foreign help, while the majority Smallholders were said to hope for a strengthening of their more conservative approach to the country's problems through Western financial help...

According to the arguments of the working-class parties, the country's major banks virtually control the financial life, and in politically unreliable hands could effectively hinder the execution of the Three-Year Plan.

In addition, the working-class parties said, the big banks have close ties with Western financial institutions and other circles. At the same time, the Smallholders party, uniting all of the conservative and clerical interests in Hungary, has close contacts with the financial leadership of the country embodied in the big banks.

The victory of the Left in the struggle to nationalize the banks was one of the decisive events in Hungarian history.
That result having been achieved, the Left at once pressed forward its advantage. On July 1, 1947, the Parliament voted final approval of the Three-Year Plan—some of the main results of which will be examined later—thus laying the foundations, after the Land Reform Act and the nationalization of the coal mines, the banks, and certain of the major industrial establishments, for the building of a Socialist economy.

Meanwhile, completing the framework of a reconstructed nation, the Allied Powers signed the Peace Treaty with Hungary on February 10, 1947, to become effective on September 15 of that year.

On August 31, 1947, the second general parliamentary elections of the New Hungary were held. In these elections, the honeymoon days of the immediate postwar coalition were over, and the sharpness of the social struggle, as indicated in the above paragraphs, had become apparent to everyone. As a result, there were widespread complaints, from Left and Right, and some reports from Western correspondents, of more tension, perhaps more fraud, and some signs of coercion—all of which had been missing in 1945.

Hugh Seton-Watson, strongly anti-Left, in a book published in 1951, said of the 1947 elections: "In comparison with those of November, 1945, they were a fraud, but in comparison with those in most neighboring countries they were free", (The East European Revolution, N. Y., 1951, p. 201). Such newspaper correspondents, however, as those representing Le Monde in Paris and the Times and Herald Tribune in New York, reported that, in general, so far as they could see, "there was neither violence nor abuse," and that elections went off rather quietly and fairly. There was sharp electioneering by the Catholic hierarchy, and by the Cardinal personally and this was considerably more prevalent than in 1945; on the other hand, it was widely reported that the police—Left-dominated—were as eager to show their partisanship as was the Prince-Prime Minister, Yett, we repeat, the general verdict, even of anti-Left observers, was that on the whole the election was quiet, free and bona fide.

Some complaints were made—as by the Cardinal—about the number of citizens still disfranchised because of their earlier prominence in fascist activities. But the fact is that while 5,100,000 cast ballots in 1945, the total voting in 1947 came to 5,400,000.

Howard K. Smith, writing of these elections, correctly points out that "only some 300,000 Hungarians were disqualified from voting on suspicion of having had Nazi affiliations." Mr. Smith uses the word "only" because, as he continues: "The proportion of disqualifications was the same as in the elections of democratic Belgium, where there were certainly far fewer Nazis than in Hungary" (cited work, p. 303).

For Americans, it may be worth recalling that during the eight years of our Revolution—and in some States for sometime after 1783—a greater proportion of Tories was disqualified (and otherwise discriminated against) than of fascists in post-war Hungary. Certainly, these disabilities were not unconnected with the fact that during that Revolution, out of a total white population of perhaps 2,500,000 men, women, and children, over 100,000 chose lives as political refugees rather than live in what many of them sneeringly called The Utopian States of America. Further, it is worth recalling that immediately after the Civil War in the South, while millions were newly enfranchised, the forces bringing about this enfranchisement also disfranchised about 250,000 leaders of the counter-revolutionary secessionist movement.

In the 1947 elections, there were ten parties competing. Four of these—the Smallholders, Communists, Social Democrats, and National Peasants—were representative of the still existing government coalition, as created two years before; six ran in opposition to the Government and represented varying degrees of Right opinion, running all the way over to slightly camouflaged totally fascist groups. Of the total votes cast, the four parties of the Government received about 3,300,000 votes; the six parties outside the Government received a little over 2 million votes.

The Communist party received more votes than did any other single party—a total of about 1,800,000 votes or roughly 22% of all votes cast. One of the opposition, the Democratic People's Party, came out with the second highest number of votes—about 815,000; the Smallholders were third with some 780,000; the Social Democrats fourth with 750,000. Fifth was another extremely Right-wing party, the Independent Party, with about 729,000 votes; the National Peasants was sixth with half a million votes.

It was noteworthy that the total voting for the two parties standing for Socialism came to about 38% of the entire electorate, or about 4% more than in 1945. In addition, many of the planks
of the other parties included more or less complete adherence to Socialism; it seems reasonably clear that, by 1947, a majority of the Hungarian electorate was voting in favor of Socialism, of varying modes and degrees.

Nevertheless, it is also important to see that certainly a large minority of the Hungarian electorate, in 1947, voted against Socialism; and a significant minority, totalling very nearly, if not fully, two millions were reflecting in their voting the deep impact upon their minds of the extremely reactionary policies that had characterized Hungarian life for centuries until 1945.

Still, the major result of the election was the large majority supporting the government bloc, and the fact that within that bloc the Communist Party emerged as the primary one, while the Smallholders had suffered a severe setback.

The fundamental reason for this result was the tremendous accomplishment of the government coalition in the preceding 30 months; and the basic reason for the emergence of the Communist Party as the number-one party in the country lay in its leadership in realizing this accomplishment—a leadership acknowledged by most Hungarians at the time. Michael Karolyi, returning to Hungary at the end of 1946, after over twenty years of exile, wrote:

The Communists had been admirable in their efforts to repair the destruction caused by the Red Army and the Germans. The currency was stabilized, bridges rebuilt, wreckage cleared, factories reopened. Their dynamism dragged the apathetic population in its wake, and even those who were hostile or neutral had to recognize their merits. Their competence, energy, and, at times, a wise sense of diplomacy and even tolerance when the interest of the party required it, were recognized by everyone. Although feared, they were admired. The bourgeois parties were of little consequence, having no definite program, and no leading personalities (cited work, p. 334).

The Communists won leadership in the election of 1947, because they had been the leaders in reconstructing and revolutionizing the nation from 1945 to 1947.

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In 1948, there were three events having the profoundest impact upon political forms and institutions in Hungary. First, in February, the Social-Democratic Party, at its 37th Annual Congress, voted to join with the Communist Party. The Communist Party and the Social-Democratic Party thereupon ceased to exist as separate entities; instead appeared one working-class party of Socialism—the Hungarian Workers Party.

The unification reflected the fact that after the War, in the common effort to rebuild and to transform, Socialists and Communists increasingly stood united in deed and fact. It reflected, also, a realization on the part of the Left that, in Hungary, there persisted a numerous and dangerous Right, significant sections of which not only opposed Socialism, but favored a return to monarchism, Horthyism, fascism. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of this fear upon the history of post-war Hungary; and it is very easy, especially for outsiders, to minimize the reality of the danger producing that fear.

Howard K. Smith, commenting on the process whereby the Right was increasingly isolated and the Left unified, remarked on how vivid were the memories of the White Terror following World War I, and the sufferings and abominations of the Horthy era. He reported, and the Left knew, that “the dispossessed landlords and hard-bitten dismissed officers had flooded into the ranks of the Smallholders”; the reality of counter-revolutionary conspiracies and of Western support therefor, was indubitable (and we shall refer to this, at length, later). Moreover, as Smith also declares: “The history of eastern Europe is a long story of well-intentioned peasant parties winning strength only to be gobbled up by the old rulers” (cited work, p. 306). After 1919-1945, the Hungarian Left—and Communists in particular—would remember this and were determined that it would never happen again. How to prevent it successfully and to avoid mistakes and crimes and a pattern of imposed conformity and rigorous restraint is another, but closely related problem, and this, too, will be dealt with later. But, now, in comprehending the unification of the Hungarian Left, this fear of the return to power of fascists must be borne in mind. When to this is added the life-and-death questions posed by the Cold War, the urgency of the fear can be appreciated.

Further, it is necessary not only to bear in mind the Hungarian experience of the White Terror and Horthy and Szalasi, and the complexities of Cold War diplomacy, but also the especially vicious, medieval-like character of the clerico-magnate elite. Michael Karolyi’s autobiography is especially enlightening on this point, and because of his own aristocratic background and political history, is also particularly authoritative on the point. During
World War I, when Karolyi describes himself politically in British terms as "a Liberal with Labour sympathies," he felt "that the ruling classes could be convinced and reasoned with. It was only after bitter experience," he continues, "that I realized the futility of such an effort in Hungary." Later, after the overthrow of the Monarchy, and the beginning of the short-lived, progressive Karolyi Republic, the same man comments: "We, animated by the pacifist spirit which came to us from the army, were filled with forgiveness for our foes of yesterday and of the morrow. We were bitterly to regret this generous attitude."

Then, after the treason of the Right which led to the slaughter of thousands of Hungarian troops by the Rumanian Army, and the foreign-supported overthrow of the Kun government, and the Horthy terror, Karolyi experienced "utter disillusionment with my own class." "Our mistake," he came to believe, "was too much liberalism and attachment to democratic ideals." Hitherto, he had believed that a new order based on planned economy could be achieved by democratic methods and that the owners of capital would themselves come to the conclusion that the principle of laissez faire did not pay. I believed that organized production and democracy were not incompatible; but now I realized that democracy, at least for the time being, was an impediment to progress in Eastern Europe. Our ruling classes were too stubborn and too selfish. They could only be tamed by their own methods. I felt that not to recognize the logical deduction of this lesson was pure sentimentality, and might cause more misery.

Karolyi continues:

I did not reject the theory of evolutionary tactics altogether, but the Second International was, I felt, in those days consolidating capitalism. Therefore, I argued, power had to be seized by revolution and retained by dictatorial measures until a new staff of civil servants could be formed. Democracy was a luxury we could not yet afford. The struggle could not yet be waged without the help of the Communists if we did not want the old feudal system to return, reinforced by up-to-date methods of terror. I had to face these harsh facts, I had no choice (cited work, pp. 78, 127, 176-77).

We do not mean to examine, at this point, what are, in our opinion inconsistencies in logic and erroneous conclusions in these passages. But we do bring them before the reader as key sentences, from a person of enormous learning, unquestioned integrity and unparalleled experiences, directly relevant to understanding the motive force behind Communist-Socialist unity in Hungary and helping to make comprehensible much subsequent Hungarian history, including the upheaval of 1956.

With the election victory in November and the merger of parties in February, the Left was ready to propose a further basic move in the direction of Socialism. It proposed that the state take over the ownership of all industrial plants (except those that were foreign-owned) employing over one hundred people. To this, at least as much as on the question of nationalizing the banks, there was, as one might expect, the sharpest opposition from the Right. Yet, it was done peacefully and through parliamentary action. With its accomplishment, the financial, mining and industrial features of the Hungarian economy had been, on the whole, socialized. Three areas remained for the future: foreign-owned industry, businesses with 100 or less employees, and agriculture.

But the sharpest struggle of all was still ahead; it involved church-state relationships, especially as these affected the educational system of the nation. That system, in its entirety—with the exception of certain institutions of higher learning—was parochial, rather than secular. That is, under the Monarchy and under the Regent, education in Hungary had been a function of the Church. This had resulted from the unity that had prevailed between Church and State; in Hungary the Roman Catholic religion was the established one, others were tolerated. One result of this was that the Cardinal was the Prince-Primiate in fact and not just in name. That is, the Cardinal had been, as we have mentioned, the first officer of the Upper House and in it, ex officio, sat all the Bishops. Church salaries were paid by the State—and the salary of the Cardinal was twice that of the Prime Minister.

This established position of the Church—identical to that of the Church in Franco Spain—was eliminated in the New Hungary of the Republic and of Socialism; religion was to be made a strictly private, personal and non-political matter. Whether or not one believed in and worshipped God—and what kind of God—was to be left solely to the private desire of the individual, with neither State interference nor support.

The fact, however, was that so intertwined was the Church with the State, in centuries of Hungarian history, that their separation was infinitely more difficult than it had been in the United
States, for example—though even in the United States the separation required time and patience and has yet to be fully achieved, with signs accumulating that the process has been reversed.

In Hungary the basic process of separation was begun with the establishment of the Republican form of government, the enunciation in law of the aim of separation, and the Land Reform Act, with its confiscation of the very swollen land holdings of the Church. The next major step in this direction was the secularization of the educational system.

Almost 65% of all schools in Hungary, after World War II, were the property and the responsibility of the Roman Catholic Church; the remaining schools, also parochial, were the responsibility of other churches—Calvinist, Lutheran, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, etc.

The secularization of schools was not opposed by the minority churches; on the contrary, they generally favored the move as they favored all moves to disestablish the Roman Catholic church as the State Church of Hungary. But the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, and the Cardinal personally and in particular, did oppose it with intensity. The nature of the opposition will be examined at another place. Here the condition of the educational system confronting the Government of New Hungary is to be made clear.

As we have stated, about 65% of the schools were owned by the Roman Catholic Church. That Church hired and fired teaching and administrative personnel, completely controlled the curriculum, selected and distributed all textbooks; in a word, the education of the large majority of the citizens of Hungary was utterly dominated by the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church—a hierarchy which all observers agree was the staunchest bulwark, politically, physically and ideologically of the old, defeated—and in terms of the Potsdam Treaty and the 1947 Peace Treaty, in part, at least, illegalized—fascistic order.

The textbooks were brazenly racist and chauvinist and expansionistic; their viewpoint of science was medieval.

All this was impossible enough for a government seeking to root out monarchy and aristocracy and chauvinism and to replace these with new forms of mass sovereignty, and with an egalitarian ideology appropriate to Socialism. In addition, its persistence was impermissible to a government whose program of Socialism necessitated an increasingly advanced form of agriculture and a highly advanced industrial base. Such changes required technically advanced masses and therefore scientific training on an appropriate mass scale.

By 1947, the Government had begun to introduce 8-year elementary schools, instead of the conventional 4-year (at most 6-year) schools that had hitherto sufficed for the overwhelming majority of Hungarians. After the 1947 elections, new textbooks were published by the government, including works in science which took account of the ideas of Darwin. The Church hierarchy remained intransigent and, on the question of education, the Cardinal refused even to enter negotiations unless the State first admitted the Church's right to dominate the school system.

By the spring of 1948, the Government picked up the gauntlet and introduced a measure for the gradual secularization of the schools. This measure included compensation where property losses to the Church resulted; it included continued employment (with a pay raise) of the existing teaching staff, plus two hours per week compulsory religious instruction in all schools. The law also exempted from its provisions “schools specifically dedicated to religious instruction,” which, indeed, were to continue to receive financial support from the State.

Despite the vehemence of the Cardinal's opposition—and more will be said of this at another place—this bill was approved by the Hungarian Parliament, on June 15, 1948, by a vote of 293 to 63, with 71 abstentions and absences. Thus was dealt a major blow to a basic source of strength for reaction in Hungary, and thus was another stone laid in the foundations of a Socialist Hungary.

Following the agrarian revolution, the rooting out of monarchical political forms and their replacement with those of a Republic, the nationalization of mines, banks and certain of the largest plants, and simultaneous with the advance in terms of Church-State separation and the educational system, came the interrelated, and fundamental effort to bring about the industrial development of Hungary.

This industrialization was related to the solution—as we have seen—of the land question; it was basic to the effort to transform the semi-colonial position of Hungary vis-à-vis Western European and American monopoly capitalism; it was central in a political sense insofar as an industrial working class was the class in whose
hands rested the destiny of Socialism; it was significant in a military sense—especially after the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan officially launched the Cold War—for the sinews of modern war lay in industry.

Fundamental, then, to the Three-Year Plan adopted by Parliament on July 1, 1947—that is, even before the 1947 elections—was the effort to transform Hungary into a country having a modern industry and agriculture in a balanced proportion. In terms of the hundreds of years of Hungarian history wherein the country had been possessed of a completely backward, overwhelmingly agrarian economy, this called for—on those grounds alone, regardless of the others enumerated above—intense preoccupation with the task of industrialization. Errors and mistakes and imbalances that appeared—and became perfectly clear with hindsight—will be examined in another place. Here it is the real historical need for the program of industrialization that is insisted upon; and with that we proceed to an analysis of the results in this sphere in the first years after the adoption of the 1947 Three-Year Plan.

Observers agree that this first Hungarian Plan produced remarkably beneficial results. Doreen Warriner pays high tribute to the leadership of the nation, and its population, which, with the implementation of that Plan, rebuilt the awful war devastation, tremendously advanced industrialization, made agriculture more productive than before and simultaneously advanced, to a marked degree, the living standards of the masses (cited work, p. 110). In earlier pages we have offered similar estimates from other sources—all of them also non-Communist, and some quite anti-Communist.

Additionally, the American correspondent and news analyst, Howard K. Smith, declared that at the close of 1948, industrial production in Hungary—but three years away from the utter destruction of the war—was already far above pre-war levels. He continued:

the standard of living for the mass of the people was higher than it had ever been in Hungarian history. Mining and metallurgical industries were producing 37% more than in 1938, the machine industries nearly 70% more, the chemical industry 23% and the textile industry 10% more... In October, 1948, all industrial real wages were running between 15 and 20% higher than before the war (cited work, p. 315).

Ilona Polanyi, in Hungary after the war, writing for the organ of the London Institute of World Affairs (World Affairs, April 1949, p. 137) observed a revitalization in the functioning of the masses themselves—a new spirit amongst them, and this too coincides with the findings of witnesses of varied viewpoints, writing of this period. Said Miss Polanyi:

With full scale industrialization and the intensification of agriculture as a target all the atrophied and latent political forces were called to the fore while the hold on them of vested interest and of semi-feudal bondage was weakened and ultimately lifted. A brand new democracy which in actual fact is a democracy in being must guard against a reversal of political power until its social base and its political institutions are stabilized.

Facts culled from the United Nation's Economic Survey of Europe in 1950 (Geneva, 1951) supplement the data and impressions offered by Mr. Smith and Miss Polanyi. The general overall index of industrial production for Hungary in 1950—with its production for 1938 equalling 100—stood at 207. The output per worker in industry, 1935–38 equalling 100, stood at 103 in 1949 and at 124 in 1950. The production of building materials, using 1938 again as the base year, was 91 in 1947, 101 in 1948, and 130 in 1948. Chemical production, with 1938 at 100, found 1947 at 88; 1948 at 107; and 1949 at 174. Hungary's installed electric generating capacity, in thousands of kilowatts, was 690 in 1938; 823 in 1948; 870 in 1949; and 1030 in 1950.

In production of cotton yarn and wool yarn the development was slower; in wool there was, in fact, no advance. Here one is to bear in mind that this kind of production existed, in considerable quantity, in pre-war Hungary and that war damage to it was very heavy; further, Hungarian industrialization concentrated upon heavy, or basic industry, not upon consumer's or processing industry. Nevertheless, in this early period the rapidity of recovery from war devastation and, in the case of production of cotton yarn, the rate of increase over pre-war standards, are impressive. The figures, in thousands of tons, are:

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In agriculture the pre-war standard had been attained by the end of 1949, a remarkable feat when the completeness of the wartime destruction of farm implements, draft animals, cattle, sheep
and pigs is recalled. Bearing in mind that the past weighs especially heavy in rural areas, that change there is necessarily slower, that man's dependence upon nature is much greater (for example, there was a severe drought in 1946), the progress made was great and reflected the impetus coming from the Land Reform Act of 1945.

The index number of agricultural production (100 for 1934-38) was at 60 in 1946-47; 64 in 1947-48; and 98 in 1948-49. The number of cattle was 2,372 thousands in 1938-39; 1626 in 1948-49; and 2159 in 1949-50. The number of pigs, in thousands, was 3886 in 1938-39; 5,600 in 1948-49; and 4,350 in 1940-50. Meanwhile the mechanization of agriculture was leaping ahead: in 1935 there were 7,000 tractors on Hungarian farms; in 1948 there were 13,300; in 1948, 15,000; in 1950, 18,000.

All in all, the conclusion of Howard K. Smith, on this period of the first Three-Year Plan, stands as indubitably correct: "The standard of living for the mass of the people was higher than it had ever been in Hungarian history." That this is true emerges not only from all eye-witness accounts, including those of distinctly non-Communist observers, and not only from the statistics (combed and checked by UN experts) already offered; it is reinforced by the fact that by 1950, for the first time in at least a century of Hungarian history, unemployment had vanished. For the first time in Hungarian history, a complete system of socialized medicine was created and there was provided paid vacations for all workers, really universal education, and important social security benefits, especially for the incapacitated and the aged.

The Budapest correspondent of The (London) Times, writing April 1, 1948, summed up the overall situation during the period of the Three-Year Plan:

Listening to the wealthier peasants, to some of the middle classes, and to those both fairly and unfairly dispossessed, one would think that there was no one behind this Government at all. Listening to the poorer peasants, to their sons and daughters educated free in the new colleges, to young boys and girls going out to build railways, new fields, bring in harvests, and to most workers, one would think that the whole country was enthusiastic for it.... Treaties have been signed with nations near by, for centuries enemies... Beyond Vienna there is little talk of war. Deserts of ruins have been rebuilt, and the economic plans are a kind of pledge of a more prosperous future (quoted by E. P. Young in The Labour Monthly, Jan. 1957).

Having brought forward the above quotation from The Times, in 1948, in a particular context, the reader may have missed its pointed reference to the existence in Hungary of decided opposition to the new course among the de-classed and the newly dispossessed. This, however, is in accord with the results of the 1947 elections; it is, also, in accord with the observations of reporters whose views, it may be presumed, differed sharply from those of the Times correspondent.

Thus, the Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg, was in Budapest early in 1946. He noted that while hard and creative work was going forward, still there remained "jackals"—prostitutes and parasites, "who spend their leisure condemning the government, condemning reforms, and longing for a new Horthy" (quoted by Vamberg, cited work, p. 196). Michael Gold, well-known American radical author, was in Hungary in 1950. He was struck, as were so many other observers, by the rebuilding and the social progress; by the sense of confidence and zest in living that so many of its inhabitants radiated. At the same time, he commented upon a contrary note:

If you want to see a museum of the past in Budapest, walk along Andrássy Street, which is the Champs Elysées of the city. There are hundreds of little cafes still flourishing here, crowded all day and night with well-dressed men and women sipping tiny cups of coffee, chatting endlessly, dramatically. They are the old Hungarian upper classes, former factory owners, land barons, playwrights, art critics, journalists, police agents, and church and state bureaucrats (The Worker, N. Y., July 9, 1950).

Nevertheless, the now-dominant, united Communist and Social-Democratic parties—the Hungarian Workers' Party—felt itself strong enough, the popular temper ready, the social and political and economic base sufficiently broad and sound, and the exigencies of foreign and domestic threats such, as to move, in Parliament, for the adoption of a new Constitution, formally proclaiming Hungary a People's Republic. This meant adoption of a political form corresponding, in the judgement of its initiators, to a state wherein the basic means of production were already socialized or clearly in the process of being socialized; wherein the rule of the working class and the peasantry was formally proclaimed. It meant a form of proletarian dictatorship, which carried with it three basic components: 1) the building of Socialism; 2) the extension of real sovereignty and fullest freedom to the workers and peasants; 3) the strictest control over and
repression of all attempts by opponents of Socialism and of worker-peasant power to recoup their strength or block their elimination or restore themselves to power. All three of these components are fundamental to proletarian dictatorship; should any one be weakened or relaxed or distorted, all would suffer to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon the degree and duration of error or distortion. All three, also, were processes, to be carried out over a more or less prolonged period of time and depending upon domestic and foreign conditions, as well as national peculiarities, traditions, and limitations.

The Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic came into effect on August 20, 1949. On December 28, 1949, the last step, in industry, befitting this political form was taken when the government nationalized all enterprises employing over ten workers, and all enterprises in the control or possession of foreign capital.

In nationalizing all foreign-owned enterprises, the Hungarian government made the point that foreign investors were intentionally retarding industrial development and actually sabotaging economic planning.

According to the New York Times (December 30, 1949) the major American-owned properties were the Standard Electric Company, the Hungarian Telephone Manufacturing Company, and the Vacuum Oil Company. Several important British-owned corporations were involved, including: Shell Oil, First Hungarian Thread Company, the Hungarian Rubber Goods Company, and the British-Hungarian Jute Company. The Brown Boveri electrical appliances company was Swiss-owned; the Budakalasz textile mills were French-owned; the Hungarian Phillips Radio Equipment works were owned by Dutch investors; the matches of Hungary were produced in three large factories belonging to the Swedish Match Company. These seem to have been the most significant foreign investments, totalling many millions of dollars, that were nationalized by the New Hungary in the closing days of 1949.

IV. Counter-Revolution and Cold War

Counter-revolution succeeded in Hungary, in 1919, because of the diplomatic, political, economic and military support of Western imperialism. Its success, however, depended upon the machinations and activities of the threatened domestic vested interests—the landed magnates, the ecclesiastical and military hierarchy, the urban upper classes. There were, clearly, closely interlocked internal and external features to the 1919 counter-revolution (and its subsequent ability to retain power). With no countervailing power then at hand, extreme reaction triumphed easily in post-World War I Hungary.

The same classes, again backed by Western imperialism, engaged in preparations for the same result, as soon as it became clear—certainly by 1944—that the Axis was doomed to defeat by an Alliance which included the Soviet Union. From the beginning, however, the hopes of counter-revolution in the post-World War II period rested upon the outbreak of war between the West and the Soviet Union. As an incident to that war (assuming, of course, the defeat of the U.S.S.R.), the restoration would triumph in Hungary—the more so as it bordered upon the Soviet Union and would necessarily be, in the projected World War III, as it had been in World War II, a base from which to attack.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, addressing Congress, on September 14, 1943, said:

We shall not be able to claim that we have gained total victory in this war if any vestige of fascism in any of its malignant forms is permitted to survive anywhere in the world.

The pledges of Yalta and Potsdam, and the provisions of the peace treaties, to root out the last remnants of fascism and to prohibit its revival would appear to represent a vindication of Roosevelt's promise. But, in fact, World War II had within it, from beginning to end, an intra-imperialist as well as a pro-democratic and anti-fascist content. Moreover, fascism was a particularly
brutal form of tyranny growing out of a monopoly capitalism in the throes of general crisis. It therefore exercised great appeal to war leaders in the capitalist world; most complete in that sector which was fascistic, less complete in that sector where fascism had not triumphed.

These divisions, intensified by fear of the Soviet Union, were manifest throughout the war years, and grew as those years passed on. It is no accident, but the consequence of these political forces, that from November, 1941, through January, 1942, less than half the American war equipment promised the U.S.S.R. was delivered, and that it required the personal intercession of the President, in March, 1942, to lift strange barriers.

As a dozen books have demonstrated, there was a deliberate two-year delay in opening the Second Front. Powerful reactionaries, in the American and British governments, courted Vichy, bolstered the fascists, Darlan and Peyrouton, blessed Franco, maintained diplomatic relations until June 30, 1944, with Mannerheim's Finland, actively allied with Hitler, propped up King Victor Emmanuel in Italy, King George in Greece, King Peter in Yugoslavia, encouraged Otto of Hapsburg, welcomed the fascists, Eichardt of Hungary and Smetona of Lithuania...

Already by October, 1942, as Andrew Rothstein later revealed, Prime Minister Churchill was circulating a memorandum on highest diplomatic levels advocating the formation of a United States of Europe, including Spain and Turkey, to act as an anti-Soviet bloc, to prevent "the measureless disaster" of the triumph, in Europe, of "Russian barbarism" (A History of the U.S.S.R., London, 1950, p. 555).

These reactionary — and in wartime downright treasonous — plans and moods were accelerated by the great victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad. On March 20, 1943, the American correspondent of the London Daily Mail reported the changed atmosphere. He stated that while Roosevelt still showed no desire to acquire "bases right and left," others in Washington did. He noted that many in high places suddenly were ready "on the slightest provocation" to abuse the Soviet Union. "While there is a vast admiration among the great mass of the people for the Red Army," he concluded, "the men of money and power still seem suspicious, even hostile, to the Soviet."

This hostility became so open and notorious that it evoked sharply rebuking editorials. These editorials appeared because the labor movement, mass organizations, a potent Left, the New Deal's political alliance and the war's progressive nature cried out against the Soviet-haters. They make fascinating reading at the present time.

The New York Herald Tribune said on February 11, 1943:

There are but two choices before the democracies now. One is to cooperate with Russia in rebuilding the world — as there is an excellent chance of doing, if we believe in the strength of our own principles and prove it by applying them. The other is to get involved in intrigues with all the reactionary and anti-democratic forces in Europe, the only result of which will be to alienate the Kremlin.

Three days later the New York Times noted a developing crescendo of anti-Soviet reports "in private conversations, in the press, over the radio and in Congress." These, said the Times:

carry the danger that they will provide a fertile ground for the latest Nazi propaganda with which Hitler hopes to escape the consequences of defeat — the propaganda which raises the bogey of a Bolshevist domination of Europe in an effort to scare the world, divide the United Nations and therewith pave the way for a compromise peace.

Freda Kirchwey warned in The Nation of February 27, 1943, that: "A return to pre-war power politics, built on a system of reactionary states held together by American food and Allied arms, would confirm Russia's old fears — fears which Allied foreign policy has done little to dispel." A month later, writing in the New Republic, George Soule declared that a continuance of the manifest anti-Soviet maneuvering would lead to a post-war effort "to build up a new 'cordon sanitaire' of anti-Bolshevist states, and may even, after the dissolution of the Nazis, connive at the erection of a newly powerful Germany as an essential element in the balance of power, a nation in which the old military caste will have a chance to resume its accustomed role."

By April 3, 1943, the editors of The Nation, in discussing "Russia After the War," warned that many of the rich insisted on the inevitability of World War III — a "thought entertained by powerful forces in the United States which fear any modification of property relationships and are made uneasy by the possible existence of a powerful and successful collectivist state in the world."

Specifically, in terms of Eastern Europe, as Doreen Warriner writes: "In 1944 all the anti-Soviet elements in the Balkan
capitals believed that America and Britain would invade the Balkans after the defeat of Germany," (cited work, p. 21n.). Leigh White, an American correspondent in the Balkans, writing in 1944, commented upon "the disreputable dynasties (there) of which our Mehemtichs of the State Department and Foreign Office are apparently so enamored" (cited work, p. 459). The distinguished English historian, Professor A. J. P. Taylor, in his introduction to the Memoirs of Michael Karolyi, declares that: "Even in the Second World War, when Hungary was an enemy state, and democratic Hungarians, one might have thought, our only friends, the British Foreign Office looked with favour on Horthy, Kallay and the rest, while Michael Karolyi was held at arm's length."

Thus it is that the Hungarian journalist, G. Paloczi-Horvath, wrote in London in 1944, as follows:

No wonder if the Hungarian fascists retain the conviction intimate that, despite another war lost on Germany's side, they will still enjoy the goodwill of financial circles in the Western capitals. They remain deeply convinced that 1944 will not prove essentially different from 1918. There will again be military missions with which they can "confer" about the plans of the new constitutional governments, and again there will be foreign business interests which hope to reap advantages by promising their support to reactionary circles... Unless the Allies make it unmistakably clear that only a truly democratic Hungary can count on their sympathy, we can be sure that the old game will be started again. In that case the Allies will eventually find that they have been restoring the power of Germany in Central Europe by fostering those social forces which can never accept the hegemony of the Slav people in the Danube (cited work, p. 18).

With whom were the Western diplomats friendly in Hungary; which social forces did they foster? Mr. O. W. Riegel, in the American diplomatic service in Italy, 1944-1945, and Chief Public Affairs Officer, U. S. legation in Budapest, 1945-1946, later a Professor at Washington & Lee University—tells us in an article appearing in The Public Opinion Quarterly, (Spring, 1947):

When I left Italy in the Summer of 1945 (writes Mr. Riegel), talk of an inevitable war with Russia was fashionable with the Catholic Right and the small cynics who know the answer to everything. Arriving in Hungary, I found this same inevitability of war an article of general faith, intensified by a heritage of Nazi propaganda and wishful thinking.

He found, in agreement with all other observers—the testimony of some of whom has been offered on earlier pages—that "...fascism and para-fascism, with their off-shoots of anti-Semitism and clerical reaction, are still strong forces in the country." These forces gained encouragement from the American officials, for in Mr. Riegel's words: "The Americans gravitate toward the most dubious elements remaining in Hungary, the remnants of the gentry, industrialists, the higher clergy, and the motley assortment of fascists and opportunists."

People on the spot, then, tell us that among Right-wing elements in Italy and in the Balkans (and in Hungary specifically) there was a general expectation of and hope for imminent attack upon the U.S.S.R. by the United States and Great Britain. Meanwhile, as we now know, Prime Minister Churchill was instructing Field Marshal Montgomery to be prepared at a moment's notice, to rearm German prisoners of war for this very purpose; and in the United States, President Roosevelt's chief personal adviser, Harry Hopkins, was entering in his journal in August, 1945: "There are plenty of people in America who would have been perfectly willing to see our armies go right on through Germany and fight with Russia after Germany was defeated."

Later in that same year of 1945 when Leo Gruliow, American Representative for Russian War Relief, returned to the United States, the first words from an American businessman that he heard were: "So you've been to Russia! Well, tell me, we going to have to fight them?" (Antioch Review, Summer, 1947.)

Exactly because of the special features in Hungary's history and development, which we attempted to make clear earlier, it was selected by United States officials as a prime subject for the institution of a policy of counter-revolution and war.

Within the country, as R. H. Markham wrote from Budapest to the Christian Science Monitor (April 13, 1946), reiterating universal findings:

...are political clericalism, resurgent feudalism, and exaggerated nationalism, anti-Semitism and outright nazism... There does exist an extreme clerical element centered around Cardinal Mindszenty, which wants to restore church lands and the old autocratic regime. Naturally, the great proprietors who lost their estates through Hungary's sweeping land reform, cooperate in every way with the clerical opposition.

That this country was picked for special attention by American diplomacy was explicitly stated in a remarkable dispatch sent from Paris, on September 28, 1946, by the well-known journalist,
THE TRUTH ABOUT HUNGARY

Alexander Kendrick. The extract is fairly long, but it merits the closest attention:

American foreign policy, seeking some spot in Europe where it can test its "toughness" and strength, has looked at Hungary and decided like Brigham Young that, "this is the place"...

U. S. support of Hungary—which before the war was the most feudalistic country in Europe, and which during the war seized more territory than any other aggressor except Germany itself—was frankly explained to a small private meeting with the British Dominion's delegates by Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, U. S. Ambassador to Moscow.*

"The Communist Party is the party in Hungary; in Czechoslovakia it's the first party; that's why we favor Hungary," Smith is quoted as telling the Dominion representatives...

The open American wooing of Hungary, it can be stated, is predicated on the assumption that before many months go by the Soviet Army will be withdrawing from Central Europe on a large scale and that the Magyars offer a better chance for return of Western capital and influence than the Rumanians or Bulgarians (PM, N. Y., Sept. 29, 1946).

Without question, the late and thoroughly expert Professor Oscar Jaszi, stated the essence of the matter, writing on "The Choices in Hungary" in Foreign Affairs, April, 1946: "...the whole diplomacy of the West is impregnated with a counter-revolutionary spirit"; it was such a line pursued successfully after World War I "which restored feudalism under the dictatorship of Horthy," but whether it would succeed after World War II was highly dubious, in Jaszi's opinion.

Certainly, everyone assumed that the policy carried with it the calculated risk of war against the Soviet Union. Indeed, so mixed were the two policies—counter-revolution in the newly liberated areas, and war upon the U.S.S.R.—that it is impossible, if not wrong, to separate them. There was precious little reticence on the part of the United States elite in expressing this relationship and threatening war. It was implicit in President Truman's "containment" and explicit in President Eisenhower's "liberation." So open was it that when Michael Karolyi was in Paris in 1947 as New Hungary's Ambassador to France his opposite number from the United States, Mr. Jefferson Caffrey, "surprised me with the blunt statement that in a very short time the U.S.A. would be ready for war, 'and will wage it, if...

*Gen. Smith later became Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to be succeeded by the present incumbent, Allen W. Dulles.

Counter-Revolution and Cold War

Russia won't listen to reason! (citied work, p. 344).

Miss Doreen Warriner, once again, has expressed the heart of Western policy towards the New Europe with great insight. Writing in 1950, she declared:

Since 1945, it has been the policy of British and American governments to oppose this (East European) revolution at every stage, and to support the opposition to it, in whatever form it has arisen, with the object of fighting Soviet influence in this region. Behind this policy there lies no constructive idea. Its aim is simply to restore the peace settlement of 1919. Had the Western powers been able to influence the course of events, they would have put back into power the same kind of governments which existed before, and whose failure led to fascism (citied work, p. XIV).

By 1949, the American reporter, Joseph C. Harsch, writing of Eastern Europe, said that while he found the efforts of U. S. officials singularly inept in Hungary, nevertheless, "nowhere else has American diplomacy associated itself so openly and aggressively with the dispossessed elements" (Harper's Magazine, October, 1949, p. 34).

A prototype of the kind of statesman Miss Warriner had in mind in speaking of "the same kind of governments (as) existed before," surely is Ferenc Nagy. This gentleman, whose positions included Secretary of the Horthy Parliament during the War, founder of the Smallholders Party in 1941 and Prime Minister of Hungary from 1945-1947 (and later in exile in the United States), has expressed his views for an American audience—as persuasively as he could presumably—in a book, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, published by Macmillan in 1948.

This book is anti-Semitic in a somewhat aloof and refined manner, and anti-Communist and anti-Soviet to an hysterical and fanatical degree. Its author makes very clear that it was only dire necessity that led him to agree to serve in a government with Communists and that he looked forward eagerly to the time when this would be unnecessary. He makes clear, too, that he considered one of his key functions as a member of the government to be the protection of the system of private property. He remarks that there were occasional "clandestine meetings" between people of his views and Western representatives, though he refrains from elaborations. He conveys the impression that Left charges of conspiracies against the Government by the Right were exaggerated and distorted, but confirms that some had substance; he appears to regret their exposure more than their
existence. The concluding section of his work is a long and impassioned argument in favor of what has since become the official Republican Party line of "liberation."

Mr. Nagy, in this 1948 book, makes perfectly plain that by "liberation," he means war and that only war could bring what he desires. He makes clear, too, that while he concentrates on Hungary, he expects the war to bring general "liberation." Thus "... it must be clearly recognized that a defensive policy against the Soviet Union's dynamic thrust is destined to defeat; only a policy intent on liberation and designed to insure an ultimately united Europe could successfully confront the Soviet Union" (p. 455). Again, a little more clearly:

Contrary to every optimistic declaration, it could hardly be expected that the threat of Communism would be removed by peaceful means. The voice of those who speak of the possibility of avoiding war wavers. It can be assumed that, aside from the Soviet, no one desires war. But certainly the free peoples would endure even an armed conflict to eliminate constant dread and secure their freedom (p. 455).

In this war that free peoples are certainly ready to endure, in Mr. Nagy's opinion, the United States is assigned a pre-eminent role: "In the coming great crisis America will not appear as a supporting power, but as the country charged with the initiative and direction" (pp. 457-58).

With the war's termination, Mr. Nagy expects people to have survived in sufficient numbers and to be in sufficient control of their faculties so that governments will still be desired. Needless to say, under these new and refreshed and liberated conditions, the private property system will re-appear. But, what of the guilty—particularly if masses themselves are more or less guilty? "A new order," Mr. Nagy writes, with statesmanlike forbearance, "cannot be built on the punishment of the masses." Of course, those really guilty—exactly who and how numerous we are not told—will be punished but: "The misled masses must be de-politicized. In the new world order, the masses must have no opportunity or occasion to go astray politically" (pp. 459-60).

Meanwhile, on the highest policy level, the United States Government pursued a program explicitly directed towards the "containment" of the Soviet Union. This policy declared its enemy to be the U.S.S.R., and pledged itself not only to thwart whatever it felt was that country's will or interest, but also pledged itself to the preservation, in the name of preventing "internal aggression" by Communism, of a reactionary status quo throughout the world.

This was implemented by undisguised or barely disguised direct military interference as in Greece, China, and Guatemala; by economic boycott and subsidy as in the Marshall Plan (1947); by military alliances as NATO (1949) and SEATO (1954); by the establishment of literally hundreds of air and naval bases in dozens of foreign countries, admittedly selected on the strength of their tactical and strategic usefulness in war upon the Soviet Union; by an early and widely publicized campaign for the development of weapons of terror and annihilation—as bacteriological and thermonuclear weapons; by hysterical "civil defense" and witchhunting programs; and by the expenditure in a few years of hundreds of billion of dollars for armaments—expenditures reaching such fantastic proportions as to result in the quasi-militarization of the nation's entire economy.

The manifest and announced challenge that all this, and more, represented to the lands stretching from Prague to Peking was as critical as it was obvious. In response there developed in those lands civilian and military measures that had momentous results upon their political and economic life, results whose dire impact intensified because in socialist-based and planned economies only one thing is more disruptive or distressing than expenditure for arms, and that is expenditure for actual war.

The impact of these world-wide events and policies upon the eight million Hungarian people, located in Europe's heart, devastated by war, wracked by inflation, trying to move from feudalism to socialism, was of a decisive nature. We shall revert again to this central matter as we inquire, later, into the fail-

*Official figures for National Security Expenditures by the U. S. Government, since 1947, are as follows:

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<th>(Billions of Dollars)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1947 — 13.3</td>
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<td>1957 — 43.0 (planned)</td>
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The total expended in the ten years from 1947 to 1956, inclusive, is approximately $330 billions.
ings, errors, blunders, distortions and crimes that marked this effort, especially from 1950 on. But in everything that is said, the fundamental purposes and basic direction of the efforts of New Hungary, and the central impediment to those efforts represented by Western imperialism must always be remembered if one is to keep his bearings.


There is one aspect of American imperialism's program, seeking the return of reaction and the destruction of Socialism, which requires separate and extended scrutiny. This subject, which had particular application to and impact upon Hungary, is the official and quasi-official effort of that imperialism and its servitors to destroy the lands of Socialism—or, at least, harass and distress them—through counter-revolutionary activity. I think that never before in history has any government as a matter of announced policy carried out so elaborate and sustained a campaign of subversion and destruction as has the government of the United States against the lands of Socialism following World War II.

When we turn to this subject we understand at once that available information, given its very nature, is exceedingly scanty and no doubt possesses a high degree of unreliability. To mention but one fact from American history: that the private secretary and close friend of Benjamin Franklin while he was revolutionary America's chief representative to France, one Dr. Edward Bancroft, who saw all significant documents handled by Franklin or other members of the American diplomatic team in France—as Arthur Lee and John Adams; that the man who went on a secret mission to Ireland for France at Franklin's suggestion; that the man who was even jailed by England, and who devoted years, of apparently conscientious labors on behalf of the American cause, that he was all the time in England’s pay did not become known until almost a century after his death, when an American historian went through just-released English archival material. What the files of Central Intelligence and of the Pentagon, of the Intelligence services of the Departments of Defense and State—and the archives of other governments—will one day reveal to the historian it is impossible, of course, to even surmise. Yet one may say, in full confidence on the basis of past history, and on the basis of what is today available, that these archives now hide strange and sinister and terrible things, and that many of these strange and sinister and terrible things revolve around a fundamental purpose of these agencies — the destruction of Socialism.

The tactics of the American intelligence service in this respect are stated in cold type. Mr. Sherman Kent, during the War an officer in the Office of Strategic Service (OSS), and since the war one of the few publicly identified top-level members of the Central Intelligence Agency, has provided the public with this printed matter. In an interesting volume entitled Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton University Press, 1949), Mr. Kent describes the mechanics of intelligence work to be used against an enemy in war or in peace; the only caution he adds, and it is quite imprecise, is that during peace, these mechanics are to be employed “in their politer guises” (p. 20).

Mr. Kent describes the various modes of coming to grips with an enemy. These comprise what he calls conventional and political and economic warfare. And, continues Sherman Kent:

Next down the line is what is termed black propaganda, that which purports to come from dissident elements within the enemy's own population, but which is really carried on in great secrecy from the outside. Sometimes the black propaganda is done by radio, sometimes by leaflet, by fake newspaper, by forged letter, by any and all means occurring to perverse ingenuity. The instrumentalties under discussion thus far have been, by and large, applicable to the target by remote control; there are other instruments which can be employed only by penetrating enemy lines. This group of instruments leads off with the rumor invented and passed along by word of mouth, it includes subornation of perjury, intimidation, subversion, bribery, blackmail, sabotage in all its aspects, kidnapping, booby trapping, assassination, ambush, the franc tireur, and the underground army. It includes the clandestine delivery of all the tools of the calling: the undercover personnel, the printing press and radio set, the poison, the explosives, the incendiary substances, and the small arms and supplies for the thugs, guerrillas, and para-military formations (p. 21).

As I have said, this top-level CIA official, in preparing a text on the employment of "Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy," does remark that these particular methods are to be used "in politer guises" against an "enemy" when actual war does not exist. But how to prepare more politely the surprises he recommends is, to me, a riddle. However Mr. Kent may unravel this, the available material proves that the recommendations in his text have been the actual practices of his students during the past several years.
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Specifically, in terms of Mr. Kent’s textbook, it is interesting to note that the late Anthony Leviero, a leading reporter for the N. Y. Times, wrote in that newspaper, December 12, 1951, of the “three types of propaganda—white,” “black,” and “grey” in common usage. Continued Mr. Leviero, as though summarizing Mr. Kent:

White propaganda is straightforward overt action, such as the broadcasts of the Voice of America... Black propaganda conceals or falsifies the source, and may include violence, planting false rumors, the manufacture and propagation of scandals and other activities designed to sow confusion and distrust. Grey propaganda is employed in the twilight zone between white and black.

* * *

We wish to present at this point the evidence establishing the fact that the United States government has, in fact, been practicing a policy of attempting to damage or to overthrow, by counter-revolutionary violence, the Socialist governments. Because of the nature of this volume, we shall concentrate our attention upon the evidences of this kind of activity in the East European countries. That the same activity is carried on—in perhaps greater degree—in the Soviet Union and in China, is certain, but is beyond our scope.

In presenting this material, we are aware, as we have already stated, that it takes a distinctly subordinate position to overt military, diplomatic and economic policies of the United States government, seeking, in the guise of “containment” or roll-back or “liberation”, the same end. Indeed, this fifth-column activity is to be looked upon as merely an extension of those more open and more potent policies.

Nevertheless, the extent of this covert activity is so extraordinary—I think unprecedented in all history—and is so revealing of the real aims of the responsible Power, that it is worth extended notice. Moreover, as an American, the author feels it incumbent upon him to contribute his bit to the effort to inform others of this activity, because just as it is certain that the American people are not authorized it, it is equally certain that were they properly informed about it, they would demand its cessation.

Further, among people who feel themselves politically sophisticated and even some who identify themselves with Socialism, there is an attitude that may be summed up as follows: “Of course American imperialism seeks the destruction of Socialism and of course it has its agents for this purpose. Who does not know it? But this can have no real significance in terms of such an obviously mass upheaval as shook Hungary.”

To this I would say that the apparently rhetorical question: “Who does not know this?” is not really rhetorical. The fact is that the questioner almost certainly does not know it; he may admit it in general or abstract terms to himself, but unless one knows the facts, the extraordinary dimensions of this activity and its organic relationship with official governmental policy, it is simply impossible to begin to comprehend events such as those in Hungary. The understanding is impossible both in a remote and immediate sense; that is, the security measures undertaken by the East European countries (as well as their forced-march efforts at military preparedness) from which basically stemmed exaggeration, aberrations, wrong policies and criminal practices, cannot be understood; nor can the actual role of provocateurs and agents and emissaries in helping to spark or divert or misdirect or prolong legitimate manifestations of unrest and discontent be comprehended.

We repeat that all the evidence to be offered, as the reader will see, comes from thoroughly “respectable” American public sources of information; and add that, given the nature of the subject, it is certain that the public references indicate only a small fraction of the full story.

* * *

President Truman, largely upon the basis of urgent representations by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, appointed a Central Intelligence Group in January, 1946. Its task was to draw together and help coordinate the intelligence services of the Army, Navy, State and Justice Departments. This organization became fully institutionalized with the passage of an Act by Congress in 1947 establishing the Central Intelligence Agency. This Agency has since had three Directors, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, General Walter Bedell Smith (formerly Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., later Under-Secretary of State), and its present incumbent, Allen W. Dulles. This Mr. Dulles is the brother of the present Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and was in charge of intelligence espionage, and sabotage operations in the European Theatre during World War II. He operated out of a Bern headquarters and was heavily engaged in seeking agreements with “moderate” elements in enemy governments, with whom peace might be made, the
private property system preserved, the influence of American imperialism strengthened, the threat of Socialism overcome and the power of the post-war Soviet Union curbed.

The C.I.A., as established by Congress in 1947, was responsible only to another newly-created agency, the National Security Council, headed by the President, which was the top-level policy-making unit, particularly in diplomatic and military matters—overshadowing in fact the Cabinet's function in these areas. From the beginning the CIA lived a life apart—unquestioned and uncontrolled by any of the legislative or constitutional devices in the American system of government. In this sense, the CIA has been above and outside the law to a much greater degree than the Department of State and even the Atomic Energy Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Democratic Senator from Montana, Mike Mansfield, who has shown more concern than any other legislator about this unprecedented and completely unconstitutional arrangement, pointed out, in a speech on the Senate floor, March 10, 1954:

As it is now, however, CIA is freed from practically every ordinary form of Congressional check. Control of its expenditures is exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other government agencies. Its appropriations are hidden in allotments to other agencies, and the Bureau of the Budget does not report CIA's personnel strength to Congress. Each year only a handful of Members in each House see even the appropriation figures. There is no regular, methodical review of this agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few members of the appropriations committee. (Congressional Record, vol. 100, pp. 2966-90.)

The Senator agrees that an intelligence agency of some kind is needed and that it "must maintain complete secrecy to be effective." However, he sees "a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy." This is what he finds in the CIA and, as he says: "Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse," and the fact is that "secrecy now beclouds everything about CIA—its costs, its efficiency, its successes, and its failures." Moreover, a completely bureaucratic attitude, contemptuous of the law and of basic constitutional requirements, has permeated the CIA so that, the Senator went on:

An aura of superiority has been built around the CIA. Calls for an investigation of CIA personnel have met with a resistance not encountered from any other agency. The administration appears to support the view that CIA officials merit an immunity which has never been claimed for the State Department or other government agencies handling equally confidential matter. CIA seems to have marked out for itself a setting above other government agencies, Congress, and the public.

Senator Mansfield sought in 1953 and 1954 to get approval for a Joint Resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, to enforce constitutional safeguards, but both times his efforts were defeated. The CIA continues today to function in a uniquely and totally unconstitutional manner.*

Frank Gervasi, a well-known American writer, in Collier's magazine, for November 6, 1948, explains the relationship between the CIA and the National Security Council:

The CIA's recommendations go to the President and the National Security Council, the new high-level policy-making body. President and Council can ignore the CIA's suggestions. But they never have in the 18 months of the organization's life. The CIA is the mainspring, therefore, of our policy-making machinery (p. 78).

In 1948, after some grievous errors and mistakes by CIA officials and agents, a committee of three, headed by Allen W. Dulles, was empowered by the President to look into its operation. The result was the enactment of a law, in June, 1949, for the purpose of making the CIA more efficient and more powerful.

Christian Century commented, editorially, as follows:

Something happened in Washington on March 7 which marks a new milestone in the degradation of the American democratic ideal. At the behest of the new spy service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the House of Representatives suspended its rules to pass, almost unanimously, a bill about which its members knew next to nothing, which they were not permitted to amend or publicly discuss but which was reported in general terms to give legal status to the CIA, and to grant it ample funds and a free hand for its operations.

The magazine pointed out that there was only one provision of the bill concerning which any public scrutiny or discussion was permitted. This "was a provision permitting the CIA to bring 100 aliens into the U. S. every year for permanent residence

*In a letter to the present writer, dated Feb. 1, 1957, Senator Mansfield says of his Resolution: "I have not re-introduced it in this Congress but I do have the matter under consideration and study to see what procedure I will follow in view of the past opposition."
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without paying any attention to quota restrictions or immigra-
tion regulations and requirements." Concluded this editorial:

The mood in which Congress handled the bill was illustrated
by two remarks which the press attributed to Rep. Dewey Short of
Missouri (Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee). On
the day before the bill was rushed through, Mr. Short was quoted as
telling the Rules Committee, "It's a dirty business." When the bill
came to the floor of the House he asserted that it would be "su-
preme folly" to debate its provisions in the open (March 23, 1949,
p. 357).

The closest thing to a substantive remark concerning this law,
in the course of its "debate," was made by Rep. Carl T. Durham,
(D., N. C.) -a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
—who declared that "There are many people all over the world
who believe in this country." Many, he thought, were in socialist
lands and:

Some of them may have been formerly highly placed in the
service of their government. Some of them may even be there now.
Many of them have important intelligence information to make
available to this country (N. Y. Times, March 8, 1949).

Further significant details as to the organization and operation
of the CIA were revealed at the time that Senator Mansfield in-
troduced, in 1953, his first proposal for a Joint Committee on
Central Intelligence. This was done by one of the very few newspa-
pers to favor the proposal, the Richmond, Virginia, News
Leader. Editorializing on March 30, 1953, it remarked: "Of the
CIA, whose expenditures are reckoned by well-informed observers
at something in the neighborhood of $1 billion a year, the tax-
payer knows nothing."

It described the 1949 Act as "one of the most amazing laws
ever put on the books." It explained this characterization by sum-
marizing the law's provisions:

By this enactment, CIA is made exempt from all rules of pur-
chasing that apply to other agencies. It may hire and fire at will,
without regard to civil service regulations. All provisions of law
and all regulations "relating to the expenditure of Government
funds" are specifically waived for the CIA. It is above any law
that might require "the publication or disclosure of the organiza-
tion, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of per-
sonnel employed by the Agency." The Director of the Bureau of
the Budget is flatly instructed to make "no reports to Congress"
of CIA's expenditures, either lump sum or itemized. CIA spends
what it pleases, as it pleases, "solely on the certificate of the
Director ..."

Counter-Revolution and Cold War

This paper, seeking to learn who were the top administrators
of the CIA, had great difficulty and could come up only with the
names of a few: Mr. Dulles, himself; Sherman Kent, whom we
have met; and Walter R. Wolf, described as the Deputy Director
of the CIA, and, apparently at the same time, Vice-President of
the National City Bank of New York.

The Richmond newspaper returned to the same subject on
July 17, 1953, and again, in an editorial, offered as full and
accurate a summarization of the organizational set-up and powers
of the CIA as is available.

It is a separate and clandestine entity of our Government. One
of the most reliable budgetary experts in Washington has told
us that he believes CIA's spending "is in the neighborhood of a
billion dollars a year," yet no committee of Congress can check
on this figure... Funds may be transferred to the CIA from other
Agencies of Government "without regard to any provisions of law
limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations." Surely
that clause in the CEA Act (of 1949) makes a mockery of Congress-
ional control over the public purse.

No restrictions are laid upon the CIA's activities. The statute
requires that "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or
otherwise restrict the powers, functions, duties, responsibilities,
uses, or purposes of the Agency."

The CIA, of course, decides for itself what its functions are. The
law specifically approves expenditures for "personnel services
without regard to limitations or types of persons to be employed;
radio-receiving and radio-sending equipment; purchase, mainte-
inance, and cleaning of firearms, including purchase, storage,
and maintenance of ammunition; acquisition of necessary land;
construction of buildings and facilities..."

All sums made available to the CIA "may be expended without
regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the
expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential,
extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be
accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director ..."

Only once more did this paper return to the subject. On July
24, 1953, it summed up the matter with complete accuracy, in
one sentence: "By law the CIA has unlimited authority to spend
virtually unlimited amounts of money for wholly unlimited
purposes."

It should be understood that while the original purpose of the
Central Intelligence Group does appear to have been one of
coordinating existing intelligence forces, this has long since ceased
to characterize the CIA. It functions autonomously and supremely
over and above the activities of the Intelligence sections of the De-
departments of Defense and Justice; and over and above the similar functions provided for, as we shall see, by other acts of Congress, or by other quasi-official or quite private organizations.

From time to time the public press issued reports on the growth of the CIA. Thus, an AP dispatch from Washington, October 30, 1949, said: "The American spy system, although still in its infancy, is robust and growing... The American cloak-and-dagger men are now working noiselessly and invisibly throughout the world." As one should expect of the richest country in the world, however, the CIA did not remain an infant for long. On the contrary, Cabell Phillips writing in the N. Y. Times, of March 29, 1953, reported it to be "certainly the biggest... national intelligence agency in the world."

The last public reports as to its size, date from 1954. The N. Y. Times published an Associated Press dispatch from Washington, dated August 7, 1954, which declared that Allen W. Dulles' "organization is housed in thirty-eight buildings in Washington and deployed around the world." Estimates of those on its payroll ran up to 30,000 people, expenditures were left somewhat ambiguous: "above $500,000,000 a year." According to a feature series entitled: "America's Secret Agents: The Mysterious Doings of CIA," in the Saturday Evening Post, the Agency "occupies thirty-odd buildings in the capital, maintains 25 domestic offices across the country on a 24-hour basis, and finances unnumbered covert branches around the world..." (October 30, 1954).

* * *

What is it that these thousands of people do with their hundreds of millions of dollars given to them every year? I suppose no one but the President and the Dulles brothers and one or two other human beings could answer that question. But we know what Mr. Sherman Kent said it should do and we know that Mr. Kent has been one of its handful of really top officials. We have also additional information—of course, from public

Moreover, while the law creating the CIA prohibits it from "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions," nevertheless the Washington Star reported on December 30, 1952 that "the CIA established an intelligence service in the United States," and according to the N. Y. Times (July 19, 1953) it actively concerned itself with the Owen Lattimore case, informing the FBI of that dangerous scholar’s alleged travel plans.

sources—as to the activities of the CIA, relevant to the subject of this book.

According to Frank Gervasi's article in Collier's (Nov. 6, 1948):

The CIA is empowered to hire, train and install in foreign countries those undercover men needed to do the five to ten per cent of the dirty work connected with intelligence.

He states, as a fact, that: "The CIA plants agents in countries in the guise of consular officers and other lesser officials." The only specific example that Mr. Gervasi offers, back in 1948, of CIA exploits is that connected with two agents in Eastern Europe who "established contact with Rumanian anti-Communists. They helped these elements from an anti-government group," but they bungled badly and were discovered; presumably that is why Mr. Gervasi was free to tell this particular story.

He adds that the CIA system "was patterned after that of the British. This," he explains, "means that we, like them, will eventually have not one, but eight or nine different spy rings operating in other countries—friendly countries as well as those which might become enemies."

James Reston, one of the top reporters for the New York Times, whose channels of information reach into the highest Washington levels, devoted a feature story one Sunday (December 9, 1951) to a story headed: "Millions for Defense Behind the Iron Curtain: Propaganda, Aid to Anti-Communist Groups Are Part of the Cold War." Mr. Reston starts by saying that the Cold War was being directed not only by the Departments of State and Defense, but also by what "may be described as a sort of Department of Dirty Tricks." Clearly Mr. Reston had in mind mainly the CIA.

The function of this Dirty Trick Department "is to counter the subversive warfare activities of the Communists in the western world, and to create behind the Iron Curtain all mischief short of war." The fostering "of a diversionary 'second front' within the enemy's camp" was a basic task. Outside of the United States these activities were rather well known, Mr. Reston thought, but: "About the only people who do not know—and they must suspect it—are the American people, many of whom do not know anything about the bare-knuckle aspects of the Cold War."

These aspects derived out of and were meant to further American governmental policy: "The policy of the U. S. government is not only to contain the Russians where they are, but to push them back where they came from." Of course, this policy—i. e.,
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“liberation”—and its “bare-knuckle” implementation may appear slightly contradictory of the solemnly and repeatedly avowed American policy of non-intervention in the affairs of other nations. But Mr. Reston is able to explain this also:

We (i.e., the U.S. government) still stand publicly for the doctrine of non-intervention in the affairs of other nations. But, as a French diplomat once remarked about Castleraugh’s doctrine of non-intervention, “This is merely a metaphysical political term which means almost the same thing as intervention.”

The Washington Post of January 9, 1953 is one of the few sources offering an itemized list of CIA activities (some of which we shall elaborate upon hereafter). This list was given as a sampling of exploits which have been the subject of many whispered complaints. Here are the samples as offered by this Washington newspaper:

1. Subjection by CIA of a neo-Nazi organization which had marked for liquidation the leaders of the (West German) Social-Democratic Party.

2. Incarceration for 8 months of a Japanese citizen under excuse of cross-examination—a job initially undertaken by Gen. Willoughby’s Army Intelligence and passed on to CIA.

3. Tapping of the telephone of Jose Figueres, former Costa Rican President, at which a CIA man was caught red-handed.

4. Abortive effort by CIA undercover men to start a revolution in Guatemala and blame it on the United Fruit Company.

5. Burmese and Thai, and Vietnamese suspicions of CIA activity in promoting guerrilla forays from the Burmese border into mainland China on the part of the tatterdemalion expellees among Chiang Kai-shek’s defeated Nationalists.

Surely, the comment of Senator Mansfield, in his 1954 speech, already referred to, takes on flesh and blood in the light of such an exposure:

Other countries cannot be expected to distinguish between CIA policy and U.S. policy . . . We cannot permit CIA, any more than we can permit any other government agency, to have free reign to do anything it wants anywhere in the world. If its agents play carelessly with fire, the whole world might get burned (emphasis added).

Finally, so far as public and specific references to CIA “bare-knuckle” work is concerned, there is some material in the series Richard and Gladys Harkness did for the Saturday Evening Post (October 30, November 6, 13, 1954). This series was written after the authors had spent about a year in Washington. As reporters on commission for the Saturday Evening Post, there is no question that they had access to top officials; in this sense, the series has a quasi-official character.

The authors specifically credit CIA agents with major roles in the reactionary upheavals that overthrew Mossadeq in Iran and put Col. Castillo Armas into power in Guatemala. In the latter case, say the authors, it was the CIA, working with the U.S. Army, of course, who saw to it that the Colonel, “former officer of the Guatemalan Army who was in exile in Honduras, obtained sufficient guns and munitions to equip each man in a force of fellow anti-Communist refugees with a burp gun, a pistol and a machete.”

According to these authors, intelligence authorities in Washington thought that of the Soviet announcements of arrests of their agents, about 1 out of 3 was truthful. In addition to research and espionage, the CIA “operates a superclandestine third force—the top-secret activity of aiding and abetting freedom forces where the patriotism of captive peoples may be fanned from a spark into action.” The authors offer examples of the work of these superclandestine operatives—in addition to those involving Iran and Guatemala—such as instigating slowdowns, blowing up bridges, destroying locomotives, etc.

Further, “it may be revealed, with no elaboration, that CIA has intelligence lines to Communist officials in positions of power and knowledge in certain satellite countries.” All this in consequence of “the guiding premise of CIA’s third force that we must develop and nurture indigenous freedom legions among captive or threatened people who stand ready to take personal risks for their own liberty.”

How is the elevating work accomplished? There are some interesting specifications offered by these authors:

To become an agent in the espionage branch, a man or woman must change, in effect, into another, entirely different person. Operatives being drilled for an assignment in Country X, for instance, are supplied with cover stories. They receive new names, new birthplaces, a set of relatives complete with snapshots, and even an educational background—all in Country X.

Before offering further details on the admitted counter-revolutionary work conducted by American governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, it is worth noting that there is every reason to believe that British and French imperialism engage in
similar activities. No doubt they function with less blatancy and fanfare and on a smaller scale than the Americans, though it is possible that their impact is as great. Certainly the strategies— as concerns the Socialist third of the world—are fundamentally identical.

Confirming this is the recent authoritative expression of the British top-level attitude, set forth in a volume by Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, entitled Strategy for the West (N.Y., 1954). Sir John begins by affirming that, “the object in our strategy for the West is to drive militant Communism back behind its own frontiers and keep it there” (p. 2). This aim, he adds “is not a negative policy of mere containment,” but he also cautions that “it is not a green light for premature attempts to liberate satellite populations” (p. 5; italics added).

Elsewhere he urges that the West be better prepared to assist “liberation” than it proved to be after the East German demonstrations of June 1953, but he again cautions against setting out “here and now” on an actual “liberation” effort (p. 72). He adds, in language hinting at the ideas expressed by Sherman Kent, that psychological warfare is very important and “is more than mere propaganda.” The ultimate aim of Sir John’s Strategy for the West, he sums up:

in the patient but persistent intensification of pressure whenever and wherever opportunity offers, to free the satellite states from the yoke of Moscow, until at long last the Iron Curtain is rolled up and the Russian peoples themselves can become equal members of a free community of nations (pp. 73-74).

It seems conservative to say that throwing the counter-revolutionary activities of the British, French, West German, Spanish and Dutch intelligence services into the scales would serve to double the impact of the American efforts, with which, undoubtedly, their work is closely coordinated.

... ... ...

The public record of more or less official American efforts to incite counter-revolutionary activities, in addition to those cited above and directly tied to the Central Intelligence Agency, begins, so far as I have been able to discover, early in 1948. Appropriately enough, the first statement comes from John Foster Dulles, not then Secretary of State, but already one of the top shapers of foreign policy. On April 8, 1948, the N.Y. Herald Tribune published a lengthy summary of Mr. Dulles’ view on the neces-
sity, as he saw it, for a “Counter-Cominform.” The paper quoted Mr. Dulles as explaining:

The proposed “Counter-Cominform” would operate in many of the fields of the “cold war” in which the old Office of Strategic Services operated during World War II. These would include detection of subversive activities, espionage and counter-espionage, counter-propaganda and assistance to democratic movements, including aid to and organization of underground movements in nations already controlled by Communists.

The newspaper continued:

Mr. Dulles believes such a Counter-Cominform organization would be a natural adjunct to the European Recovery Program and increased United States military strength in the over-all effort to halt communism... In the interim before the long range effects of the plan are felt, he believes the anti-Communist forces must be encouraged, and that the Counter-Cominform could help in such practical ways as supplying newspaper for democratic newspapers, aiding in radio broadcasts and supplying money for effective democratic political organization.

At the same moment, talk favoring the implementation of Mr. Dulles’ proposals reached the stage where United States Senators were ready to be publicly identified as supporters. This was notably true of Republican Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire. Said the semi-official, Big-Business journal, U.S. News and World Report, April 9, 1948:

One school of thought in Washington and abroad wants Project X performing behind the Iron Curtain with tactics similar to those used by the OSS in wartime. This school advocates strong-arm methods, including assassination if necessary to keep Russia’s part of the world in turmoil... American agents, parachuted into Eastern Europe... would be used to coordinate anti-Communist action. Volunteers for such work, many of them veterans of the undergrounds of World War II, already are turning up in Washington to look for jobs.

In August, 1948, was registered the first public Soviet protest against this type of activity. In a meeting of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, the Soviet delegate protested that “camouflaged military defense groups” were being formed from among notoriously fascist emigres and from war criminals and Gestapo.

*Later in 1948 the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, Togliatti, was seriously wounded by a gangster; shortly thereafter, the Chairman of the Belgian Communist Party, Lehaut, was murdered.
groups in German displaced persons camps (N. Y. Herald Tribune, Aug. 13, 1948).

That same year the State Department began the "Voice of America" network in West Germany, with millions earmarked for the project by Congress. The avowed intent was to induce dissatisfaction and provoke unrest in the areas from Berlin eastward. In the Summer of 1949, Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer, then Director of Psychological Warfare for the Army, urged before a Congressional committee increased appropriations for the Voice, with which he proposed to intensify the anti-Soviet propaganda in the "areas around Russia." The General continued:

Then we could hope to penetrate further into Russia and reach them also with pamphlets and with agents; however, the life of an agent in Russia today would not be worth very much.

We do have a few. That is something that has to be generated very slowly—an intelligence organization within Russia. We do not get from Russia very good intelligence reports. Our sources are very limited, but they are improving (A. P. dispatch from Washington, published in the Christian Science Monitor, Aug 16, 1949).

Government officials of the highest rank have repeatedly called for open intervention into the affairs of the Socialist lands in language remarkable for its bluntness. Thus, speaking in Buffalo, N. Y., on February 13, 1951, Senator Hubert A. Humphrey (D. of Minnesota) was quoted in the N. Y. Times (Feb. 14, 1951) as declaring: "Material aid to underground movements in Russian satellite nations should be included in the European defense plan."

Senator Pat. McCarran (D., Nevada), according to the same paper (August 18, 1951) "proposed" in a televised speech to the nation "that the United States arm refugees from the Communist states to promote revolution against the Soviet governments." The notoriously reactionary Senator urged, said the paper, "that the U. S. give all the support and help it can to 'underground insurgent groups' behind the Iron Curtain."

Speaking to leaders of the extremely nationalistic American-Hungarian Federation, President Truman, on October 12, 1951, "said that the United States would keep on trying to bring freedom to Russian satellite nations as long as he was President" (N. Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1951).

One of the main features of the 1952 Presidential campaign was the vehemence with which the Republicans called for open insurrectionary attempts against the Socialist governments; in contrast the Democrats, while agreeing with the purpose, thought their opponents' tactics were a little brutal and unsubtle. Senator Robert A. Taft, of Ohio, then one of the most powerful political figures in the country, declared in a coast-to-coast broadcast in June, 1952:

We must marshal the forces of freedom, both this side and the other side of the Iron Curtain, so they are ready to go if a break in the Kremlin strength or unity every comes.

It would be criminal to attempt today to foment national revolts in Russia and her satellite countries since that would produce only the murder of the anti-Communists... Nevertheless, we should help the anti-Communist underground to keep the hope of liberty alive among their people. Then, when the time is ripe, opportunities can be exploited... We ought to employ the native underground agencies in each oppressed country who, with us, believe in freedom, but know far better than we do the means by which their people can be converted to our side... It is reassuring to find that Mr. Dulles' present position is so close to my own... (N. Y. Times, June 2, 1952).

General Eisenhower, himself, at a press conference that June, when asked: "Would you help conquer subversion by helping resistance behind the Iron Curtain?" replied in this way: "My dear sir, when I am in a thing like this, I believe in helping everybody who is on my side." (N. Y. Times, June 8, 1952.)

The New York Times in its story dealing with the platform of the Republican Party for the 1952 campaign (July 6, 1952) highlighted its emphasis upon "'new and dynamic' efforts to obtain the liberation of the peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia, now dominated by the Soviet Union." Clearly, said the newspaper, the Republican Party desired to "encourage opposition to the Communist Governments in those areas, through agents, propaganda, and financial, economic, and even limited military assistance..."

Eisenhower, as Presidential candidate, in a major address in New York City, August 26, 1952, declared that "the United States must use its influence and power to help the Communist-controlled nations of Eastern Europe and Asia throw off the yoke of Russian tyranny" (N. Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1952). Statements of this nature provoked some worry from people at large and some condemnation from Democrats (including President Truman) that the warnings of Senator Taft against efforts to start uprisings at once were being forgotten. In view of this kind of protest,
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John Foster Dulles, speaking in Buffalo on August 27, offered the following clarification (N. Y. Times, August 28, 1952):

...the General's liberation policy for Communist-"captive" peoples does not mean violent revolution but peaceful revolution using such "quiet" methods as passive resistance, noncooperation, discontent, slowdowns, and industrial sabotage...

The idea, he said was "to stir up the resistance spirit behind the Iron Curtain," as a result of which it was hoped, "resistance movements would spring up among patriots, who could be supplied and integrated via air drops, and other communications from private organizations like the Committee for a Free Europe."

Meanwhile, in terms of legislation, the Government had not been idle. Thus, in 1950, Congress enacted the so-called Lodge Act, named after its chief sponsor, the then Senator from Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge (presently Chief of the U. S. Delegation to the U. N.). This act institutionalized and legalized the kind of procedure against which the Soviet delegate to the U. N. had protested in 1948. It provided for the recruitment of an anti-Communist "Foreign Legion," to total 12,500 men (2,500 a year, later increased to a total of 25,000), selected from among emigres from the Socialist countries. These men were to receive "specialized" training and, after five years in the U. S. Army, were to be rewarded with citizenship.

Wrote Clifford Hume in the London Times (June 25, 1950):

For a new and secret project, the United States Army is to recruit for "specialized duties" 2,500 Russians, Poles, Czechs and others... All the recruits will be single men aged between 18 and 35, picked for their familiarity with the terrain and topography of "certain countries of Europe" and for their knowledge of the languages, customs, habits, psychology, philosophy and other characteristics of the peoples of these countries.

Typical of the progress of this project is the report of the arrival at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, of a group of 52 German, Yugoslav, Polish, Czech, Hungarian and Russian nationals. Characteristic of the freedom-fighters in this new Foreign Legion was one Ernest Smitka, whose "father was a colonel in the German Army." He, himself, "fought the Russians (during World War II) for nine months as an irregular" (N. Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 10, 1951; see also N. Y. Times, December 9, 1951).

In 1951, as an amendment to the Mutual Security Act, was passed what amounts to the Project X proposals of 1948. The Project, hitherto carried out sporadically and unofficially, was now placed upon a full-time, legal basis, with a yearly appropriation of $100,000,000 to keep things moving. This 1951 legislation; the 1950 Lodge Act; the Voice of America yearly appropriation beginning in 1948; and the 1947 Central Intelligence Agency Act make up the body of legislation and appropriation (plus untold millions for separate Intelligence agencies of other Departments) which together probably consume between one billion and one billion, two hundred and fifty million dollars every year, and occupy the full-time efforts of somewhere around 100,000 people.

The Mutual Security Act (of 1951) has as its stated aim, "to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy and provide for the general welfare of the U. S. by furnishing assistance to friendly nations in the interest of international peace and security." To this was added an amendment, introduced by Representative Charles Kersten (R., Wis.) and approved by the House (and the Senate and signed by President Truman in October) in the following form, appended to the above:

and for any selected persons who are residing in or escapes from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or the Communist-dominated areas of Germany and Austria, or any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union, either to form such persons into national elements of the military forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes, when it is similarly determined by the President that such assistance is important in the defense of the North Atlantic area and of the security of the United States (Congressional Record, August 17, 1951, vol. 97, p. 10281).

In the debate, the counter-revolutionary purposes of this Amendment were made crystal-clear. "We must begin to move in the direction," said Mr. Kersten, for example, "of eventual liberation of the eastern nations of Europe." His definition of "liberation" appeared in his hailing the ultra-reactionary and notoriously anti-Semitic General Anders as his standard-bearer: "Think of the great potential for liberty," he said, "in General Anders' army. Apart from the 25,000 that may come into the American Army (under the Lodge Act), there is no other way practicable, as yet, in which these people can be used." Further, he declared:

My amendment contemplates the possibility of aiding the underground organizations that may now exist and come into existence in the future. It could give such underground organizations direction so that they would not be abortive.
Later, warmly supporting his amendment, the Hon. Mr. Kersten was more specific:

We don't advocate dropping bombs on Russian cities tomorrow, but we certainly advocate a strongly aggressive policy in the fields of propaganda and subversion ... to say that terror would play no part in a liberation movement in Eastern Europe is to be utterly unconversant with what constitutes a liberation movement. One of the main objectives of a real liberation movement is to strike terror... it will require strong action. (Congressional Record, Oct. 20, 1951.)

We repeat, it is this Kersten Amendment, authoritatively interpreted for us by Mr. Kersten himself in the terms quoted which became and remains law. The United States government faced by the official protests of the Soviet Union* and the governments of Central and Eastern Europe, insisted that the Kersten Amendment did not mean what its language says and what its sponsor says it means. But even while it was filing these formal protestations, the New York Times (January 18, 1952) was printing this dispatch from its Washington office:

The Government indicated today that it had already begun to use secretly part of the $100,000,000 appropriated to aid the escape of men from behind the Iron Curtain who wished to join combat units for the ultimate liberation of their homelands... It was indicated that the State and Defense Departments, the Mutual Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency were taking part in the planning.

Meanwhile, beginning in 1948, there were established several quasi-official organizations openly aiming to assist counter-revolution. One of the earliest of these—started in 1948, with the encouragement of His Holiness, the Pope—was described by the New York Times, of December 22, 1950. It told of a school for priests of the Franciscan Order, located in Stamford, Connecticut, who were undergoing a rigorous curriculum including courses in Communist ideology and the customs and traditions of Iron Curtain countries. This was important, because the "graduates

*Andrel Gromyko, then Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, handed the U. S. Charge d'Affaires in Moscow a note protesting against this law on November 21, 1951. It read: "The adoption of such a law is an act without precedent in the U. S. in the internal affairs of other countries... It is self-understood that the Government of the United States has no right whatsoever to set up sabotage groups and armed detachments for conducting subversive activity against the Soviet Union."
early in 1953, held a three-day international congress, in New York City, where a permanent constitution for the organization was adopted.

The constitution set as the goal of this organization, "the liberation of the people of Central Europe from Communist oppression, the reconstruction of the freed countries on the basis of Christian Democratic principles...." It was agreed at this congress that:

We want an economic order based on private initiative and private ownership... no peaceful co-existence of the two worlds is possible... the free world must be determined to make every sacrifice for rearmament. Without such strength, not only will there be no liberation at the Communist subjugated world, but the still free world will live in mortal danger.

A 36-member council was elected; the Rt. Rev. Joseph Kozl Horvath of Hungary, was elected President.

The Congress was addressed, in the most glowing and encouraging terms, by James J. Wadsworth, Deputy United States Representative at the U. N., Senator Theodore F. Green, Democrat of Rhode Island, Senator Ralph E. Flanders, Republican of Vermont, and Whitney H. Shepardson, president of the National Council for a Free Europe (N. Y. Times, March 16, 1953).

Because of the great influence of Radio Free Europe, and because of its close relationship to the Hungarian uprising of 1956, it is necessary to deal with it at greater length; something needs to be said also of its younger brother, "Free Europe Press."

Both are divisions of the Free Europe Committee, Inc., and are under the general direction of the "Crusade for Freedom." Though ostensibly private, its officers and leading sponsors have included and still include men like President Eisenhower, Allen W. Dulles, Generals Clay, Crittenberger, and Walter Bedell Smith, Admiral H. B. Miller and former Ambassadors, as Joseph Crew and Winthrop Aldrich. All financial contributions to the Crusade or any of its affiliates are income-tax deductible.*

*Advertisements for donations to the "Crusade for Freedom" tell the public to send their money "in care of your local postmaster." In addition, one finds this happening: Early in 1955 a special campaign for funds was organized. Wealthy people were assembled in halls in many cities throughout the nation, and a closed radio circuit broadcast was arranged for them. Those appealing for funds in this manner were President Eisenhower, General Walter Bedell Smith, and Henry Ford II. According to the
It has not been possible to ascertain the budget of the Crusade. When the *New York Times* asked Mr. W. J. C. Egan, director of its affiliate, Radio Free Europe, about this, "he declined to tell, for 'security reasons,' what the budget of Radio Free Europe was" (Jan. 24, 1957). In public campaigns for funds, however, it is known that from 1950 to 1956 it received about $60,000,000; that it receives additional funds, from private and governmental sources, is certain, but how much is not known.

According to the *Wall Street Journal* (Nov. 30, 1956) the Free Europe Committee's "bills have been picked up for the most part by such corporations as Standard Oil of New Jersey, United States Steel, and Ford Motor Company." On the Board and among the Members of the Free Europe Committee, Inc. are the publishers of *Time* and *Life* and *Fortune*, Henry R. Luce, the President of Hunter College, George N. Shuster, a former Assistant Secretary of State, A. A. Berle, Jr. The biggest money and brass operate through the Crusade for Freedom, including Cardinal Spellman, General David Sarnoff, head of the Radio Corporation of America and the National Broadcasting Company, Cecil B. De Mille, the movie tycoon, Henry Ford II, Charles E. Wilson of General Electric, Benjamin F. Fairless, of U. S. Steel, Hines Baker, a McCarthyite oil millionaire who heads the Humble Oil Company, Evelyn Price, head of Westinghouse Electric, Harlow M. Curtice, president of General Motors, Harvey S. Firestone, the rubber monopolist. Chairman of the Crusade's Board is Eugene S. Holman, Chairman of the Board of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. These are among the most prominent of the latter-day Crusaders for Freedom.

*The Nation* (December 12, 1956) editorially states, and quite correctly, that “the attempt to deny these activities are in reality government-sponsored is disingenuous.” The magazine states, what everyone knows and sees, that “the government has encouraged” the Crusade for Freedom and its entire operation. It indicates also, what is an open secret, that it “is accountable, in some covert manner, to one of the intelligence services or to the Department of State.” More unequivocally, Douglas Larsen, a Washington columnist for the Scripps-Howard newspapers, says of Radio Free Europe in particular:

N. Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1955, the President "urged a continuing effort to intensify the will for freedom in the satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain."

The official publications of the Crusade affirm that its essential purpose and that of all its affiliates is "to sustain the spirit of opposition" among the inhabitants of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria to their present governments. Such a spirit of opposition, in time of war, say these official publications, would be "equal to many divisions." Further, in concentrating on the five named—and of these it pays particular attention to Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia—it does so in the belief that "if some countries are freed, others will be affected."

For these semi-military aims and with these announced counter-revolutionary purposes, Radio Free Europe and Free Europe Press—in liaison with the Department of State and the Intelligence Service, and in part, apparently, financed by the Government and certainly enthusiastically approved by the Government—directly employ about 2,200 people in the United States and in several European countries. Since 1954, Free Europe Press has dispatched, from West Germany, half a million large plastic balloons, scattering over Eastern Europe 500,000,000 leaflets; since 1955 the same organization has been dropping 12,000,000 miniature newspapers every month in the five countries named above.

Radio Free Europe maintains fourteen news-bureau offices "strategically located along the Iron Curtain from Stockholm to Athens." It operates 29 radio-transmission stations, located in Portugal and West Germany; one is a medium-wave transmitter of 135,000 watts, others operate on short-wave frequencies with 10,000, 50,000 and 100,000 watts. As a point of reference: the most powerful stations in the United States are limited to 50,000 watts. Programs are beamed to Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, 20 hours a day, every day; to Rumania and Bulgaria, 7 hours each day.

We return now to conclude a presentation of the evidence, from public sources, that the U. S. Government itself finances and conducts a campaign of terrorism and violence as part of an avowedly counter-revolutionary program.

A remarkably frank disclosure was written by Anthony H.
Leviero and published in *Nation's Business* (organ of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce) in April, 1952. Here are Mr. Leviero's own words:

No government official will admit it, but we are training men to be spies, saboteurs, specialists in the tougher forms of psychological warfare...they learn to blow up bridges, railroad trains and war plants, are taught to use all types of weapons, both U. S. and foreign...They learn secret methods of communication so they can get back what they learn. They merge into hostile populations and spread disquieting rumors, help to frame Russian stooges so that their own superiors will lose confidence in them.

As we have seen, in preceding pages, Mr. Leviero was wrong in thinking no government official would admit such conduct and we shall see again, that such admissions were forthcoming. It is of interest to note that Mr. Leviero tied the conduct he was describing directly to CIA and the Intelligence agencies of the War and State Department. He added that highest authority felt that "big-time sabotage and guerrilla fighting" was then (i.e., in 1952) "considered premature at this stage of the cold war, at least in Europe..." Clearly implied here, however, is the idea that already in Asia and in the not distant future in Europe such major "black propaganda" efforts were to be undertaken.

Shortly after Mr. Leviero's article appeared in this Chamber of Commerce magazine, the favorite Presidential candidate of the gentlemen of the Chamber was saying analogous things. Speaking in the closing weeks of the campaign in Cincinnati (Sept. 22, 1952) General Eisenhower declared that the U. S. Government should use every political, every economic, every psychological tactic to see that the liberating spirit, in the nations conquered by Communism shall never perish. Thus we shall help each captive nation to maintain an outward strain against its Moscow bond. The lands closed in behind the steel Curtain will seethe with discontent; their peoples, not servants docile under a Soviet master, but ardent patriots yearning to be free again.

Eisenhower was here expressing the meaning of the Republican Party's 1952 platform pledge of an active and vigorous policy of "liberation," rather than Truman's allegedly inactive policy of mere "containment." On this particular point, after the General's election in November, 1952, newspapermen were naturally interested in getting the views of Eisenhower's choice for Secretary of State. Early in January, 1953, Charles T. Lucey of the

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*Washington News* interviewed Mr. Dulles concerning this matter. The content of this interview appears in this paragraph:

The prospect (of "liberation") doesn't mean violent revolution, says Mr. Dulles, but use of such "quiet" means as passive resistance, non-cooperation, discontent, slow-downs, and industrial sabotage. He would use the Voice of America to help stir discontent and to let the Poles, Czechs and others, know they have this country's moral support. He sees the possibility of airdrops to aid such peoples (*Washington News*, Jan. 6, 1953).

At rare intervals are published reports not only of sabotage or assassination or other activities of the Dirty Trick Department, but even references to efforts seeking actual overthrow of governments—in addition to such "successes" as Iran and Guatemala. Thus, the *U. S. News and World Report* of March 20, 1953, contained a very brief reference to some disappointments experienced by British Intelligence:

Case of Albania is cited (by it) as one that ought to be easy but hasn't been. It has no land link to Russia, has few Russians around. Yet secret Allied efforts to overturn Albanian Communists, free the country, have so far got nowhere.

When Senator McCarthy was still indignant at the State Department's "coddling of Communists" and was even threatening to investigate the CIA, that statesman's favorite journalist, Westbrook Pegler, exploded in his syndicated column of January 15, 1953:

The Central Intelligence Agency should not have the power to interfere in the internal policies of other countries. Still less should we submit to a stealthy system of conspiracies whereby our money by the million is handed over...to hire street fighters to wage riots and terror in European countries.

Within eighteen months, Mr. Pegler was whistling another tune, but it came from the same composition, and, in another framework, was equally revealing. In his column of June 30, 1954, millions of readers saw these sentences:

Not to put too fine a point upon it, one of the obvious duties of our CIA is to organize, touch off and exploit revolutions such as the one in Guatemala where the Communist menace is imminent and acute. We are not allowed to know anything about CIA and there is a sentiment to the effect that it were somehow disloyal and a service to the enemy to discuss this mysterious outfit at all. But practical persons, not necessarily with special knowledge of "intrigue" must recognize as a fact the expedien...
and necessity for swift, efficient, successful blows in such crises as the one in Guatemala.

Is it cynical and does one go too far in stating that the CIA, a secret department of the American government, has a duty and a free hand to kick up revolutions in small countries to kick out Soviet puppets? Cynical one may be in so stating, but that is the fact nevertheless...

In 1958, President Eisenhower appointed a committee of eight to report to him on how the country should conduct its psychological warfare against the lands of Socialism. On this committee were, among others, C. D. Jackson, a millionaire publisher and special assistant to the President, Robert Cutler, White House liaison man with the National Security Council, and the deputy Secretary of Defense, Roger M. Kyes. The public was told only that the Committee recommended an increase in radio broadcasting, but in the N. Y. Times of August 20, 1953, there was this additional, cryptic paragraph:

The report was given to the President last month but only a small portion of it had been released to the public. A White House statement said many of its recommendations, "are of a highly classified nature."

If Mr. Leviero reported, as he did, in 1952 that the consensus in Washington then was that major counter-revolutionary efforts, in Eastern Europe, were premature, there was a steady drift, as the months wore on, to feel that the ripe time was approaching. This process had its culmination in April, 1955, when General David Sarnoff, head of R. C. A. and N. B. C.—and a leading figure in the Crusade for Freedom—presented a "Cold War Plan" to President Eisenhower himself.

A month later, on May 9, the Sarnoff plan was made public, and soon it was published in full in the U.S. News and World Report (May 27, 1955) taking up ten of its precious pages. An editorial foreword stated that the plan "was discussed thoroughly with President Eisenhower." At a press interview held soon after the release of this plan, the New York Times reported that "President Eisenhower approved a memorandum which the chairman of the board of R.C.A. had submitted to him... (which) embodied an all-out 'cold war' thesis" (May 16, 1955). The same issue of this paper reported a speech made by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, Democratic Leader of the Senate, at a dinner honoring Sarnoff, also announcing his full endorsement of the General's proposals.

The Sarnoff plan is posited on a view of Communism as a world-wide criminal conspiracy, straight out of the police blotters of Mussolini, Hitler and Franco. On the basis of this Goebbels-like rationalization, it sees the Cold War as a struggle to the death and urges the acceptance, as official policy, of a continual, carefully prepared program for the destruction of socialism through counter-revolutionary provocation and terror.

Hence:

No one knows whether, let alone when, the internal Soviet stresses can reach a climax in insurrectionary breaks. It would be frivolous to count on such a climax. But we have everything to gain by promoting a spirit of mutiny, to keep the Kremlin off balance, to deepen existing rifts, to sharpen economic and empire problems for them.

He projects eight lines of activity in the aim of destroying socialism. These sum up to a gigantic anti-Communist propaganda campaign within the "Free World" and to every possible inducement and provocation and argument and instrument to bring about the overthrow of the Socialist states by their own peoples, assisted from without. For the latter everything must be done "to keep alive throughout the Soviet empire the spirit of resistance"; to assure "the internal enemies of the Kremlin" that "powerful allies" are "beyond their frontiers"; "to make maximum use" of the all the emigres; and

To provide moral and material aid, including trained leadership, to oppositions, undergrounds, resistance movements in satellite nations and China and Russia proper.

*Proper the "Free World," Representative Thomas B. Curtis (R-Missouri), told his fellow Congressmen: "I had the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress collect some data for me about the countries abroad from which I derived the following conclusions. There are 71 countries outside the Iron Curtain which we erroneously refer to as the 'free world.' Of these 71 nations, 49 of them are outwardly or actually dictatorships or close oligarchies and the majority of them cannot even pass under the term benevolent dictatorships. Of the remaining 22 nations, most of them truly have some claim to the adjective 'free' as far as their political governments are concerned, but, certainly as far as the economic control of several of them is concerned, it is oligarchic and a small percentage of the nation is living off the backs of the other 99 percent." (Congressional Record, Feb. 18, 1955.)
The basic attitude the U. S. Government must bring to bear, in General Sarnoff's opinion, is this:

We must learn to regard the Soviet countries as enemy-occupied territory, with the lifting of the occupation as the over-all purpose of freedom-loving men everywhere. This applies not only to areas captured since the war, but includes Russia itself (emphases in original).

The policy may provoke or lead to a general war, but we "cannot avoid risks," and here the General quotes Secretary Dulles, who said that it might become necessary "to forego peace in order to secure the blessings of liberty."

What is to be done, now, and in a practical sense? The propaganda efforts of Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, etc., must be enhanced tremendously. Further: "Pending the critical periods when active resistance in one or another Soviet country is possible and desirable, full encouragement and support must be given to passive resistance. This refers to things the individual can do, with minimum risk..."

In this regard:

Our opportunity is to give the process purposeful directive. In this concept the individual opponent of the regime becomes a "resistance group of one." He receives, by radio and other channels, specific suggestions and instructions. The tiny drops of resistance will not be haphazard, but calculated to achieve planned results.

Further, in certain areas--specifically mentioned are Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, China, Albania--we are told, "pockets of guerrilla forces remain." True, "there is always the danger of activating them prematurely," but they must be borne in mind, and, "in concert with exiles who know the facts, they must be kept supplied with information, slogans and new leadership where needed and prudent."

The U. S. Government, it is urged, should collaborate fervently and fully with various exiled and emigre groups. These should be unified "into specific, well-organized, well-financed anti-Communist organizations"; they should be "utilized for propaganda and other operations"; they should be enabled, "in some cases, to return to their native lands as 'sleeper' leaders for future crises." Moreover:

Officers' corps of emigres can be formed; perhaps groups of only a score or a hundred, but available for emergency and opportunity occasions. The existence of such nuclei of military power—a fact that will be widely known—should help generate hope and faith among their compatriots back home.

Of course defection should be stimulated and generously rewarded, and from the defectors additional "cadre" could be trained, not only to engage now "in propaganda, subversion (and) infiltration," but also in preparation for carrying on "administrative and civic work after the collapse of Communist regimes in various countries" (italics in original).

Above all, and the end of all, is for counter-revolutionary uprisings. This is the goal. And for this General Sarnoff has several sentences which he italicizes:

We must seek out the weakest links in the Kremlin's chain of power. The country adjudged ripe for a breakaway should receive concentrated study and planning. A successful uprising in Albania, for instance, would be a body blow to Soviet prestige and a fateful stimulus to resistance elsewhere... Eastern Germany is among the weakest links. Its revolt would ignite neighboring Czechoslovakia and Poland. The time to prepare for such actions is now—whether the time to carry them out be in the near or distant future.

We repeat that this Plan was submitted, on April 5, 1955, to the President personally; that when it was made public, on May 9, 1955, the President declared that he had given it careful study and that he was in agreement with it.

It is to be added that President Eisenhower appointed General Sarnoff to the post of Chairman of the National Security Training Commission on November 17, 1955 (N. Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1955) presumably as further evidence of his approval of the General's proposals.*

Meanwhile the Central Intelligence Agency of the U. S. Government was acting in concert with a very distinguished veteran in the Civilization World's noble battle against Communist Barbarism. We have in mind Reinhard Gehlen, of whom it is necessary to take some notice.

Gehlen, born about 1900, was a Colonel attached to the German General Staff when World War II began. From 1942 until 1945 Gehlen was in charge of Military Intelligence on the Eastern

*The N. Y. Times, April 15, 1956, noted that General Sarnoff had met with the Foreign Minister of Spain—comrades-in-arms for a Free World.
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Front. As such, according to the account by Joachim Joesten (in The New Republic, Oct. 4, 1954), Gehlen was not connected with the traditional German Secret Service, but rather was a top-ranking figure in the Gestapo. Gehlen’s staff, according to Joesten, “was—and still is—trained and indoctrinated by the dreaded Nazi political police.” He performed his duties in occupied Eastern Europe and in the U.S.S.R. to Hitler’s satisfaction and had reached the rank of Lieutenant-General by the War’s close.

With the complete victory of the Red Army in the offing, General Gehlen hastened west, to Bavaria, with “his priceless archives and his lists of underground agents” where he surrendered to General Patton and offered his services to the Americans. Gehlen was released from custody and his offer was accepted. American Intelligence, according to Joesten, “told him to get right back on the job, and carry on.” Gehlen did so, “and by early 1946 he was back in business at the old stand, minus the Nazi uniform, and under new management.”

Edward J. Byng, writing from Munich—near which Gehlen’s headquarters have been located—on November 17, 1956, declares that from 1945 on, Gehlen “directed the organization under American supervision until 1954, when it was transferred to the West German administration under his continued leadership” (N. Y. World Telegram and Sun, Nov. 17, 1956).

Public sources declare that in Gehlen’s organization are about 4,000 to 5,000 agents, concentrated in—to exclude, but not exclusively—the East European countries. It is clear that Byng antedates the return of Gehlen’s organization to German governmental control. On July 20, 1955, there was an Associated Press dispatch from Bonn, beginning: “The West German government informed Parliament today it planned to take over the American-financed international spy network headed by former Lt. Gen. Gehlen.” It was to be known as the West German Federal Intelligence Service and was to continue “operating on both sides of the Iron Curtain.” This story asserted that the United States Intelligence had financed the Gehlen network to the tune of about $48,000,000 since 1948; it declared that this American financing was scheduled to end in August 1955 when the Bonn government would take over (N. Y. Post, July 20, 1955).*

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*In the N. Y. Times of July 21, 1955, M. S. Handler wrote of the same story from Bonn. Mr. Handler said that Gehlen had “brought over with him to U. S. Intelligence almost the entire personnel of the German Army’s General Staff section that conducted military espionage against the Russians” and that his organization was thought to be “the most effective body in action against the East European Communist Governments and their security organizations.”

**The New Statesman & Nation (London, Oct. 18, 1952) published excerpts from a speech by a leader of this B.D.J.: “They are fake Christians who say that Christians must not kill... We’ll reconquer Breslau and Koenigsberg... We are against any kind of planned economy... Denazification was the biggest crime and swindle against the German people. The U.S. is our guarantor of victory: the Americans are the Romans of our century... We shall go on fighting to vindicate the honor of the Waffen—S.S.”**
prominent Social-Democrats, including government officials! After a flurry for a few days, the scandal was forgotten; if anyone was punished, no publicity was given to the fact.

Certainly Herr Gehlen suffered nothing from the fiasco. Rather, he appears briefly again in connection with his 1955 transfer to the Bonn government apparatus, already noted. We meet him again in the press only for a moment, after the Hungarian upheavals of October-November, 1956. Then, in the dispatch from Munich of November 18, by Edward J. Byng, previously cited, one reads that Herr Gehlen “is believed to have had a hand in Hungary’s ‘October Revolution’ against communism.” And further, noting that by then “5,000 full-time agents work for the organization”:

Well-informed diplomatic circles assert that although the recent anti-Soviet uprising in Hungary was a spontaneous outburst of a nation’s wrath against its tormentors, Gen. Gehlen’s network of highly specialized agents was instrumental in its intensification.

Herr Gehlen’s career was brought up-to-date by the announcement from Bonn, in February, 1957, that the West German government had appointed Hitler’s Intelligence Chief in Eastern Europe to the new position of President of the Federal Intelligence Agency.

The reader will recall the dispatch from Alexander Kendrick in Paris in September, 1946, previously cited, wherein General Walter Bedell Smith was quoted as telling British Dominion officials in substance that: “American foreign policy, seeking some spot in Europe where it can test its ‘toughness’ and strength, has looked at Hungary and decided like Brigham Young that ‘This is the place.’” The material heretofore presented explains why such a decision seemed eminently reasonable.

There is a rather curious strand in the literature on the New Hungary which is relevant to General Smith’s remark. This is the fact that running through the literature, especially that created by hostile authors, is a confident note of the fairly imminent overthrow of that government. This is more than bravado and more than wish-fulfillment; and it is so clear and repeated a refrain that noting it is not mere hindsight.

Thus, the exiled Smallholder Premier, Ferenc Nagy, in closing his work, *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain*, not only calls, as we have seen, for the overthrow of the Hungarian government—

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knowing this means the clear likelihood of general war—but he writes, too, with a firmly prophetic vision that very soon this would be attempted and he, personally, would be on his way back. For example, one finds this paragraph:

I know that soon the time will come when I shall bend my knee and kiss that sacred American soil, and thank it for having given bread to my family, and respect to me. Then I shall turn my steps home, to my Hungarian people, to shoulder humbly new cares and new burdens, and build with my modest strength, on the physical and spiritual ruins—a new nation (pp. 460-61).

Rhetoric to be expected from a forlorn and ambitious politician-in-exile? Possibly; yet, withal, a clear sense of immediacy and high confidence, I think.

Again, consider this paragraph from a study of Governments of Danubian Europe, by Andrew Gyorgy, a Yale professor, published in New York in 1949, and no doubt completed sometime the year before. In this work, Professor Gyorgy discusses the fierce opposition demonstrated by Cardinal Mindszenty against the political, social, educational, land, and church reforms undertaken in Hungary from 1945 to 1948 (the Cardinal was not convicted of treason until February, 1949). Then quite suddenly appear these sentences:

Some of Cardinal Mindsentzy’s close followers recently submitted a plan which would put Hungary’s reconstruction on a broader and more democratic basis. This project entails a 4-power supervision of the Hungarian Army and police force after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. The supervision outlined by the planners would be integrated and general rather than of a zonal character. It is aimed at the armed and police forces of Hungary, which are under strict Communist Party control at present. Mindszenty’s followers also contend that a majority of the people would oppose Communist control with force (emphasis in original) and that the recent ill-starred plots (of Smallholder leaders in 1947) were a mere foretaste of what might come. These members of the small Liberty party and of the formerly dominant Smallholders appealed to London and Washington in the hope of getting “one last opportunity of preventing the establishment of a completely Communist dictatorship in Hungary.”

The professor is somewhat cryptic; he cites no source for the “plan” from which he quotes. One may dismiss as boasting some elements in the proposal—“a majority of the people”; previous conspiracies “a mere foretaste,” etc.—but there remains a definitive and confident and impending ring that matches that in Ferenc Nagy’s book.
Again, on New Year's day, 1954, the Foreign Relations Committee of the U. S. Senate released a study, through its Chairman, Senator Alexander Wiley (R., Wis.) which spoke of "accumulating tensions" and mounting "sabotage and underground activities" in Eastern Europe, and referred in particular to Hungary as being the most tender spot—the "weakest link," in General Sar- nov's phrase of 1955. Hungary was at a particularly "low ebb" and from this, said the Wiley report "the free world can draw hope and encouragement" (N. Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 2, 1954).

In the summer of 1955, a feature column by Henry C. Wolfe appeared in the editorial page of the N. Y. Herald Tribune (July 25, 1955) entitled, "The Way of the Magyar." The author begins by recalling the numerous evidences of an anti-Communist under- ground that he had found when he was in Budapest in 1948. He then at once offers this thought:

In this time of quick political changes in Europe, the memory of such incidents help bring Hungary to mind as a possible candidate for Soviet "dismemberment." Like Austria, Hungary is a key nation in East-West relations. Economically, geographically and politically, the land of the Magyar has an importance out of proportion to its actual size.

The author muses, in the summer of 1955, what might happen "if the Hungarians should win their freedom" and writes hopefully: "If Hungary were neutralized, the neutral belt would be complete from the border of France, through Switzerland, Austria and Hungary to the frontier of Rumania."

Just summertime meanderings by Mr. Wolfe, accidentally featured by the Herald Tribune? Perhaps ... What, then, is one to say of the quite remarkable way in which George N. Shuster closed his apologia for Cardinal Mindszenty, entitled In Silence I Speak, published in the summer of 1956 in New York City? President Shuster, on the Board of the Free Europe Committee, Inc., ends his work by raising with "grave concern" the question as to what was to happen in Hungary, "if the Communist regime were to collapse." That is, he sees as on the agenda serious deliberation upon the follow-up question, assuming the first eventuality to happen, namely: "What manner of government would accede to power?" That the question is especially grave appears from this estimate by Mr. Shuster: "The chances were that it would be exceedingly Rightist and reactionary, unless by some miracle the Cardinal could emerge from obscurity and assert his moral power" (p. 277).

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Since Cardinal Mindszenty is poised in the summer of 1956 as the potential savior of Hungary from an exceedingly reactionary regime that is put forth as likely in the event of the downfall of the People's Republic of Hungary; and since, in a few short months, he was to be put forth in life as the actual savior of Hungary (among other organs, by Radio Free Europe, in which Mr. Shuster is so influential), it may be well at this point to examine into the views of this Prince-Prime.

We have already indicated, what is nowhere denied—that the Cardinal stood opposed to the ending of the monarchical form of government and its replacement by the republican, and favored the restoration of the Hapsburgs; that he opposed the punishment of fascist war criminals; that he opposed the disfranchisement of major fascist figures; that he opposed all efforts in the direction of separating church and state; and that he most vehemently opposed the School Reform program.

Other sources of evidence as to the social and political outlook of this very potent figure in recent Hungarian history are worth examination. As a medievalist and clerico-fascist, the Cardinal has shown remarkable frankness and consistency. At his inauguration as Prince-Prime, at Esztergom, on October 7, 1945, he said:

The continuity of constitutional rights seems broken. When the calamity shall have passed and the nation's sobriety shall have built a bridge to arch over the cataract, then, by the right held sacred for over 900 years, the Prime of this country, as Pontifex and First Peer of the Realm shall take his share in the restoration of our juridical and constitutional life. I say this without mourning over the lost worldly riches, yet without accepting as lawful, actions which had no legal sanction. (Quoted by Iloa Polyan in World Affairs, London, April, 1949, p. 192, quoting from Hidverok, December, 1948.)

*This image is the inspiration for the title of a publication, Hidverok (Bridgebuilders), set up by fascist and extreme Right-wing emigres and former soldiers from Hungary in 1948, in the American Zone of Germany. This journal consistently called for the restoration of the old regime and, in fierce terms, warned of a return to Hungary to wreak vengeance upon the "usurpers." For example, its issue of March 10, 1949, contained a poem by one Kalman Serto, with this stanza:

"When we go back to the last attack
With gnashing teeth
We won't even have mercy on infants,
When we go on our last attack."
The Cardinal’s intervention in political affairs was open, direct and consistently pro-Right. The Land Reform, he said in a Pastoral Letter while yet a Bishop (May 24, 1945), was "one most severely affecting the social structure of our country" and one which "threatens the very existence of ecclesiastical institutions by depriving them of their material foundations." His first Pastoral Letter as Cardinal, issued October 18, 1945—just a few weeks prior to the general elections—excoriated the coalition government and denounced some of its proposals as "deeply wounding the feelings of the Christian population,"—a remark whose anti-Semitic overtones, given Hungary’s past, and the presence of some Jews among the governing coalition, were manifest.

Education, he insisted, could not be separated from religious instruction—and by the latter, he meant, of course, Roman Catholic instruction: The Church’s “educational mission springs from God himself”; “religious indifference... is worse than disbelief”; and “it is not a question of the parents’ will whether or not children are to receive religious instruction, since this would be a violation of God’s right to the soul of the child and the child’s right to a knowledge of the eternal truths”—all this in a Pastoral Letter dated May 20, 1946.

Prior to the 1947 elections the Cardinal—publicly supported by the Vatican—campaigned ardently in favor of the Right-wing anti-coalition ticket. When, nevertheless, the government coalition won, “The Cardinal,” writes the editor of his own Authorized White Book, “had no choice but to consider the secular power of the State as resting on illegal foundations. He acted accordingly.”

When, in 1947, the Government began a revision of the notoriously chauvinistic and antiquated textbooks used in the elementary schools, the Cardinal’s opposition became well-nigh hysterical. Especially was he appalled by the teachings of modern principles of biology. On November 12, 1947, the Cardinal issued a Pastoral Letter, to be read, of course, in all churches, devoted to the textbook question. He said:

The Government has introduced in the higher forms of the national and municipal schools a new textbook entitled The Life of Man. These schools are attended mostly by Catholic children. This book does not teach them anything concerning revealed truth. It presents man, not as God’s creature, but a being descended from the ape—a theory disregarded by serious scientists for some time. We understand very well why there is anxiety in certain quarters to proclaim man’s descent from the ape! But we, the Hungarian Bishops, defending the souls of the Hungarian children, will never acquiesce to the picture of God the Creator being obliterated in the minds of children and replaced by the hideous face of a monkey! We forbid, (emphasis in original) therefore, all Catholic parents, instructors and teachers under pain of sin to accept or to use this book. These pamphlets propagating self-abuse and circulated in many schools should be thrown in the fire. (The preceding quotations are from Cardinal Mindszenty Speaks, N. Y., 1949.)

This is twenty years after the Scopes trial; but, unfortunately, this is not a voice emanating from a Tennessee village; it is the official voice of the Prince of the Church in Hungary.

There are available at least two published interviews with Cardinal Mindszenty, both conducted in 1948, and both quite illuminating. Ruth Karpl, a correspondent in Eastern Europe for several months that year, was one of the few to whom the Cardinal granted a meeting. He was in the throes of his struggle against the secularization of education, so that almost his first words were in the form of an exclamation: “You understand, of course, that the Church never can and never will give up the natural right of the parents to educate the youth for God. What I mean is that we will fight this law with every weapon at our disposal!”

He did everything he could publicly, and more privately. Publicly, he excommunicated all Catholic members of Parliament who voted for the Educational Reform Law; in July he ordered all Catholic schools (65% of all Hungarian schools) closed; in August he prohibited ordained teachers from continuing their work in public schools; in September he officially threatened to excommunicate any Catholic who criticized either his policies or his person.*

Continuing Miss Karpl’s report of her interview, she remarked that the Cardinal “has never recognized the Hungarian Republic.” Further:

He told us at Esztergom that he considers the Republic unconstitutional and that for him Hungary is still as it has been for the past thousand years, a monarchy.

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*Earlier a popular Catholic daily paper, Magyar Nemzet, had charged that “through this terrible inflexibility of his over the school issue he not only infringes upon the rights of Catholic parents but injures even the fundamental interest of the Church;
As for some of his other views, here again is Miss Karp’s report:

The land reform, he told us, was “anti-Christian.” Darwin, in his view, “was a dangerous heretic who should have been burned at the stake.” After the war he refused to change textbooks used in Catholic schools which describe the French Revolution as “that mob movement of the late 18th century in France which was designed primarily to rob the Church of its lands.” (The Nation, Jan. 8, 1949.)

“Critic” of The New Statesman and Nation states that he, also, had a “long talk” with the Cardinal sometime in 1948. Writing in the issue of November 17, 1956. “Critic” recalls:

He (the Cardinal) wanted Western intervention, hated all Socialist doctrine and, as a peasant and a cardinal, advocated a peasant society ruled by the Catholic hierarchy. I was impressed by his reckless courage and asked him if he wanted me to report what he said. He hesitated but said that he would rather I did not.

The “reckless courage” was considered plain recklessness by others, including Catholics, and as we have seen, one Hungarian Catholic paper referred to the Cardinal’s “terrible inflexibility.” George N. Shuster, in his glorification of the Cardinal, also notes: “From the very beginning the Cardinal seemed to many inside the Church as well as to those outside it, to have thrown all caution to the winds” (cited work, p. 27). The simple fact of the matter is that by 1948, with the Smallholders Party defeated, Doreen Warriner’s statement, having this period in mind, is the exact truth: “The Catholic Church in Hungary was of course a political power of the first order; always an instrument of reaction, it now represented the last stronghold” (cited work, p. 31).

This reckless medievalist, who regretted that Darwin had not been burned at the stake, who refused to recognize the Republic, who refused to accept the legality of the 1947 elections, who condemned every specific effort at reform and transformation made in the New Hungary from 1945 through 1948, who loathed all Socialist concepts, who wanted the old order, his stand threatens the monastic orders at the very root of their existence.” (Quoted in The Nation, Jan. 8, 1949, p. 39.)

*John Gunther (in Harper’s, June 1949) noted that Archbishop Gyula Czepik of Eger (who had been a bishop when Mindszenty was still but a parish priest) had refused to permit the reading of the Cardinal’s Pastoral Letters in his diocese.

who desired Western intervention and who represented enormous power, internally and internationally, moved—in accordance with his desires and temperament and power—to active counter-revolution.*

His arrest (along with Prince Paul Esterhazy, whose guilt no one seems to have doubted at any time) in December, 1948, and conviction in February, 1949, of charges that amounted to treason, was justified on the basis of all the evidence, the man’s own views, and the opinions of practically all contemporary, non-Communist observers.

The terrible revelations of coerced confessions in the lands of Socialism, which have come with such shattering impact, naturally cast extreme doubt on all court proceedings there, and it is possible that one or another element in the trial of the Cardinal was not fully true. But it is certain that his essential guilt—to which he pleaded guilty, in part—was and remains true.

It is because of this, no doubt, that the Catholic hierarchy, itself, in Hungary, as Mr. Shuster writes, “did not protest against the arrest of the Cardinal,” (cited work, p. 39). In January, 1949, for the same reason:

The Reformed Church, largest Protestant denomination in Hungary, issued a statement holding that Cardinal Mindszenty’s arrest resulted from his political, not his religious activities. This was signed also by leaders of the Methodist, Baptist, Adventist and Hungarian Free churches. At the same time, three Lutheran bishops published a declaration that, “Cardinal Mindszenty’s activities would have been forbidden by any government” (Christian Century, February 2, 1949).

Gaetano Salvemini, professor emeritus at Harvard, on the basis of “a cool examination of the evidence,” was convinced that, “the charge that the Cardinal was engaged in activities connected with a Hapsburg restoration seems substantiated beyond any doubt” (The Nation, August 6, 1949). A score of Western correspondents at the trial issued a joint statement denying published reports that their dispatches—clearly indicating guilt—had been distorted by Hungarian authorities or that their coverage...
had been hampered in any way (N.Y. Times, February 6, 1949). John Gunther, writing in Harper's in June, 1949, also expressed certainty as to the substantial guilt of the Cardinal.

It has been necessary to go into some detail concerning the views of the Cardinal because, the reader will recall, it was this individual that Mr. Shuster held out as the only person capable—in the event of the overthrow of the Hungarian People's Republic—of saving Hungary from an extremely reactionary and Right-wing government! Furthermore, as we shall see, the Cardinal was in fact pushed forward by powerful forces, late in 1956, as the Saviour of Hungary.

* * *

In general, that which has been said above, of the trial of the Cardinal, applies to the arrests and conviction of various Right-wing political and military leaders in January and November, 1947. Such Smallholder and National Peasant figures as Lajos Veres, Zoltan Pfeiffer, Deszo Sulivok and Karoly Peyer, were surely guilty of seeking through internal and external pressures, to overthrow the existing Left-oriented government, undo the land reform and put a stop to further socialization. Even Ferenc Nagy, while denying specific elements in the accusations—and certainly the possibility of exaggeration or individual injustices existed—does concede the existence of discreet plottings and conspirings. Moreover, his own book, written in 1948, is a long apologia for his program which amounts to the overthrow of the Government, the re-institution of a private enterprise system and the use of Western intervention to achieve this. Additionally, one has the kind of convincing evidence offered in the book by Professor Gyorgy to which attention has already been called.

Concerning those particular events, an editorial in The Nation (June 14, 1947) sums up the matter well:

But independent observers are convinced that the reactionary wing of the Smallholders—a catch-all party in which many dispossessed and disgruntled aristocrats have found refuge—has been actively plotting to undo the revolutionary changes instituted by the government.

A little later, as the clamor from the Big-Business press of the world mounted concerning these 1947 disclosures, Freda Kirchwey, still holding firm to her belief in the counter-revolutionary purposes of the accused, added an illuminating paragraph, of lasting significance:
V. Basic Developments within Hungary: 1950-1955

In certain basic areas of life the changes and gains achieved from 1945 through 1949 were further extended and consolidated from 1950-1954, the period of Hungary's First Five-Year Plan. This was true, for example, in the development of a social welfare program, notable for its advanced practices in connection with the very young and the very old. It was true in the elimination of unemployment and part-time employment, terrible and chronic plagues of the Old Hungary. It was true in terms of the institutionalizing of two-week paid vacations as a reality for the working people of Hungary, something undreamed of by members of that class in the Old Hungary.

It was true in one of the best indices of general living conditions—i.e., the cutting in half of the death rate of the Hungary of Horthy as compared with the New Hungary. In this connection the reduction in the infant mortality rate was particularly noteworthy.

Advances in education were breathtaking in many respects. The 12% of the population of Horthy Hungary which had been completely illiterate was fully wiped out after 8 years of the People's Republic, and great strides were made in eliminating the functional illiteracy that impeded 25 to 50% of the prewar population.

While in Horthy Hungary about 60% of the children had to leave school after the fifth year, by the mid-1950's very nearly all of Hungary's children were remaining in school for a minimum of eight years. While in 1927-28 there were some 350,000 children in the general schools, in 1955 there were over 1,225,000 in such schools. In Horthy Hungary fully half of all the schools were actually one-room shacks; by the end of 1955 there were less than 300 such one-room schools in the entire country. Before the war there were about 26,000 teachers in the elementary schools of Hungary; by 1953 there were over 40,000.

The numbers attending institutions of higher learning increased about four times from pre-war to 1955 Hungary; and while in Horthy's day practically all the students were of middle and upper class status, in 1955 the majority were of working-class and peasant families and were of all religious backgrounds, including Jewish, with absolutely no discrimination. This still left a large number—in absolute figures a larger number than before the war—of students from aristocratic and upper-class (formerly) backgrounds, but the class composition had been revolutionized. For the first time in the history of Hungary, sons—and daughters—of workers and peasants were to have the opportunity of becoming physicians, engineers, physicists.

Church-state relationships were transformed and all forms of special privilege or special disabilities—including anti-Jewish legislation—were wiped from the statute books. Religious teaching in the schools became purely voluntary. (As late as 1955, about 25% of the students were receiving such instruction.) The salaries of the clergy were still the responsibility of the State, but unlike the past, those of Lutheran and Protestant ministers and Jewish rabbis were raised to the level of the Catholic priests. In the 1950's, it may be affirmed that on the whole the following provision of the constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic, adopted in 1949, was adhered to quite well:

The Hungarian People's Republic assures liberty of conscience for its citizens as well as the free exercise of their religion. To assure this liberty, there will be a separation of church and state.

An overall table presenting the actual investment in social capital—to be defined in the table—from 1950 through 1954 will do more than many hundreds of words to convey an idea of the basic character of development. It will be observed that there is a steady and considerable rise in all fields, without a single exception, through 1953; but in 1954, with a concerted and sudden shift in the basic form of capital investment—of which more later—there was a steep cut in appropriations for schools and other cultural activities and for welfare and recreational institutions.
Here is the table:

Actual Gross Fixed Investment in Social Capital, Hungary

(millions of forints in prices of July, 1949)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>1029</td>
<td>1117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town &amp; Village Development</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational &amp; Cultural Establishments, of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools &amp; Universities</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Cultural Insts.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports grounds, etc.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health establishments</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare institutions</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1165</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>2902</td>
<td>2597</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the fundamental areas of industry and agriculture the developments were quite extraordinary, though terribly one-sided. Beginning with industrial developments, the half decade from 1950 on saw a phenomenal increase in Hungary's heavy industry, but a notably smaller rise in her light, or consumer, industry. The presentation of an overall table delineating the main features of this basic trend will be useful right at the beginning. Here are, for Hungary:

Annual Rates of Growth of Gross Industrial Production

(percentage change compared with previous year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light &amp; Food Industries</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Industry</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As we have seen Hungary throughout her history to be exceptional, in the midst of exceptional conditions, so is this characteristic continued here. For while concentration upon heavy industry was characteristic of all the Socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe, including the U.S.S.R., from 1950 through 1953, the percentage of growth of heavy industry in Hungary was higher (generally very much higher) than that of any other Socialist-based country, with the single exception of Rumania, which in the one year 1950, had a slightly higher increase than did Hungary.

Further, while the Eastern countries generally reversed the concentration on heavy industry in 1954, Hungary's reversal was the most complete of all. She alone showed so great a dip as to register an actual decline, into the minus zone, as compared with 1953. Such a sudden and drastic reversal could not help having a drastically unsettling impact upon the entire economy.

We may turn now to a somewhat more detailed picture of economic development in Hungary, concentrating first on the early years of the 1950's and offering some comparative data with the 1940's.

Of great consequence was the percentage of investment in agriculture and forestry, in light and heavy industry and in the crucial item of housing. Let us examine the respective figures, in all these categories during the pre-war era, the immediately post-war, and the first years of the '50's.

**Percentage Distribution of Investment, Hungary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agriculture and Forestry</th>
<th>Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light &amp; Heavy</td>
<td>New Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947/48</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Once again, Hungary is extraordinary, for its figure for percentage distribution of investment in heavy industry is considerably higher, in 1951, than any of the three comparable states for which figures exist—East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Further, in 1948 the percentage of the total national product of Hungary which went to heavy or producer industry was 18.5; for light or consumer industry it was 19.4; but by 1951 the respec-
The truth about Hungary
tive figures were 28.6 and 19.0. This put Hungary first in the
rate of change in this respect among all Socialist countries, and
actually brought hitherto overwhelmingly agrarian Hungary
within one-tenth of one percent of the figure in 1951 for the
more maturely industrialized Czechoslovakia.
In 1950, Hungary’s Five-Year Plan began. It is instructive to
compare the planned increases in gross output in Hungary with
those of neighboring Socialist states for which figures exist. In
tabular form, here are the facts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Producer Goods</th>
<th>Consumer Goods</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary’s 5-Yr Plan</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish 6-Yr. Plan</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia’s 5-Yr. Plan</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria’s 5-Yr. Plan</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: As previous table, p. 29)

Once again, the exceptional position of Hungary is clear
immediately. A dramatic way to indicate Hungary’s extraordinary
concentration on developing heavy industry, as projected in her
1950 plan, and in part carried out, is to note that the investment
planned for her single greatest steel-producing plant was greater
than the total investment planned for all light industry in the
Everywhere in Eastern Europe it was clear that socialist devel-
opment and the needs of agricultural well-being would require
collectivization. This was least urgent in Bulgaria where the
latifundia system had been least developed before the war, and
most urgent in Hungary for reasons we have examined earlier.
Obviously, however, collectivization of agriculture was a social
process and required patience, education, demonstration—and
again patience.
But in Hungary—no doubt because the need there was so
pressing—collectivization was pressed forward more quickly and
more arbitrarily than anywhere else in Eastern Europe. Again a
table will quickly clarify the matter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE FARMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Basic Developments: 1950-1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>4215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>2738</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Economic Survey of Europe Since the War [U. N.,
Geneva, 1953], pp. 37, 179.)

Another area in which, again, Hungary showed herself to be
exceptional was in that of military expenditure—a particularly
devastating kind of waste to a Socialist economy. In the years
of 1947 through 1952 when the Marshall Plan, the Truman
Doctrine, the devastation of Greece, the rearming of West Ger-
many and of Japan, the atomic bomb experiments, the “police
action” in Korea, the obtaining of hundreds of military and naval
bases throughout the world and the lifting of the national
security budget of the United States from a little over $18 billions
in 1947 to almost $49 billions in 1952, made the whole question
of war or peace, human survival or annihilation, one of ex cruci-
ating urgency, the Socialist lands tightened discipline, formed the
Warsaw Alliance and strengthened their armed might. But
Hungary stood out in this effort.

Thus, in 1947-48 the percentage of total state expenditures for
arms in Hungary was 4, the lowest in Central and Eastern
Europe. But with the policy of re-arming, Hungary was devoting
36% of all state expenditures in 1952 to defense preparations.
This nine-fold increase was greater than any other Socialist
country (very possibly greater than any country in the world),
and it brought the percentage of Hungary’s expenditure on arms
to the top of all Socialist countries in 1952.

In certain other significant economic matters, the rate of
change in Hungary between the late ’40’s and the early ’50’s was
economous. In all the East European countries there was after
the war a considerable rise in the industrial output per man.
By 1953 this increase had reached as much as 50% in Poland
and Czechoslovakia, but in Hungary it had reached as much as
75%. These figures represent capacity utilization, as contrasted
with the mass unemployment of the 1930’s; they also reflect
increases in working hours, through on this, precise figures are not
available. Much of the increase, also, is attributable to the
standardization of products, the improved production-organization
and, above all, the great improvement in industrial
techniques.
THE TRUTH ABOUT HUNGARY

In Hungary it was possible to lift rationing of food and certain other commodities by the end of 1949, as occurred at varying times in her neighboring countries. In all, there followed fairly rapid price increases, but once again this was more marked in Hungary than elsewhere. Thus, for example, the cost of living rose by over 70% from June, 1950 to December, 1951, but during the same period wages increased about 25%.

The rise in prices was stimulated by a severe drought in 1952 and up to the summer of 1953 there was a steady decline in real wages. Significant measures of economic relief came, however, towards the end of 1953 and in 1954, with the shift in emphasis of the whole Plan, from concentration upon producer industries to consumer industries and to agriculture. There were three significant price reductions, especially on food, in 1953 and 1954, and during the same period the government cancelled arrears in taxes, deliveries and machine-station fees still owing by working peasants. In 1954 the decline in real wages had been halted and a reverse trend developed; by the end of that year real wages had returned to the level of, and went slightly above, those of 1949.

During the years of declining real wages, a contributing factor was the practice of redefining wage norms, in a continual effort to raise the rate of production. What was involved here was upward adjustment of wage norms, or to put it another way, reduction in piece rates. This occurred as average productivity was pushed upward by Stakanovites. This process occurred throughout the Socialist countries, but in Hungary the process was most severe. For this reason it is Hungary which is selected by a United Nations survey to illustrate the practice. Says that survey:

In Hungary, for instance, wage norms were in July 1949 redefined in terms of the average performance of workers during seven weeks towards the end of 1948; a year later they were again redefined, this time in terms of the (higher) average performance of four weeks in the spring of 1950; in 1951, there was no need to reduce wage-rates, because prices had risen, but in June 1952 piece rates were reduced once more (Economic Survey of Europe Since the War, Geneva 1953, p. 32).

This was done, of course, as part of the process of acquiring the investment capital to push forward industrialization and also to carry forward the heavy defense program, and it was a fundamental source for both processes; but since these readjustments in wage norms were not accompanied by price reductions, but the contrary, until the end of 1953, they tended to develop sharp resentment among workers, except those of the most fully developed class and Party consciousness.

Tremendous strides forward were taken in industrializing Hungary. More was done in this regard in the ten post-war years than in the ten preceding centuries. This is a tremendous and lasting accomplishment. By the end of the Four-Year Plan period (1949) Hungary's industrial output stood at 137.5% as compared to 1938; by the beginning of 1955 her industrial output was three times what it had been in 1938. From 1950 to the end of 1954, production doubled in each of these basic fields: coal; electric power; pig iron; steel; oil; aluminum; and cement.

There was a smaller, but a considerable rise, also, in the light and food industries. This was notably true in cotton-goods, woolen cloth, shoes, paper and sugar output, the rise equalling about 60 to 80% from 1950 to 1955, with the major gains here coming after 1953. Here, however, consumer demand began to grow increasingly selective and critical, and the problem of rejects and poor quality grew in severity as the Five-Year Plan drew to an end.

The problem of agriculture was met less successfully. The "three-million beggars" of the Horthy regime were gone and most certainly the peasantry never forgot that it was the New Hungary which had wiped out the unspeakable physical, cultural and psychological impoverishment of those awful days.

Yet here, with nature in control and man still quite puny and with the weight of the past hanging like veritable Alps upon the backs of the peasantry, actual advances in total production were much slower than in industry. Thus while by 1955 industrial output was three times greater than pre-war, agricultural output was only negligibly higher—ranging from five to ten percent. Indeed, certain crops—corn, for example, was below pre-war levels, and others—potatoes, for example, barely held its own. The picture as concerns stock-breeding was no better; the cattle, hog, sheep stock remained essentially at pre-war level.

This was true up to 1953 and it remained true thereafter, despite strong efforts at improvement. Here are the harvest results in Hungary in the period after 1952 (millions of tons):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cattle raising was also practically stationary: in March 1954 there were 1,950,000 head; in March, 1955 there were 1,960,000. The development in pig raising, however, was encouraging: 4,450,000 pigs in March, 1954; 5,800,000 in March, 1955, and an extraordinary leap forward, in October, 1955, to 8,000,000.

Another area of the greatest consequence in terms of sheer living conditions was housing. Here, however one had an expenditure which, while requiring vast quantities of basic materials and great numbers of workers, detracted both from the primary necessity of building heavy industry. Yet, just as it is perfectly clear that the concentration upon this was very excessive in Hungary—and more will be said of this later—so it is also clear that insufficient attention was paid to housing.

Bearing in mind the colossal destruction of World War II, so that catching up to the pre-war level in housing was a major accomplishment, it nevertheless remains true that, in terms of basic human need, far from enough was done in this category. The following table presents the facts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSING IN HUNGARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Dwellings (millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Rooms (millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling per 1,000 inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons per room</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The overall accomplishments in the economic field were very great in Hungary from 1945 through 1955. The wholesale beggary and impoverishment of millions, characteristic of the Horthy days, had been abolished, and with it had gone unemployment altogether and landlessness almost completely. In education, social security and social welfare, health, cultural opportu-
the horrors of the Horthy era fade from memory or recede into pure history.

Reparations were an additional drain upon the Hungarian economy, and involved in their payment was the question of Soviet-Hungarian economic relations. By the terms of the 1947 Treaty, the international community penalized Hungary for her war-time aggressions, a total of $300,000,000, payable in kind, with $100,000,000 due Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and $200,000,000 due the Soviet Union.

Such penalization is, of course, normal and well-established diplomatic practice and that levied upon Hungary, in view of the facts and compared to other examples of reparation charges, was far from excessive. Yet history demonstrates that reparation payments always constitute a running sore, and where, as in this case, the bulk of the payment was due the land which Hungarians had been taught for a generation, was the enemy, the condition was only aggravated.

Further, the burdening of a transformed Hungary with the paying-off (so far as money could pay-off) of the sins of fascist Hungary was somewhat incongruous and perhaps greater imagination would have recommended, in this case, a break with the pattern of international diplomatic practice and the renouncing of reparations.

As a matter of fact, the conduct of the U.S.S.R. in connection with reparations from Hungary was rather generous. First of all, she extended the time of payments from six to eight years. Then, on January 20, 1948 she announced a reduction of $17 millions on Hungary’s reparations, and on June 8, 1948 she waived 50% of the remaining reparations payments. Nevertheless, for eight years Hungarians witnessed trainloads of commodities (sorely needed at home) chugging their way eastward to complete reparations payments. This was made to order for hostile rumors and exaggerated gossip (the existence of CIA, etc., is to be recalled at this point) as to how fierce was Soviet Russia’s alleged exploitation of Hungarian resources. The severe Soviet secrecy in connection with anything involving her own internal development—especially as this touched on military matters—did not help squash such rumors and tales.

Similarly fantastic stories were invented about regular trade relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union. Actually, the
VI. Sources of Popular Discontent

Discontent in the New Hungary stemmed first of all from the former rulers and their numerous economic, political and ideological servitors. We have tried to present the reality of Old Hungary. We have tried to show how deep, after a thousand years, and how extensive, after generations of deliberate cultivation, were the roots of the old rulers. The magnates and their ten thousands bailiffs, courtiers, superintendents and flunkies, hated the change with passion and lived only to undo it. Some had fled and carried on their vengeful work outside the borders; most remained, hoped for failure of the New and exaggerated every mistake and invented many that never occurred.

The ecclesiastical and military hierarchies had nothing but hatred and contempt for the "unkempt mob," for the "Jews and vagrants and tramps" who dared aspire to build a new way of life. These elites were numerous and had thousands of hangers-on, and had powerful international ties and friends.

Many among the middle-classes, many of the professionals, the relatively well-off farmers, the snug minor officials—steeped in Hungary's colossal caste-consciousness—resented and distrusted the New and hoped desperately it would crumble and everything would be again "as it always was."

The lumpen and criminal and completely beaten who took their cue from "their betters" and "knew their place" and eked out their parasitic lives fawning over the rich and the well-placed, sought, as these creatures always do, to "make the best of it" and to "adjust." But they were ever doubtful and ever hoped, more or less secretly, for the "good old times" when men who were really vultures had a natural role to play in a society frankly built on dog-eat-dog—with the vultures claiming the remains.

These were all the prime material; what reaction was and what it worked with. Visitors, from John Gunther to Michael Gold testified to how numerous and tenacious they were even in the post-war Hungary. And it was among these in the first place that the CIA and the quasi-official and semi-private and private terrorist and counter-revolutionary groups, with their hundreds of millions of dollars and official backing found their first and warmest responses.

Then among the broadest masses, especially in the rural areas, was the hold of a thousand devils and a score of centuries. Things will never change; we are meant to suffer; don't stick your neck out; why take a chance—these were the expressions of social inertia whose weight is incalculable. Others have tried to make a new life before and where did they end? On the rack, in the fire, on the gallows. Who could forget 1919 and the horrors it brought to the men and women who stood up to the rich? And who could forget the Horthy time and how the rich in the West then praised him and all his works?

And the teachings of the Church: man's fall and his sinfulness. Does not the Church condemn the New? Do not the Fathers tell us it is mortal sin to follow the New? Can we be sure they are wrong—and in any case, be they right or wrong, God knows they are powerful?

And are not, indeed, the Jews the cause of all our woes? Did they not kill Christ and do they not drink the blood of our children and lust for our daughters as eagerly as they do for our wealth? And is not Rakosi a Jew and Vas a Jew and Gero a Jew? Is not this New way really the Jew way—meant with typically sly cunning to beguile us and then chain us hand and foot and fleece us?

And is not the Magyar God's elect? Should not Hungary be great and powerful, rather than small and weak and smothered by a Slavic sea?

And these New ones—do they not teach sins; do they not say a woman is man's equal, and that a child should not be beaten and that all people—even Jews—are as good as all others? Are we then to change everything we have been told and have believed in the past? Can we be sure this New will last; or will it go down in blood again as in 1919?

These and ten thousand more superstitions and dark fears, hidden deep sometimes within the innermost recesses of the brain, and rooted in centuries of oppression and mis-education were widespread among millions, in one form or another, to one degree or another. These were the soil, the nourishment for the malice of the Old Overlords and the imperialist conspirers.
Without this—and without this on the backdrop of Anglo-American imperialism as the basic bulwark of world reaction and the fundamental source of the war danger—the New Hungary, as the New World of Socialism, in general from 1917 into the future, would move on, relatively undisturbed, to the building of the “human epoch of world history,” when exploitation and oppression and tyranny shall disappear. But the world being what it is, the process, though inexorable, moves on with great disturbances and despite terrible setbacks.

Some of these disturbances and setbacks derive from the mistakes and crimes of those trying to build Socialism, for they are human beings, shaped by their environment, functioning in a far from perfect world, encompassed by opponents and seeking to accomplish that which is largely unprecedented and that which is, within each national entity seeking it, in many respects unique.

It is of the utmost importance to understand these failings—the failings from within—because without these, it is clear, the tragic events in Hungary of October-November, 1956, would never have occurred. We repeat, the fundamental sources of the upheaval were the machinations and the pressures of imperialism, but decisive to the actual outbreak of that upheaval were the errors on the part of those charged with building and safeguarding Socialism. Further, it is important to learn the lessons of these failings, so that the method of correction may be grasped and so that their repetition, in Hungary or anywhere else, may be avoided.

* * *

The errors seem to have fallen into four main categories, all interrelated and reinforcing each other. These were: 1) a failure to properly evaluate the national feelings of the Hungarian people; 2) persistence in a badly one-sided economic policy resulting in a halt to the improvement of the material conditions of the masses, and for certain periods, a decline in such conditions which never, at any time, had exceeded rather limited standards; 3) an insistence upon monolithic unity in all spheres of life, enforced with terrible rigidity, deteriorating into crass administrative bullying and intolerable violations of legality, humanity and sheer decency; 4) a failure to preserve the revolutionary elan and purity of the Marxist-Leninist party.

* * *

The fact that the national feelings of the Hungarian people were affronted is indubitable and emphasized by observers of all opinions. Why did this happen and how did it manifest itself?

The causes are complex. First of all, it is true, I think, that Communist theory classically tended to underplay the significance of national feelings and rather one-sidedly picture patriotism as the tool of exploiters and the deceived of the exploited. This emphasis was perfectly understandable—and even proper—when imperialism ruled the entire world and its wars were plunder campaigns camouflaged with “patriotic” appeals. But in the era when Socialism is on the agenda, so far as world history is concerned, and is actually built or building in much of the world, this kind of approach to national feeling becomes quite outmoded.

There was a lag, in the worldwide proletarian movement, in adjusting to this change; a lag reinforced by the fundamental need of support of the Soviet Union in face of the acute danger of fascism and war; a lag especially painful as the rise of colonial and liberation movements throughout the world gave unprecedented impetus to national feelings everywhere.

In the case of Hungary there were four especially complicating factors. One was the fact that in Hungary—as we attempted to make clear in earlier pages—nationalism was most closely tied to ultra-reactionary foreign and domestic policies. In consequence, the Hungarian Left was always especially hostile to nationalism, and viewed it with keen and understandable suspicion. And further, the Right was able, almost unchallenged, to put itself forward as the guardian and promoter of Hungarian glory and aggrandizement.

Related was an additional element. Hungarian reaction had been triumphant so long that it had succeeded in large part in physically annihilating the uncompromising Left or in driving it into exile. It therefore was an historical fact, that, for many years, outstanding leaders of the Hungarian Left were forced to live outside Hungary. This produced a separation which did not help develop the national sensitivity of the exiles and which intensified the feeling among large numbers of Hungarians that those of the Left were, indeed, alien.

Third, was the fact that the nation making possible social revolution in Hungary—making possible the liberation of Hungary—was that greatest of Slavic powers which was the traditional enemy of Hungary. If one could conceive of the United States making possible the full revolutionizing of and liberation of
Mexico, one would have, from the viewpoint of national feeling, a somewhat analogous situation.

Fourth, Hungary had been at war with the Soviet Union; her fascist regime had conducted, with Hitler, an official campaign of frightfulness inside Russia that is probably unparalleled in the history of European military atrocities; and her people had not created a national democratic or anti-fascist resistance movement. Hence, to the Red Army, Hungary was enemy territory, much as Germany, and this colored Soviet policy, diplomacy and conduct in Hungary, especially from 1945 to 1949.

Additionally—and while this does not apply only to Hungary, it certainly affected her as well as other countries—it is clear and admitted now by all that the U.S.S.R. itself, under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, practiced bullying tactics which were often contemptuous of the national feelings of fraternal, but weaker, states seeking to build Socialism. Clearly, under that leadership, there was a fanatical pre-occupation with rigid unity and a brutal insistence upon the adoption of prescribed policies which paid precious little heed to national differences or sensitivity.

The practices that affronted national feelings were numerous, some petty and some horrendous, but all mounted up to a keen and widely-felt resentment. Some stem directly from the fact that Hungary had been an enemy and fascist nation and so certain attributes of its past were broken with all at once—for example, the styling of the Army uniforms—but such actions seem to have been taken without sufficient and persuasive preparation. They seem also in too many cases to have seen the replacing of the fascist style with one markedly similar to the Soviet Union’s—as in the case of uniforms—rather than distinctively national.

Again, the names of a thousand streets and a hundred towns were changed. Once more this is logical and proper, for the heroes of a fascist regime will not be the heroes of a Socialist government. But too often—and again the enemy nature of Horthy Hungary is to be recalled—the new names selected were the names of Russian or Soviet heroes—of Lenin and Stalin, Mayakovsky and Kalinin, etc., etc.—which rang strangely in the ears of all Hungarians. It was a rare Hungarian who did not feel rather awkward and bitter in addressing a letter to a friend in Budapest and writing down Mayakovsky Avenue.

Similarly, in remodeling features of the educational system one observed an insensitivity to feelings of national pride that, in retrospect, is astonishing. Clearly, with the defeat of Hitlerism, German could not be the sole compulsory language, after the native tongue, required of all higher-level students. But surely it was crass to substitute the language of the liberating power as that which, instead of German, was the required one! It might well be and should be one of a series of several languages—let us say French, German, English, Russian—from which students going on to advanced levels would be required to select one or possibly two for study. Again, certain purely pedagogic methods inherited from the Horthy days—even those having to do with the system of grading—were found to be faulty, but too often the solution was not to choose a method devised or selected by the Hungarian educational body, but rather to transplant, quite mechanically, the method used at the moment in the Soviet Union.

Even national holidays, or religious holidays having powerful national overtones, were rather arbitrarily abandoned or utterly changed. Almost incredible is the fact that this was done with March 15—the Hungarian equivalent of the American July 4th—and the day was to be marked only as the anniversary of the issuance of the great Land Reform Act of 1945. Would it not have been more logical and more fitting to combine the traditional association of March 15 with the 1848 struggles together with the more recent and more profound liberating impact of the March 15th of 1945? Similarly, should not the new national emblem of the New Hungary have combined symbols of socialism with the splendid memories of Petofi and Kossuth?

It is clear that in an effort to uproot the last vestiges of chauvinism and aggressive nationalism—so very widespread in Hungary—the Communist leadership was grossly insensitive to wholesome and powerful national feelings and too ready to adopt a proletarian internationalism that smacked of slavish imitation of the U.S.S.R. and so was anything but genuine proletarian internationalism. At least equal blame for these blunders must be attached, it seems clear, to the Soviet leadership for allowing, if not encouraging, their commission.

Hand in hand with this went an effusiveness and a repetitiousness in declaring Hungary’s indebtedness to the Soviet Union for liberation from fascism—an historical truth, certainly, but everything, even the truth, can be beaten to death. This was looked upon very widely, especially as the months wore on and
the ritualistic acknowledgment of indebtedness did not diminish, as sycophancy of a marked character.

The government of the New Hungary, under the leadership of Rakosi, confronted the national feelings of the majority of its citizens. The evidence shows clearly that this was a major source of popular discontent.

The second major source of popular discontent in the New Hungary, especially after 1949, was a markedly one-sided concentration upon heavy industry at the expense of light, and an excessively forced pace in the effort to socialize agriculture. With this, especially the over-concentration upon heavy industry, went a failure to improve sufficiently (and for a time to improve at all) the actual living conditions of the masses from the high point it had reached with the beginning of 1950.

In saying this we do not mean to deny what indeed has been stressed in earlier pages, namely, the great necessity, from the standpoint of building Socialism and lifting human standards, to introduce industry and to rationalize and collectivize agriculture. These needs were, and are, present in varying degrees throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and they were markedly present in Hungary. Having made this point, however, and emphasized the real contributions to actual and potential economic strength made by the New Hungary, it nevertheless remains true that the method of conducting an historically sound and necessary policy was quite faulty and its pace very forced.

We wish, at this point, to reiterate three ideas: First, the degree of concentration upon heavy industry—again, apparently, in a rather uninimaginative copying of Soviet experiences developed under different circumstances—was higher in Hungary than elsewhere in the Socialist world; second, the shift from this policy, when it came in Hungary (in the end of 1953) was more dramatic and total than elsewhere; third, the shift back from this over-correction was done more quickly in Hungary (by 1955) and again in a more exaggerated form than elsewhere. In the latter connection, the shift to pre-1954 policy was particularly marked in agriculture.

Thus, the United Nations' Economic Survey of Europe in 1955 (Geneva, 1956, p. 195) points out that by the end of 1955, as a result of an abrupt change in 1954, about 34% of agricultural land was already socialized; at the same time the government announced its intention to "bring more than half of the total agricultural land into the socialist sector by 1960." As we have previously indicated, the agrarian problem in Hungary was an especially vexing one, and it seems plain that only great advance in technique and scientific methods, plus collectivized processes promise a fundamental solution. But exactly because of the very vexing situation and since the aim is for a fundamental solution, the process had to be deliberate and accompanied by the most careful persuasiveness. The facts, however, show a marked degree of haste and arbitrariness. These, too, provoked some popular hostility; added to the forced pace and precipitous changes on the industrial sector, it must be said that the actual functioning of the Five-Year Plan, despite very real and lasting benefits, provoked considerable uneasiness and even hostility.

The one-sidedness in economic activity not only adversely affected living conditions in general, but also produced difficulties of a rather minor character, but very distressing. That is, it was not alone a question of a decline in real wages, and speeded-up work pace, and an intensified housing shortage and a squeezing of farmers—especially the majority not yet within the socialized sector. The impact was felt in things which, taken by themselves were not too important, but they were aggravating, and piled on to the more important grievances, heightened popular unrest. An example will help make clear this point: Rakosi is speaking at a meeting of the Budapest Party Leadership, July 11, 1958, and is emphasizing the need for change—recognized, in varying degrees, throughout the Party by that date. At one point, he says:

As a result of the absorption in socialist industry, and often of our own mistakes, many artisans have left the villages and have become industrial workers. Thus, a situation has arisen that, in many villages, there are no barbers, no blacksmiths, no shoemakers, and, in order to have a horse shoed or a shoe soled, one often has to go as far as the third village or the chief town of the district. It is only natural that the population of the villages is angered by such a state of affairs. Unfortunately, the same state of affairs often prevails in the towns, too. (Information Bulletin, published by the Central Committee, Hungarian Working People's Party, Budapest, June-July, 1958, p. 18).

One can see the farmer wasting two hours looking for a blacksmith and the mother clutching three pairs of shoes and running off from pressing tasks in search of a cobbler some eight miles
distant—and each finding the respective craftsman deluged with work. And one can hear all concerned muttering about the brilliant comrade leaders who are transforming a nation and making it burdensome for its inhabitants to keep their horses shod and their shoes repaired!

There is no more graphic and precise summary of the conditions in this area inducing unrest than these sentences from the Report of Matyas Rakosi himself at the Third (1954) Congress of the Hungarian Working People's Party:

In the entire policy of the Party, the fundamental tasks, the consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance and the improvement of the working people's living conditions were relegated to the background, due to the exaggerated industrialization and the forced pace of development in cooperative farming. In other words, the only possible foundation for building Socialism was relegated to the background.

The extreme one-sidedness in the economic development of Hungary, particularly from 1950 until 1954, its forced pace both in terms of heavy industry and agriculture, the neglect of living conditions (especially of housing), the heavy tax that extraordinary defense appropriations entailed—the whole tenseness and strain and sense of continual emergency, with occasional sharp shifts, which characterized the practice of the New Hungary for part of its existence contributed heavily to popular discontent.

In Hungary, especially with the intensification of the Cold War—the Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, napalm bomb “pacification” of Greece, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the inclusion therein of West Germany and such choice specimens of the Free World as Portugal and Turkey (the latter also in the “North Atlantic”)—there developed, from 1949 until the middle of 1953, a rigidity, bureaucratism and rule by administrative fiat that became increasingly obnoxious to larger and larger segments of the population. This was accompanied by the imposition, in time, of an extremely tight “monolithic unity,” not only in the Hungarian Working People's Party, but in every aspect and phase of life. Rigid over-centralization became characteristic. Youth organizations, student organizations, organizations of scientists, writers, journalists, teachers, all were merged so that in each category there was but one nationwide organization. Other organizations, as those uniting the trade unions or sup-

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posedly broader groupings like the People's Front—became in fact rubber-stamping, dues-collecting associations.

Moreover, it is to be borne in mind that, by 1955, the Party, in a country of about 9 millions, had a membership of over 900,000. What this meant, in fact, was an enormous duplication of leadership, and even of membership, in the various mass organizations. The result was that the Party leadership tended to be insulated or isolated from anything like grass-roots, direct public opinion. One had a situation where the leader of a regional youth organization would report to an executive committee of the regional Party organization of which he was already a member! I do not, of course, mean that it was not natural and necessary for Party leaders to be mass leaders; but I do mean that if there was in fact organizational unity, right down to and including identical personnel—as there was to a marked degree in Hungary—one had a situation that encourages bureaucracy and nepotism and favoritism and crasser forms of corruption and the toleration of sheer incompetence.

In addition, this kind of duplication, within a context of rigid “unity” (quotation marks are used because the unity was often more formal than real) made it exceedingly difficult for the rank and file—for the mass of workers and farmers and intelligentsia—to really express themselves or to feel that they were able to reach through the layers of duplicating officials up into some level where saying what they wanted to might have an impact. And increasingly, as this tier upon tier of officialdom solidified, less and less did the rank and file even try to get through or feel it safe to try. The result was accumulating frustration and bitterness, and leadership increasingly divorced from those it was leading. This, by an inner logic of its own, tended to become more and more ingrained and led increasingly to administrative rather than persuasive measures and to reliance upon deception rather than education. And, dialectics applying here as elsewhere, one had ever increasing exacerbation of the situation: a bureaucratic set-up leading to separation; separation intensifying the set-up's bureaucratism; the intensified bureaucratism in turn intensifying the separation. This went on in Hungary until one could have 900,000 Party members in a country whose adult population was hardly over 9,000,000 and yet the leadership of that Party had a distorted view of the feelings, needs and desires of that population.
Once again specific examples and precise quotations from indubitable sources—surely not tending to exaggerate failures and problems—will be most illuminating. For this purpose, we choose an article entitled “On Problems of Cadre Work,” by Rudolf Foldvari, Secretary of the Budapest Party Committee, published—as part of the struggle for change—in a leading Party publication, Társadalmi Szemle, February, 1954.

Foldvari complains of a “low level of political leadership” which leads to repeated meetings and interminable discussions—and still ends in orders rather than real understanding or agreement. “That is why,” this Party leader continues:

Complaints are made in almost all our organizations about the great number of meetings, the bureaucratic style of work of Party bodies, and that the functionaries spend the greater part of their working hours doing office work and not in checking up on the lower bodies on the spot, getting to know and educating the cadres.

What is the result?

It is quite impossible to verify the correctness of the political line; there is not enough time to make a thorough analysis of experiences and to deduce correct, generalizing conclusions, in order to work out political and organizational tasks to eliminate difficulties. Leadership thus becomes general, often chatter instead of real, live leadership.

Bureaucracy of this kind of nebulous highly generalized leadership, tends to place a premium upon the “reliable” person, rather than the expert, the one who knows and produces and will generally be a person of some stature and one less subject to “agreeing” with the goal of ingratiating—and holding on to the job and perhaps moving up.

Hence Foldvari finds it important to stress that:

In selecting cadres, it is necessary to consider their political reliability together with their practical and professional fitness. We must not accept views such as “the main thing is political reliability; the profession (i.e., the professional ability) does not count” because in this way we may ruin many a cadre who wants to work honestly but does not know his profession, and thereby retard the development of our organizations for a long time.

Obviously competence and expertise are of central consequence to the efficient functioning of any organization or Party; but when the Party exercises State power, the question of real knowledge among its leadership clearly becomes a matter of vital consequence to the Party and to the Nation.

Further, bureaucratic practices not only lead to a premium upon the “reliable” person—which so often means, the pliable one: they lead also to the development of an elaborate technique for ascertaining reliability, which technique becomes a basic part of the bureaucracy. Foldvari spells out the result as it showed itself in Hungary:

Some of our functionaries have an unsound mistrust of the political past of cadres, go to excesses in probing their ancestry, exaggerate the importance of relatives living abroad and do not pay sufficient attention to what has happened since the mistakes made by the cadres a long time ago.

The mistrust leads to paper work, for everyone wants to be “protected” and wants to have a “record” of his caution and his own political scrupulousness. Hence, functionaries, says the Budapest Party Secretary:

Demand too much written material and information so that if something were to come to light about the political past of the cadres, they could refer to the pile of documents, saying: “I did everything; I am not responsible.”

Of course, this evolves into quite an “apparatus,” with elaborate codes and rules—and even swollen manuals. Thus, the Ministry of Postal Services and the Ministry of Heavy Industry, for three years from 1950 to 1953 adopted and used an official Manual, entitled: “What a Biography (of a Potential Employee) Should Contain.” Among other things, the applicant was to supply the year and place of birth of grandparents on both sides, with their occupations and their addresses if alive, or otherwise years of death. Similar information was required concerning all brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, fathers-in-law, mothers-in-law, and their brothers and sisters. And, for good measure, the last line of the Manual read: “Do not answer the questions briefly, but in detail.”

Most assuredly, it is not possible to comprehend this fully unless one puts it in the context of the Hungarian past, and its profoundly deep and long-time and widespread caste-system, complete with inheritance of rank and civil position—a caste-system which pervaded all levels of pre-1945 Hungarian society. Nevertheless, in a Socialist society and for a Marxist-Leninist Party, it is completely contradictory and vitiating.

It can lead to virtual paralysis. It can lead to the sort of situation described by Foldvari: “The intolerable mistrust towards
cadres takes another form, namely, that leaders in some Party organizations claim they cannot promote anyone because there are no comrades with a clean record who are willing to do active work."

Of course, perhaps one's own relatives are the only really reliable people. In any case keeping offices within the family is convenient and if it serves to enhance one's comfort and, perhaps, one's own power, these are more or less fortunate coincidences. Certainly nepotism was not uncommon. Again, the Budapest Party Secretary is the witness:

Some functionaries are surrounding themselves with relatives and friends. The manager of a Budapest factory appointed his younger brother assistant works manager, and the head of the personnel department gave a leading post to his relative who was a contractor formerly. This unhealthy spirit also affected the Party life of branch organizations. The two brothers-in-law of the branch secretary of the maintenance shop Party branch were also members of the branch committee. We must put an end to occurrences such as these, because ties of kinship and friendship are a hot-bed for the unprincipled, uncritical spirit of "if you don't hurt me, I won't hurt you."

Once again it is necessary to remark that this was normal and standard and infinitely more intense in pre-1945 Hungary—as it is the rule in all capitalist political parties and organizations and social orders. But that this was basically a hangover from a completely predatory society did not make it less, but rather more, obnoxious to and alien to and harmful to, a workers' and peasants' order building a Socialist foundation. In fact, because it was alien to a Socialist society, its existence tended to produce intensified public discontent. That it exists even while Socialism is being built, should not make one despair of Socialism. It should make one keenly aware of the weight of the past, of the difficulties of personnel work. It should, too, reinforce one's conviction in the superiority of Socialism for it is under that system only that such habits are anachronistic; and so superior and fundamentally sound is the system of Socialism that it persists and even develops despite these drawbacks of an earlier social order and despite the influence exerted by that hostile society still existing elsewhere.

Another consideration that hampered the proper functioning of the Party and the State in their relations with the people arose out of the overall error of over-concentration on heavy industry. A result was the assignment of the most mature and most capable and most highly regarded personnel to heavy industry, while light industry, agriculture and—above all—cultural work suffered. Generally assignments to these areas of work were made on the basis of the best (and the most) personnel for heavy industry and the worst (and the least)—or what could be spared, or no top leader imperatively demanded—for cultural work. Of course, in terms of public relations—especially in view of the extreme difficulties of effective Socialist work in the aesthetic, artistic, scientific and literary fields—this principle of personnel assignment was exceedingly harmful. Bearing in mind, also, the pronounced articulateness of the people in the cultural field—the writers and professors, the students and artists, the dramatists and musicians—and the fact that the very nature of their work was mass communication and instruction, it becomes clear that the Party's notable deficiencies in these areas were very influential in developing discontent.

Once again, it is because, with Socialism, culture is so precious and cultural workers so esteemed—quite unlike the case in exploitative social orders—and because culture becomes truly a mass phenomenon for the first time in history—it is, because of this, I say, that deficiencies in this area, and bureaucracy, inexpertness and rudeness among those charged with its leadership become especially unfortunate and provoking.

The functioning of the Party in Hungary, especially from late 1949 through most of 1953 was characterized, also, by extreme concentrations of power in particular leaders, with the national concentration in the hands of the First Secretary, Matyas Rakosi. This, of course, was more or less true in Communist Parties throughout the world, and was notably true, at the same time, in the Soviet Union. There is no question that this particular example and its influence—remembering the great prestige of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the enormous power of that pioneer socialist land—was very weighty upon the Hungarian Party, perhaps more so than any other, because of the special features of Hungarian national and Party development discussed earlier.

Concerning this very costly aberration, Foldvari declared:

Where the principle of collective leadership is violated, where the conditions for the development of criticism and selfcriticism are lacking, there the leaders do not feel responsible for their work and they are characterized by harmful complacency and conceit. It is in such an atmosphere that bullying and petty
tyrants come to the fore, the personal cult and unprincipled flattery become widespread. There are Party committee members even today who tolerate the first secretary of the committee to lead on his own, who do not criticize his mistakes for fear of offending him.

Such violations of Socialist practice, and ethic—as nepotism, bureaucracy, personal rule—helped produce, also, some decay in more elementary standards of moral behavior. There appeared amongst some of the leadership a grossness of personal behavior that drew from Foldvari this paragraph:

All our cadres must practice what they preach; they cannot teach Communist morals to others and seriously violate them themselves. We must educate them for irreproachable moral purity. If leading cadres show an example with their life and work, then this will have an educative effect on their colleagues as well. Only the leader who himself lives and works in an exemplary manner, has the moral right to criticize mistakes sharply and in a party-like manner.

Once again, such violations by leaders are especially distressing to public opinion in a Socialist society exactly because Socialism is infinitely the most moral of social orders yet projected by man. Where, in pre-1945 Hungary, the elite were supplied with stags for their day’s hunting and peasant girls for their evening’s enjoyment—as recorded in Karoly’s Memoirs—where, as in the United States the morality of the rich is somewhat below that of the goat and the bourgeoisie consciously seeks to debase the general cultural level to their own standards—in such societies, the piggishness of the “big shots” is taken for granted. Where, as in pre-Hungary, a peasant girl’s status was about that of a stag and the dignity of women generally, or of the workers and peasants, non-existent so far as the rulers were concerned, such behavior would be considered normal and would not particularly induce discontent and unrest. But, with Socialism, the equality of women is a basic postulate; with Socialism, the supreme worth of the worker and peasant is fundamental. In such a society, grossness and immorality by leaders is especially disgusting and, where present, would tend to produce widespread popular contempt and displeasure.

Finally and related to what has gone before, the evidence demonstrates that among many of the leaders in the Hungarian Working People’s Party there developed an estrangement from the masses, an underestimation of them, a fear of them and a kind of cynicism toward them. Sometimes this was dressed in “Left”-sectarian verbiage, sometimes it appeared in “Right-opportunist” guise—but what it added up to was keeping the masses in the dark, not telling them of difficulties and problems and not fully explaining or frankly rectifying. Said Foldvari:

It is precisely from us that the masses wait for an explanation of the causes of the difficulties, and if we acquaint them with the actual situation they will accept our explanation and will fight with us to eliminate the difficulties. There is nothing more dangerous than hiding the truth from the people.

Such lack of confidence in the masses robs Socialism of its greatest strength and its decisive advantage over all exploiting systems. In the actual world of today, with imperialism’s central purpose the destruction of socialism, this lack of explanation—this absence of a “mass line,” as the Chinese Communists call it and practice it—is made to order for internal and external enemies of Socialism. In such an atmosphere the agent and the provocateur, the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, the restorationist and fascist, can have—and in Hungary, did have—a field day.

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The state and the Party were centralized to the point of near-identity in Hungary after 1949. The result was that the rigid singleness of the Party and its mounting bureaucratization impressed itself upon the State. Rather than the Party as inspiration and guide, the Party became, with the might of the State, omnipotent.

The absence of modes of dissent within the Party and of variety in the organizational life of the nation and the lack of a system of divided or balanced powers produced a fierce concentration of control. The organizational difficulties within the Party became inflated into threats to the State. Opposition to particular Party tactics or emphases became opposition to the People’s State form. Differences with line, variations in fundamental approaches—for example, the degree of concentration upon heavy industry or the speed with which agriculture should be collectivized—became increasingly intolerable to the apparatus and were more and more identified with treason.

If this whole development is abstracted from the real enmity of Anglo-American imperialism, it is falsified and the historical picture is basically distorted. If this development in Hungary
is abstracted from a similar development in the Soviet Union—in response to the same fundamental challenge—and if the dominant power position of the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe is obscured, then also, the Hungarian experience is seen out of focus.

Above all, we repeat, for it cannot be too often emphasized, the manifest moves by American imperialism, armed with atomic weapons, in the direction of isolating, “containing,” and ultimately attacking the lands of Socialism, culminating in 1949 in the creation of a separate German sovereignty—the German Federal Republic, integrated within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, re-militarized and led by Hitler’s chief lieutenants—conditioned the whole complex of developments in the Socialist sector. It conditioned the drive towards uniformity and unity—even at the expense of national feelings and even at the cost of Yugoslavia; it conditioned the burdensome rearmament drive; it conditioned the excessive concentration on heavy industry; it conditioned the further growth of bureaucracy. And, with the hostile purposes of imperialism buttressed by the open and official adoption of a policy of provoking counter-revolution by all and any possible means, there developed a crash program of insuring internal, domestic unity and security though it seem to require fierce repression.

How much of the efforts of imperialist intelligence went into the task of speeding the policy of repression in the lands of Socialism one does not know. But certainly that repression was fundamentally alien to Socialism; to build it up, to bulwark it with atrocious systems of frame-up and physical terror would be a prime aim of provocateurs. To this writer it seems clear, especially bearing in mind the announced purposes of Anglo-American intelligence, that some of this was the work of agents-provocateurs. But this cannot be the basic explanation of the systematized repression which came into being. True, the challenge of imperialism is a basic source. But related are the aberrations in Party organization and functioning and the “forgetting” of decisive considerations—for any adherent of Socialism—of national sentiments, real popular sovereignty, the improvement of living conditions and the general ennoblement of mankind. It is this ennoblement which is the aim and purpose of Marxism-Leninism—its beginning and its goal and its reason for existing.

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That which does not serve this supreme end is the ultimate “deviation.”

The institution of a system violative of law, filled with censorship restrictions and gross injustices and characterized by terrible violations of human rights marked the years from 1949 through 1953 in Hungary. I do not now discuss motivations; but the actions were frightful, were such as befitted the repressive machinery of exploitative systems. To say that they violated elementary Marxist-Leninist principles of behavior is to speak moderately; they violated elementary considerations of humanity.

In their worst expressions they victimized Communists and Socialists; in a general pattern of illegality and the inculcation of fear they reached out quite broadly through the nation. This system of repression was a basic source of popular discontent in Hungary and, especially to 1954, did as much as any other single thing to bring the whole Party into disrepute, and to shake the faith of rank and file members in Marxism-Leninism itself.

Some of the repression reached out quite widely. It took the form, for example, of severe travel restrictions, so that permission to leave the country, even to visit neighboring Socialist countries, was difficult to obtain. It took the form of discouraging correspondence with people elsewhere, and especially with friends or relatives, or professional colleagues, in Western Europe and in America. Indeed, Party members were even expelled solely on the “charge” of having written to people in the United States. There was a mechanical, dogmatic overseeing of cultural work; in this area there was excessive rule by fiat and often the rulings came from people notable for their own lack of creativity.

Widespread censorship appeared. This had its roots in the post-war obligations to root out the last vestiges of fascism. Since fascism had swamped the country, this was no small task and required, for example, thorough examination of libraries and book shops and some efforts to cleanse them of outright fascistic, ultra-chauvinistic, aggressive, and anti-Semitic “literature.” Examples of this anti-human material might well remain as evidences of ruling-class idiocy and bestiality, but room would have to made for works of science and humanism and protest.

This process, however, degenerated into a full-scale political censorship of the most inclusive kind. Something of the story was told when the censorship process was being challenged suc-
cessfully and a policy of emancipating the book shelves was adopted. Thus, in The Librarian (a professional journal published in Hungarian in Budapest) for August, 1956, appears a leading editorial article, "For Democratization of Our Library Life" which gives the facts. After the large-scale removal and replacement of fascist volumes, and once again beginning towards the end of 1949, there started a process of placing on special reserve or confining for limited use other books, or even removing books for warehouse storage. Indeed, by about 1952 as many books were on restricted or confined or special reserves or in storage as were on the shelves for readers. It reached the point where Freud, Proudhon, Edward Bernstein, Jung, Gide, Malraux, Maurois, were unobtainable or available only after hard and even courageous effort. Some musical scores were banned, some Hungarian literary classics restricted, classical works on political economy (like Adam Smith) and philosophy and history were confined to very limited circulation.

But, in addition to this, terror appeared. The irrefutable facts concerning this terror are as painful to this writer, I think, as they can be to any human being—other than one whom it victimized. Yet a summary of those facts must nevertheless be offered if one is to comprehend the truth about Hungary.

Beginning with the arrest and frame-up and execution of the Communist leader Laszlo Rajk, several thousand people, mostly Communists and Socialists, were more or less arbitrarily apprehended, more or less unjustly convicted, and in scores of cases—perhaps some hundreds of cases—wrongfully executed. It appears also indubitable that forms of torture were used, not rarely, for purposes of extracting "confessions" or as sheer punishment.

Here, again, under capitalist rule, especially in its racist and fascist and colonial expressions, and generally in terms of the radical and the poor (and notably in pre-1945 Hungary) injustice and frame-up, police beatings, third degree tortures are institutionalized matters, known to all with any political sophistication. But their appearance, to any degree and in any form, in Socialist countries is intolerable and utterly unjustifiable—no matter what the provocation or the danger or the background. Again, too, it is exactly because such inhumanity is alien and hostile to Socialism that it aroused the popular hatred for its servants that it did arouse. Socialism cannot and must not and will not abide such conditions, and part of the truth about Hungary is right there.

Istvan Kovacs, a prominent leader of the Party, speaking at a meeting of Party functionaries in Budapest on October 14, 1954, declared:

We may frankly admit that the leaders of the former State Security Office arrested many comrades, using criminally improper methods, and they were convicted by the courts on grounds of invented and forced charges and testimony. (A. P. dispatch from Budapest, in N. Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1954).

In July, 1956, the newly-appointed Chief Prosecutor, Gyorgy Non, publicly stated that many persons had been imprisoned unjustly in the past and that among these several had been executed. He pledged: "Socialist legality will never again be violated in the future." (A.P. dispatch from Budapest, in N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1956.)

That same month, on July 18, 1956, Matyas Rakosi resigned. In submitting his letter of resignation to the Central Committee, Rakosi cited illness, which had become more serious during the past two years. "Moreover," his letter continued, "my mistakes in the sphere of the personality cult and Socialist legality make it more difficult for the Party leadership fully to concentrate its attention on the tasks before us."

In a statement amplifying and accompanying his letter of resignation (which the Committee accepted) Rakosi said, pertinent to the question of violations of Socialist legality:

As for my mistakes in the sphere of the personality cult and of violations of Socialist legality, I repeatedly admitted them at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee in June, 1953, and in the subsequent period and in connection criticized them in public. After the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and Comrade Khrushchev's report, I realized that the gravity and influence of these mistakes were greater than I believed and the damage inflicted upon our Party as a result of these mistakes much more serious than I thought earlier.

These mistakes complicated the work of our Party, reduced the attractive power of the Party and the People's Democracy and impeded the development of the Leninist standards of Party life, collective leadership, constructive criticism and self-criticism, democratization of the Party and state affairs, the initiative and creative force of the mass of the working people.

And lastly these mistakes gave the enemy quite a wide target for attack. The sum total of the mistakes that I made at the
most important post of Party work seriously prejudiced all our Socialist development. (Published in Szabad Nep, Budapest, July 19, 1956; In translation in the N. Y. Times same date.)

So resigned a man who for over forty years had been a staunch Communist leader, one who had rallied Hungarian soldiers against Rumanian invaders in 1919 as an aide of Kun; who had served sixteen years in Horthy jails; had suffered years of solitary confinement; had been tortured repeatedly, the soles of his feet torn to shreds, but had held firm; was sentenced to die in 1925, but stood firm; had played a leading role in liberated Hungary since 1945. Now, gravely ill, 64 years old, his resignation was necessary, as he said, “to serve the great cause of our Party, the working people, Socialism”—to this had the errors of the Party he had led, and his own errors, reduced him. High among the list of these “errors” were the least forgivable amongst them—and his services had been many, and his abilities were tremendous—the crime of violating Socialist law.

The man who was then elected to succeed Rakosi as First Secretary was Erno Gero—the Bridgebuilder, the dynamic miracle worker of the heroic days from 1945-1949. He too, in a Report to the Central Committee on July 19, 1956, referred to the great difficulties facing the Party, and consequential, “in this state of affairs,” he said, were “the grave mistakes committed in the field of the cult of personality and legality, mainly before July, 1953.” He went on: “The liquidation of these mistakes was begun in 1953, later got bogged down, started again with renewed ardor, and is now nearing completion.” (This speech appeared in full in Szabad Nep, July 20, 1956; substantial portions in English, are in Paul E. Zinner, ed., National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe, N. Y., 1956, pp. 342-45.)

On July 21, 1956 the Central Committee of the Party adopted an exceedingly important and rather lengthy Resolution, entitled “With Party Unity for a Socialist Democracy” to which we shall refer again later. On the subject of violations of law, this Resolution contains precise data, otherwise impossible to discover. It refers to “grave violations of law” and to “innocent people, revolutionaries, Communists, veteran fighters of the labor movement,” as among those victimized. It declares that the process of investigation, “nearing completion,” had reviewed 474 cases of injustice. Among those victimized were 12 members and candidate members of the Central Committee, including Janos Kadar, Gyula Kallai, Gyorgy Marosan; an outstanding Social-Democratic leader, arrested in 1950, is also mentioned as among the rehabilitated—Arpad Szakasits, formerly President of the Republic.

Behind the names and the numbers lay an unutterable tragedy. In this same July, 1956, the widow of Rakj, who had herself been jailed, spoke to 2,000 leading Communists in Budapest:

Comrades (she still used this most beautiful word), there are no words with which to tell you what I feel facing you after cruel years in jail, without a word, a crumb of food, a letter, or a sign of life reaching me from the outside, living in despair and hopelessness. When they took me away I was nursing my five-month old baby. For five years I had no word of my baby.

To such depths could Party leaders fall when their loyalty degenerated to fanaticism; when rigidity and centralization and bureaucracy had blinded them; when separation from the masses had led to cynicism and a dependence upon force; when they forgot the reason for the Party, for Communism—the liberation of the oppressed and, therefore, of all mankind.

They neglected the dual aspect of the politics of proletarian dictatorship: the transitory suppression of the minority exploiters and the full freeing of the majority of exploited.

Indeed, even with the centralization and bureaucracy and repression and illegality, the fact is that with the revolution in the land and in the factories, with the revolution in education and church-state relations, there did go a fundamental democratization of Hungarian life that nothing—not even the worst of 1950-1958—was able to eliminate. Further, the whole content of Marxism-Leninism is so revolutionary, its whole outlook and spirit and essence are so contrary to dogmatism and elitism that adherence to it in however limited and partial and distorted a form brings protest against injustice and tyranny.

In the New Hungary, in the worst time, the heroes of books and plays were the protesters and revolutionists. In the worst time, the old social order was gone and the peasants and workers were living in a social order that was theirs, partially it is true, but that itself was very important and it promised more. Even in the worst time, the peasants and workers were being educated, did become the new doctors and technicians.* the caste system of old Hungary was destroyed. And always there was the promise

*In 1937-38, children of workers and peasants equalled four percent of the total school population; in 1954-55 they equalled sixty-three percent.
of real freedom—as there was of better material conditions—there was the knowledge dispersed among the masses that Socialism had to mean their own liberation.

Ilona Polyani, knowing the Old Hungary well and visiting and studying the New Hungary for prolonged periods, wrote truly, in 1949, when she reported that the New was “a brand new democracy which in actual fact is a democracy in being.” (World Affairs, London, April, 1949, p. 187.) Rakosi spoke truly, when he said at the Third (1954) Congress of the Hungarian Party, that in the old days for the peasant “every door of advancement was shut in his face, that together with his children he was denied culture, ostracized from the life of the nation; that the very word, peasant, spelled contempt and oppression,” and that the New “threw wide open to him and his children the gates of opportunity.”

Perhaps more persuasive testimony to this same point comes from a rather unlikely source—the fanatically anti-Communist New Leader (New York). In its issue of February 25, 1957, appears an article by one Ladis K. Kristof, described in an editorial note as born in Rumania, educated in Poland, active for a time in post-World War II Rumania and now at the University of Chicago apparently as a political exile. Mr. Kristof’s point is that Communists bring democratization (“for their own purposes”—all deceitful and evil) and that this guarantees their own destruction. He is, in his conclusion, quite wrong. I think, but in his observations of the basic change in Eastern Europe he is, I think, right. Mr. Kristof seeks to distinguish between the governments and the societies of Eastern Europe. He writes:

The societies in Eastern Europe are today much more democratic than they were before the war; only the regimes by which they are ruled are oppressive. The democratic-equalitarian spirit has spread surprisingly fast. Free intercourse among people of different ethnic, religious, or social background is taken for granted. The barriers erected along class or racial lines—strictly enforced by pre-1939 society—have broken down. Almost everyone, regardless of previous social position, admits that rank in society ought to be based solely on individual achievement. For the first time in history, the democratic creed has taken root in this part of the world.

It is the fact of a contradiction between government and people, within Socialist lands—to varying degrees (and in Hungary it existed to a tremendous degree)—which is pointed to in the profound analysis of recent developments offered by

the Chinese Communist Party.* The perception of this fact is new—just as its development is quite new—but it is a fact that must be faced. Hiding from the truth will resolve nothing. Having faced up to the fact, the problem is how to overcome existing manifestations of this contradiction and how best to avoid or reduce their appearance in the future.

One may gain confidence from certain observations. Socialism and democracy are organically related and the inhibitions of one are the distortions of the other. Hence, given the Socialist material foundations, any political superstructure contrary to democratic development—whatever the reasons—will be irritating and the longer the anachronism persists the more distressing and confining will it become. But, unlike systems based upon the private ownership of the means of production and the exploitation of the many by the few, where the natural bent of the ruling class is anti-democratic, and where this natural bias becomes more pronounced as the system becomes more mature, in Socialism the natural direction is democratic and the maturing of Socialism carries with it developing social action looking towards its expansion and safeguarding.

In Hungary, while the anti-democratic aberrations appeared in aggravated form, there also appeared strong efforts at change. These efforts had secured notable successes by 1956. We turn our attention now to an examination of this aspect of Hungarian development.

*Published in full in Political Affairs, Feb. 1957. The particular section referred to occurs on page 5.
VII. Efforts at Change

It is the death of Stalin, the attack upon Beria and the whole gigantic process of “thawing out” that became clearly visible in the U.S.S.R. (and in its relations with Socialist neighbors, in particular with Yugoslavia) in 1953 that had its immediate repercussions elsewhere and not least in Hungary. Another force of great consequence pushing in the same direction was a lessening in international tensions, especially after the collapse of serious American proposals to wage war in Vietnam (1954) and to use atomic weapons there. The trend continued thereafter, with some unevenness, and culminated in the Summit Conference at Geneva (July, 1955). Additionally there were intensifying internal pressures, for reasons already indicated, within the Socialist lands, for democratization of State and Party functioning. These three forces, acting simultaneously and reacting upon each other, are basic explanations for the striking efforts at change that appear in Hungary, beginning in 1953.

The direction of these efforts will be clear to the reader who has followed me to this point, for they sought the elimination of the “sources of popular discontent.” Of basic importance in this regard was a rectification of the nation’s economic planning and policy, so that its one-sided over-emphasis upon the development of heavy industry might be changed. This would carry with it, necessarily, significant changes in policy and conduct as concerned consumer-industry, agriculture, handicrafts, military expenditure, and appropriations for social welfare.

*Of special influence upon Hungary was one of the events in this process—the Soviet Union’s initiative in breaking the deadlock on Austria, and in March, 1955, unilaterally completing the negotiation of a treaty with her. The other three Powers approved and the treaty came into force in July, 1955. With it went the prompt withdrawal by the U.S.S.R. of her troops. This “neutralization” of Austria made a profound impression on Hungarian public opinion.

Secretary Dulles’ response to the neutralization of Austria and the withdrawal of Soviet troops was characteristic. He thought

It followed, that it was necessary, “as quickly as possible,” to reduce capital investments in heavy industry, increase them in agriculture and still avoid shocks to the overall functioning of the economy. Further, the errors of the past made it necessary now, while carrying out this reorganization to strive simultaneously, “to devote greater attention to raising the standard of living of the working class, to ensuring the maximum satisfaction of its material, social and cultural requirements.”

Even before Nagy’s report, the Government had made substantial reductions in the prices of many commodities. His report promised further cuts as part of the effort to improve living conditions. The system of fines as a method of labor discipline

the idea of neutralization would be “contagious and it’s going to spread surely to the neighboring countries.” He added: “For the first time there will be an open door to freedom on the part of Hungary.” (N.Y. Times, May 18, 1955.)
was to be abolished; all overtime work was to be ended and all Sunday work was halted forthwith.

Fines and arrears dues, levied on peasants and consumer cooperatives for non-fulfillment of quotas, were either cut or eliminated. Veterinary service was to be free, all obligatory contracting for agriculture was prohibited. Agricultural purchase quotas were to be defined for a number of years ahead, so that the farming masses could more confidently and intelligently plan their work and “know exactly and in advance the amount of their quotas and [would thereby] be able to dispose of their surplus.”

Too much of “an atmosphere of mistrust” surrounded the intelligentsia and this impedes the securing of technically proficient specialists so vital to “all branches of our economic, cultural and scientific life.” Not enough was done to advance education, especially on the elementary levels. Too much of an attitude of impatience had appeared in the sphere of religion. Nagy, speaking for the Central Committee, made clear:

We adhere to the standpoint of conducting patient explanatory work among the population by means of education and persuasion. We shall not tolerate administrative or other compulsory methods.

The system of justice and law inscribed in the 1949 Constitution, while certainly not perfect, was excellent; what was required was “strict observance of the rights and obligations of citizens stipulated in the Constitution.” Further:

The organs of state power must ensure not only that citizens fulfill their obligations, but that every citizen of our motherland is able freely to enjoy the rights accorded him by law.

But in the functioning of the organs of justice and the militia and also of the local councils, law is often not sufficiently observed. Lawful objections arise from the intolerable, rude, brutal and heartless attitude of some bureaucrats in our offices in relation to ordinary people arranging their affairs. Modesty and an attentive and humane attitude are qualities which we require from everyone in public office.

At the same time, Nagy himself called attention to the marked persistence in Hungary, of reactionary pressures and groups and urged that law enforcement personnel “fight more vigorously against the hardened enemies of our democratic system.” He urged that: “We must not give a moment’s respite to the enemy who is encroaching on our achievements, on our successes, and on our freedom.”

A policy of amnesty was simultaneously announced, to provide “for the release of all those whose crimes are not so grave as to render their release a danger to the state or public security.”

Rakosi, in a speech on July 11, 1953, to Budapest Party leaders, summarized the results of this June meeting of the Central Committee in a similar manner. He saw “the substance of the economic decisions” of that meeting to be as follows:

Our proposals are intended for the unchanged continued building of Socialism, but in such a manner, as to correct the mistakes made in the development of industry by our failure to secure a corresponding rise in the well-being of the working people… Learning from mistakes, we wish now to continue the building of Socialism without ever losing sight of the need for the continuous raising of the living standard and well-being of our working people, and, first of all, of our working class, and for the satisfaction of their cultural and social needs.

In this speech, however, Rakosi made no mention of the needs for reform in legal practice; he did not refer to violations of Socialist legality. He did—as had Nagy, but more pointedly and repeatedly—call attention to “the enemy at home” and “the imperialists abroad” who desired nothing so much as the destruction of Socialism. He emphasized that the imperialist powers were “spending hundreds of millions of dollars on organizing provocations and acts of sabotage and are mobilizing their agents, spies and provocateurs.”

In this Rakosi spoke the truth, but in omitting reference to the frightful violations of legal requirements that had marked the past few years—under his leadership—he was omitting an important part of the whole truth. That he should omit this when it was so strongly stated in the Central Committee’s Resolution and in the reports and publicity flowing from that Resolution was especially important and distressing.

At the same Budapest meeting, Imre Nagy also spoke. He declared his “full agreement” with Rakosi’s speech, but he did refer, though quite briefly, to the work of the Ministry of Justice and to the fact that amnesty and reforms were in the process of implementation. Again, however, and at considerable length, Nagy also referred to the dangers from reactionary, restorationist and imperialist elements—a reference unquestionably reflecting the special danger such forces represented in Hungary. It is likely, too, that Nagy as the active champion of the quick
Elimination of all violations of Socialist legality may have felt impelled, tactically, to emphasize the danger from reaction.

Be that as it may, the fact is that Nagy, himself, in this July, 1953 speech, warned that in the countryside in particular, "hostile elements have stepped up their undermining activities"; he referred also quite specifically to "the wrecking activity of hostile elements." He denounced those who "attempt to create impatience and distrust" and warned that those having "contempt for the interests of the State," or those guilty of "infringement of the laws" would be dealt with mercilessly. Some, he said, reacted "to the Government measures which put an end to unlawful practice and arbitrary actions."

By adopting an attitude hostile to the Party, to the Government and to the People's Democracy, by infringing the law and by committing acts of violence against our working people.

Yet again, at the close of his speech, Premier Nagy said that the enemy is attempting to thwart the success of our objectives by preventing the implementation of the measures which promote the interests of the masses of the people, and by exaggerating or prematurely pushing the demands.

After hearing from Rakosi and Nagy, the leadership of the Budapest Party organization, in July 1953, adopted a Resolution —without a negative vote—which did give in capsule form the heart of the effort at change. Urging exposure of "hostile elements," and of "their demagogy and provocations"—especially dangerous at a time of change—the Resolution declared:

While continuing unchanged the policy of socialist industrialization as the main line of our Party, we shall develop our heavy industry at a relatively slower pace and, thus, assure the increased production of consumers' goods, the more rapid development of agriculture and the steady and consistent rise in the living standard of our working class and our entire working people...to assist the producer cooperatives, to assure strict adherence to the principle of voluntariness, to raise the yields of the individual peasant farms, and to assure lawfulness, enforcement of the law, and amnesty.

The fact is that considerable changes in economic development were swiftly instituted in Hungary, especially in the period from July 1953 until early in 1955. There was achieved a considerable improvement in the living conditions of a majority of the population, thanks not only to the changes, but ideal weather conditions in 1953 helping assure a bumper crop. In the second half of 1953 and in March, 1954 there were three substantial reductions in the prices of food and other basic consumers' items. Housing construction from 1953-1954, while still not sufficient to meet the critical needs, was double that of 1952-53. The wages of workers—particularly those performing heavy physical labor and those in the lowest wage categories—were raised; so were the wages of professionals, notably teachers. Pensions were increased. Physically, the actual volume of consumers goods available went up substantially. The quality of goods and the rate of productivity per worker did not, however, show improvement.

In May, 1954, the Third Congress of the Party expressed general satisfaction with the way in which the economic changes had been managed. The First Five-Year Plan period was to expire with the end of 1954, but this Congress decided that, rather than adopt a Second Five-Year Plan then, in detail, it desired that 1955 be devoted to examining more carefully the full results of the 1953-1954 turn. On the basis of such a more careful inquiry, it was felt, the Second Five-Year Plan could begin with 1956.

The broad perspective for the Second Five-Year Plan was conceived in the following terms:

The fundamental task of the Second Five-Year Plan is continually to improve the well-being and cultural standards of the Hungarian working class, the working peasantry, the intellectuals and the people as a whole through a greater output of consumers' goods of a higher quality, through broadening the range of choice of goods, through steady improvement of social welfare, national health service, housing needs and the increased satisfaction of the cultural requirements of the population.

Hungary, however, as we have seen, is a country whose history runs to extremes. The "New Course" in her economic policy—similar in main outline to that adopted by other Socialist lands at about the same time—resulted in more drastic and sudden changes in the Hungarian economy than anywhere else in Eastern Europe. We have presented the details on this in an earlier section; here it is necessary only to remind the reader that instead of Hungary's heavy industry showing a slower rate of growth, it actually showed a decline (of 6%) at the end of 1954 compared with 1953. Again instead of a reduced pace of collectivization, in Hungary from 1953 through 1954, collectivization had ceased and
there appeared a definite retreat in the socialist sector of her agriculture.

These developments, drastic as they were, provoked in turn an effort at curbing the over-correction. The effort was announced in the decisions of the Central Committee taken in March, 1955. Here was reaffirmed the basic decisions and line of June 1953 and the over-shift was severely condemned. In April, 1955, Nagy was removed as Premier and in November, 1955, announcing himself in sharp disagreement with the March decision, Nagy was expelled from the Party. Happily, by now, such disagreement brought with it nothing other than expulsion. Nagy, now outside the Party, but with a considerable following in it, took his disagreement to the country at large and carried on a strong and bitter campaign against the line and leadership of the Party.

The general economic policy did, in fact, adhere closely to the 1953 Resolution and there was not a reversion to the top-heavy and over-speedy economic program of 1949-53. On the other hand, there persisted wide-spread suspicion and some disappointment that the pace of change was slowed down from 1955 to 1956, as compared with 1953-1954.

* * *

Significant changes in respect to legal procedures were instituted in 1953. Beginning at that time, a definite breakdown in the Rakosite terror-system is apparent. There were pauses in this campaign, but the evidence shows that from 1953 to 1956 major reforms were made in judicial and penal practices, the frame-up apparatus was smashed, the innocent were freed, those imprisoned for excessive periods in view of actual crimes were amnestied, or had their sentences greatly reduced. Those martyred by the fearful violations of Socialist legality were publicly declared to have been innocent so that the stain of treason might be removed from their reputations and from the hearts of their relatives and friends. Efforts were made to compensate—to the degree that material means can compensate—the family members.

In 1953 a special department under the direction of a Chief Attorney, was established and charged with the duty of inquiring into and directing the rectification of injustices and illegalities. The first concentration of this department was the office of State Defense and especially that of the Security Chief. Lt-Gen. Gabor Peter. The result was the General’s almost immediate removal; shortly thereafter criminal proceedings were instituted against him and in March, 1954 he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Several of his chief deputies were also removed and some were sentenced to prison for varying periods.

Fundamental to the investigation of General Peter’s office was an examination of the cases which it had handled, with those instituted since 1948 inspectors with special care. Of the cases examined in 1953-54, it was found that 149 were sufficiently dubious to justify re-opening. Of the 149 re-opened cases, the convictions of 129 people were declared false, the sentences of guilty changed to acquittal and the victims freed at once—with strong efforts at compensation and fresh assignments being made. It is to be observed that these victims, whatever their personal bitterness, accepted new assignments or tasks and undoubtedly took up the work of purification with great zeal.* Ten were found to have been guilty in lesser degree; these were amnestied. Fifteen were found to have been fully guilty as charged, but several had their sentences reduced.

This process, under the direction of the Chief Attorney, continued into 1956 (there was some slowdown in the latter part of 1955) and, in addition to the totals already indicated, 456 people were found to have been convicted illegally and were officially declared innocent. These were released immediately. In an additional 1,100 cases, where guilt was confirmed but where mitigating circumstances were found, sentences were sharply reduced.**

The Chief Attorney’s office was also charged with the responsibility of receiving and inquiring into any protests from the public concerning the maladministration of justice, or questions of dispute involving the interpretation or application of law. This function was to be exercised in any kind of a case, from one involving a capital crime to one concerning some housing regulation. That it was taken seriously by the public—and that there were things to complain about—is proven by the fact that

*For example, among those freed in 1953 was Janos Kadar, then 41 years old. Soon after release, Kadar was made a Party Organizer in an important working-class district in Budapest. Though the evidence is good that Kadar—one of the few survivors of Communist underground work against Horthy and one who never left Hungary—was physically maltreated when in jail (1951-1953), he went back to work to build socialism.

**An illuminating treatment of the work of the office of the Chief Attorney. In English, was written by Laurence Kirwan and appeared in World News (London), August 22, 1956.
from the middle of 1953 to the middle of 1956 the Chief Attorney's office processed almost 80,000 such complaints.

All courts were placed under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Justice alone, in 1954, and the popular election of judges—called for in the Constitution, but widely ignored—was instituted at the same time. The Justice Ministry was also given charge of prison administration, rather than the Interior Ministry, so that the agency doing the detecting would not supervise sentencing—a division of function which, it was felt, would help prevent unjust imprisonment.

An effort was made to remove relatively minor law infractions from the regular courts altogether and to have them handled by "social courts" where the "sentences" would not involve prison at all, but some kind of collective assistance or guidance. Generally, the whole penal setup was relaxed with the result that after 1953 there was a steady decline in the prison population. This continued right on into 1956: for example, while in November, 1955 there were 37,027 people in prison (for all offenses), by July, 1956 the total had fallen to 22,088.

A concerted attack was opened up also upon the atmosphere of intimidation and super-caution that had accompanied the repression. Often the effort at change was expressed in a halting and almost pathetic manner, but the main direction of the effort was unmistakable. For example, a discussion of "Problems of Cadre Work" in the chief theoretical organ of the Party, Tarsadalmi Szemle, for February, 1954, contains this paragraph:

We must put an end to superfluous probing of relatives and ancestry, judging people on a "biological" basis and the exaggerated "environmental study" of cadres. Except for some instances, it is unnecessary to investigate apart from the father, mother, brothers and sisters, the political past and financial position of relatives upwards, downwards and sideways on the family-tree. In judging relatives living in the capitalist states it must be taken into consideration that a few million Hungarians are living abroad. Many of them emigrated prior to the First World War to escape misery and starvation. The overwhelming majority of them are not nationalist agents, in fact some of them are members of Communist and Workers' Parties and peace organizations. Apart from exceptional cases those who correspond with such relatives must not be expelled from the Party, as unfortunately has happened more than once. Communist vigilance is necessary in this respect, but all unhealthy excess must be abolished.

More significant is the fact that Rakosi, in his Report to the Third Congress of the Party, May 1954, noticed, though briefly,

"the mistakes which became apparent in the state apparatus, the local councils, the work of the courts and state security organs, and in the question of respect for our laws." He declared, correctly, that "the rectification and overcoming of these mistakes is under way"—not very prolonged notice of a serious question; but still some notice, and from Rakosi. More extended and vigorous was Rakosi's comment, on the same occasion, about exaggerated vigilance practices:

In the case of some comrades, vigilance is replaced by extreme distrust and suspicion and, in such instances, the treatment accorded to cadres takes on the form almost of a hearing or investigation, doing more harm than good. The distortion of vigilance is apparent—in the work of cadre workers, of personnel department heads who, when drawing in new forces, always consider their own safety first and constantly tremble lest they make a mistake and be called to account... We must eliminate such phenomena, which distort the so necessary, proper vigilance and, at the same time, make it difficult to put every citizen of the People's Democracy in the place where he can work best for Socialism.

Rakosi had not reached the point of looking askance at a practice that involved one's "safety" and led to "trembling" while trying to select an assistant or fill a vacancy. But he had reached the point of acknowledging "excesses" and calling for a halt to them, at any rate.

By 1956 there had been a definite relaxation in the entire "investigating" psychology, and a movement away from "security" censorship in publications, education, and libraries.

Vigorous efforts were made to break down the over-centralization that made everything so rigid. In mass organization work, a real attempt was made to turn the National People's Front into something worthy of its name, not merely in the number of its membership, which was large enough, but in the functioning of its membership which had been largely formal. In government, another strong and more successful attempt was made with like objectives—to breathe life into the local councils. These were supposed to be actual political organs on a local basis; established in 1950, they had never developed any real local initiative. Beginning in 1953, a decentralization of the governing apparatus was undertaken and progress was made. By 1956 the local councils were no longer paper groups and did have real economic and political functions which, with considerable mass participation, were being performed.
The effort to bring democratic functioning and collective leadership into the Party was pushed seriously from 1954 on. It faced obstacles growing out of timidity, the opposition of time-serving bureaucrats, the differences, sincerely motivated and meriting careful consideration, as to timing and pace and extent of change. It faced obstacles, too, because the apparatus had been so very highly centralized and so highly personalized and was so unwieldy—900,000 members by 1956—that just the normal inertia of a gigantic organization was working against so serious a change as democratization and collective, responsible, leadership.

The pressures for this, however, from the mass of the members and the people generally, was enormous. Further, the contradiction between its tightfisted, authoritarian procedures and the true nature of a Marxist-Leninist Party were glaring and served to develop momentum for change. Very important, too, was the strong attack upon socialist illegality, and the return to active Party work of many arbitrarily or hastily expelled, as well as the considerable number released from actual confinement. In addition, there was a great movement throughout the Socialist world, including within the Soviet Union, in the direction of greater member initiative and the principle of collective leadership.

The movement for change in this regard reached the point, already by mid-1954, where Rakosi himself repeatedly and vehemently championed it—at least in his public speeches. It was he who denounced “top-heavy organization, characterized by over-centralization”; who warned that “bureaucracy has gained ground”; who demanded that the Party and State “diminish centralization and struggle against all forms of bureaucratism,” get “closer to the working masses.”

In mid-1954 Rakosi reported “considerable improvement in inner Party life and methods of leadership,” but professed himself dissatisfied for “we have not been successful in executing a complete turn in this sphere as yet.” He went on to declare that:

in the work of a number of Party organizations, including certain county committees, the old style of leadership has remained or has returned; instead of collective leadership, they practice one-person leadership, instead of convincing, they employ methods of issuing orders and continue to underrate the importance of elected bodies... the higher Party bodies do not sufficiently encourage criticism from below.

Human beings are capable of peculiar things and it is barely possible that Rakosi did not feel the astonishment—and worse—that had to emanate from the audience as he uttered these laments and promptings. But their utterance reflected the potent nature of the forces for change and the success these forces were having.

By mid-1954, Rakosi came right out and said, “An end must be put to bureaucratic cadre work, based upon questionnaires and documents alone.” He discovered that: “Many of our Party functionaries live in a fool’s paradise believing that one can accomplish miracles with paper, that it is sufficient to pass a resolution and all problems are automatically and smoothly solved.” This will not do: “They should not study life from documents because they will never learn about life in this manner; they should maintain living ties with reality!” Further, and again with exclamation marks: “Extreme centralization is the twin brother of bureaucracy! Bureaucracy and extreme centralization are becoming obstacles to our entire development... We must change rapidly this intolerable situation.” And then, once more with exclamation marks: “Excesses in this sphere must be eliminated; the unnecessary bodies must be liquidated, and the leadership everywhere brought closer to life and the people!”

Now, as we know from another source—(Tarsadalni Szemle, Feb. 1954): “The working people of one of the branches in the Matyas Rakosi Works said the following about such leaders: ‘They should practice less self-criticism and do more.’ And it is delightful that they labored in the Rakosi Works!

Still these exclamations from Rakosi himself—and these more gentle remarks by workers, reported in the Party press—did reflect a very real and difficult process of democratization, decentralization and effective assault upon bureaucratic encrustation.

There was also a start made in trying to separate the Party from the State. Again this was of great importance in terms of introducing some flexibility and elasticity to political and social life and in terms of instituting some kind of a check-and-balance system. Without this the vanguard role of the Party turns rather into a governing role, and instead of a dictatorship of the working class, one moves towards a dictatorship of the Party. Enough momentum developed for this kind of separation so that Rakosi, again by mid-1954 is saying: “Our organization must understand the difference in function of the Party and the State, and realize that the Party cannot substitute for the State.”
This process, as all other aspects of the movement for change, progressed in spurts, but the line was definitely and continually upward. Once again, by 1956 marked progress had been registered, and the alterations had reached up to the National Assembly, or Parliament.

By early 1956 the meetings of the Parliament were made more frequent and more prolonged than had been true before. All legislation by then, without exception, had to be issued only after approval by the Assembly and could not appear as Government decrees, as had occurred at times earlier. Question Time, which had fallen into disuse after 1949, was revived. It was functioning quite vigorously by August, 1956 with Ministers being sharply questioned by Parliamentary Members, and with their replies being rejected as inadequate, from time to time, by a majority of the Assembly. John MacCormac, then the Budapest correspondent for the *New York Times*, observed the real vitality of the Parliament and remarked especially upon the vigor of the exchanges marking Question Time. He felt all this represented “a great step forward on the road to democratization of the regime” (*N. Y. Times*, Aug. 4, 1956).

Even in the especially sensitive area of aesthetics, of literary work, the period after 1953 was characterized by a major campaign against bureaucracy, corruption, intimidation and rule by fiat. Again the remarks of Rakosi may be offered as indicative of the degree of pressure for this kind of change. In July, 1954, it is true that Rakosi was still making statements that, in a painfully familiar manner, were asserting things to be in existence which were not yet present, and then, on the basis of the assertion, assigning “tasks.” Thus: “We are giving free rein to creativeness; let our writers and artists reply by fulfilling their task with a still greater sense of responsibility.”

But, while saying that “free rein to creativeness” was “given” he also, rather contradictorily said, in the same speech: “The bureaucratic or too direct interference in the process of creative work must be abolished. The principle that writing is primarily the writer’s business must be asserted.” The heart of the view in Rakosi’s remarks, came in the following paragraph:

We must put an end to the over-centralization of Party and state guidance. The principle must be asserted that the ideological and practical problems of the various fields are solved with the Party’s help by the artists and critics themselves who work in that field. The Communist and non-Party writers, artists and critics who are supporting the Party’s aims heart and soul, should overcome the remnants of bourgeois ideological and sectarian views in open debates on principle, and evolve a partisan standpoint on the ideological, political and professional problems of artistic creative work. Those workshops of cultural life, which are called upon to assist creative work on the spot, must be given far-reaching authority. We expect artistic associations, book publishers, theatre and film script editors, and editorial boards to show greater initiative based on greater responsibility and independence.

The fullest expression of the new Party stand came in an editorial article entitled “Some Questions Concerning the New Hungarian Literature,” published in the Party daily newspaper, *Szabad Nep*, March 15, 1954. This stated that the new turn heralded by the June, 1953 Resolution of the Central Committee had direct relationship to literary features of life as to all other features. Two kinds of responses to the Resolution were making its implementation very difficult. First: “Right from the beginning much of the justified criticism by the writers was intermingled with harmful exaggerations and even panic.” Second, things were “also made more difficult” by:

Those who thought that the June Party resolutions contained nothing new for our literary life, that essentially there was no reason for a change, and that order could be established with a firm hand and a few strict words...

Of course, panic would abandon the whole struggle; would simply smash Socialism and lead to a return to the old. On the other hand, those who esteemed only the very real progress that had been made and did not see the errors that had grown to major proportions were, by denying the errors, threatening the continuation of progress. And since nothing stood still, if the process creating the errors were not halted and reversed, they would grow and this too would result finally in the destruction of the Socialist foundations and the return of the old.

The editorial article did not make all this fully explicit, but it certainly did concentrate on the need to avoid panic and abandonment and, even more—since then that danger was greater—upon the attitude that nothing really had to be done and that the whole thing would “blow over.”

The fact was that writers in increasing numbers were reaching back to subjects of the past in order to avoid replying to the burning problems of the people; others are squandering their
energy on art for art’s sake.” Others dealing with the present “were able to express and portray only fragments of this.” What was wanted was that “the portrayal of our new life become the center of our literature.”

This was lacking because it was the most difficult kind of writing, strictly from a creative viewpoint. But truly creative workers never avoided something because it was difficult. No, said the editorial, there is something else and that something else that stifles creative work is bureaucracy, the heavy hand of “instructions.”

Expanding on the theme, the Party editorial continued:

We have spoken, and not without effect, in recent years about how life, including people’s private life, should be portrayed more richly; but in practice much official and semi-official “interference” has made this more difficult. We have theoretically stressed the indispensibility of the criticism on the part of writers, but in practice this has met with no little difficulty. It is not an exaggeration to say that it was not always the writer’s political “limitations” that hampered the treatment of contemporary subjects, sometimes the bureaucratic difficulties of solving the task gave rise to the “opposition” of certain writers.

It was “the right and duty of every writer” who was a supporter of Socialism, “to examine the small and big problems of the people’s life conscientiously and with his own eyes, to state his own opinion and arrive at his own judgment.” At any rate, in view of public demands: “The portrayal of life in all its richness and complexity of detail, a demand that has been emphasized for a long time, can be postponed no longer.” The fact is, said the editorial, that: “The growing criticism of the masses of the people is gradually becoming one of the most important levers of our development.”

The editorial urged “the bold revealing of mistakes, and the passionate hatred of regressive forces.” It said that: “The Party considers the castigation of mistakes to be of inestimable help to the writers in the struggle for the new.” All actions hostile to Socialism were to be exposed, whether stemming from “bureaucracy, selfishness, lack of vigilance, faint-heartedness” or whatnot. And specifically, satire was to be welcomed, and in satire, by its nature, the good and bad could not appear in the same proportion. On the country “satire portrays the negative features of our life, and what is more, in an exaggerated manner according to the laws of art.” Further:

The consistency of the writer’s support for the cause of the people and progress does not become evident by the watering down of criticism, but on the contrary, by the sharpening of correct criticism.

And the criterion for “correct” was this:

It must be made clear that the phenomena unmasked are the surviving remnants of the capitalist past which are condemned to extinction, antagonistic and alien to the essence of our people’s democratic system.

Literary criticism must combat compromise, maneuvers, capitulation, flattery, arrogance. “An end must be put to those forms of guidance which directly interfere with the creative work of the writer.” The Party “must overcome Communist arrogance, do away with the slighting of talent and artistic competence.” Finally, the Party:

must consistently champion truth, but always adhere to the methods of open debate and convincing.

These were the aims of the New Course in the arts and they were implemented to a considerable degree, again reaching a high point of development in 1956. In this area, too, there were backslidings, but on the whole the advance was noteworthy. There was, however, a notable rise in “panic” and abandonment of adherence to Socialist allegiance, especially after the Khrushchev disclosures of fearful illegalities in the Soviet Union. Still the whole process was basically one of purification, and by 1956 significant success was apparent.

Beginning in an intensified manner during the end of 1955 its climax came in the summer of 1956. In November of 1955 a stormy meeting of the Writers Union demanded a complete break from Party guidance. This prompted a Party resolution denouncing the efforts of some writers—Tibor Dery, Zoltan Zell, Tamas Azcel were named—as “attempting to organize an opposition faction within the Party.”

The Resolution was not followed by any kind of administrative measures—let alone the kind of measures that might have been resorted to prior to 1953. Then in Feb. 1956, was held the historic 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, with its call for collective leadership and its denunciation of bureaucratic and tyrannical behavior. In March and April, 1956 rather stormy meetings of the Writers’ Union were held; in the latter month the Party’s candidate for general secretary of the Union was defeated.
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The journal of the Writers' Union, Irodalmi Ujsag, conducted vigorous and wide-open polemics, for, as one of the contributors to that publication asked: "Can principles of law be laid down without knowledge and analysis of facts? Is it conceivable that we can come to correct conclusions without debates?" (April 7, 1956). Another writer, in the same issue, said that in the past too often had he rationalized that which was wrong:

And we, who not long ago, in our youth, had sworn by the tremendous power of thought, stood here with crystal-clear hearts but empty heads, like dried out amphorae in a museum. And the amphorae nodded consent to everything.

A tumultuous meeting of the Union and a public meeting of the Petofi Circle (a debating society formed in March, 1956, as part of DISZ, the Party youth organization—itself an example of the process of change) were held in the end of June and were attended by thousands of people.

At the Petofi meeting, the last before the summer recess, Tardos and Dery (whose novel Niki was then a best seller in Hungary) made exceedingly bitter attacks, by name, upon many top figures, including the Minister of Culture, Jozef Darvas, himself a writer, and Marton Horvath, editor of the Party's central organ, Szabad Nep. Dery, possibly carried away by his eloquence, not only bitterly attacked the entire Party leadership, but called upon the "Youth of '56" to emulate those of 1848 and "aid the people in their conquest of the future." Clearly revisionism—rather than purification, rather than Marxism-Leninism—was not absent from elements in the Petofi group.

Dery and Tardos were expelled—even while dozens of others who had been expelled were in the process of returning. But a graphic demonstration of the process of change was the fact that everything Dery and Tardos wrote was published, after expulsion. Further, Dery received a passport without a moment's delay, vacationed in Italy and returned in August. At the end of that month, the Writers' Union unanimously resolved that Dery be re-admitted into the Party—and that is where matters stood on that particular front of the changing Hungarian scene as the fateful October 1956 appeared.*

*There is a valuable report of this whole matter by Ursula Wasserman, writing from Budapest, in The National Guardian (N. Y.), October 1, 1956. An informative dispatch appeared in the N. Y. Times, June 13, 1956.

Efforts at Change

Once again, and in this area, the facts show—with mistakes of exaggeration and impatience on one side and a remaining reliance on administrative procedures on the other—immense strides forward in the very difficult task of democratization in the midst of a Cold-War world. Certainly the events of 1956 in the literary field would have been simply unthinkable in 1952.

* * *

Fresh breezes penetrated the trade-union organizations in Hungary, also, after 1955 and reached a high point in the summer of 1956. Trade-union leaders were appointed, in 1955, to high positions in the Political Bureau of the Party. Early in 1956 the veteran trade-union leader, Sandor Gaspar, who had been in eclipse for several years, was appointed general secretary of the Free Trade Union Council. Another militant old-timer, Nicholas Somogyi, who had fought bureaucratism in trade-union affairs and had lost his position in the building trades union, was elected its President in December, 1955, and soon became President of the Free Trade Union Council.

Under their leadership, the top levels of the trade-union movement were refreshed with younger workers, noted for their opposition to dogmatism and rigidity, and for the first time in over five years vigor was being displayed by the trade unions in terms of workers' grievances. This, too, was interrupted by the October events.*

The new course was beginning to "pay off" in basic economic areas, also, by 1956. The one-sided decline in industrial production in 1954, was evened out by 1955. And in the first six months of 1956 the output of industry was almost 7% above the corresponding period of 1955. More important, labor productivity showed an increase of just under 5% in the same comparative periods.

The agricultural crop was good; the forced pace of collectivization marking the pre-1953 period had slackened, but the regression of 1954-55 had been overcome. And in July, 1956 the system of forced procurements, which was unpopular with large numbers of peasants, was declared at an end. Largely as a result of increased trade-union initiative, the minimum basic wage payable

*Of special value on trade-union developments is an article, based on interviews and visits, by Sam Walsh in The Canadian Tribune (Toronto), Feb. 18, 1957.
to time-rate workers was raised, early in 1956, directly raising the wages of about 170,000 workers.

At the same time a premium bonus system, increasing the workers' material interest in raising production, was introduced. On May 1, 1956, prices on several thousand commodities were cut from 10 to 40%, and the hours of work for those laboring in dangerous or unhealthy tasks were cut from 48 hours per week to a maximum of 42 and a minimum of 36.

The ending of forced procurement, the rise in minimum wage scales, the cutting of prices were especially popular measures. Even more popular and appealing to all elements of the population was the government's action, in August 1956, of ending the forced "Peace Loan" tax; this represented an increase in wages and income of about 5%.

These developments, and others to be mentioned later, had all been presaged in the whole process of change going on for three years. But they were more precisely indicated in the Resolution on the Lessons of the Twentieth Congress, CPSU, adopted by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Party in the middle of 1956. Here the line of the Third Congress of the Party (1954) was re-affirmed in the economic sphere. The whole tenor of that line in general was re-emphasized, in very decided terms. For example: "...backwardness in ideological work can be eliminated only if we do not brook ideological inertia, trends toward rigidity in Marxism-Leninism, and dogmatism."

Further:

A tenuous and systematic struggle must be pursued in the Party so that collective leadership shall become a reality to the fullest extent on all levels. Democracy within the Party must be further developed and, relying on the achievements that have already been attained, socialist legality must be strengthened even more.

The Central Committee was worried by what it called, on June 30, 1956, the growing boldness of elements altogether hostile to Socialism. It warned that, "the danger of hostile treachery has increased" and that factionalism would weaken the effort at change. Likewise, the Party organ, Szabad Nep, in an editorial: "In Defense of Democracy and the Party Line, July 3, 1956, warned against individuals "opposed to the ideas of Socialism" and against opportunism. In connection with the mounting threat from external counter-revolutionary forces, the Resolution referred specifically to the apprehension, during the first six months of 1956, of forty agents and saboteurs from the Intelligence services of the West. In connection with Right-opportunism, which was encouraging internal foes of Socialism, the Resolution mentioned Imre Nagy as one playing a harmful role, whatever his own motivations might be, and one moving towards revisionism and the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism.

Nevertheless, the fullest enunciation of the most sweeping changes made was in the Resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Party at its meeting, July 18-21, 1956. This is the meeting at which Rakosi's resignation as First Secretary was accepted, to which we referred earlier, and to which we will revert again. The substance of this historic resolution (published in Szabad Nep, July 23), appeared in its title, "With Party Unity for a Socialist Democracy."

The Resolution begins by recapitulating the changes made, in the State and in the Party, since 1953, which earlier pages have detailed. It then goes on to develop "the tasks ahead." These comprise in the first place, the necessity "in the next few months to extend socialist democracy and to tighten Party and state discipline in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism."

In the economic sphere, the line of the Third Congress was re-affirmed. It was planned that by 1960 total industrial production was to be about 48% higher than in 1955, a good increase, but one that, being less than 10% a year would not be precipitous. In agriculture it was planned to bring production by 1960 to about 27% higher than in 1955. It was agreed to proceed with the building of the socialist sector of agriculture, but to do this gradually and to do it not administratively but by demonstrating—and the Resolution italicized the following words—"the superiority of agricultural producer cooperatives in a convincing manner by their economic and cultural prosperity."

Fearing the italics were not sufficient, the Resolution added: "In the course of developing the producer-cooperative movement, one must most systematically inscribe the principle of voluntariness."

The Resolution went on to stress that a fundamental orientation in economic effort was to be "Raising the Workers' Standard of Living." The goal was to lift the actual living conditions of

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workers and peasants by at least 25% by the end of 1960. This 
was to be done by further tax reductions, wage increases, enhanced 
management processes, raising pensions, and gearing everything, 
in terms of the highest priority, to this betterment.

A greater degree of participation of workers, engineers, fore-
men, directors and more independence for them was projected.

The “further democratization of state life” was held out as an 
essential task. The Central Committee directed that “our Party 
must give every support to the further development of our peo-
ple’s democratic regime, to the improvement of the work of the 
state organs.”

The development of the actual powers of Parliament and the 
local councils was urged. The right to revoke the mandate of 
Representatives was reaffirmed and “must be implemented.” 
The election law was to be changed at once: “instead of the 
present system of list-ballots, which does not permit direct con-
tact with the electorate, the single-member constituency system 
must be introduced.”

Further improvement in safeguarding socialist legality was to be 
undertaken immediately. The state security authorities were to 
be further restricted; right of detention or remand in the course 
of investigation was severely limited; judicial authorities were to 
maintain that no one’s guilt be established on the basis only 
of his own testimony but that additional evidence of sufficient 
force be present also.

The independence of the judiciary was affirmed as a guiding 
principle and detailed methods for the implementation of this—
from the duties of the Supreme Court, to a system of the popular 
elections of judges and prosecutors, with recall—were spelled out.

In the area of culture, while dedication to Socialism was re-
iterated as the sine qua non of life in the New Hungary, signif-
icant attacks upon bureaucratic and administrative concepts were 
made in this Resolution. The necessity of “creative debate” was 
stressed and it was insisted that cultural and artistic and learned 
organizations be “forums of scientific debate.” It was specifically 
declared that “it must be insured” that students and teachers 
have access to “the scientific achievements and periodicals of 
foreign countries.” In artistic associations the aim was to guaran-
tee “the development of democratic life” and as one of the means 
to accomplish this it was declared as a principle that the Party’s 
role in such spheres must be manifested through the functioning 
“of Party members who are working in these fields.”

In the building of the Patriotic People’s Front, the Resolu-
tion said:

It is necessary that a large number of democratically-minded 
and peace-loving non-Party members, workers, working peasants, 
intellectuals, and others, regardless of their nationality, general 
world view, and religious conviction, be elected to the executive 
boards of PPF organizations.

Similarly, work among the youth was to be shorn of bureau-
kratism. Youth leaders “must establish close contact with the 
masses of young people, they must live among them, and they 
must become the young people’s genuine leaders.”

Much attention was devoted to the further democratization 
and activation of the trade unions. In sum, this was the aim:

Trade unions must adopt a more determined and more militant 
attitude on protecting the interests of the workers, they must 
fight to insure that collective contracts are respected, they must 
take bolder initiatives, and they must consistently focus their 
activity on improving the workers’ living conditions.

A significant section of the Resolution dealt with foreign af-
fairs. It reiterated “fraternal alliance with the USSR” as a bul-
work of Hungary’s foreign policy. At the same time it stated its 
support of all measures seeking an end to the armaments race and 
to the Cold War. Specifically, the Resolution proposed that the 
Army be further reduced by the immediate return to civilian life 
of 15,000 soldiers. It reiterated its adherence to the Warsaw Pact, 
“until the establishment of European collective security” and 
urged the conclusion of a treaty providing such security.

The Resolution expressed friendship for Yugoslavia and spec-
ifically proposed that “discussions should start between the Hun-
garian Workers Party and the Yugoslav League of Communists 
with a view to establishing closer, friendly contacts”—something 
done almost at once, as we shall see. In addition, the desire was 
expressed for the widest, fullest and friendliest relations “with 
countries outside the camp of socialist states.”

The Resolution, in a concluding section, reverted again to the 
“limitation of democracy” and the personal rule—“alien to Marx-
ism”—that had “gained ground” up to 1953. It reiterated the 
necessity to press onward the process of cleansing in this area. 
It stressed that while in Hungary “the economic and political
basis of the class enemy is steadily narrowing," and that therefore "the building of socialism could be attained without an acute class struggle," still "the activity of international imperialist reaction" persisted and had lately intensified. Hence: "The gravest danger for the people's democratic order today is imperialist reaction and its agents in this country."

Mistakes by the Party and the increasing pressures of imperialism had produced a weakening in Party unity and prestige. To overcome this, neither panic nor rigidity would do. We must go forward, said the Resolution, on the path of democratization and purification, all the time being vigilant and remembering the prime aim: the building of Socialism.

The conclusion, in italics, read:

In the different fields of state, social, and Party life our duty is to develop the democracy of the workers, socialist democracy, in order that we make the widest masses of workers even more conscious and active builders of socialism. Socialist democracy at the same time means that the workers recognize the discipline based on Leninist democratic principles as binding on themselves.

Prior to this July meeting, General Mihaly Farkas had been dismissed from his post as Minister of Defense, on the grounds that, before 1953, he had been responsible for violations of socialist legality. The July meeting announced his expulsion from the Party and his relief from all military rank as further penalty for this behavior.

Most significant of all the administrative acts by this meeting of the Central Committee was its acceptance of (actually its request of) the resignation of Matyas Rakosi as the Party's Secretary. Parts of the documents connected with this action, relevant to other topics, have already been quoted. But there were other passages which illuminate features of the efforts at change and these may be brought forward at this point.

Rakosi in his letter of July 18, 1956 requesting that he be relieved of his post of First Secretary of the Central Committee, and of his membership in the Party's Politbureau, cited as one reason failing health. But he added:

Furthermore, the mistakes I have committed in the field of the cult of personality and socialist legality make it difficult for the Party leadership to concentrate our Party's attention to the fullest extent upon the tasks lying ahead of us.

In an oral statement, made to the Central Committee, when he handed in his letter, Rakosi expanded considerably on the failures and the necessity for vigor in overcoming them. He declared that since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, and the Khrushchev revelations concerning Stalin, "it became clear to me that the weight and effect of these mistakes were greater than I had thought and that the harm done to our Party through these mistakes was much more serious than I had previously believed."

Rakosi continued:

These mistakes have made our Party's work more difficult, they diminished the strength of attractiveness of the Party and of the People's Democracy, they hindered the development of the Leninist norms of Party life, of collective leadership, of constructive criticism, and self-criticism, of democratism in Party and state life, and of the initiative and creative power of the wide masses of the working class.

They offered, too, he said, "an extremely wide opportunity for attack to the enemy"; in sum, "they have caused serious harm to our socialist development as a whole."

Rakosi said that it was his duty and obligation to take the lead in the effort to rectify these mistakes. But in this, too, he admitted, his role had not been noteworthy. On the contrary:

If rehabilitation has at times proceeded sluggishly and with intermittent breaks, if a certain relapse was noticed last year in the liquidation of the cult of personality, if criticism and self-criticism together with collective leadership have developed at a slow pace, if sectarian and dogmatic views have not been combatted resolutely enough—then for all this, undoubtedly, serious responsibility weighs upon me, having occupied the post of First Secretary of the Party.

At this same momentous meeting, the personnel of the Central Committee of the Party was changed; the direction of that change was clearly towards those individuals who were associated with the effort to democratize the Socialist order. It is clear that within the Party leadership, after 1953, there developed an intense struggle between those desiring no change, those desiring immediate and sweeping change and those, of the Center, as it were, who wanted basic change, but who feared that if this were made too precipitately it might open up fissures that would serve the purpose of internal and external foes of Socialism itself. The general nature of the personnel changes in the leadership in July, 1956
represented a victory of this Center group; this, in turn, promised a certain speeding up in the process of change for the immediate future.

Thus, while at the meeting the resignation of Rakosi was requested and obtained, the Resolution itself attacked Nagy as being reckless and excessive in his demands. Again, while Rakosi was replaced as First Secretary by Gero—who was one of those hesitant about changing—the vast majority of the new personnel was of a decidedly more forward-looking nature. Several, such as Janos Kadar, Gyula Kallai, and Gyorgy Marosan, had actually been jailed before 1953 for their opposition to the rigid and forced line of Rakosi; others like Imre Horvath, Jeno Fook, Karoly Kiss, and Sandor Gaspar had been demoted, removed or otherwise disciplined for the same reason. Notable was the fact that Kadar, Kiss and Marosan were elevated to the Politbureau, and that Kadar was elected Secretary of the Central Committee.

The promise these shifts held out was realized at once in a developing series of changes. On July 30, Gero, while retaining his position as First Secretary was relieved of his post as First Deputy Premier, which reflected not only a shift again from those least willing to change, but also a change in terms of separating the Party from the State. Gero’s government post went to Istvan Hidas, associated with the Kadar school of thought. At the same time, Marosan (a former leader of the Social-Democratic Party), who was one of those actually jailed, was made a Deputy Premier, and Imre Horvath was elevated to the position of Foreign Minister. Albert Konya, also associated with courageous struggle against rigidity and illegality, was brought back into prominence by being appointed Minister of Education.

In September, Gero went on his annual holiday to the Soviet Union and while there conferred frequently with Khrushchev and with Tito. At the same time, that is, in September, a delegation from the Hungarian Party, headed by Janos Kadar, went to China as fraternal delegates to the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

A little later, but still in September, Marosan publicly proposed a re-examination of the expulsion of Imre Nagy, with the hope that he could again be brought into the Party. On October 4, Nagy requested readmission in a letter to the Central Committee. He did this on the basis of the changes accomplished, the need for unity in the Party and a recognition of excesses in his be-

havior. Nine days later the Politbureau announced its decision to annul the expulsion of Imre Nagy.

Meanwhile, in September, significant and very well-attended meetings of the trade unions, cultural and youth organizations were held. In all cases new leaderships were elected reflecting the kind of changes that the Central Committee had itself made in July; all the organizations demonstrated renewed vigor and independence and initiative, in line with the proposals of the Party itself.

Early in October, at the initiative of the Central Committee, a public rehabilitation ceremony, of a rather macabre nature, was held in Budapest and witnessed by hundreds of thousands of people. Here, October 6, occurred the re-interment, in a grave of honor, of the bodies of Laszlo Rajk and General Gyorgy Palfy, chief victims of the unjust persecutions and executions that began in 1949. Tibor Meray, a leading writer and poet, spoke: “Since we know your fate,” he said of the martyrs, “we stopped indulging in unquestioning faith.” He concluded with these words:

Your tragedy taught us. We shall never say anything but the truth—never even if submitted to the rack, or pushed by imaginary and erroneous “enthusiasm” for the cause. Your tragedy taught us and obliges us to be humane and Hungarian, just and free. I make no pledges or promises, I take no oaths... All I can say is, inexpressibly, bitterly and softly, our life is only worth living inasmuch as we can make your death good.

Meanwhile, still in October, the new Minister of Education announced the ending of the compulsory study of Russian by college students; the expansion of the time allotted for most courses of study (to relieve the strain of study); and other reforms demanded by the student organizations.

On October 14 a delegation consisting of Gero and Kadar and others left for Yugoslavia, at the invitation of the Central Committee of the League of Yugoslav Communists. Meetings were held with Tito and other Yugoslav leaders from October 15 to October 22. In the evening of the latter day, the Hungarians returned to Budapest and issued a communique to the nation hailing the cementing of fraternal relations with the Yugoslavs and announcing that very soon Tito would repay their visit.

At the same time, it was announced that an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee was to be held on October 31; and the opening of a new session of the now very much revitalized Parliament was also due to begin the end of October. Further, an in-
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dependent trade-union delegation, headed by Sandor Gaspar and Nicholas Somogyi, had just returned from an extended visit to Yugoslavia, as part of a re-thinking and re-examination by the Hungarian trade-union leadership of the whole question of increasing direct worker-control in industry. This trade-union delegation was scheduled to report to the Central Committee of the Party on October 23; the idea was to work out specific and detailed proposals for public discussion and action, with the deadline set for November, 1956.

In the midst of all these exciting and promising portents and changes, the invigorating news came of the successes of the Party in Poland in achieving significant advances there and in arriving at a new and improved relationship of equality and fraternity with the Soviet Union.

This brings us to the fateful day of October 23, 1956. The record is perfectly clear that very important changes had been made since 1953 in the fundamental economic planning of the nation and in the actual functioning of the Party, mass organizations, their leadership, the state, including local organs, Parliament and the judiciary. Great advances had been made towards democratization and in overcoming rigidity, over-centralization, and bureaucracy. The rate of change had been speeded up in 1956, and by October, just as there had been basic victory in Poland, so this clearly impended in Hungary. Indeed, the dates for significant meetings and assemblies and reports and new elections had already been set; and the new foreign orientation, symbolized by the Hungarian-Yugoslav communique, actually made public on October 23, made as clear as anything can be made clear in the sphere of politics that a peaceful purification of the most profound kind was in the offing to cap a process that had been going on for over three years.

On the very day of October 23, the organ of the Party, Szabad Nep, entitled its editorial, “New Spring Parade.” It had reference to the stirrings and the debates and fresh breezes blowing through the country and welcomed them. It referred specifically to the student and youth demonstrations set for October 23, and welcomed them also. It knew and emphasized and was proud of the fact, as it stated in italics, that “the vast majority of the participants take part as firm believers in socialism.”

But, the paper added, addressing itself directly to the youth:

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They must be aware of their great responsibility; if they fight consistently against sectarianism they also fight against the danger of bourgeois restoration. By standing up against bourgeois endeavors they also pull the ground from under the feet of the sectarians.

There was the essence of the problem of successful change, wherein proletarian dictatorship becomes real and complete as it makes living the full freedom of the workers and the peasants, and at the same time, maintains the firmest opposition against all revisionists, compromisers and restorationists.

It is in this spirit and because of this background that the demonstrations of October 23 were to be held. It is with the knowledge of this that one can comprehend, I think, the desperation of counter-revolutionary forces that very soon showed their hand. The evidence persuades me that it is because of the great advances made in Hungary towards solving the problems posed by errors and misleadership and because greater advances distinctly portended, that external and internal counter-revolutionary, restorationist, fascist and “liberating” forces (notably those in the pay of CIA and other such “freedom” organizations) decided that it was now or never for them. This moment of elation, of change, of mass outpouring was their last chance to provoke an armed attempt at that for which they had been planning and dreaming and organizing ever since 1945—the crushing of socialism in Hungary and the restoration there of a hotbed of reaction, chauvinism and clerico-fascism.

It is to be added that there was one area of misleadership which was responsible, as I have tried to show, for much popular discontent, which is hardly alluded to in all the movements for change within the Party. I have reference to the violations of national sentiments.

No doubt the source of this lagging is to be found in the general underestimation of the whole question of national feeling. No doubt, too, it lies in part in the special relationship between nationalism and social reaction that marked Hungary’s history, as we have shown. A further source of the delay here sprang out of errors in this field made by the leadership of the Soviet Union.

Be that as it may, it is a fact that but the barest beginnings were made on this question even up to 1956; this weakness served to embolden and strengthen the enemies of Socialism. It also disquieted friends of Socialism and of its purification.
The organ of the Hungarian Party, Szabad Nép, appearing on the morning of October 23, featured two items. One was the editorial, quoted in the previous chapter, welcoming the meetings and activities of university youth directed towards speeding the process of democratization. The other was the reprinting in full of the Report by Władysław Gomułka to the Central Committee of the United Workers Party of Poland on October 20, 1956. The paper preceded Gomułka’s speech with the remark that "something of historic significance is taking place in Poland these days."

Gomułka’s speech deals with the same essential problem that confronted Hungary, though in a different form. Because of this and because the Polish experience so directly impinged on Hungarian events, and because of the fact that his speech was brought in full to the Hungarian people on the fateful day of October 29, it is important to note those passages in it that touched its Hungarian readers most closely. Said Gomułka, and the Hungarians read and nodded:

In the situation which arose following the Twentieth Congress, when it was necessary to act quickly and consistently, to draw conclusions from the past, to go to the masses with all frankness and to tell them the whole truth about the economic situation—the causes and sources of distortions in political life—the Party leadership failed to work out quickly a line of concrete action.

Gomułka said that "the broadest democracy for the working class and the working masses" was "the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and where this was neglected there would appear "bureaucracy, infringing the rule of law, violence." He said the problem of "the democratization of our life, as well as the development of inter-Party and interstate relations with our great fraternal neighbor—the CPSU and the Soviet Union" were central to all their deliberations.

He posited each within the framework of changes needed in order to strengthen socialism. Thus:

The road of democratization is the only road leading to the construction of the best model of socialism in our conditions. We shall not deviate from this road and we shall defend ourselves with all our might not to be pushed off this road. And we shall not allow anyone to use the process of democratization to undermine socialism.

And further:

The Party and all the people who saw the evil that existed in the past and who sincerely desire to remove all that is left of the past evil in our life today in order to strengthen the foundations of our system should give a determined rebuff to all persuasions and all voices which strive to weaken our friendship with the Soviet Union.

Gomułka closed with a warning of the serious dangers confronting efforts at significant change. Hence:

Postulating the principle of the freedom of criticism in all its forms, including criticism in the press, we have the right to demand that each criticism should be creative and just, that it should help to overcome the difficulties of the present period instead of increasing them or sometimes even treating demagogically certain phenomena and problems.

And speaking directly to the youth, in this newspaper of October 23, to the youth of Hungary, Gomułka said:

One can always forgive young people many things. But life forgives no one, even youth, for thoughtless acts. We can but rejoice at the ardor of our young comrades. For it is they who are to take over from us the posts in the Party and in the state apparatus. But we are fully justified in demanding from them that they should join their enthusiasm and ardor to the wisdom of the Party.

Alas, in Budapest the ardor was unrestrained; the wisdom of some still in the leadership of the Party was not outstanding; and there were, from the first moments of the demonstrations of October 23, forces at work which had nothing at all to do with youthful ardor or Party wisdom, or the strengthening of socialism. Alas, too, in Hungary the undermining of the Party by its rigid, doctrinaire and fanatical leadership, by destructive and reckless criticism, by factional divisions, had gone so far that the principled enemies of Socialism saw a perfect opportunity
to overthrow the New Hungary altogether by annihilating the Marxist-Leninist Party.

University students of Budapest decided on a demonstration in solidarity with the Poles; the assembly point was to be the Writers’ Union headquarters, the time 2:30 P.M. The indecision in the Party leadership reflected itself to the last moment, for shortly after noon the radio announced that the Ministry of Interior had forbidden the demonstration; but two hours later it rescinded the ban.

Students and other youth assembled at the appointed place and time, carrying placards. The sentiments dominating the banners were: “Solidarity with the Polish Youth” and, “For Friendly Relations with the Soviet Union, on an Equal Basis.”

At about 3 P.M. the demonstrators marched to the statue of the great Hungarian patriot and poet, Sandor Petofi. From thence they moved on to the statue of General Bem, a Polish hero who assisted Hungarian revolutionary efforts a century before. By this time the marchers numbered perhaps 50,000. Towards the end of the afternoon, the Budapest broadcasting station announced the text of the result of talks held in Belgrade between leaders of the Hungarian and Yugoslav Parties, already referred to, and it was announced that in the near future leaders of Yugoslavia were to visit Budapest.

A little later—it was evening now—the leadership of the Party announced that a full meeting of the Central Committee would be held in a few days, to press forward the purification of the Party and democratization of life. Simultaneously, it was broadcasted that Erno Gero, First Secretary of the Party (who had just returned from Belgrade) would address the nation that evening at 8 P.M.

Per schedule, Gero spoke to the nation and his words were carried by loud-speakers through the streets of Budapest, where by now something like 150,000 to 200,000 had assembled, the vast majority in a spirit of elation; rather confident that real progress in necessary changes was in the offing. The speech—especially coming from Gero who of all those still in leadership was most closely associated with Rakosi—was not at all attuned to the needs of the moment, nor in keeping with the hopes and aspirations of the assembled scores of thousands. It is not true, as has been often declared, that in the speech Gero attacked the thousands in the streets. Geared to the nation as a whole, and read in about 20 minutes, the basic content of Gero’s remarks were not off the main line of the Central Committee, which, as we have shown, was definitely one of significant improvement and serious change. Yet it did reflect something of the rigidity that Gero was unable to shed, apparently, and while it would have been good at a Party meeting six or even three months before, it was bad in a broadcast to an impasioned nation and an ecstatic assembly of scores of thousands of youth.

After his salutation to the “dear comrades, dear friends, and working people of Hungary,” Gero went on in a formal and utterly “correct” manner:

The Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party adopted important resolutions in July of this year. The membership of our Party, our working class, our working peasants and intellectuals, our people received these resolutions with approval and satisfaction.

Gero went on to summarize, quite accurately, the July resolutions and affirmed:

It is our resolute and unalterable intention to develop, widen, and deepen democracy in our country, to increase the participation of the workers in running the factories, state farms, and various economic bodies and institutions.

Gero emphasized that the effort was to build a socialist, not a bourgeois, democracy. He said that “enemies of our people” sought to destroy faith in socialism, in the capacity of the workers and peasants to rule, they sought to besmirch the Soviet Union and to drive Hungary away from the socialist sector. He denied that there was anything wrong in the relationship between Hungary and the U.S.S.R., insisting that it had been and was established “on the basis of full equality.” Here Gero was not only wrong, and miles away from his audience; he was also off the line of the Central Committee resolutions of 1956, which had promised to bring about relationships reflecting “full equality.”

Gero did affirm that in building socialism it was necessary to bear in mind “the specific conditions prevailing in Hungary,—the economic and social situation of our country, Hungarian traditions.” The Party is patriotic, said Gero, but it is not nationalistic. It was “waging a consistent fight against chauvinism, anti-Semitism, against any other reactionary, anti-social, and inhumane trends and views.”
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In this context there followed the most damaging portion of Gero’s speech, insofar as his words reached the ears of the massed tens of thousands in the streets:

We therefore condemn those who strive to spread the poison of chauvinism among our youth and who have taken advantage of the democratic freedom insured by our state to working people to carry out a demonstration of a nationalistic character.

Gero followed this at once by saying: “However, even this demonstration will not shake the resolve of the leadership of our Party to continue along the road of developing socialist democracy,” but this really tended to emphasize the misjudgment—as though the tens of thousands in their own minds and firmest purposes had not, in the large majority, turned out in order to assist and support, not curb or mislead, the process of purification.

Gero saw the challenge as profound, when he said, very near the close of his remarks:

One has to state frankly that the question now is whether we want a socialist democracy or a bourgeois democracy. Do we want to build socialism in our country or make a break in the building of socialism and then to fling the gate wide open to capitalism?

He concluded his address with the slogan: “With Party Unity for Socialist Democracy!” That was splendid and correct, but where did it leave the 200,000 people packed in the streets of Budapest who had heard their effort denounced as “a demonstration of a nationalistic character”? It left them sharply dissatisfied and disquieted, particularly since the characterization was more in keeping with the previous role of the speaker, than was his promise.

By now—nearing 9 p. m.—uglier sentiments began to appear among the demonstrators: sentiments justifying Gero’s characterization for a small minority certainly present from the beginning. Evidences of disciplined, preconceived schemes of provocation and disorder began to appear—anti-Semitic remarks, false rumors of shooting, the bursting of fire-crackers. Soon contingents broke away from the main body and, very sure and very clear as to what they were doing and where they were going and who was to do what, one group headed for the broadcasting station; another for the building housing the newspaper Szabad Nep; a third for the telephone center; a fourth for a motor park containing 60 trucks; a fifth for an electrical factory recently converted into a small arms plant. A sixth went to a munitions dump.

At the radio station were some police and guards but they had firm orders not to shoot except in self-defense. They were attacked; the group killed several and wounded more. The firing then was returned and after a skirmish and some damage, the attack on the station broke off. At the newspaper office, after killing a woman, the group gained control, smashed a bookstore in the building and burned the books, tore down and burned a red flag that topped the building and held the presses for about 16 hours. Meanwhile, the trucks had been driven off—drivers clearly prepared and selected beforehand—and arms and munitions were loaded into them from the factory and the dump.

Involved in all these more or less simultaneous and swift actions were perhaps something under a thousand people. Meanwhile, many demonstrators had returned home, suspecting nothing, and even the Government seems to have been informed tardily and not very urgently of the apparently disconnected, sporadic assaults by mere handful of people.

An emergency session of the Politbureau was convened about 10:30 in the evening of October 23 and it confirmed Gero as First Secretary, but made a momentous decision in offering the Premiership once again to Imre Nagy.

Meanwhile, the armed groups had assembled (except those ensconced at the newspaper building) and set out in the early hours of October 24 to attack other public buildings. It was just about breakfast time of October 24, that the Council of Ministers first announced that “fascist reactionary elements have launched an armed attack against our public buildings and have attacked our armed formations.” Still later that morning, the Council of Ministers declared martial law. Finally, as a third step, still on October 24, the Council—announcing that “The Government organs have not reckoned with bloody dastardly attacks,”—called upon “the Soviet formations stationed in Hungary,” in accordance with the terms of the Warsaw Treaty, to come to its assistance.

While those formations responded affirmatively to the request, they do not seem to have actually undertaken any significant armed action until October 25; indeed in the earliest period, from October 24 to about noon of the next day, Soviet troops fraterni-
ized with masses of Hungarians who themselves were not engaged in any hostile activities. Soviet transport, including tanks, actually carried Hungarian civilians to assembly points for purposes of peaceful demonstration.

At noon on the 24th, Nagy took to the air and promised full amnesty to all who would lay down their guns by 2 p.m. (later extended to 10 p.m.). He reiterated that the Party and Government program was “the systematic democratization of our country in every field of Party, state, political, and economic life”; he promised “the realization of a Hungarian road corresponding to our own national characteristics in the building of socialism.” Nagy said: “Hostile elements joining the ranks of peacefully demonstrating Hungarian youth have misled many well-meaning workers and turned against the People’s Democracy...” He pleaded for peace and calm.

Kadar followed. He, too, pointed out that “the path of decisive reforms is open to us.” What was needed at once was “to cleanse and free this path against every counter-revolutionary force.” It was such a force which consciously persisted in diversionary, terrorist armed attacks upon police, security forces, army personnel, Party and state officials. “Provocateurs, going into the fight surreptitiously, have been able to hide behind the cover of people who lost their orientation in the hours of chaos, and particularly many youths whom we cannot consider as conscious enemies of our regime.”

Still early on the 24th, Zoltan Tildy, a leader of the Smallholders Party and President of Hungary from 1946-48, also appealed for an end to the fighting; so did the leadership of the United Association of Hungarian University and Academy Students (MEFESZ), an organization recently formed in opposition to the Party youth organization (DISZ). It, too, asked that the Central Committee be trusted and followed “in a spirit of revived Leninism.”

A little later similar statements came from the National Council of Hungarian Women and the National Peace Council. Medical, legal and pedagogic students condemned “every counter-revolutionary provocation” and urged an end to disorder so that a purified People’s State could get to work.

In the late afternoon of the 24th, the National Trade Union Council agreed that a “largely well intentioned” demonstration was “turned into a counter-revolutionary movement by irresponsible elements and provocateurs” who succeeded in winning over “many politically inexperienced youth.” It appealed for order, and its call was seconded by the leadership of the Petofi Club. The National Association of Hungarian Newspapersmen said the same thing; it favors democratization; the demand was in the process of full implementation; the violence and disorder dismayed the process; only “irresponsible elements and enemy provocateurs” could persist, therefore, in the use of violence.

Towards evening Arpad Szakasits made a nation-wide address. Szakasits had been General Secretary of the Social-Democratic Party in 1948 when it merged with the Communists; from 1948 to 1950 he had been President of the Republic. The errors of the past were being overcome, he said, and the way to a democratic-socialistic life was open. Hence:

It is the more agonizing that the peaceful demonstration which was to reflect the enthusiasm of our youth and of our working people has been utilized by anti-democratic irresponsibles who still weep for a return to the past.

That night, finally, the chairman of the Bench of Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church, Jozsef Grosz, Archbishop of Kalocsa, broadcast the following statement:

The standpoint of the Catholic Church is open and clear. We condemn massacre and destruction. Members of our flock know this. Therefore, I sincerely hope that our believers will not take part in such activities, but will give an example by preserving quiet and order, and try to assure the Hungarian future by peaceful work.

What fighting there was on October 24, was conducted in very large part by units of the Hungarian Army itself, and by the end of that day it appeared that the back of the organized armed assault had been broken. There still persisted some coherence and unity in the Party and in the organs of State power.

In the morning of October 25, the Central Committee of the Party announced that Gero had been dismissed as First Secretary and that the post had been accepted by Janos Kadar. But later that morning there were renewed assaults upon army and police units and organized assassination attempts upon Communist leaders. This was still largely sporadic and did not yet involve large-scale participation. The disciplined nature of the attacking groups was manifest; it was also observed that their members were well-armed with infantry weapons, and that many wore
similar cloth bands of identification on their sleeves—hundreds of these, identical in nature, appeared overnight, as it were.

A short time later Kadar spoke again to the nation on the radio. He reiterated that the October 23rd demonstration had “honest aims” so far as “the majority of the participants” was concerned, but that a small minority had launched “an armed attack against the state power and People’s Democracy in accordance with intentions of anti-popular and counter-revolutionary elements.”

He went on, in a central passage with implicit reference to the controversial and nice problem of requesting Soviet armed assistance in repelling the assault with what to many seemed precipitate haste:

It was in this grave situation that a decision had to be made. In complete unanimity the leadership of our Party decided that the armed attack against the power of our People’s Republic had to be repelled by every possible means. The power of the working people, the working class, and the peasantry embodied in the People’s Republic is sacred to us and must be sacred to everybody who does not wish to reimpose on our people the old yoke, the rule of the capitalists, bankers, and large estate-owners.

I have emphasized the words “in complete unanimity” because while it appears that Gero, as First Secretary, was basically responsible for urging and calling for immediate participation of Soviet troops, Kadar is saying publicly, after Gero’s dismissal, that the decision was unanimously supported and approved. Despite Nagy’s denial of this, made a week late, this approval must have included himself, and the fact is that he followed Kadar on the air this morning of the 25th and did not deny Kadar’s statement, but, as we shall see, explicitly confirmed it.

There were two additional paragraphs in Kadar’s address of October 25 that are very significant and revealing of the intentions of the Party at that time. Those intentions, in turn, are clearly logical extensions of the whole process of change which had been proceeding ever since 1953 and had been greatly accelerated with the start of 1956. Kadar said:

It is the firm resolve of the Party leadership, after the earliest possible restoration of order, to face frankly and without dilatoriness all the burning questions whose solution cannot be postponed. We want to solve these without delay, by deepening the democratic character of our State, Party, and social life, within the limits of realistic possibilities.

Comrades, the Central Committee of the Party recommends that, after the restoration of order, it should conduct talks with the Soviet Government in the spirit of complete equality between Hungary and the Soviet Union, fraternal cooperation, and internationalism, for a mutually equitable and just settlement of the issues between the two socialist countries.

Imre Nagy, as Premier, followed at once. He asserted: “A small number of counter-revolutionaries and provocateurs launched an armed attack against the order of our People’s Republic.” He then added, what was indubitably true, that “a section of the workers of Budapest, because of their bitterness over the country’s situation, supported them.”

He went on to declare that the bitterness sprang from “the grave political and economic mistakes of the past”; he pointed out that the new Party and Government leadership had come into their positions because they had led in the struggle against these errors and that they were really determined to press home the fullest corrections. But, clearly: “For the realization of this program the immediate cessation of fighting, the restoration of calm and order, and the uninterrupted continuation of production are absolutely indispensable.”

He reiterated the substance of Kadar’s promises about negotiations with the U.S.S.R., specifying that these would include “the withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Hungary.” Pertinent to this, he remarked, “The recall of the Russian troops whose intervention in the fighting has been made necessary by the vital interests of our socialist order (italics added) will take place without delay after the restoration of peace and order.”

He emphasized the need for “national independence,” but, in this speech of October 25—unlike speeches he made a few days later—Nagy was still referring to “our national progress and our socialist future.”

Even while these appeals were being made, however, attacks resumed in Budapest. On the 25th, armed bands set fire to the National Museum, at half a dozen places at once. When workers and other citizens and members of the fire department attempted to halt the destruction of priceless works of art and historical documents, they were fired upon from adjacent roofs and other hiding places. The fire raged finally uncontrollable and the magnificent building—rebuilt in 1945—was once again a wrecked shell.

In the countryside, outside Budapest, also on the 25th, armed groups of from twenty to fifty men, in vehicles—and with no
pretensions or slogans for a purified Socialism or anything else—set out on a murder hunt. Here was sheer fascist terrorism, and within a few hours in the evening of October 25, in about fifteen outlying villages, these murder-hands systematically set about slaughtering all known Communists, presidents of local councils, police officials and leaders of cooperatives and collectives. At this time and for several more days, Soviet troops confined themselves to activity only in Budapest, which explains these widespread massacres outside the city.

The news of much of this, in the general disorder, was filtering back to the government in drabs and drabs. But the setting fire to the Museum was known. In mid-afternoon Gabor Tanczos, recently elected Secretary of the Petofi Club, whose organization had been in the forefront of the struggle for democratization and who personally was identified with the most intense efforts at change—even to the point of recklessness—addressed the nation via radio. He began by stating: “We greatly appreciate the enthusiasm you have displayed in the past few days. We respect your true patriotism.” But, Tanczos went on:

We are quite certain you have nothing to do with certain stupid elements demonstrating their cruelty. We know that the mistakes committed by the wrong leadership of the now-relieved Erno Gero have filled many with bitterness and have led them to commit acts they did not originally intend.

Now, he said, the process of change had won, “our leadership is good,” and we must proceed with “the building of a truly democratic Hungary, Socialist in a Hungarian way and equal with any other nation.” But how could this be done “while the guns are roaring”?

Clearly, it could not be done; hence anti-democratic and anti-Socialist elements, who had the guns and had clear if sullied motives, were keeping those guns roaring.

That same afternoon thousands of Hungarians set out for the square before the Parliament building. The essential purpose seems to have been to support the plea for peace which, as we have shown, were coming now from all sides where responsibility and good-will still existed—from a Roman Catholic Archbishop through the First Secretary of the Party. Many of the demonstrators rode to the square atop Soviet tanks and there was the warmest fraternity between the Hungarian masses and the Red Army troops.

But at the square, there was firing in the direction of the Soviet forces and into portions of the crowd. Security forces were present and it may have been that some among them—nervous, distraught or provocative—fired. It is altogether possible that the kind of forces which had already burned books and museum treasures, and outside the city had begun widespread murders, seized this opportunity to provoke renewed fighting. For it really appeared then, that order was being restored; all elements had declared themselves for peace; the Red Army had not yet really committed itself in any real force; and here was a living demonstration of fraternal regard between Soviet and Hungarian. And Gero was out of office so that the Government and Party leadership seemed fully changed.

Exactly who fired first cannot be clearly established and probably never will be. (To this day there is no unanimity among historians as to who fired first “the shot heard round the world” in Massachusetts in April, 1775.) It is however, perfectly clear that it was only forces opposed to democratization and socialism who could then have wanted a continuance of fighting, and certainly the shooting at the Parliament Square on October 25 assisted such forces.

The fact is that there was firing and that Soviet tanks participated in the firing; it is certain, too, that many demonstrators were killed as a result. The figures as to the casualties are difficult if not impossible to ascertain with confidence. The forces seeking reaction immediately started rumors anent the “hundreds” slaughtered—the figure finally reached six hundred. It is this ultimate exaggeration, which, quite naturally, is repeated in James A. Michener’s sensationalized and utterly unreliable story, The Bridge at Andau (N. Y., 1957). But John MacCormac, Vienna Correspondent for the New York Times, who was in Budapest during October and November, says that he was at the scene of the tragedy and he “counted fewer than fifty” who fell on that Square (N. Y. Times Book Review, March 3, 1957).

Yet there was, for reasons we have tried to make clear, wide public willingness to accept the worst possible rumors, especially concerning the Russians, and the world-wide commercial radio and press apparatus did its best to invent and magnify “atrocities” tales. In addition to this one about the six hundred slaughtered in Parliament Square, another tenacious lie started and repeated everywhere as if by magic (the pages on the CIA earlier in this
book identify the magician), was to the effect that the Russian "savages" had massacred one hundred, two hundred—the final figure was three hundred—infants and children in a clinic. Pictures appeared, complete with empty cribs, and the story was repeated a thousand times; it was not until November 13, 1956—when order had returned and the lie could no longer be maintained—that the N.Y. Times carried a joint dispatch from Reuters, Associated Press and United Press correspondents in Budapest that none of the children had been killed; indeed, that "none of the 300 or more children had been injured."

At six o'clock in the evening of October 25, the Government declared a curfew to hold for twelve hours, and ordered that all house entrances be locked for that period. Shortly thereafter, the Budapest radio broadcast the voice of a widely respected and well-known author, Gyula Hay, who had been outstanding in the struggle against one-man rule and all manifestations of repression. He said:

I was with you and marched among you through the streets of Budapest, arm in arm. ... I have been fighting along with you for years for a new, young literature, for honor for youth, for truth and for the people. I know you and I know that you are honest patriots, that every breath you draw is true. If need be I would stand before any tribunal in the world and declare: these young people are not criminals, they deserve no punishment.

But, Gyula Hay continued, it would not be necessary to offer such testimony, for our desires are the desires of the present leadership and it was because he fought for the same things that Kadar was jailed. Now he is out and vindicated and is himself First Secretary. Hence, to continue violence now can only mean to fight for the resurrection of the old, the bestial, the days of Horthy. Therefore:

We must immediately revert to peaceful methods; fighting must stop immediately. Even peaceful demonstrations should not now be undertaken, because they might be misinterpreted.

By the morning of October 26 a certain degree of order and calm had returned to Budapest. At 6 a.m. the Government announced via the radio that because of this, people could undertake shopping and other chores from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. that day, and workers in the food and transport industries were assured that it was possible and safe for them to resume their tasks. Plant managers were instructed to see to it that all workers "receive the wages due them or sufficient advances."

The Party newspaper, Szabad Nep, made its regular morning appearance again and devoted its editorial to explaining: "Order and Peace Are Needed." This declared that without the errors and crimes of the past the "real counter-revolutionary forces" could never have had the success they did achieve; but the whole effort at purification had resulted in the present Nagy-Kadar government. It pointed out that all three of the top secretaries of the Party—Kadar, Ferenc Donath and Gyula Kallai—had led in the struggle for change and had suffered imprisonment therefor. Hence "he who wants to set the people against these leaders and wants to spread mistrust against them, helps everybody except the people."

But meanwhile, outside Budapest and especially in the West—where the border with Austria had been thrown open since last July—and where, as we shall show later, all sorts of strange people were entering by the thousands—fighting continued against Hungarian police and army units. The Red Army took no part in these battles and skirmishes, having been ordered apparently to participate only in governmental defensive measures inside Budapest. By the end of October 26, insurgents had gained control of the Austro-Hungarian border and of dozens of county seats in the western part of the country.

In the late afternoon of October 26, shooting resumed in Budapest and from then on the murder of individual Communists became fairly common within the city. Indeed, the Communist government officials no longer returned to their homes for fear of assassination. The vast majority of the city's populace did not participate in the fighting at any time and by October 26 they were out of it; but the workers of Budapest by and large adopted an apathetic or passive or neutral attitude, Having been embittered by past errors and wrong policies, but not desiring reaction and still wanting a purified Socialism, the workers, mistrusting the Party (itself now very confused and strife-torn) adopted a hands-off attitude, which in fact gave a free hand to terrorists, reactionaries and fascists.

This does not mean that then, and later, some honest workers

*The N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1956, reported a very large influx of tourists into Hungary, especially from Austria in the past few weeks.
and students did not fight on the same side as malicious, criminal and fascistic elements. Some did unquestionably, and this reflects the bitter nature of the Rakosi-government’s failure. But this fact no more determines the nature of this resistance than does the fact that millions who volunteered and fought in World War I (on both sides) did so for the purest and most noble reasons, alters the nature of that war from what it was—an imperialistic catastrophe. Again, many of the hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the Confederate Army, during our Civil War, fought for the most splendid individual reasons—to defend their homes, to save the South from (they believed) invading Yankee devils seeking “booty and beauty.” But this is no way alters the fact that the Confederate Army was created by the slaveholding oligarchy and was an instrument meant to preserve and extend the institution of human slavery and not to protect Alabama homes from rapacious Yankee devils.

Getting closer to our own day: anyone who believes that among Hitler’s millions of deluded and passionate followers there were not thousands upon thousands of workers (and German workers with great political maturity and generations of class consciousness) simply deludes himself and misses the whole point of Hitler’s calling his party a National Socialist one. Anyone who thinks that among the five million members that the Ku Klux Klan had in our country in the 1920’s there were not scores of thousands of deluded and chauvinistically-poisoned workers, is ignorant of that movement or wishes to close his eyes to hard facts.

So, Hungary, being what it is, and the Hungarian masses, including workers, having the history and special features in their development that they did have and provoked as they were by the misleadership of the Party for years, developed a certain degree of popular participation in an effort that really aimed at ultra-reaction, though the motivation of the popular elements was not against Socialism, but for its refreshment.

As we shall see further, the internal and external forces of reaction would not let, if they could help it, peace and order return to Hungary—not, at any rate, until it would be the “peace and order” of a Horthy-like kind of government.

Meanwhile, as October approaches its end, it is to be remembered that the Mid-East crisis draws to a boil. By October 28 the Israeli government—with direct French and British aid—launched its diversionary attack upon Egyptian territory. At the same period, for days, the press of the world was reporting the mobilization of British and French forces at home and in Cyprus and Corsica for an attack upon Egypt. On October 30 a massed air and naval attack upon the main population centers of Egypt was launched by combined Anglo-French forces. How that would turn out, at the time, and what the United States would do, after the then impending elections were concluded, no one could be certain. For several agonizing days the peace of the world teetered in the balance.

It is within this immediate context that the position of the USSR must be weighed; it is under these circumstances that she had to view—as did the Hungarian Party leadership—the Hungarian assault, with the clear participation of external counter-revolutionary forces (which we will demonstrate in due course) as either part of an effort, perhaps still to develop in other spots, to launch a general war; or as part of a diversionary assault immobilizing Soviet resistance to the naked Anglo-French imperialistic aggression. In either case, with either motive, the timing of the two events must have seemed—and still seems—something other than coincidental. Certainly, to those responsible for the security of the USSR, the two events must have appeared interlocked. The vigorous and successful leadership of the Soviet Union in containing the aggression against Egypt and in bringing about its relatively prompt cessation is a matter of indisputable and uncontroversial fact. Its policy vis-a-vis the Hungarian events is to be examined in the light of this expanded crisis.

Above all, then, from reaction’s viewpoint, violence must continue in Hungary and the attempt not to purify but to destroy the People’s Democratic state and its socialist base must be carried through to success. In West Hungary, rebel “governments” appeared and reinforcements moved east with intent on keeping the pot boiling in Budapest and bringing more and more pressure from the Right on the Nagy government.

The government and the Party was still meeting the threat essentially by reiterating its policy and purposes, appealing for peace, and depending upon the Red Army in the capital to prevent its own physical destruction. On October 26, the Central Committee of the Party issued a Declaration which reflected a further appeal for order. This promised ”the election of a new national Government,” pledged beforehand to rectifying past
errors and devoted to the creation of “a free country of prosperity, independence, and socialist democracy.”

The government would rest “on the broadest national foundations” and would move at once, with the USSR, “to settle relations between our countries on the basis of independence, complete equality, and noninterference in one another’s internal affairs.” This corresponds to the interests of both countries, it would cement Hungarian-Soviet friendship. “It is on that basis that relations between Poland and the Soviet Union are now being shaped anew.”

The policy of workers’ councils in the factories, already advocated and in part implemented, would be pursued further and every effort would be made to meet the material needs and demands of the workers.

Amnesty was assured to all, provided the use of violence ceased by 10 that night. The Central Committee reaffirmed “their adherence to the principles of socialist democracy,” and their “firm resolve to defend the achievements of our People’s Democracy.” It would “not budge an inch on the issue of Socialism.”

On October 27 there was relative calm in Budapest itself. The Presidium of the National Council of Trade Unions announced that elections of workers’ councils, within factories, was to begin and was to be conducted as the workers themselves wished. The councils were to have control over wage structure and “questions of production, administration and management” within each plant, but the principle of regional and national planning and direction was to remain a function of Government.

On the same day a re-organization of the government was announced. This consisted entirely of anti-Rakosi Communists and of several leaders of other parties. Imre Nagy was the Premier; there were three Deputy Premiers, one, Antal Apro was a Communist, one Jozsef Bogner, was of the Smallholders’ and one, Ferenc Erdei, of the National Peasant Party. Of the Ministers, four were formerly of the leadership in the Smallholders’ Party; these held the portfolios of Foreign Trade, Agriculture, State Farms, and State. Two university professors of international repute in their fields, and both Communists who had opposed bureaucratism, were placed in charge of Health (Prof. Antal Babits) and of Culture (Gyorgy Lukacs).

With the close of October 27 there was reason to hope that the worst was over and that now peaceful reconstruction and im-

provement could go forward. Hence the Government issued an order directing “a general and immediate cease-fire. It instructs the Armed Forces to fire only if attacked.” This order was accepted as pertinent to the Soviet forces, as well as the Hungarian.

At the same time, the Premier, Imre Nagy, in a broadcast, denied that the present movement as a whole was a counter-revolution. He saw, rather, “a national and democratic movement” and announced again that the new Government was dedicated to “democratic national unity, independence, and socialism.” True, Nagy said,

As always happens at times of great popular movements, this movement too was used by criminal elements to compromise it and commit common criminal acts. It is also a fact that reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements had penetrated into the movement with the aim of overthrowing the popular democratic regime.

The program of democratization and of careful concern for material needs and national sensitivity was yet again reiterated. The cease-fire order was referred to and Nagy announced that agreement had been reached with the USSR for the quick withdrawal of her troops from Budapest. Negotiations for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops were to continue and the aim was “mutual equality and the national independence of socialist countries.” Nagy ended by declaring that the past twelve years, while containing blunders and worse, nevertheless also contain lastling, ineradicable, historic achievements” upon which “our renascent popular democracy” could now press forward unimpeded by tyranny, illegality and false judgments.

On the same day, the Central Committee announced that at a meeting held that morning the above pronouncement of Nagy was approved. It said that, because of the exceptional circumstances, the Central Committee was transferring the mandate it had received from the 1954 Congress to a Presidium of six, chaired by Janos Kadar, and containing Antal Apro, Karoly Kiss, Ferenc Munnich, Imre Nagy, and Zoltan Szanto.

Still on October 28, was published the appeal of the same date, from the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party—signed by Gomulka and Premier Cyrankiewicz—for an end to fighting in Hungary. It asked for a defense of “the unity of the camp of socialism.” It said: “You and we are on the same side, the side of freedom and socialism,” and offered the opinion that:
We think that only those who wish to turn Hungary back from the road to socialism could reject the program of the Government of National Unity of Hungary.*

Simultaneously came a message from Tito to the leadership of the Hungarian Workers Party containing substantially the same views as those expressed by the Poles. Tito thought that there now was “proof that the policy of the present state and political leadership and the genuine socialist aspirations of the Hungarian working class have merged.”

Therefore:

Any further bloodshed would only harm the interests of the Hungarian working people and socialism. It could only serve the aims of reaction and bureaucratic deformation.

Hence Tito hoped that the bloodshed might cease, else there could be “unforeseeable consequences not only for Hungary but for the international movement.”

But the forces which had turned to violence in the first place and had persisted in its use, were far from satisfied with the developments so far accomplished. They had no intention of stopping now; and daily across the Austrian frontier reinforcements for their purposes streamed into Hungary. From these western areas of Hungary, and from Radio Free Europe, other broadcasting systems in Spain, Italy and West Germany, and now from inside Hungary came demands reflecting a steady drift to the Right.

By October 28, the demand began to be voiced for the immediate and unilateral withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, the immediate neutralization of Hungary with her status to be guaranteed by a Four-Power agreement where capitalist countries would outvote the U.S.S.R. by 3 to 1, for changes of an economic nature suggesting a reversal from socialization. Moreover, by October 28, radio messages in Russian and thousands of leaflets in Russian began to appear calling upon the Soviet troops to desert, to mutiny, to join the insurgents in a holy crusade against the Red Army.

Still, the Party leadership in Hungary, segments of the Hungarian government and the responsible directors of Soviet policy in Hungary persisted in the belief that the counter-revolutionary thrust was contained, that stabilization was possible and, by the end of October 28, that the worst was over.

On October 29, the re-organization of the police force was announced by the Interior Ministry; on the same day the Defense Ministry announced its assurance that the program of the Government as set forth on October 28 had the ardent support of the vast majority of Hungarians and concluded on a clear note of relief and victory: “Forward with the people for an independent, democratic, and socialist Hungary!”

The same day, it was announced that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from various sections of Budapest was to begin at once.

Indeed, that evening units of the Hungarian Army, as the Defense Ministry stated, “began to replace Soviet troops in the eighth borough of Budapest.” Further withdrawals were to go on, beginning at dawn on the 29th, with the objective—if the Soviet troops were not disturbed—of completing the withdrawal in about 24 hours.

Still, this did not induce a termination of the demands directed against the People’s Democracy and socialism, but seemed rather to embolden the Right. Certainly, the Rightward drift went on.

On October 30, Imre Nagy issued a proclamation terminating the one-party system, and announcing the return of the Government to the coalition plan that had existed in 1945. For this purpose “an inner Cabinet within the national Government” was established. It consisted of six people, three of whom were Communists (Imre Nagy, Janos Kadar, Geza Losonczy) and three non-Communists (Bela Kovacs and Zoltan Tildy, Smallholder, and Ferenc Erdel, Peasant). At the same time it was announced that a seventh person would be added as soon as possible from the Social-Democratic Party. This was Anna Kethly, added to the ruling inner cabinet the next day. Thus by October 31 the decisive governmental powers were not in the hands of Communists, but rather in a coalition whose majority consisted of a leading Right-wing Socialist and three non-Socialists.

Nagy’s announcement requested the “immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Budapest,” urged the ces-

*Trybuna Ludu, organ of the Polish Party, in Warsaw, on Oct. 28, while placing the source of the uprising “first of all, in the errors, distortions, and even crimes” of the past went on to say “that the abolition of the People’s power in Hungary, irrespective of the sources of the explosion, of the intentions of the participants, would have been not only an awful tragedy for Hungary where, as a consequence, the dictatorship of the landlords and capitalists would have reigned anew, but it also would have constituted a threat to peace.”
sation of shooting by insurgent forces throughout the country and
concluded: "Long live free, democratic, and independent Hun-
gary!" It is significant that by October 30, Nagy was omitting
"Socialist" from his descriptions of Hungary. It is a fact that
thereafter in his speeches and pronouncements and in those of
other Government figures until November 4, the Socialist funda-
ment of Hungary is omitted.

Still, it is noteworthy that Kadar, who was a member of this
Government, following Nagy on the air, expressed his alignment
with these aims and rearrangements—in the name of peace. He
called upon his comrades to "fully rid ourselves" of the legacy
of the "bad leadership of the past years" and to rebuild a purified
Party.

On the afternoon of October 30, Zoltan Tildy, now a member
of the inner cabinet, offered his opinion that Cardinal Mind-
szenty should be allowed to "return to his seat in Esztergom and,
by taking up his activities as Primate of Hungary, take part... in
the noble fight which counts on every true patriot in these
historic times." Mindszenty, who had been released from prison
in the summer of 1955 and was living under a kind of house arrest
in the former estate of a Prince, was actually freed from this
detention on the evening of October 30. The act was accomplished
by a Hungarian Major—the son of a Count who had been a leader
in the 1919 White Terror and a prominent figure under Horthy
—with several tanks. That same night the Cardinal entered
Budapest.

Meanwhile, still on October 30, the Eisenhower government
offered the new Hungarian government a grant-in-aid of $20,000-
000, but this did not become public knowledge until it appeared,
in a one-inch item on the back pages of the N. Y. Times of January
9, 1957. Presumably, however, this negotiation was known to
the Soviet government very much earlier than the next January.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, on October 30, issued a declara-
tion, "On the Foundations for the Development and further
Strengthening of Friendship and Co-operation between the Soviet
Union and the Socialist States." In this historic declaration the
government of the U.S.S.R. stated:

Being united by the common ideals of building a socialist society
and by the principles of proletarian internationalism, the coun-
tries of the great community of socialist nations can build their
mutual relations only on the principles of complete equality,
respect for each other's territorial integrity, state independence
and sovereignty, and non-Interference in each other's internal
affairs.

But in attempting to implement this hitherto untried and un-
precedented kind of international relationships errors had
appeared:

The process of building up the new system and the deep-going
revolutionary transformations in social relations met with many
difficulties, unsolved problems and direct mistakes, including
those in the mutual relations between socialist countries—viola-
tions and mistakes which belittled the principle of equal rights
in relations between the socialist states.

At the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, these mistakes and
violations had been denounced "with the utmost determination"
and efforts were made and were still being made to eliminate
them. Hence, on the question of economic and military relations
the government was ready and willing to discuss "with the gov-
ernment of other socialist states" methods of improvement and
equalization.

Directly on the question of Hungary, this declaration contained
several paragraphs of the greatest consequence. The reader should
have these before him in direct and full quotation:

The Soviet government considers it necessary to make a state-
ment in connection with the events in Hungary. Developments
have shown that the working people of Hungary, which has made
great progress on the basis of the people's democratic system,
are justly raising the question of the need for the elimination of
serious shortcomings in the sphere of economic developments, for
a further improvement in the material well-being of the popula-
tion; and for a struggle against bureaucratic distortions in the
machinery of government. To this just and progressive movement
of the working people, however, there soon adhered forces of black
reaction and counter-revolution which are trying to exploit the
disenchantment of a section of the working people in order to under-
mine the foundations of the people's democratic system in Hun-
gary and to restore there the old regime of landlords and
capitalists.

The declaration went on to deplore the fact that developments
in Hungary had reached the point of bloodshed. It declared that
upon the request of the Hungarian government and in accord-
ance with the Warsaw obligations Soviet military units had helped
"to restore order" within Budapest. Further:

Bearing in mind that the further stationing of Soviet military
units in Hungary may provide a pretext for making the situation
more tense, the Soviet government has instructed its military command to withdraw the Soviet military units from the city of Budapest as soon as the Hungarian government finds it necessary. At the same time, the Soviet government is ready to enter into appropriate talks with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and the other parties to the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary.

At the same time, while thus making explicit and implicit criticism of an unprecedented nature in a diplomatic document coming from a major power, the last two paragraphs of this declaration unequivocally reaffirmed the basic and sacred obligation to defend the cause of Socialism and to defeat all efforts of reaction to regain ascendency.

The defense of the socialist gains of People's Democratic Hungary is today the chief and sacred obligation of the workers, peasants, and intellectuals, of all Hungarian working people.

The Soviet government expresses confidence that the peoples of the Socialist countries will not allow external and internal reactionary forces to shake the foundations of the people's democratic system, won and reinforced by the selfless struggle and labor of the workers, peasants, and intellectuals of each country. They will do their utmost, after removing all obstacles standing in the way of the further strengthening of the democratic foundations, independence and sovereignty of their countries, to develop further the socialist foundations of each country, its economy, and culture for the sake of the steady advance of the material well-being and cultural standards of all the working people; and they will strengthen the fraternal unity and mutual assistance among the socialist countries for the consolidation of the great cause of peace and socialism.

At exactly midnight, marking the end of October 30, 1956, an insurgent radio station in Hungary broadcast, in French to Europe, the fact that when Cardinal Mindszenty had been released and was brought to the nearest town, Retsag, on his way to Budapest, he had said simply: "I shall carry on where I left off eight years ago."" The reader is referred to the appropriate earlier pages for a definition of the Cardinal's position in 1948.

By October 31, the Red Army units had withdrawn from Budapest proper. By October 31, the President of the National Bank was removed, the Army Chief of Staff was dismissed and the

*This occurs on p. 46 of the publication entitled The Revolt in Hungary, October 23, 1956—November 4, 1956, based exclusively on internal broadcasts by central and provincial radios, issued by the "Free Europe Committee," N. Y., 1956. This is part of the "Crusade for Freedom" organization.

Defense Minister was fired. Nagy took over the Foreign Ministry. The Smallholders Party established new headquarters, announced an Executive Committee, and a daily newspaper representing that committee, Kis Ujsag, appeared. Simultaneously the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party took identical steps—its paper was Nepszava; its president was Anna Kethly.

Before dawn on October 31, the National Air Defense Command demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Hungary: "Failing this, the air forces of the People's Army will take action in support of this demand"—other Hungarian sources simultaneously put this more bluntly: "Bomb the Soviet troops."

Further, on October 31, Premier Nagy announced, quite on his own authority, that the 1948 prosecution against Cardinal Mindszenty "lacked all legal basis." Hence:

The Hungarian national Government announces that the measures depriving Cardinal Primate Jozsef Mindszenty of his rights are invalid and, therefore, the Cardinal can exercise, without any restrictions, all civil and ecclesiastical rights.

Still on this last day of October there was announced the recognition of the National Peasant Party, the Independence Party, the People's Democratic Party, and (on November 1) the Catholic People's Party and the Catholic National Association—all with antecedents going back to the Horthy days and to the anti-government groupings in the 1945-1948 period. Also on October 31 was announced the dissolution of the Trade Union Council of Hungary and its replacement by an organization called the National Federation of Free Hungarian Trade Unions.

Somewhat later that same day, Premier Nagy addressed the nation and informed it that he was demanding forthwith the complete withdrawal from Hungary of Soviet troops and the termination of Hungarian participation in the Warsaw Pact. He affiliated himself unconditionally with the drift of events in the past few days and again while calling for a "free, independent, democratic" Hungary, the idea of Socialism was conspicuously missing from his speech.

Actually, by October 31, as we shall demonstrate subsequently, a full scale White Terror, complete with anti-Semitic pogroms, had made its appearance in Budapest and in many areas of Hungary—especially in the West. But we continue now with a chrono-
logical account of the top-level events and statements as authorita-
tively established and of unquestioned authenticity.

John MacCormac, filling his dispatch from Budapest, declared
(N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1956): “Now that the Russians have left
Budapest, no one seems to know who rules Hungary.” On the
same day, in the organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary,
Anna Kethly herself warned against counter-revolutionary dangers
which "threaten the ideological substance and goals of the revolu-
tion”—i.e., the goals as envisaged by this leading Right-wing
Socialist of Hungary. Indeed, on November 1, the so-called
“Radio Free Kossuth,” a leading organ of a component of the
insurgent forces, itself declared: “The real cause of the revolu-
tion is in danger. Arms have been obtained by elements whose
objective is not the sacred cause of the revolution but looting
and robbery.”

Still on this first of November, Nagy returned to the radio
with new announcements of “progress”: He had informed the
Soviet Ambassador that Hungary then and there and at once
repudiated the Warsaw agreement; he officially declared the
neutrality of Hungary; he officially requested the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to put the “Hungarian Question”
and its status of neutrality on its agenda; he officially requested
through the same official, that the neutrality of Hungary be
protected by mutual agreement between the United States,
Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.*

Again he closed his speech by hailing a “free, independent,
democratic, and (this was an addition) neutral Hungary”—but
“socialist” was missing.

Assisting the drift to the Right was the accumulating disinte-
gation of the Hungarian Workers Party. Without a united,
confident, fervent Marxist Party, the working class itself was a
body without a head, and its various limbs went in every direction
at once, in fact immobilizing that class. Hence no effective
organized resistance against the reactionary drift, within Hun-
gerian life itself, was available. This very much intensified the
danger of actual fascism in Hungary.

Recognizing this development, Kadar in a radio address on
November 1, did his best to stave it off by announcing the forma-

*It is worth noting that Britain and France began the bombing
of Egypt on October 31; on November 1, their troops were invading
Egyptian territory.

The Uprising of a new, clearly anti-Rakosite, Marxist-Leninist Party, to
be called the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and to publish
a new paper under the name of Nepszabadsag (People’s Freedom).
Socialism, to be complete, required, said Kadar, “freedom for
the people and independence for the country.” In the battle for
this—and both demands were fundamental to the whole process
that culminated in the events of October 23—Communists played
a leading role and they must again play a leading role, in secur-
ing the purification of our country’s life, in guaranteeing Hun-
gary’s independence, and in maintaining and extending Socialism.

“The uprising,” said Kadar, “has come to a crossroads.” We did not
seek the elimination of bureaucracy and rigidity amounting
to tyranny so that it “might be replaced by the reign of counter-
revolution.”

We did not fight in order that mines and factories might be
snatched from the hands of the working class, and the land
from the peasantry.

Either we go forward to a democratic life, filled with “human-
eness,” or “we sink back into the slavery of the old gentry world
and with it into foreign slavery.”

Said Kadar:

The grave and alarming danger exists that foreign armed inter-
vention may allay to our country the tragic fate of Korea. Our
anxiety for the future fate of our country leads us to do our
utmost to avert this grave danger. We must eliminate the nests
of counter-revolution and reaction: We must finally consolidate
our democratic order and secure conditions for normal productive
work and life—peace, calm, and order.

The new Party, breaking away from the errors and crimes of
the past, will fight, on “the front of national independence” for
“friendly relations with every country, far and near, and in the
first place with the neighboring socialist countries.” It would be
a party of Marxism-Leninism, within Hungary, and so would rest
“on the revolutionary and progressive traditions of Hungarian
history and culture.” It would carefully avoid “servile copying
of foreign examples,” but rather would seek conscientiously “a
road suitable to the historic economic characteristics of our
country.” The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party stood ready to
fight, side-by-side with all democratic elements, “to overcome the
danger of a menacing counter-revolution” and to safeguard the
nation’s independence and its socialist achievements.
But the forces of reaction were rapidly consolidating their power and pushing forward on the top levels, while in the streets the blood of scores of massacred Communists, Jews, and progressives was flowing. On November 2, Nagy again called officially for UN action and Four-Power guarantees. Meanwhile, the new Defense Chief, Pal Maleter, announced that the Army's support of the Nagy government depended upon its immediate withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and its pursuing a bold policy in driving the Red Army out of Hungary, by force if necessary.

Then, on November 3, once again the formation of a new Government was announced and again it represented a further move to the Right. In this Government the names of twelve persons were announced. Of these, three were Communists—Nagy, Kadar and Losonczy—but the name of Kadar was included without his authorization and against his will. Now, in fact, of eleven members, only two were Communists. Of the remaining nine, three were of the Smallholders Party; three were of the Social-Democratic; two were of the Peasant; and one was Independent. This, even in name—let alone in the realities of power at that moment—was a government considerately to the Right of that formed eleven years before.

Meanwhile, on November 3, for the first time, there came publicly-announced attacks upon and repudiations of Socialism, with the clear perspective of a return to capitalism. At noon on November 3, the Peasant Party—two of whose leaders, it had just been announced, were in the new Government—declared that while it did not wish to undo the Land Reform Act of 1945, nevertheless, "The Peasant Party believes in private property and advocates free production and marketing." On the same day there appeared the publication of the Sacred Heart of Jesus Society and its editorial, "What We Want—the Essential Points of the Program of the Hungarian Catholic Church," was broadcast (in French and in Hungarian). The editorial, stated the broadcast:

demands the return of the estates formerly owned by the Catholic Church. It also demands that schools which belonged to the Church be returned to it.

That is to say, this official Catholic organ on November 3 was calling for the undoing of the Land Reform and the Educational Reform Acts—always denounced by the hierarchy and by Mindszenty in the first place—which meant the uprooting of the social transformation of the old Horthy Hungary.

At this point we may turn to His Eminence in person. The views of this clerico-fascist-medievalist were presented at some length earlier. When freed from house arrest, his first words uttered via radio on October 30, were, as we have seen, that he held to these same views and stood in 1956 where he had stood in 1948.

George N. Shuster, the official apologist for the Cardinal, wrote a series of articles for the N. Y. Herald Tribune, October 29, 30, 31, 1956, based, according to the paper, upon "direct information from that country (Hungary) within the last few days." Mr. Shuster declared, "There can be no doubt that the key to the solution of the nation's problems is in Cardinal Mindszenty's hands." Further, wrote Mr. Shuster:

When the revolt started, another effort was made to convince the Cardinal that he should go before the microphone, calm the people, and tell them to put down their arms. Obviously the appeal was made without success.

Yes, that is obvious; and it has, I think, but one explanation: the Cardinal wanted the violence to continue because he wanted the drift to the Right to gather momentum. Shuster remarks that in the highest circles within the insurgent movement was Bela Kovacs, formerly Secretary General of the Peasant Union, and once jailed for counter-revolutionary activities even before Mindszenty and released sometime before the October uprising. Kovacs, wrote Shuster, on October 31, was "a faithful and ardent supporter of Cardinal Mindszenty"; Kovacs was third in the chain of command (behind Nagy and Tildy) in the eleven-person government announced by Nagy on November 3.

Shuster also wrote:

The revolt has shown that Mindszenty was and is the sole moral force in the country, whether he is in office or not. The drive of this national upheaval draws strength from him.

Shuster published that on October 31. On the same day, Radio Free Europe, with which Shuster is connected and whose imperialist financial ties and reactionary political orientation we have demonstrated in earlier pages—then broadcasting to Hungary 24 hours a day—noted that "the question has arisen too as to whether our brave youth have a leader? The answer to that question,
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According to Shuster, the Mindszenty-Kovacs leadership “has one aim”:

install in Hungary a genuine Christian Democratic regime in which Mindszenty will not participate actively, since he is not a politician, but which he would support as the greatest force for justice and moderation. This is what he did in the past.

On November 2, Populaire, organ of the French Socialist Party, noted:

Cardinal Mindszenty frequently speaks over the radio. It seems the Cardinal intends to play a leading role in political life. The impression is that nothing is done without him. The danger in Hungary is the revival of Horthyism, after liberation from the Soviet yoke.

In a leading Paris newspaper, Aurore, on November 3, it was reported: "Cardinal Mindszenty is ready to participate in a government that will re-establish order in Budapest.” The editor declares that he has interviewed the Cardinal, who was anxious to see a Christian-Democratic party emerge as a potent force. The Cardinal, asked if he would accept a “leading post in the future government” responded, “It is possible.” Yet, the editor added, it was not likely the Cardinal would take the leading office in such a government: “This position would revert to a political man to whom the prelate would expect to give, as Minister of State, his moral support.”

Reuters at the same time announced from Budapest that the Cardinal, interviewed by Prince Hubertus Lowenstein, had declared that a united and rearmed Germany, “ready to repulse the Soviet danger by all means” was the hope of Hungary and all Europe. Probably it was this interview that Peter Wiles, a fellow at New College, Oxford, then visiting Hungary, had in mind when he wrote in The New Leader (N. Y., Feb. 11, 1957):

It was not tactful of Mindszenty to say to a German journalist during the revolution that the greatest bulwark in Europe against Communism was a reunited and rearmed Germany.

This background is important in understanding the remark by Barrett McGurn, reviewing recent events in the N. Y. Herald Tribune, November 17, apropos of Mindszenty—“one of Hungary’s foremost leaders”:

It soon became clear that what Russia faced in Hungary was not the prospect of Gomulka, a nationalistic Communist of the stripe of Poland’s premier, but an Adenauer, a militant Catholic athwart natural tank routes into as well as out of the Soviet Union.

On November 3, the Cardinal delivered a national radio address, described later as “catastrophic” by conservative writers. It was catastrophic to them because it prematurely attacked the Socialist foundation of Hungary, which the vast majority of the people favored; that is, it exposed the real designs of the dominant forces in the developing counter-revolutionary movement too nakedly and too quickly.*

The London paper, Reynolds News, in its issue of November 4, bluntly declared that the Cardinal called for the return of capitalism; the restoration of the old order. Clearly, too, it said, his speech reflected opposition even to the Nagy government of that moment. The Reynolds News headlined its front-page story: ‘‘Drop Socialism’’ Mindszenty Hits Out At Nagy.’ Its first two paragraphs read as follows:

Cardinal Mindszenty last night bitterly attacked the Imre Nagy Government in a broadcast on the Hungarian Radio, describing it as the ‘‘heir of a broken system.’’

The Roman Catholic primate, who was released from prison(sic) only last week, demanded Hungary should abandon Communism and return to a system of private property.

Further, reported the paper:

Cardinal Mindszenty demanded restoration of old rights and property of the Catholic Church in Hungary, and guarantees for Church life and Catholic schools and newspapers.

A completely authenticated copy of the entire speech (if there was but one) seems impossible to obtain. John MacCormac, in a dispatch from Vienna, published in the N. Y. Times, wrote: ‘‘Premier Kadár also said the Cardinal had proposed in a radio speech on Nov. 3 that all private property be restored, including church lands.’’ As we have seen, this—plus the return of the schools—was most certainly the explicit demand made in an official

*Peter Schmid, a Swiss journalist was in Budapest during the uprising. In the vehemently anti-Communist magazine Commentary, January, 1957, he writes (p. 32): “Anti-Communists themselves acknowledged that Cardinal Mindszenty’s speech with its reactionary echoes was a catastrophe.”
Roman Catholic publication appearing in Budapest on November 3 and broadcast on the Hungarian radio that day.

In any case, MacCormac's dispatch goes on to say that Roman Catholic circles in Vienna furnished the text of the speech as consisting of two paragraphs. That most certainly is not the full text (we shall prove this in a moment), but even in this version, released by Church authorities in Vienna, over two weeks after the speech was made, we find the Cardinal quoted as saying: "We stand on the basis of private enterprise, properly and justly limited by social considerations." Here, too, he reiterates his agreement still with the Church's stand in 1945, which we have presented in earlier pages to have been one opposed to the Republic, land reform, and church-state separation. The Cardinal, even in this version, said he "awaited with complete justice the immediate restoration of freedom of Christian teaching." This, from Mindszenty, as we have shown, could only mean the return of 65% of the schools of Hungary into the physical possession and the complete control of the Prince-Primate himself.

In the publication of the Free Europe Committee, entitled *The Revolt in Hungary*, to which reference has already been made, there is printed (pp. 79-80) the text of a speech by the Cardinal delivered via radio near midnight of Nov. 3. Here twelve paragraphs occur—and some of the words in the MacCormac dispatch appear—rather than two, but even here ellipses appear five times indicating extensive omissions. I think it is fair to assume that the editing of the speech by the hierarchy in Vienna and the authorities of the Free Europe Committee was such as not to emphasize any ultra-reactionary content that might alienate American public opinion.

Be that as it may, this version, as the MacCormac version, contains the essence of a counter-revolutionary outlook and program, which alone could be expected from Cardinal Mindszenty by anyone who has any knowledge of his history and ideology. The Cardinal starts by declaring: "I need not break with my past." On the contrary, he affirms: "I stand by my convictions physically and spiritually intact, just as I was eight years ago"—and for those, once again, the reader is referred to the appropriate earlier pages of this work. To him, he repeated, the changes of 1945, represented "a regime [which] was forced on us." Further, he declared:

Those who participated in the fallen regime are responsible for their activities, omissions and default. If things proceed decently and according to promises made, my task will not be to make accusations.

And he did, in this version as in that issued by the Church in Vienna, say: "We support private ownership which is rightly limited by social interests."

So bad had conditions on the streets become by November 3 that even General Bela Kiraly, a new and extremely nationalistic leader of Hungarian military forces, appealed for a cessation of violence, denounced the incitements of Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America, and said "what the revolution now needed was to have the workers return to their jobs" (N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1956). On the same day, in the Herald Tribune, Barrett McGunn told of "revolutionary" groups who were distributing freshly printed leaflets asserting that Russia's own people should follow Hungary's example and rebel now against Communism in the name of God and freedom. The pamphlets urged that Hungary carry its liberation eastward to the Russians. To let the Russians read, too, part of it was printed in their language.
IX. The Uprising (continued)

We wish to turn our attention now to what was happening outside the government buildings, and to what was being said and done—and by whom—in the streets and countryside of Hungary in the week preceding November 4, and the return of Soviet troops, in force, to Budapest.

First, there are certain good pieces of evidence indicating long-time planning for an armed assault upon the government, quite apart from the actual events that occurred on October 23 and thereafter, which themselves certainly prove an absence of spontaneity among the minority who resorted to violence.

Thus, a United Press dispatch from Budapest, on October 25, 1956, stated:

The rebels were well armed. It was this that provided the first indication that an apparently well trained, well equipped underground had chosen this mounting ferment in Hungary as the moment to strike against Communist rule.

On the same day, the Budapest correspondent of the London Daily Mail reported that he had dined with leaders of the uprising “who for a year plotted this week’s revolt.” Considerably fuller was the United Press story, dated October 30, filed by Kurt Neubauer from the border town of Nickelsdorf, in Austria. After prolonged questioning of many armed rebels, Mr. Neubauer concluded: “It was fairly obvious today the Hungarian revolution had been planned for months—or even years.” While, when he asked, “How did you get so many guns?” he received as an answer “each time only a stony silence”, and while when he asked, “you mean you’ve been planning this uprising for a long time, getting ready, been waiting?” he also received no answer, still the reporter concluded as I have indicated. This was because, as Neubauer wrote:

Only hours after the revolt started last week every one seemed to be armed—some with pistols, some with rifles and a few with machine guns. Thousands of tri-colored arm bands sprouted on

the sleeves of volunteers. Some one had to make them. Men rode into battle on trucks. Mobilizing the vehicles was no small task. Such plans could not have been drawn up in a day or a week.

There is excellent and abundant evidence of the development of a general condition of White Terror in Hungary—directly reminiscent of 1919—especially after October 29, when the Red Army withdrew from Budapest, and reaching a crescendo of fury by November 4, when units of the same Army returned.

Elie Abel, writing on October 29 from Budapest for the N.Y. Times, told of so-called “revolutionary councils” in West Hungary, which were “busy clapping in jail local officials of the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party and of the security police.” He continued: “In some cases these servants of the Budapest regime [of Nagy, remember] were hanged or shot without ceremony.” Sefton Delmar, describing the prolonged and systematic attack upon the headquarters of the Party in Budapest on October 30, in the London Daily Express (Oct. 31)—again recall that by now the mixed government of October 27 and the mixed inner cabinet of October 30, under Nagy, was presumably in “power”—wrote:

They (the attackers) have strung up every man and woman they found inside the building, including some good Communists and supporters of Communist Prime Minister Nagy’s rebellion against Moscow...

These men are hanging from windows, from trees, from lamp posts, anywhere you can hang men from. The trouble is that ordinary citizens are being strung up at the same time.

A regional editor of the Big-Business journal, U.S. News and World Report (Nov. 9, 1956) making notes “as he drove by automobile from the Austrian border into Budapest,” with the Soviet troops out of the capital, reported: “You pass big crowd standing around bodies of Security Police. They’re beaten into lumps that don’t even look human. Other Security Police hanging from a building.”

One can hardly recognize the human form, but of course there is a certainty these tortured and lynched ones are of the Police. One recalls the photographs by John Sadovy in Life, Nov. 12, 1956, showing a group of uniformed Hungarians, unarmed, with hands raised in surrender, some wounded, and then showing them shot down in cold blood, at perhaps five paces, and then, one not
yet dead and still erect, one sees a photo of the butt end of a rifle descending upon his skull. Life, in advertising its wares in a nearly full-page of the N.Y. Times (Jan. 14, 1957) reprints two of these photos and asserts that they illustrate "one brutal but glorious instant in a passionate fight for freedom." And, once again, the excuse is that the massacred ones are Security Police. Of course what is illustrated would be sickening were the victims dogs rather than human beings. But just for the record, the men pictured, as their faces and their uniforms clearly show, are quite young members of the Hungarian Army (very likely recruits) and are not policemen of any kind.

Further, the photographer of this "glorious instant," himself stated in the text accompanying the photographs that the "freedom fighters" kept shooting all who tried to surrender, shouting: "No prisoners, no prisoners!" Further, says Mr. Sadozy, after he had watched this glorious instant stretch out into forty minutes of cold-blooded massacre:

Then my nerves went. Tears started to come down my cheeks. I had spent three years in the war, but nothing I saw then could compare with the horror of this.

Gunnar D. Kumlein, the regular correspondent in Rome for the Catholic weekly, The Commonweal, was in Hungary during the uprising. He seems to have spent considerable time outside Budapest and while he was passionately in favor of the "freedom fighters" he did comment, with no hint of disapproval, that some of the insurgents were "killing off their Communist bosses as if they were animals" (Dec. 14, 1956, p. 280).

Leslie B. Bain, well-acquainted with Hungary, very conservative, and in Budapest during the uprising, wrote that while clear evidences of extreme reaction appeared at the very beginning of the resort to violence, these became more and more marked after October 29.

Here and there, wherever a group started rioting, a few individuals seemed inclined to strike a note of extreme nationalism. I even wondered at times whether these nationalist elements had a supreme command. I did my best to find it, but I never succeeded in obtaining any convincing evidence. Yet the nationalist tide kept rising.

According to Bain, "by the fifth day" (i.e., October 28) "a close associate of Nagy admitted that the revolt was beyond the control of those who had started it." As the days went on, "The Nagy government kept floundering. The insurrection drifted" (The Reporter, N. Y., Nov. 15, 1956, p. 21).

By October 31, the Associated Press was filing dispatches like this from Budapest—and again its certification that all the victims were members of the "secret police" is to be taken with more than a grain of salt:

Vengeance squads of young revolutionaries still prowled the streets of Budapest and the city's sewers, hunting members of the hated Hungarian secret police. When they found them in the sewers, they shot them and dumped their bodies. When they found them in the streets they hung them up by the feet. When they shot them in the streets, they poured gasoline on their bodies and burned them (N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1956).

Similarly, a dispatch filed the same day from Warsaw, declared: "Some of the reports reaching Warsaw from Budapest today caused considerable concern. These reports told of massacres of Communists and Jews by what were described as 'Fascist elements' . . ." (N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1956).

Bookstores were special targets of the "freedom-fighters." The works of Communists, classical progressive authors of all countries, made up huge bonfires in the streets—"The fires burned all night," Leo Cherne ecstatically reported (N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1956).

Georges Vanhoute, Secretary of the Left-wing Chemical and Oil Workers Trade Union International, who was in Budapest at the time, testified:

The atrocities happened particularly in the second period of the tragic events in Budapest, following the campaign which came particularly from outside the country, notably the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe from West Germany, but also from the campaign to incite people which came from fascists in Hungary and particularly in Budapest.

We know examples of whole families, like the Kalamár family, which was exterminated, and courageous, active workers, like Imre Mezo, former French partisan, who were savagely tortured and murdered.

Blacklists were printed and posted up in the streets, bearing the names of men and women who were to be killed, among whom were those of Hungarian and Soviet cultural figures, and members of working-class organizations (World Trade Union Movement, London, December, 1956, p. 20).

The correspondent in Budapest of the French Liberal weekly, L'Express, on October 31, told of seeing the hunt for members of the security police:
I saw summary executions. It was enough for someone to be called by anyone a "police spy" for him to be hung, shot or burned alive. I saw the execution of a supposed non-commissioned officer of the Political Police and I heard the maddened crowd on the Kostassageter Square howling insult against the "dirty Jew" who had at last paid for his accused race.

The special correspondent of the Yugoslav paper, Politika, (Nov. 15, 1956) describing the events of these days, said that the homes of Communists were marked with a white cross and those of Jews with a black cross, to serve as signs for the extermination squads. "There is no longer any room for doubt," said the Yugoslav reporter, "it is an example of classic Hungarian fascism and of White Terror. The information," continued this writer, "coming from the provinces tells how in certain places Communists were having their eyes put out, their ears cut off, and that they were being killed in the most terrible ways."

Andre Stil, editor-in-chief of the French Communist newspaper, L'Humanite, arrived in Budapest on November 12. He toured the city and conferred with many Communist and other survivors of the days of White Terror. His account is substantially the same as the reports sent in by Times and Tribune and Commentary and U.S. News and Life and Politika eyewitnesses, fascist mass murder reminding one of the Berlin days of 1933—and the Budapest days of 1919. Thus:

After the tortures, those who were still breathing were hanged. Even dead people were hanged. The corpses of those hanged were in such a state that many could not be recognized. The trees in Republic Square still bear the traces, these corpses, in all parts of their bodies, were bored through with bayonet thrusts, assailed by kicks, torn by nails, covered with exsanguination... Even amongst those who had allowed themselves to be deceived, there were many who were unable to bear such acts. Nearly all the comrades with whom I have spoken owed their salvation only to these people, sometimes even to those who, up till then, had been dragged along into the riots.

The fury mounted, as October became November, and increasingly the massacres were assuming a more highly organized character. More and more batches of people were being arrested and held for subsequent mass extermination. By the end of November 3 there were hundreds of people in Budapest and more hundreds in villages throughout the country who were being held for execution in the nearest future. The evidence is conclusive that the entry of Soviet troops into Budapest stopped the execution of scores, perhaps thousands of Jews, for by the end of October and early November, anti-Semitic pogroms—hallmark of unbridled fascist terror—were making their appearance, after an absence of some ten years, within Hungary.

In some of the material presented above, the reader will have observed references to anti-Semitic features of the murders. The evidence concerning the organized nature of the effort at mass extermination of the Jews is clear.

Thus, in the article by Peter Schmid in Commentary (itself published by the American Jewish Committee) already referred to, the author, bitterly hostile to Communism and insisting as he does that it was a "lie" to hold that the uprising "had fallen into the hands of reactionaries and fascists," nevertheless does write that "there were such elements among the rebels." And he did, specifically "detect" what he calls an "undercurrent of anti-Semitism" behind this uprising.

How difficult it was to "detect" this "undercurrent" is indicated in the story Schmid tells to illustrate it. He is watching while a group of "freedom-fighters" are using steam shovels to dig into the basement of a building where they believe "security police" are hiding. Their object of course, is massacre. At this point, writes Schmid: "One of the diggers came up to me apropos of nothing and began to insist that the Jews should be exterminated because they had brought Communism to Hungary." This was a member of what Schmid actually calls "a group of freedom fighters"! Of course, if these are the proper sentiments of a fighter for freedom, one would be compelled to agree that the uprising had not "fallen into the hands of reactionaries"!

Leslie B. Bain, whose general political orientation is similar to that of Peter Schmid, also found that in Budapest, even early in the uprising, "from time to time there appeared a few groups of marginal characters who gathered on street corners and started yelling 'Exterminate the Jews.'" He adds that "even during the first night as well as during subsequent days" he observed "enough anti-Semitism around... to present a distinct danger signal..."

*Actually, towards the end of his article, Mr. Schmid himself writes: "The speed with which the politicians of the pre-war period reformed their old parties and started up their old squabbles, as if nothing whatever had happened in all the postwar
A correspondent for the Israeli newspaper *Maariv* (Tel Aviv) reported:

During the uprising a number of former Nazis were released from prison and other former Nazis came to Hungary from Salzburg. I met them at the border. I saw anti-Semitic posters in Budapest. On the walls, street lights, streetcars, you saw inscriptions reading: “Down with Jew Gero!” “Down with Jew Rakosi!” or just simply “down with the Jews!”

Leading rabbinical circles in New York received a cable early in November from corresponding circles in Vienna that “Jewish blood is being shed by the rebels in Hungary.” Very much later—in February, 1957—the World Jewish Congress reported that “anti-Semitic excesses occurred in more than twenty villages and smaller provincial towns during the October-November revolt.” This occurred, according to this very conservative body, because “fascist and anti-Semitic groups had apparently seized the opportunity, presented by the absence of a central authority, to come to the surface.” Many among the Jewish refugees from Hungary, the report continued, had fled from this anti-Semitic pogrom-like atmosphere (*N.Y. Times*, Feb. 15, 1957). This confirmed the earlier report made by the British Rabbi, R. Pozner, who, after touring refugee camps, declared that “the majority of Jews who left Hungary did so for fear of the Hungarians and not the Russians.” The Paris Jewish newspaper, *Naye Presse*, asserted that Jewish refugees in France claimed quite generally that Soviet soldiers had saved their lives.

Reports that have been accumulating about many of the Hungarian refugees tend to confirm the reactionary and anti-Semitic nature of certain of the leading “freedom fighters.” Thus, in refugee camps in Canada and in England it was necessary for the police to intercede to stop the lynchings of Jews. Oskar Helmar, Minister of the Interior in Austria, reported anti-Semitic demonstrations and attacks upon Jews in the refugee camps in his country (*N.Y. Times*, Jan. 15, 1957). A little later Mr. Zev Weiss, on the Executive Board of the Youth Aliyah, an international agency for the assistance of Jewish children, said, makes one wonder whether the revolution was not in danger of going astray and ultimately turning into restoration” (p. 33).

*Helpful on this aspect of the uprising was the article by J. Gershman in the Canadian Jewish paper, *Vochenblatt*, January 3, 1957.

The *Cleveland News*, December 8, 1956, reported the speech made to a group of Reserve Flying Officers, of a former lieutenant in Horthy’s army who had been a war-prisoner of the Russians. This man, Ference Aprily, described by the newspaper as “a Hungarian patriot,” said that when he returned to Hungary he at once “began his plotting against Soviet domination.” Aprily says that “he was well known to the Russians as a saboteur, plotter, spy and freedom fighter,” wherefore he was arrested in 1948, though he underwent “a trial with no evidence”!

However that may be, he had been released in September, 1956, “in time,” he says “to join the seething feeling of revolt running rampant” in Hungary. Of the fighting itself, in which he participated from the beginning, he says: “We didn’t want to identify any single group or man, so the fighting just seemed to develop where a fight was needed. I was advisor to and leader of a group of 35 fighters.” (This remark would seem to illuminate the problem of “spontaneity” that puzzled many observers of the uprising—other evidence will be offered on some of this “spontaneity.”)

Aprily told his audience proudly that he had helped wipe out eighty Communists in one headquarters. No prisoners were taken: the victims “were hanged.” The newspaper story ends:

Aprily said he was urged by the revolt leaders to leave when he became the object of a city-wide search. He pedalled on a borrowed bicycle to the Austrian border and eventually was granted asylum in the United States.

Other distinguished “patriots” have found sanctuary in the United States. Count Edmond de Szigethy, formerly the owner of a textile mill in Hungary employing 1,200 workers, found himself dispossessed after Socialism. This gentleman was also a “freedom fighter”; he also escaped, and will be able to manage without his 1200 “hands.” The Count has married Mrs. Gabor, much-married mother of the much-married Gabor sisters, whose love matches, blackened eyes, diaphonous gowns and other attributes of dramatic talent have gained so much appreciation from night-club connoisseurs. (The happy event with its touching details are in the *N. Y. Post*, Feb. 28, 1957.)
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Mr. Emil Lengyel has offered the information that "former members of the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party, in comparison with whom even the German Nazis were friends of the Jews" were among the freedom fighters, as well as nobler elements. Lengyel adds that "the head of this Party's Department for the Extermination of the Jews broke out of prison during Budapest's chaotic days. He is now in the United States" (The Saturday Review, Feb. 25, 1957).

Out in Helena, Montana, the Governor himself greeted two refugee Hungarian "freedom fighters" amidst great fanfare. Shortly afterwards it was discovered that both of them were scabbing while workers were picketing the plant of a local mill and cabinet works. Said a local newspaper:

Church officials sponsoring the refugees were immediately contacted by officers of Local 2409, but refused to do anything about the unpleasant situation on the grounds that, "Your union must realize that these are freedom fighters" (The People's Voice, Helena, Feb. 8, 1957).

Very recently the U.S. Immigration Service actually deported a "freedom fighter" after a complaint from the American Jewish Committee. This patriot was Dr. Odon Malnazi, who had been in charge of propaganda for the Szalasi regime in Hungary towards the end of World War II. He also had "broken out" of jail and had fought for freedom and had been allowed to come to the United States. But this one was too notorious and has been deported. Another leader of the Arrow Cross Party, Miklos Serenyi, apparently the person Emil Lengyel had in mind, had also come to the United States under similar circumstances; the Naturalization Service was still examining his case (N.Y. Times, March 7, 1957, N.Y. Post, March 11, 1957).

Recently, also, Dr. Richard Saunders, president of the Save the Children Federation, said that many of the adolescents among the refugees "were in no sense political refugees" and that most of them, he thought, were "pre-delinquent and maladjusted." He said, too, that of the adults a very large proportion were "criminals and adventurers," the former among them apparently having been released from jails during the uprising (N.Y. Times, March 4, 1957).

The Uprising (continued)

Some of the material presented above contained references to the entry into Hungary, once the uprising had begun, of reac-
tionary forces from abroad. On this point, also, there is additional, abundant, and conclusive evidence.

First, the fact is, as we have stated, that for several months prior to October the Austro-Hungarian border had been practically open and thousands of tourists entered the country, particularly from August on. Second, it is a fact that very soon after the first resort to violence, on October 23, the insurgents concentrated on gaining control of the Western sections of Hungary. No resistance to their activities was offered by the Soviet units, and the Budapest government, certainly by October 27, had no effective power to intervene there, assuming it so desired. By the end of October all border controls had disintegrated, as the country itself—the official government being reconstituted every other day and emerging as more and more Right-wing with each change—reached near chaotic conditions and the White Terror began to spread.

Thus, Peter Schmid, whose work we have previously cited, states that he entered Hungary on November 1, aboard a truck filled with supplies—"food, clothing, and medicine," he says—that went from Zurich, Switzerland directly to the Hungarian border town of Sopron. What happened at the border? Schmid writes:

The Hungarian border guards never even bothered to glance inside the truck, much less at my visa. The country was in that anarchic in-between period when one regime was falling and another hadn't taken its place yet (Commentary, Jan. 1957, p. 25).

This, we repeat, was on November 1.

Peter Fryer—who had been the London Daily Worker correspondent in Hungary (and resigned from the paper because of sharp disagreement with its editorial board's position on the Hungarian question) and who while admitting that, "The danger of counter-revolution did exist," felt the danger was not acute and that the Hungarians in a large majority, wanting Socialism, could have successfully opposed an effort to install fascism—nevertheless did state:

Austrian Communists told me that before November 4, some 2,000 emigres, trained and armed by the Americans, had crossed into Western Hungary to fight and agitate (London Daily Worker, Nov. 16, 1956).*

Mr. Fryer's reporting of the numbers involved is, I think the

*Mr. Fryer's views are expressed in his brief volume The Hungarian Tragedy, London, 1956.
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evidence establishes, a serious under-estimation (in tune with his minimizing of the counter-revolutionary, restorationist and fascist threat, as I think the evidence offered in this work proves). Still that he cites a figure reaching 2,000 is consequential, because even that number of specially trained and armed reactionary terrorists, hurled into the middle of the turmoil that was Hungary after October 23, could play a momentous part in keeping violence and disorder and panic alive. They could be decisive, for example, in helping to explain why the repeated appeals for a cessation of fighting that came from the Budapest radio—especially after an overwhelmingly non-Communist government was in “power”—went largely unheeded. They could be decisive, too, in helping to explain the flying squads of assassins who exterminated large numbers of Jews, Communists and others, including entire families— from October 30 through November 3.

Certainly, streams of fascist and reactionary exiles did pour into Hungary after October 23. Unquestionably this was basically of an organized nature and may even have had one over-all command center. It is noteworthy, as the well-known Washington reporter Drew Pearson stated in his syndicated column dated November 8, 1956, that: “By some strange coincidence, practically every exiled satellite leader now living in Washington went back to Paris just before the Hungarian revolt.” Included were Mikołajczyk formerly of Poland, Osuský formerly of Czechoslovakia, Dimitrov formerly of Bulgaria, and Ferenc Nagy, formerly of Hungary. Mr. Pearson says: “Maybe they had a premonition of events to come.”

Of course, one cannot be sure; and these gentlemen were often conferring. It is certain, however, that they did all meet, this time in Paris, in mid-October. It is certain, also, as we have shown earlier, that these gentlemen met as members of a Central-European Committee of exiled leaders of reactionary and bourgeois pre-World War II parties, and that their purpose was the destruction of the Socialist systems in their native countries. It is certain that Ferenc Nagy was the Committee’s Chairman; that the group had received sympathetic treatment, warm encouragement and substantial material aid. It is inconceivable that this group, meeting in Paris in October, was not deeply involved in the stirring events in Central Europe at that moment.

It is certain that Nagy himself, in Paris on October 28, “said he would be willing to return home to head a new anti-Com-
munist regime.” It is also certain that he arrived in Vienna the next morning and “will go from there to the Hungarian border,” where “he is expected to meet with leaders of the revolution” (N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1956). Whom Mr. Nagy did succeed in seeing (there were some reports that he went into the Hungarian town of Gyor) and what, if anything, he accomplished, this writer does not know.

It is certain that Hapsburgs, beginning with broadcasts from Madrid, and Horthy’s father and son, beginning with broadcasts from Lisbon, activated themselves and their followers. They or their representatives appeared in Paris and in Vienna late in October, and without any doubt, their purpose was to encourage and assist reactionary and restorationist efforts in Hungary. How great their influence actually was and how numerous their following, in and out of Hungary is conjectural; indubitable is their effort to bring that influence and those followers into activity.*

Marie and Walter T. Ridder, correspondents in Central Europe, wrote from Vienna immediately after the uprising had been overcome:

One of the difficulties which beset the ill-fated government of Free Hungary was that too many people wanted to move right back to the pre-war pattern too fast. They couldn’t wait and put tremendous pressure on the regime of Nagy to establish the old way of life right away.

Many of those who one way or another were calling for a quick restoration of the “good old days” were emigre Hungarian aristocrats who had fled Hungary during the Soviet occupation of 1945.

As one Viennese lady haughtily, if accurately, put it—“The Hungarian aristocracy is rushing to the rescue—out of every night club in Europe” (San Jose, Cal.) News, Nov. 17, 1956).

Similarly, The (London) Times of November 9 commented: “There is something macabre about the way in which the Hungarian aristocracy has rushed to the rescue, out of every night club in the world.” “These circles,” the Brussels Socialist paper, Le Peuple, reported on November 3, “are already dream—

*There are, of course, Right and Extreme-Right divisions in the emigre circles. Thus, on Jan. 7, 1957 from Strasbourg came the report that Ferenc Nagy, Paul Auer and Hudil Nemeth had resigned from the Hungarian Emigre Committee, in New York, because it included strong elements “hoping to restore the Horthy regime or the Hapsburg monarchy” (N. Y. Post, Jan. 8, 1957).
ing of a crusade. Everything is ready, money and even arms, they said recently."

But if there is something denoting the opera bouffe about this, there was nothing at all even slightly ridiculous about the well-trained and murderous Szalasi veterans and fanatical fascists, by the tens of thousands, in camps in Western Germany and in organized groups in half a dozen other countries, including Great Britain and the United States. These were the ones who, the reader will recall, threatened in their West German newspaper to "come back for the final attack" when they would show mercy to none, "not even infants."

Many of these were men enlisted and trained in various "special" units within NATO or with other organizational ties as provided in various American legislation; they were also organized in various Intelligence services as those conducted by Gehlen or more directly, by the CIA. They were, additionally, to be found in para-military organizations, as the MHBK, an international association of veterans of the fanatical Szalasi fascist army.

It is of these kinds of groups that Mirko Bojic, former adherent of Mikhailovich in Yugoslavia and graduate of the "Free Europe University" in Strasbourg, was writing (in The New Leader, Jan. 28, 1957, p. 14): "Hungarian exiles living in Western Europe left en masse for Hungary to fight." European newspapers, of all shades of political opinion, reported fairly frankly this development beginning with the Vienna Oesterreichische Volksstimme of October 30 which affirmed the existence of "regular headquarters" at border areas where reactionary and Horthy agents "have recently crossed the border together with Hungarian refugees in order, as they say, to join the insurgents."

The next day the France Presse agency reported: "It has been confirmed that military organizations are being formed in West Germany with feverish haste, with the aim of taking political measures which will result in far-reaching consequences." The agency went on to say that these military groups had contact with former Arrow-Cross members "and with the ultra-nationalists who are in Austria."

Inmates of the refugee camp at Traunstein, in West Germany, who were largely Hungarian Swabians and former Szalasi-troop members, left for Hungary beginning October 24 and continuing four more days. According to the Berliner Zeitung of Nov. 20, their main assignment was "to rouse the (Swabian) national minority in Hungary," which totaled in 1956 about 300,000.

Uj Hungaria, a newspaper published in West Germany by extremely reactionary Hungarian emigres, declared (Nov. 2) that "voluntary battalions" had been formed in England, France, Germany and Austria "and other European countries" and were "on their way to Hungary or, perhaps, have already crossed the frontier."

We have already indicated that anarchic conditions had made crossing the frontier nothing but a physical act--so long as one was anti-Communist. Reflective of these conditions was the somewhat dramatic case of Stuart Whitehill Kellogg of Massachusetts, who was studying, under the GI bill, at Bonn University. He had left Bonn and, dressed in an American army uniform, had entered Hungary and participated in fighting in Budapest on November 24. This was publicized only because he managed to return to West Germany and was having passport difficulties (N. Y. Post, Feb. 1, 1957; N. Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1957).

The trained fascist killers who went into Hungary did not come only from Europe. There is convincing evidence that some even made the trip from the United States and that these also participated in the violence in Hungary. In New York City there was established, late in 1956, an extreme Right-wing Hungarian newspaper, called Szabad Magyarsag. In its issue of December 21, 1956 there is an article by Hugo Martonfalvy, deputy-group commander of MHBK in the United States. This gentleman expresses regret that the Western powers did not actively intervene, with arms and troops, in the Hungarian uprising.

He continued:

A little group, all of them former Hungarian soldiers, members of the MHBK, however, did go over to resume contact with the rebels in spite of all obstacles and prohibitions. The role of this little group perhaps did not weigh very heavily in the scale, but it became the symbol of the will to fight of the emigrant national Hungarians.

Our quiet work throughout the years did not prove to be fruitless. At the outbreak of the revolt we started negotiations and our leadership was ready for all active moves. Our work, of course, is by its very nature silent and in some respects secret."

"Major Toronto newspapers carried advertisements, in November, 1956, of an "Organization for Hungary," headed by one A. Kovari, appealing for money and volunteers ready "to accept military discipline" in order "to help actively" in Hungary. See the story in the Canadian Tribune, Dec. 17, 1956."
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Apparently these "freedom fighters" do not experience difficulties with the Passport Division of the U. S. Department of State.

Not only were supplies and fighters sent in to Hungary from the West. The reader will recall our mention of the leaflets, in Russian, that made their appearance in Budapest calling upon men of the Red Army to turn their guns against their officers and, in some cases, to join Hungarians in a crusade for the "liberation" of the Soviet Union! It now appears certain that these leaflets had been printed by the thousands in Milan, Italy, beforehand and, somehow, gotten into Hungary.

Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Communist Party of Italy, in a public address delivered in Milan on January 20, 1956, referred to these leaflets and said:

Well, do you know where these leaflets came from? They came from Milan... Avanti (organ of the Socialist Party) has already published the fact that in a field near Lodi a great packetful of these leaflets was found. But our comrades also discovered that there is a printing press at Milan where these leaflets were printed in Cyrillic characters, in tens of thousands, calling for mutiny in the ranks of the Soviet Army. I could give you the name of the printing press and the name and address of its proprietor (published in English in World News, London, Feb. 9, 1957, p. 86).

Meanwhile, Western imperialism sent Hungarian reaction, via its broadcasting stations in West Germany and Austria, everything from inspiration to promises of armed help (especially after the American Presidential elections, to be held November 6), to specific directions for the conduct of hostilities then going on. If the reader will bear in mind the origins and political motivation of the Voice of America program and the Radio Free Europe subsidiary of the Crusade for Freedom—described earlier—he will be better able to grasp the significance of this radio invasion of the Hungarian air.

Normally, Radio Free Europe directed its broadcast to Hungary on a 20-hour per day schedule. Other groups, as the Voice of America, the British and French broadcasting companies and the Vatican Radio also paid special attention to Hungary for from 1½ to 4½ hours each day. All, beginning on October 23, expanded their program and positively saturated the air, every minute of every day, with broadcasts beamed to every part of Hungary.

These broadcasts, particularly those emanating from Radio Free Europe, explicitly urged the overthrow of the Hungarian government and then kept calling for the raising of more and more demands upon the Nagy government. The broadcasts insistently urged a continuation of armed resistance and plainly promised that important material aid would soon be forthcoming from the West. In some cases radio broadcasts, apparently not directly connected with RFE, took over the task of offering specific tactical directions of a clearly military nature.

One of the insurgents told a Newsweek reporter (Nov. 12, 1956) that while the shooting was done by Hungarians "it has been the hand of the Western radio which has told us where to go and what to demand." Togliatti, in his January 20th speech, to which reference was made earlier, declared:

Those of us who then listened to the radio, heard not only propaganda, but the detailed orders that came from radio stations situated in Germany and Austria to this or that specific armed group, to attack this or that specific building, to undertake this or that action, to go and fetch armored cars from some specific point on the frontier. These things we all heard.

Even W.J.C. Egan, director of RFE, "conceded," according to the N. Y. Times (Jan. 24, 1957) "that certain 'mistakes' had been made." He defined one of the "mistakes" as "broadcasting with a tone of great excitement and urgency' reports on the progress of the rebellion picked up from clandestine radios operated by the rebels in Hungary." The Times story continued:

Broadcasts by other propaganda agencies that went much further than Radio Free Europe and were confused with it by the people within Hungary presented another problem, Mr. Egan remarked.

Anything that "went much further than RFE" must have been doing the kind of broadcasting which is normal for the signal corps of a combat outfit and was described by Togliatti. The call letters of that broadcasting system were, I think, CIA. RFE did give, however, direct political directives and did urge specific measures looking towards the implementation of explicitly internal problems. RFE did make broadcasts like this on October 24, referring to a speech by Imre Nagy:

The speech which the Prime Minister delivered was imploring and compliant rather than aggressive, and from his speech one...
can draw a conclusion—how great a confusion exists within the government itself. The government and its armed units are no more masters of the situation.

And on November 2, it argued that "there is not time... for a gradual change in the composition of the government. With one single decision," declared RFE, "all those elements must be removed from the government which by their mere presence remind of the Stalinist past, as well as all those whose mere name is provocation to the nation." Who the RFE could have had in mind, at this late date of November 2, within Nagy's government—other than possibly the Premier himself—it is impossible to see.

Even on November 7, after the Red Army had returned to Budapest and nothing remained of armed resistance but sporadic shooting, RFE said: "The West could have done more for its freedom in Hungary with five divisions than with five hundred divisions which it is perhaps now preparing to set up."

The correspondent of France-Soir, after leaving Budapest, towards the end of November, declared:

We heard on Radio Free Europe programs whose impassioned tone and desperate calls to revolt certainly did a lot of wrong. "During those last days," numerous Hungarians told us, "these broadcasts have provoked bloodshed." (Quoted in The New Republic, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 4).

The bitterness of Hungarians at this deception and provocation was intense and was very widely reported. It was so notorious that it forced the West German government to promise an "investigation," but nothing has come of this in the ensuing months and RFE is back at full blast with its thousands of employees, dozens of stations and millions of dollars.

John MacCormac, of the N.Y. Times, declared that RFE was especially harmful because it kept up its incitations after the Communists had been removed from the government, and so the predominantly bourgeois government could not gain an even keel and faced insistent violence. All this was done in such a way that it seemed preparatory to a war with the USSR wherefore, "the Hungarians were thoroughly convinced the United States would help them against the Soviet Union."

When this did not happen, after the provocative broadcasts directed against the non-Communist government—which actually had no effective power from November 2 on—it seemed a deliberate betrayal to those reactionary forces which had kept press-
Szalasi and Horthy elements, of the actual incorporation in the apparatus of terror and suppression of the thousands of ultra-Right emigre and professional killer groups.

But additional significant evidence appears in the comments of many first-hand non-Communist observers and analysts.

The reader will recall that Marie and Walter Ridder, in their dispatch from Vienna published in the San Jose (Cal.) Evening News of Nov. 17, had commented that the pressure "to move right back to the pre-war pattern too fast" had proven irresistible to the final Nagy government; he will recall that rather similar estimates were made by Peter Schmid and Leslie B. Bain.

The fear that this might happen haunted influential circles in Washington from the beginning of the uprising. Thus, James Reston, writing from Washington on October 24, produced a dispatch that was headlined in the next day's Times, "U.S. Fears Rebels May Act Too Fast." Washington observed, said Reston, that in response to the request of the Hungarian government, the active intercession of the Red Army was on a very partial scale and confined to Budapest. It hoped, however, the reporter continued, "that the pace and anti-Soviet aspects of the events in Budapest" would not be such as to impel the USSR to act more vigorously. The whole point was, said Reston, "that the prudent thing for the United States Government to do is to watch developments closely and keep quiet." Of course, he continued, with the elections a few days off, it was difficult for leading figures to "keep quiet"; still, Reston's closing words were:

The feeling among the best-informed persons here, however, is that whatever the United States does must be done quietly, and without claims that the new situation was created by the United States.

Bruce Renton, Budapest correspondent of the London New Statesman and Nation, who was passionately opposed to the role played by the Soviet Union in Hungary and who felt the danger of fascist counter-revolution was a Communist invention, nevertheless wrote that a follower of Nagy, sometime before November 4, had told him "in Nagy's office," that "the tragedy was that the revolution has overrolled itself, and that the government has ended up in the hands of the Right wing." (Nov. 17, 1956, p. 614).

Similarly, Leslie B. Bain, whose political sympathies are probably more conservative than Mr. Renton's, wrote of an inter-

view he had, on November 4, in Budapest, with Bela Kovacs— the former Smallholders leader, who had been in Nagy's inner cabinet. Kovacs, it will be recalled, was described by George N. Shuster as a fervent admirer and disciple of Cardinal Mindszenty. Kovacs told Bain that "we went too fast and too fast."

Kovacs, the Smallholder admirer of Mindszenty, was asked if he did not think there was a danger of "a new reign of White Terror," if this "too fast and too far" had continued. Wrote Bain: "Kovacs admitted there might have been a possibility of that," though he thought there was no chance of actually retaking the land from the peasants and the factories from the workers and keeping these from them. Still:

Politically, there had been the likelihood of a strongly Rightist development, but, in the absence of economic power, after a few short months, the extremists would have been silenced (The Reporter, Dec. 13, 1956, p. 14).

Is this not the projection of Civil War on a major scale? And this from a Smallholder leader who sees a further Right drift as the "likelihood" and for whom those to the Right of the Cardinal are "extremists."

Further, in defining his "too far and too fast," Kovacs told the American reporter:

I wish you could convince the West and make them keep the reactionaries out of our hair. Many of the exiles the Americans are backing are men who are marked because of their war crimes. Some of the voices that come to us over Radio Free Europe in particular are not welcome here. I understand the Americans' eagerness to fight Communism, but this is not the way to do it.

Especially significant substantiation of the "too fast, too far" development comes from Edmond Taylor, the European correspondent for The Reporter. In that magazine for December 27, 1956, Mr. Taylor writes that on about October 28 he "learned from a reliable U. S. official source in Europe that the worry about the new regime in Hungary moving too fast persisted." Indeed, he tells us that, "The American charge d'affaires (in Budapest) was instructed to call on Premier Nagy and urge him in effect to please maintain at least a slightly suspicious attitude toward the West until the Soviet forces were safely out of the country."

Further, according to Edmond Taylor, the U. S. officials at first urged Nagy "not to denounce the Warsaw Pact"; but this
slow-down effort was so contrary to the strategic policy of the United States and was countered so heavily "by other official or unofficial American actions" that it was ineffective. Taylor believes that most unfortunate was the American commitment to Cardinal Mindszenty, whom he describes as "a fiery patriot" but "a tragically inept politician." He said this American backing boomeranged because

Cardinal Mindszenty withheld his support from the Nagy government at its most critical moment and even helped undermine it by encouraging the untimely demands for legalization of the new Hungarian Christian People's Party.

By about November 3, he writes, the so-called revolutionary committees were dominated by "nationalist and rather conservative" elements—though, he says, "not fascist." He sums the matter up by quoting "an official American observer in Budapest":

At first it seemed likely that the Hungarian revolution would degenerate into sheer anarchy. Later it became clear that the real danger was that it would swing too far to the Right too fast.

Surely it is pertinent to an estimate of the Hungarian outbreak that an American official in Budapest is quite clear that "the real danger" was of its swinging too far to the Right—and too quickly—to suit even him!

Finally, Isaac Deutscher, also writing in The Reporter (Nov. 15, 1956) comes to basically identical conclusions. "The Cardinal," he writes, "became the spiritual head of the insurrection. A word of his now carried more weight than Nagy's appeals. If in the classical revolutions the political initiative shifts rapidly from Right to Left, here it shifted even more rapidly from Left to Right."

Deutscher sees a "powerless Premier (who) hoped to avert the catastrophe by bowing to the storm and accepting every anti-Communist demand." But by about October 31, Deutscher thinks, this, too, was not working: Nagy "was now indeed 'Kerensky in reverse.'"

There is an additional dimension which Deutscher adds that is a primary consideration. With the utter disintegration of even the Nagy coalition and the country moving with increasing speed to the Right, and with a Mindszenty kind of regime in the offing:

It was no longer Hungary but the whole of Russia's position in eastern Europe, in Germany, and in the world at large that was at stake. The collapse of communism in Hungary was sure to increase a hundredfold the anti-Communist pressures everywhere.

This brings us to an additional facet of the Hungarian events to which references have been made, but which requires more extended notice. The Hungarian uprising as an end result of imperialism's "liberation" policy is manifest, when all the evidence is known and weighed. In the face of this fact, the then raging attack upon Egypt, the mobilization of the entire aristocratic, reactionary and fascist scum of Europe and America, the clear and mounting drift to the Right in Hungary, the impotence of the Nagy regime, the grooming of the Prince of the Church for more secular responsibilities, the hysteresis of Radio Free Europe, the demands for full-scale Western military intervention, the border with Austria, the appearance, by November 2, of slogans for the re-taking of the "Munich" awards to Hungary (involving Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia)—surely in the face of facts such as these, the White Terror raging in Hungary seemed but a mild foretaste of the devastation that might be in the offing; at the least, full scale civil war in Hungary (a Korea in the middle of Europe), at the worst, the ultimate catastrophe to mankind, a Third World War.

What the Soviet Union faced in Hungary by November 3, was the certainty, if nothing were done to alter matters, of a Mindszenty-Hungary, bordering Austria and adjacent to a remilitarized West Germany, heavy with American atomic cannon. It was a Herald Tribune correspondent, Barrett McGurn, as we have seen, who called attention to the fact that Hungary sat "athwart natural tank routes into as well as out of the Soviet Union." And Mindszenty had already "tactlessly," as we have seen, chosen the ear of a West German correspondent to say that only a strong, rearmed, united Germany could save Europe from Communism. Further, according to Le Monde (Paris, December 13, 1956), the Bonn's Minister of Defense Strauss had said: "If only we had a German army. We would have marched to Hungary and settled the whole question."

So careful a student of European affairs as Alexander Werth stated in the London Reynolds's News, October 31, 1956, that he thought it possible the Soviet Union might abide an advanced bourgeois-democratic government in Hungary but that "the Russians will not tolerate a fascist dictatorship in Hungary; what
is more, it will not be tolerated by Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia, either."

At the best the prognosis seemed to be that suggested by Walter Lippmann, in his column of Nov. 9, 1956:

Had the Hungarian rebellion succeeded, and had it spread by the contagion of its example, the satellite orbit would almost certainly have not been Titoist and neutral but anti-Communist and anti-Russian.

To a similar effect writes Richard Lowenthal, chief political analyst for the London Observer, in the publication Problems of Communism, issued by the official United States Information Agency, in Washington. Says Mr. Lowenthal:

If the U.S.S.R. had given in, Hungary would have become not a new Poland or a new Yugoslavia but a new Austria or at best a new Finland. To tolerate such a development, as a result of a revolutionary movement against Soviet control, would have started a chain reaction throughout the satellite empire (cited publication, Nov.-Dec. 1958, pp. 8-9).

That what loomed was not another Austria but another Spain intensified the nature of the problem; but however asked the clarity of vision and however distorted the mode of expression, these two conservative but acute observers, Messrs. Lippmann and Lowenthal, are putting their fingers upon the relationship of Hungary to the whole edifice of the defense of the Socialist sector of the world, a matter of decisive significance in the maintenance of world peace.

It is to be borne in mind that by November 1 the Nagy government is, in effect, calling for Western intervention when it is unilaterally denouncing the Warsaw Pact, demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces (and its army is threatening to bomb these forces) and calling upon the Four Great Powers (the USSR one out of four) to supervise its future foreign orientation.

Further, more and more openly the various insurgent radios in Western Europe, are calling, by the morning of November 4, for aid "with force, with soldiers and arms"—to quote "Radio Free Vac."

Thus, too, by November 4, when the re-entry, in force, of Red Army units into Budapest occurs, Istvan Bibo, Smallholder leader and a Minister of State in this final Nagy government, has ready a carefully prepared document. He calls to him John MacCormac, Budapest correspondent of the New York Times, and dictates it. This document was printed in that paper on November 12, 1956 (p. 18). It reads in full, as follows:

In this situation I state that Hungary has no intention of following an anti-Soviet policy. I reject the slander that fascist or anti-Semitic actions have stained the glorious Hungarian revolution. The entire Hungarian nation participated in it, without class or religious discrimination.

It is my conviction that now, when the liberation of East European countries has been almost realized, in this historical moment, the only means by which world peace can be assured is by taking the risk of a world war. On the other hand, deferring the decision endangers the policy of the free world and makes certain the outbreak of a world war at a later date.

As for the first paragraph in Istvan Bibo's statement, I think the data presented in this work up to this point effectively refute it. The Nagy regime, as it moved to the Right, was more and more pursuing an anti-Soviet policy; fascist and anti-Semitic actions—White Terror and pogroms—most certainly did stain the uprising and, I believe the evidence shows, reached the point by November 3, of characterizing the continued violence.

Further, the entire nation did not participate in the uprising. Had the millions actually arisen and actually participated, the event would have been of an altogether different character and duration. At the very least one would have had prolonged and general fighting—major Civil War—rather than very limited, quite sporadic and generally brief fighting. The majority of the working class did not participate in the fighting; they remained rather apathetic, generally suspicious of the leadership at all stages, and increasingly distrustful as that leadership moved further and further to the Right. The mass of the peasantry also did not participate in the fighting and, on the whole, these millions opposed the drift to the Right as this began to challenge the Land Reform Act. Indeed, there were cases of forcible resistance by the peasantry to Arrow-Cross, restorationist and landlord elements as they began more openly to expose themselves beginning with the first of November.

But the second paragraph of Bibo's statement is the substantive one. In that he is calling upon the West to intervene with force—not to defer the decision—and is saying that only this will realize "the policy of the free world." He says in so many words
that this “free world” must now and in Hungary assume the
risks of world war.*

It is to this that Ministers of State in the Nagy government
had come—from the purification of People’s Democracy to an
anti-Soviet world war; from an effort to cleanse Socialism, the
better to assure its growth, to an effort to destroy Socialism—
“liberate the East European countries”—and replace it with a
clerical-fascism.

There remained an alternative in Hungary: A supreme effort
to rebuild a revolutionary party of Marxism-Leninism, born of
personnel tyranny and cleansed by the fires of years of struggle
and terrible days of torment, and calling upon the armed assist-
ance of the Soviet Union to beat back the forces of reaction
and fascism, to throttle the White Terror, preserve intact the Socialist
sector, maintain the defensive system of that sector and eliminate
the danger to world peace of a restorationist Hungary in the
Heart of Europe.

On November 4 was born the supreme effort.

The leaders in this move were Janos Kadar, Antal Apro, Istvan
Kossa, Ferenc Munnich, Gyorgy Marosan, Imre Horvath, Imre
Dogli, and Sandor Ronai. Beginning November 1 these men, and
others, had undertaken the preparation of a movement and pro-
gram and government which would save Socialism in Hungary
and beat back reaction. By November 4—it is likely that the final
clincher was Cardinal Mindszenty’s speech of November 3, with
its open call for the undoing of the basic economic and social
features of the New Hungary and its expression of opposition
even to the Nagy government as then constituted—was announced
the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government. This
was a government born in a struggle against Rakosite error,
rigidity and tyranny and against clerical-fascism. It was a govern-
ment born in a struggle for Socialism, national equality, and the
protection of world peace.

The announcement of the new government was made in a
jointly signed statement, broadcast by Dr. Ferenc Munnich. The
step was taken, said this announcement, “in the face of the ever
growing strength of the counter-revolutionary threat menacing

*It is worth noting that the Democratic Digest, organ of the
Democratic Party, declares, in its issue of February, 1957 (p. 5)
that: “There is little doubt that World War III would have been
launched if armed forces of the West moved into Hungary.”

our People’s Republic, our worker-peasant power, and our social-
ist achievements with extinction.”

Further:

We could no longer stand by idly as members of the Govern-
ment, incapable of action, while under the cover of democracy,
counter-revolutionary terrorists and bandits were bestially mur-
dering our worker and peasant brethren, keeping our peaceful
citizens in terror, dragging our country into anarchy, and putting
our entire nation under the yoke of counter-revolution for a long-
time to come.

Dr. Munnich was followed by Kadar, who elaborated on the
causes for the formation of the new government, and discussed its
program. He saw the mass movement, which culminated in the
October 23rd demonstration and had “the noble aims” of elimi-
nating arbitrariness and illegalities and democratizing Party and
governmental life, vitiated and finally turned into its opposite
by the rising ascendency of reactionary forces, internal and external.
This regressive development had reached the point where all the
“socialist achievements, our people’s state, our worker-peasant
power, and the existence of our country have become threatened.”

After naming the members of the new government, and pledg-
ing in it general to the safeguarding of Socialism, the restor-
ing of peace, the democratization of life, the improvement of living
conditions, the consolidation of full sovereignty and the achieve-
ment of equality in all international relations, Kadar then stated
the Government’s program in fifteen points. These are of such
basic importance and historic interest that they are herewith
quoted in full (a translation was published in the N. Y. Times,
Nov. 5, 1956):

1. The securing of our national independence and our country’s
sovereignty.

2. The protection of our people’s democratic and socialist system
against all attacks. The protection of our socialist achievements
and the guaranteeing of our progress along the road of building
socialism.

3. The ending of fratricidal fighting and the restoration of in-
ternal order and peace. The Government will not tolerate the
persecution of workers under any pretext, for having taken part
in the most recent events.

4. The establishment of close fraternal relations with every
socialist country on the basis of complete equality and non-inter-
ference. The same principle governs our economic relations and
mutual assistance agreements.

5. Peaceful cooperation with every country, irrespective of social
order and form of state.
6. The quick and substantial raising of the living standard of the workers, particularly of the working class. There must be more houses for the workers. Factories and institutes must be enabled to build apartments for their workers and employees.
7. Modification of the Five-Year Plan, the changing of the methods of economic management, taking into consideration the country's capacity so as to raise the population's living standard as quickly as possible.
8. Elimination of bureaucracy and broad development of democracy in the interests of the workers.
9. On the basis of the broadest democracy, worker-management must be realized in factories and enterprises.
10. The development of agricultural production, the abolition of compulsory deliveries and the assisting of individual farmers. The Government will firmly liquidate all acts of law infringement in the field of the cooperatives and demmization.*
11. Securing democratic election of existing administrative bodies and revolutionary councils.
12. Support for retail trade and artisans.
13. The systematic development of Hungarian national culture in the spirit of our progressive traditions.
14. The Hungarian Revolutionary Workers-Peasants Government in the interests of our people, working class, and country, requested the command of the Soviet Army to help our nation in smashing the sinister forces of reaction and restoring order and calm in the country.
15. After the restoration of calm and order the Hungarian Government will begin negotiations with the Soviet Government and with the other participants to the Warsaw Pact about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

* A method of redistributing lands of different owners, so that the land of each owner shall be in fewer parcels or areas.

The Uprising (continued)

main arteries were held; and the infiltration of hostile units or military supplies from across the border was stopped.

While much of the press and other communication media of the West reported sensational stories of major battles, utter devastation and heavy casualties, the truth appears to be that there was nothing approaching a significant battle, devastation was not heavy and casualties were not high. In about fifteen hours practically all organized resistance had ceased; in about a week all armed violence throughout the country was terminated. In terms of the Red Army's stopping the White Terror and the pogroms and rescuing hundreds scheduled for execution, it is likely that as many lives were spared in that week as were taken in the actual fighting. As to the losses which a major civil war would have entailed, this certainly would have run into the scores of thousands. Of the human cost of a major war—let alone World War III—it is better not to speak, for here one would be dealing with casualties in the many millions.

Perhaps the single readily available source, of a non-Communist kind, conveying some sense of the reality, in military terms, of the November 4 commitment of Soviet forces, comes in Peter Schmid's article in Commentary (January, 1957) to which we have referred earlier. By November 6, Schmid "ventured out" in Budapest and "found surprisingly little damage even in the immediate area of the fighting." And, "off on the side streets life was going on much as usual." Schmid "had the impression that the Russian command was taking it easy on Budapest." Further, "the apparent hesitation of the Soviet command to wage an all-out campaign was as nothing compared with the reluctance of the ordinary Russian soldier to slaughter helpless civilians."

These are some of the factors leading Schmid to say that: "Hungarian losses during the actual fighting were so much smaller than the exaggerated estimates that appeared in the world press... I cannot emphasize enough the necessity for discounting the lurid stories about heaps of corpses and blood flowing in the gutters of Budapest with which sensation-hungry journalists filled their dispatches."

Certainly the reports, common from Western news agencies, of 50,000 to 60,000 killed, were altogether exaggerated. Prime Minister Nehru, of India, was reported as having said to the Indian Parliament that a total of about 32,000 Hungarians and Russians had died in the fighting from October 24. This, too,
in the opinion of the present writer, is a considerable over-
estimation.

The Kadar government, in a radio broadcast of December 29,
1956, declared that about 2,000 had died in the Budapest fighting
(exclusive of the White Terror casualties which seem to be al-
together uncertain), but no estimate appears to have been made
of the fatalities outside Budapest—almost certainly these were
considerably lower. Between October 25 and December 1, Budapest
hospitals registered not quite 13,000 wounded persons. This
would coincide with the figure of about 2,000 dead, in terms of
a normal 6 or 7 to 1 ratio between fatal and non-fatal casualties
in modern combat. It is, however, likely that only seriously
wounded were registered for hospital care; this consideration,
plus the absence from the Government figures of the count for
the provinces and the Russian losses—and probably a predisposi-
tion in this case to minimize the losses—makes it seem likely that
perhaps 5,000 to 7,000 were killed and 30,000 to 40,000 wounded
during the Hungarian uprising. Again, we repeat, there seems no
sound way to even approximate the figures for those murdered
or injured as a result of the Terror and the pogroms. Certain
it is that these figures were not small; more than this the evidence
does not, at present, permit.

* * *

It may be useful at this point to offer a very brief summary
of what seem to be the main developments in Hungary since the
termination of hostilities. There is distinct evidence of continuing
efforts at loosening the rigidity of Hungarian society that stemmed
from excessive identification between Party and state. Extreme
centralization of power within the national governmental ap-
paratus is being combatted institutionally by building up local
and regional authority.

Progress towards institutionalizing collective leadership in the
Party, as a protection against excessive personal authority, has
been made, notably in the creation of a 5-member secretariat
and a 5-member control commission, established during the end
of February.

The Government has directed its attention to encouraging the
development of artisan and small-scale private enterprise in the
countryside. In the major factories it is encouraging the develop-
ment of workers' councils (not regional councils) which are to
confine their activities to economic and management questions,
however, and not, in a syndicalist manner, enter into the political
arena.

The Socialist Workers Party reached a membership of 200,000
by early March, 1957. The intent seems to be not to have its
membership increased to the proportions it had reached in 1956.
The majority of the new members enrolled in February were
coal miners.

Agricultural production had been effected very little by the
uprising, since the vast majority of the peasants did not partici-

de in it. In this area, therefore, conditions are not at all criti-
cal. The Kadar government is encouraging a policy of voluntary
cooperatives and of increased state aid, especially in terms of
mechanization and fertilizers. A system providing for the free
sale of farm products is to be developed.

Recovery in industrial production, since December, has been
good. At the same time, this process was marked by severe dif-
ficulties. Part of these difficulties arose from sheer physical
damage, and the necessities of repair; part arose from the persist-
ence of saboteur and assassination attacks, which made the return
to work, in certain cases, dangerous. But most of it sprang from
widespread and thoroughly understandable worker suspicion of
the intentions of the new Government, as well as infection among
some of the workers by reactionary ideology.

Nevertheless, considering all the obstacles, the recovery in in-
dustrial production was quite rapid. Basic to this in Hungary,
is the mining of coal, since coal is the fundamental source of
energy there. On December 19, there were mined 26,500 tons
of coal; on January 9, the total stood at 39,000 tons, or about
half that mined in September, 1956; on January 17th the figure
was 46,000 tons; on January 23 it had reached over 51,000 tons.
The total coal output in the month of February, 1957 came to
about 1,500,000 tons, which meant a daily average roughly 80%
of that of September, 1956. On the basis of the damage to the
mines during the uprising and the general economic dislocation
it produced, the plan for February 1957 had actually called for
about 1,350,000 tons.

Schools, on all levels, including universities, were in full opera-
tion by the beginning of February.

There were evidences, in terms of alterations in uniforms, the
national flag, observance of holidays, educational practices and
curricula, and public pronouncements, of a more enhanced sensi-
tivity to national sentiment and pride in the Kadar government than had been true before.

There remained, without any question, sharp and widespread distrust and caution among large elements of the population.

As of early March, too, there still seemed to exist a considerable estrangement—or, at best, coolness—between the cultural and artistic intelligentsia and the Party and Government. An indication of this was the apparent preference, at least for the time being, of the internationally renowned literary critic and cultural historian, György Lukacs, to remain in Rumania rather than return to Budapest. This still exists as of March, 1957, on the part of Mr. Lukacs, though the Hungarian government has expressed its highest regard for him and its certainty that his activities in the turbulent days of the Nagy government (when he was very briefly Minister of Culture) were undertaken with the noblest possible motives.

The problem of actual security, including the rounding up of hundreds of released criminals and the seeking out of armed terrorists, appears to have been handled efficiently. Repression, considering the sharpness of the counter-revolutionary danger and the ferocity of the White Terror, appears to be characterized by marked moderation; in this respect the reports from Vienna and other West European sources to the contrary seem to be quite false.

Fraternal aid, in money and supplies, especially from the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, has been very substantial, amounting in the aggregate to several hundreds of millions of dollars.

The fullest statement on “most urgent tasks” to come from the Kadar government, so far in 1957, appeared on January 6. This statement stresses “further democratization of state power”; a concentration on enhancing living standards, especially housing conditions, at the earliest possible moment; the democratization of economic management. It emphasized progressive Hungarian national traditions in educational and cultural work; the development of fullest national independence, including in this connection, the question of Soviet troops in Hungary; and the broadening of public life to encompass figures “from different parties” and also specialists in various fields where competence rather than ideology was to be the compelling consideration.

X. Conclusion

The fullest analysis of the sources and nature of the October-November events in Hungary was offered by the provisional Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party in a Resolution issued on December 7, 1956. This statement began with the sentence: “The main forces which brought about the events that started on October 23 are now clear.”

There were, according to this Resolution, four “main forces.” They were:

First: “The deviation from the principles of Marxism-Leninism in Party and state life, as well as in economic life,” by the Rakosi-Gero leadership, from 1949 on. This “deviation” manifested itself in a “sectarian and dogmatic policy, a leadership method which did not tolerate contradiction; and a leadership that was autocratic and bureaucratic.” This policy divided the Party leadership itself; it divided the leadership from the membership; it divided the Party as a whole from the working class, from the peasantry, from the intellectuals. Correction was too slow, especially on the part of this top leadership; even after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU it did not undertake fully and seriously to admit and to rectify “its mistakes and crimes.” The demonstration of October 23 began as one of “deeply embittered Communists and non-Party people”; it was part of the whole effort “for the rectification of these mistakes.”

Second: Elements of the opposition to the top Party leadership, led by Imre Nagy and Geza Losonczy, “played a grave role in the development of events.” In large part their efforts were commendable, but more and more their criticism became completely destructive and began to lose a Party spirit and a Party sense. By the spring of 1956 these elements took their destructive and often exaggerated criticism outside Party ranks, sowing further disunity and confusion. Moreover, in concentrating upon criticism, the Nagy-Losonczy group tended to omit a positive program, thus again confounding confusion. And since all their fire was directed against the Party leadership, it encouraged reactionary elements, from whom, in turn, Nagy and associates did not dissociate themselves.

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Third:

The counter-revolutionary activity of the Horthyites and the old capitalist landowners was a fundamental factor. Their aim was the restoration of the capitalist land-owning system.

Fourth: "International imperialism played a basic and decisive role."

Their aim was to turn the democratic-minded masses against socialism. They sent their advance guards to Hungary in an increasing number even before the October events to carry out subversive work. Their final aim was to foment a new hot-bed of war in Europe.

The Resolution re-affirms that "The majority of the youngsters demonstrating in Budapest on 23 October, in their bitterness over the mistakes and leadership methods of the Rakosi-Gero clique, strove for abolition of the mistakes on the road to building Socialism." This was also true in the provinces; indeed, there, the devotion to Socialism was, if anything, even more complete than in Budapest.

But from the beginning consciously anti-Socialist and ultra-reactionary elements were present and the actual resort to violence, with its highly planned and disciplined mode of execution, was the work of trained counter-revolutionaries. Indeed, "the basic characteristic of the armed (italics added) uprising that started on the 23rd was counter-revolution."

The Nagy government moved further and further to the Right, and finally as open reaction and White Terror became dominant, "it covered and screened it with its name."*

The most concise analysis of the Hungarian uprising was that contained in the joint statement issued in Budapest, January 17, 1957, by the Chinese and Hungarian Government delegations. This statement was signed by the heads of the two delegations: Premier Chou En-lai for China and Premier Janos Kadar for Hungary. Two paragraphs in this statement are directly relevant, and they are given in full:

Imperialist reactionary forces and Hungarian counter-revolutionary elements took advantage of the justified discontent of the laboring people and the youth against serious mistakes committed by former leaders, to carry out their long-planned counter-revolutionary subversive activities aimed at overthrowing the people's democracy and the socialist achievements in Hungary. This turned the course of overcoming mistakes in work among the Hungarian people into a grave struggle between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries, between socialism and fascism and between peace and war.

The Hungarian working people, under the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Government and relying on the assistance of Soviet troops, frustrated the armed riots of the counter-revolutionaries instigated by the imperialist reactionary forces. This defended the cause of Socialism of the Hungarian people, prevented Hungary from becoming a hot-bed of war in Europe and defeated the imperialist attempt to drive a wedge in Hungary with a view to carrying out their conspiracies against the socialist countries.

Prior to offering some observations of my own, I wish to place before the reader a third analysis and estimate of the Hungarian events. These come from Palmiro Togliatti, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Italy. They were made in the course of a speech delivered in Milan on January 20, 1957. Togliatti felt it was clear that exceedingly serious mistakes had been made by the Party leadership in Hungary and that there was not enough speed in their correction. Further, he said, great damage had been done by those who, losing their perspective, attacked the Party as a whole, and even seemed to be attacking Socialism itself and "everything that had been done since the conquest of power in Hungary." As a result of both these factors, disorientation and disintegration befell the Party. And:

It was inevitable that into this confusion would penetrate enemy forces whose aim was not to preserve socialist gains, but even to correct errors committed, but to destroy everything that had been gained and to bring about, yet once more, a reactionary regime, a regime of fascism and war.

In such a situation, Togliatti continued, it was impossible for the Red Army to be idle; how "could (it) watch with indifference a development the consequences of which were clear to all?" Togliatti's fundamental conclusion appears in these sentences:

We recognize that there were serious mistakes which Communists didn't face and correct in time; but it cannot be denied that there in Hungary we found ourselves at a decisive moment in a struggle, perhaps of decisive character, between the forces of reaction and war and those of revolution and peace. When such a conflict opens—and I would like to say this also to our Socialist comrades and to many democrats—the place of the working man, the place of the man of the people and of the democrat who has the sense of revolutionary reality, is on the side of revolution and
not on the side of reaction. And then, when the battle is won, we will continue to debate on the mistakes and on how to correct them. But above all we must not lose the conception of the place of those who fight for Socialism and for peace.

Having examined the evidence, the present writer finds himself in substantial agreement with all three of these views and with the varying emphases that complement rather than contradict each other. Yet this writer would be so bold as to suggest the need for consideration of additional factors, and emphases.

Of very great consequence was the trampling upon national sensitivity which marked the course of events in Hungary, after 1948. This is of such great significance that it requires explicit and extended attention.

It is true that in the joint statement of the Chinese and Hungarian government delegations on January 17, already cited, there is, at another place, at least a reference to the question. This occurs in a passage on the basis of international relations between socialist nations where the point is made that these “must be in accord with the Leninist principle of national equality.” The statement goes on, in a most salutary manner, to remark that “the socialist countries are also independent, sovereign states” and that therefore “mutual relations between them must also be in accord with the Leninist principle of national equality.”

But the point is, so far as the Hungarian events of October-November, 1956 are concerned, that the relations between socialist countries, and specifically between the USSR and Hungary were not, prior to the uprising, in accord with such Leninist principles. It was a momentous, and almost unprecedented advance in Big and Little-Power relations, to find this frankly stated in the Declaration of the Soviet Union of October 30, 1956:

The process of building up the new system and the deep-going revolutionary transformations in social relations met with many difficulties, unsolved problems and direct mistakes, including those in the mutual relations between socialist countries—violations and mistakes which belittled the principle of equal rights in the relations between the socialist states (emphasis added).

It is also a fact that the violations of Hungarian national sensitivity sprang not only from this international blunder, but also from an internal lack of feeling concerning this most delicate question. Janos Kadar, himself, for example, in a speech of November 18, 1956, used very severe language:

I should also say that the ugly subservient and kowtowing measures by which the Rakosi men gravely hurt the national sentiment of our people and which we have now to put an end to, were far from what the Soviet Union and the Soviet people needed. Who needed them were only those servile men who, having divorced themselves from their own people, aspired to extol themselves by subservient copying, and monopolize for themselves the friendship of the Soviet Union for this country.

The program of change announced and now in the process of implementation by the present Hungarian government, proves how consequential errors in this field were. In any examination of the sources of the October events, they need a prominent place.

The errors in this regard, toward Hungary and within Hungary, were part, I think, of a general underestimation of the strength and persistence of nationality feelings, not least in the era of socialism. This is especially true now when the people's conquest of state power expands, rather than diminishes, their national pride, and when this is reinforced by the world-wide colonial and national liberation movements. That such feelings are subject to distortion—especially in a land like Hungary where, in the past, national feeling was so misused by reactionary and aggressive ruling classes—by agents of the bourgeoisie only increases the need for extreme care in dealing with this question by adherents of Socialism.

In addition, there is need to probe more fully into the sources of the mistakes which it is unanimously emphasized were committed by the Rakosi leadership, and into the reasons why their correction was so difficult—or to put it another way, their hold was so tenacious.

Here, once again, it is necessary to observe that the nature of those errors—rigidity, bureaucracy, resort to illegal methods—was widespread in the Socialist sector. It was, as we now know, present in the Soviet Union. This surely, is a source of the errors of the Rakosi leadership, which, in the altogether different circumstances of Hungary, adopted or copied the worst of the arbitrariness that had made its appearance in the USSR. The damage this caused in the infinitely stronger and very much more mature Soviet Union is acknowledged by all to have been great; in small Hungary, just beginning its Socialist development, this arbitrariness and resort to methods of repression and illegality was disastrous.

Now, most certainly, the source of this aberration is imperialism. And by this, we do not mean imperialist conspiracies and spies and saboteurs. These conspiracies and this internationally organized apparatus most certainly exist—on a scale hitherto un-
preceded in world history. I have in earlier pages tried to show it in all its infamy and enormous scope.

But it is important to note that this apparatus of counter-revolution, with its billions of dollars per year, constitutes only one manifestation of the policy and strategy of imperialism—the destruction of Socialism. It is in this sense that the system of imperialism—which encompasses its apparatus of reactionary terror and subversion—is at the root of many of the difficulties, excesses, aberrations and evidences of fanaticism that have so far marred the building of Socialism. More important than the CIA’s annual billion dollars, is the 50 billion dollars appropriated for arms yearly by the United States. More important than the saboteurs sent to East Europe, are the 25 additional air bases now being built in West Germany at a cost of $375,000,000 (N. Y. Times, Jan 7, 1957). More important than the Western efforts to assassinate Communist leaders, is Secretary of State Dulles’ calm announcement that “U. S. forces almost everywhere are equipped with atomic weapons” (A. P. dispatch from Canberra, March 13, 1957). More important than the filthy shenanigans of Allen Dulles and his partner, the Nazi chief saboteur, Reinhard Gehlen, is the announcement that Gen. Hans Speidel ("scholarly soldier," the N. Y. Times delightedly calls him) who was in charge of the Nazis’ occupation of France during World War II, is now Commander of Allied Land Forces in Central Europe (N. Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1957), and that Gen. Adolf Heusinger, formerly Operations Chief of Hitler’s General Staff, is now in charge of the Armed Forces Department of West Germany (N. Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1957).

These are facts—and there are a thousand more like them. They show the policy of Western imperialism to be reactionary, aggressive, brutal and war-like. They are buttressed by acts, by deeds, from the policy of remilitarizing West Germany and Japan, to propping up Franco, from destroying democratic governments in British Guiana and Guatemala, to warring upon Egypt and Algeria.

In terms of what one is dealing with and what kind of a world is the “free world,” one may glance at the less publicized of its continuous acts of atrocity. Here, for example, is an item in the N. Y. Times of November 8, 1956, telling of “a strange war” which “the outside world ignores.” It is the war of repression waged by servitors of American imperialism now looting the nation of Colombia. And stuck away in this item is the President’s remark to the Times newspaper man “that more than 100,000 civilians and soldiers have been killed since the civil war erupted in 1949.” That’s over one hundred thousand killed in a nation whose total population comes to less than twelve millions. This is one of the “minor” illegalities (shall we say?), in “a forgotten war” in a side alley of Wall Street.

And when it comes to “illegality” as a whole, one must bear in mind the essential character of law in a capitalist society—i. e., the maintenance of capitalism. There are differences among capitalist countries; there are democratic rights, most of them won from the bourgeoisie through mass struggle and more or less implemented, depending upon time and place and circumstance, but always and everywhere precious. Yet basically, the great American journalist and crusader, Henry Demarest Lloyd, expressed the nature of bourgeois law, half a century ago, when he said apropos of political prisoners: “The bird of freedom has always been a jail bird”; and when he said of law enforcement in general: “Only the rich can get justice, only the poor cannot escape it.”

It is pressures from this kind of a system which is a basic source of the difficulties experienced in building Socialism. He who ignores or minimizes this—who does not estimate it at its full and overwhelming significance—does not comprehend the world today, neither capitalist nor socialist nor neutralist, neither imperialistic nor colonial.

This is the central foe of adherents of Socialism, the source of basic contradictions in today’s world. But it is not the sole source of the aberrations and illegalities and mistakes marking the rise of Socialism. In addition are vestiges of capitalism within Socialist societies, the extreme difficulties of making an unprecedented social transformation, limitations in personnel, and profound psychological problems hardly stated, much less solved as yet. In addition, there is the whole problem of power per se, of its own logic, its own energy to distort and to corrupt.

All these forces played a part in bringing on the Hungarian events of 1956.

What is required is the institutionalizing of the right to dissent. What is needed is the institutionalizing of the protection of the full legal rights of each citizen. Inquiry and challenge is the energy of science. If it is stifled or inhibited—let alone punished—dogma flourishes and science withers. As Emerson said in “The American Scholar” written in 1837, under such pressures "love of
the hero corrupts into worship of his statue... the book becomes noxious; the guide is a tyrant."

Confidence in legal procedure; knowledge of that procedure and its absolute and unconditional inviolability are necessary for the fullest flowering of Socialist democracy and are of the essence of the multiple features of proletarian rule.

Further, what is required is a dedication to humaneness—in personal and official relations and in conduct. The contrary—
the gruff, imperious, insensitive official—is the creation of class-exploiting societies and must not be tolerated within the State or Party apparatus where Socialism is the objective. This must be guaranteed not in words, but in practices and in standard procedures of inquiry, where the fullest encouragement is given to the voice of the people—who, after all, are confronted by such officials.

The problem of technical proficiency, of expert skill, of real mastery is another essential in Socialist life and construction. Reliability will not replace knowledge; nothing replaces knowledge. Those in charge of guiding art and letters, medicine and education, cattle-raising and steel-making, must be, in the first place, acknowledged everywhere as expert in these particular areas.

The question of improved living conditions requires the highest priority. Socialism exists in order to make life better, in all respects. Without security there is no socialism; without defense against imperialism there would long since have been no socialism. This is true; but it is also true, especially now, that the building of Socialism must mean to the vast majority of the people participating in it, a steady, visible and undeniable improvement in their living conditions.

The events of the past confirm the strength of socialism. In forty years socialism has become the system of one-third of humanity. During that period the speed and scope of the rise of the Soviet Union have been without equal in world history. It was the Socialist Soviet Union which withstood the supreme test and saved humanity by crushing Nazism in World War II.

This strength is being confirmed today in the process of growth; of democratization and purification. This is a Communist process and it is going on within Socialist societies because such societies cannot tolerate misleadership and injustice, because

Socialism, unlike capitalism, is by nature dedicated to humane, just, ennobling works.*

Thus, even in Hungary, where errors were most severe, the mass of people wanted Socialism—purified and in line with their own national needs and backgrounds. The reactionaries, the White Terrorists, the pogromists, were the minority. This is always true in counter-revolution; it is part of its definition. In Hungary it was not a matter of imposing Socialism by a gun; it was a question of preventing the violent overthrow of Socialism, so that in pursuit of the will of the vast majority of Hungarians, their Socialist order may be cleansed, and rejuvenated.

The danger of imperialist adventures—such as were successfully met in Hungary—persists and will persist as long as imperialism. Can anything be clearer than the remark, made in January, 1957, by Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in Eden's Cabinet, that "Hungary has shown the occasions and the opportunities of which no one would have dared to dream some time ago," and that, therefore:

Might it not be possible for NATO to furnish in secret arms to patriots, not only in Hungary, but also to the other satellites? Such diversions, added to a strengthening of the ranks of the allies, will permit NATO to resume the initiative in the Cold War.**

So long as imperialism exists, their distinguished statesmen will have such dreams. This does not exempt those of us who live in imperialist lands, but despise the policy of their rulers, to struggle against the realization of such dreams. On the contrary, this makes that responsibility all the more urgent. Specifically, in the United States, the scandalous, illegal and atrocious conduct of the whole CIA apparatus, the "black propaganda" program, the VOA and RFE recklessness, and the whole strategy of "liberation" on the one hand and maintenance of the status quo on the other—which are but two hands engaged in a single reactionary operation—should be vigorously condemned. Given sufficient effort and organizational know-how, significant sections of this policy could be undone in a short time.

*On November 1, 1956, the West German paper, Die Stimme der Gemeinde (the Rev. Martin Niemoller is one of its editors) said: "The Communist states in the East, the so-called People's Democracies are going through a process of renovation... This process is no symptom of decline... the changes in the People's Democracy had the sanction and approval of Moscow."

THE TRUTH ABOUT HUNGARY

In opposing imperialism in its every manifestation at home and abroad, lies the greatest single contribution that the American Left could offer to the purifying and strengthening of world socialism, to the cause of world peace, to the welfare of their own people, and to the rebuilding of its own strength.

* * *

I take leave of my reader with two quotations. One, of some length, is from Lenin; the other, quite brief, comes from Chu Teh. The first occurs in Lenin’s *Letter to American Workers*, which he wrote in August, 1918, when the commercial press of the world was denouncing him, his Party and the Revolution he was leading:

Let the kept bourgeoisie press howl to the whole world about each mistake made by our revolution. We are not afraid of our mistakes. Men have not become saints because the revolution has begun. The toiling classes, oppressed and downtrodden for centuries and forced into the clutches of poverty, savagery and ignorance, cannot be expected to bring about a revolution flawlessly. And the cadaver of bourgeoisie society… cannot be nailed in a casket and buried. Defeated capitalism is dying and rotting around us, polluting the air with germs and poisoning our lives, grasping the new, the fresh, the young and the live with thousands of threads and bords of the old, the rotten, the dead.

For every hundred mistakes of ours heralded to the world by the bourgeoisie and its lackeys… there are 10,000 great and heroic deeds, the greater and the more heroic for their simplicity… performed by men who are not used to (and who do not have the opportunity to) herald their achievements to the world.

But even if the contrary were true—although I know this supposition to be incorrect—even if there were 10,000 mistakes for every 100 correct actions of ours, even in that case our revolution would be great and invincible, and so it will be in the eyes of world history, because for the first time not the minority, not only the rich, not only the educated, but the real masses, the vast majority of toilers are themselves building a new life, are deciding by their own experience the most difficult problems of Socialist organization.

Anthony Nutting spoke of imperialism’s “secret arms.” Socialism has a secret weapon, too; it is the weapon which makes valid Lenin’s claim of invincibility.

Agnes Smedley, in her splendid book, *The Great Road*, quotes Chu Teh, Chinese Communist leader, on this secret weapon:

All our forces and power come from the people. All our ways and means are created by the people. Relying on the power of the people we have defeated the enemy and overcome every difficulty. We have only one secret weapon—complete unity with the people.